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How do non-governmental actors exert power beyond the confines of nation-states? Examining the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) and its network of European foreign policy 
elites, I argue that non-governmental actors developed transnational political agendas in part to 
counter the democratizing and social shifts of the early twentieth century. Throughout the interwar 
period the CEIP emerged as a key participant in cultural internationalism by providing financial and 
logistical aid for transnational outreach. Well connected to social elites in several countries, the 
CEIP’s emergence illustrates how internationalism was inexorably structured by economic, social and 
cultural capital. As formerly marginalized social groups—e.g. women, organized labor and ethnic 
minorities—became more integrated into national decision-making processes, traditional elites began 
to erect new barriers around transnational spaces to preserve existing power structures. Rather than 
constituting the formation of an emancipatory “transnational civil society,” the transnationalization 
of politics emerged as a technique for curtailing social movements.  
 
The project investigates how the CEIP fostered the construction, transformation and circulation of 
expertise among the technical experts who in the wake of the First World War were becoming 
increasingly central to the making of foreign policy. Starting in the mid-1920s, the foundation 
promoted networking between economists, international lawyers and other specialists who staffed 
foreign ministries and international organizations such as the League of Nations or the Permanent 
Court of International Justice. The CEIP used these connections and the power of the purse to 
stimulate the development of professional communities with the ultimate goal of reaching policy 
consensus on the divisive issues of the time. These agreements—styled as “scientific” or 
“objective”—then formed the basis of a CEIP-funded educational campaign for a liberal, yet 
hierarchical, global order in the United States, Europe and Latin America, particularly among highly 
educated elites. 
 
This attempt to construct an “international mind” faltered with the beginning of the Second World 
War. Yet, tracing the careers of CEIP-connected experts into the post-war planning projects, the thesis 
ultimately challenges “creationist” narratives of international financial, human rights and security 
regimes after 1945. Many of the international policies implemented in the second half of the 1940s 
had largely been developed in an environment that bore little resemblance to the de facto power 
constellation of the early Cold War. Instead of representing a clean break with a failed past, they were 
legacies of an attempt to make the world safe for a return to the liberal capitalist order that had marked 
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“In each country there are one or a few dozen men who feel closer to certain inhabitants of other 
states than to the rest of their fellow countrymen,” José Ortega y Gasset wrote in 1926 to describe the 
internationalist movement of his time.1 While the years between the two world wars were an era of 
widespread nationalism and international instability, they also witnessed one of the great movements 
toward international cooperation. Terms such as “intellectual cooperation” and “moral disarmament” 
proliferated in public speeches and in the pages of learned publications. The Spanish philosopher 
ascribed this movement to a spontaneous surge of intellectual convergence, “without any action or 
even purposeful propaganda.” It was a romantic notion of detached intellectualism that bore, however, 
little resemblance to the tangible logistical challenges of a field that thrived on cross-border travel, 
communication and organization.  At its heart was a transnational support structure that provided 
organizational and financial resources and fostered “something akin to an international cartel, 
cultivated by visits and the exchange of personnel and publications” between institutions, as Alfred 
Vagts of Hamburg’s Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP) later remembered.2 As Vagts knew well, 
most organizations working in this field—whether peace societies or academic institutions—sooner 
or later reached out to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), America’s sole 
philanthropic foundation dedicated exclusively to furthering international understanding. It was a 
mechanism Vagts was closely familiar with, having himself managed a CEIP-financed program in 
Hamburg during the 1920s.  
 
Originally founded in 1910 by Scottish-American industrialist and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie 
to hasten “the speedy abolition of international war between so-called civilized nations,”3 the CEIP 
rose to prominence after the First World War when, under the leadership of Columbia University 
President Nicholas Murray Butler, it embarked on a global campaign to spread what it called an 
“international mind,” an undertaking the foundation pursued with particular vigor through its Centre 
Européen in Paris. To his contemporaries, Butler appeared as “a kind of permanent American 
ambassador” to Europe, whose annual transatlantic trips were watched closely for news of the latest 
political developments. The foundation was held in similarly high esteem in the Old World, where 
the Norwegian Nobel Committee, which awarded Butler its Peace Price in 1931, lauded the president 
                                                 
1 José Ortega y Gasset, “Kosmopolitismus,” Die Neue Rundschau 37, no. 2 (1926): 2. 
2 Alfred Vagts, “Erinnerungen an Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy,” n.d., p. 13, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy 
Collection, LBI. 
3 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Year Book 2 (1912), 3.  
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for pursuing the cause of peace with “superhuman strength and untiring energy.”4 During the 1920s, 
the German government worked from the assumption that CEIP reports were “passed from hand to 
hand among the President, Congress and the administration” where they were allegedly “considered 
gospel truth.”5 Even many critics furthered the narrative of the foundation’s legendary clout, holding 
Butler and the CEIP’s board of East Coast business and financial luminaries to form an “irresistible 
directorate” of the moneyed elites, an “invisible government” that foisted its own foreign policy views 
on the country.6 Journalist Carleton Beals discovered the extent of this far-reaching reputation for 
influence during his travels in Mexico. Stopped by the police without his papers, he ceremoniously 
handed over his Columbia University diploma bearing Butler’s signature: “The gendarme promptly 
drew himself up, saluted, turned on his heel and went out.”7 
 
With the passing of time, such outsized interpretations of the CEIP’s commanding authority collided 
with the more prosaic record of its actual achievements. Already some of Butler’s contemporaries 
had questioned the innovative value of the president’s countless public pronouncements—a 1934 
bibliography of his speeches and articles ran over four hundred pages.8 A close European collaborator 
later accused him of having “cautiously avoided anything that smacked of originality.”9 As successive 
generations of historians examined the archival records of foreign ministries, they mostly looked in 
vain for the kind of decisive personal interventions by Butler or his fellow CEIP directors that 
contemporary supporters and critics alike had always suspected. The one major international 
agreement that Butler’s foundation could reasonably point to as a direct result of its efforts—the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 outlawing wars of aggression—was ultimately widely regarded as a 
failure, a manifestation of internationalists’ naïve faith in moral progress.10 A scathing assessment by 
one of the Carnegie Endowment’s sister foundations in 1941 judged that it was precisely such 
attempts at amateur diplomacy, the relentless “concentration of interest and energy on haute 
politique” that had rendered it largely ineffective.11 Thus reevaluated, the CEIP president was 
posthumously transformed into a caricature of a snobbish poseur, a water-carrier for moneyed 
                                                 
4 Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, “Nicholas Murray Butler: A Portrait of a Reactionary,” The American Mercury, March 1935, 
288; Address of Halvdan Koht, 12 December 1931, Box 6, Nicholas Murray Butler Papers, RBML Columbia. 
5 Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff to Bülow, 16 October 1925, R 53703, Bd. 1, PA-AA. 
6 Jennings C. Wise, Woodrow Wilson: Disciple of Revolution (New York: The Paisley Press, 1938), 80; Remarks by 
George H. Tinkham, Congressional Record, 3 February 1933, vol. 76, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, 3337–3339. 
7 Carleton Beals, Glass Houses: Ten Years of Free-Lancing (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1938), 95. 
8 Cf. Milton Halsey Thomas, Bibliography of Nicholas Murray Butler, 1872–1932: A Check List (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1934). 
9 Moritz Julius Bonn, So macht man Geschichte: Bilanz eines Lebens (Munich: List, 1953), 295. 
10 See especially Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1952), 264–265. 
11 “FPK Notes for Talk with Eliot Wadsworth in Washington,” 30 December 1941, Series III.A, Box 73, Folder 3, 
Carnegie Corporation Records, RBML Columbia; emphasis in original. 
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interests, a “pompous old guy”12 whose illusions of grandeur were unmatched by substance. The flip-
side of the fame of his living years, Butler’s biographer Michael Rosenthal notes, was “instant 
oblivion” after death.13  
 
These conflicting assessments of the CEIP’s impact point to the larger question of how non-
governmental actors affect change in the international system. In this thesis I argue that the CEIP’s 
outreach to Europe was part of the transnationalization of politics in the early twentieth century at a 
time when the challenges facing societies were increasingly global but politics increasingly national.14 
The First World War had overthrown many of the formal and informal institutions that had shaped a 
globalizing world since the mid-nineteenth century. Governments now asserted unprecedented 
control over their populations and territories, dividing the world along hardened and often newly 
drawn borders and hindering the activities of existing non-governmental organizations which had in 
the past assisted in international coordination. Yet, the problems societies faced at the time were often 
part of developments that went well beyond the state-level: the impact of industrialization on labor 
relations, ethnic conflicts, changing gender roles. Activists consequently began to seek out allies in 
other states to help realize their hopes and aspirations, creating a diverse landscape of transnational 
activism.  
 
This movement was not exclusive to those seeking sweeping changes to national and international 
institutions. Instead, I will argue that the technique of seeking consensus and coordinating action 
beyond the confines of national political processes was at least partially a counter-movement to the 
democratization and social shifts of the early twentieth century. During the interwar period the CEIP 
was closely aligned with traditional elites on both sides of the Atlantic that opposed the new 
nationalist particularism but also a social-reformist internationalism they considered radical and 
destabilizing. Starting in the 1920s, the foundation initiated or financed exclusive programs and 
institutions designed to foster cross-border negotiation and consensus formation among liberal policy 
elites. The “international mind” of the academics, civil servants and technical experts informing state 
                                                 
12 Donald A. Krueckeberg, “Between the Housers and the Planners: The Recollections of Coleman Woodbury, Recorded 
and Edited by Donald A Krueckeberg,” in The American Planner: Biographies and Recollections, ed. Donald A. 
Krueckeberg (New York: Methuen, 1983), 331. 
13 Michael Rosenthal, Nicholas Miraculous: The Amazing Career of the Redoubtable Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 461. 
14 I employ a definition of the “transnational” that appears to be increasingly gaining consensus status in the field: 
interactions, connections or transfers involving multiple actors of which at least one is not a national government, 
while not implying that the effects necessarily destabilized the nation, cf. Daniel Laqua, Internationalism 
Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 2; Patricia 
Clavin, “Time, Manner, Place: Writing Modern European History in Global, Transnational and International 
Contexts,” European History Quarterly 40, no. 4 (2010): 624–640; Kiran Klaus Patel, “Überlegungen zu einer 
transnationalen Geschichte,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 52 (2004): 626–645. 
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action would compensate for the lack of official cooperation between governments. Despite the 
foundation’s persistent protestations of political neutrality this bid to create informal, technocratic 
governance mechanisms was not an apolitical development. As formerly marginalized groups such 
as women, advocates of organized labor and ethnic minorities became more and more integrated into 
national decision-making processes, erecting new barriers around transnational spaces promised to 
preserve existing social institutions. 
 
Viewing the international history of the interwar period from the perspective of the Carnegie 
Endowment’s networks illustrates the limits of both a state-centered diplomatic history perspective 
and of a transnational “history from below”-approach that has marked many recent studies of the field 
of interwar internationalism. For one, the CEIP’s network of foreign policy elites destabilizes notions 
of the state as a unitary actor. Diplomatic realism holds that nation states, represented by diplomats 
and foreign ministries, act in accordance with the national interest and that interwar internationalists 
(or “idealists”) erred in confusing politics with morality, imagining a world of state autonomy 
bounded by international norms and institutions.15 Yet, a closer look at the genesis of various policy 
solutions during the interwar years indicates the process by which the “national interest” was itself a 
construct, produced in social interactions that often included foreign partners. Starting in the mid-
1920s the CEIP specialized in fostering networks between newly-formed foreign policy institutions 
in the United States and in Europe such as the Council on Foreign Relations in New York or the 
Institut des Hautes Études Internationales in Paris. It sponsored the exchange of personnel and 
publications and helped build community institutions, such as the Hague Academy of International 
Law and the Geneva Institute of International Affairs, which served as platforms for debate, 
coordination and identity formation among groups of transnationally connected experts. With 
growing nationalism in the wake of the Great War threatening a lasting fragmentation of the 
international system, liberal elites allied with the CEIP hoped that the “international mind” binding 
international lawyers, economists, businessmen and other specialists could further global governance 
by informing official diplomacy.  
 
Naturally, not everyone with visions for an equitable world order was invited to participate, making 
                                                 
15 For the realist critique of interwar activists see esp. the seminal Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–
1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan and Co., 1939); Hans Joachim 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1948); for a reassessment 
of the “realist” vs. “idealist” dichotomy see David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: 
Inter-War Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Andreas Osiander, “Rereading Early Twentieth-
Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited,” International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 3 (September 1998): 409–32; Brian 
C. Schmidt, “On the History and Historiography of International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, 
ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 3–22. 
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this inherently a story about exclusion—specifically of Socialists, women’s rights activists, Christian 
pacifists and anti-colonial reformers. Indeed, one of the key motivating factors animating the 
transnational outreach of liberal elites during the tumultuous interwar years was the belief that the 
world teetered on the cusp of revolutionary upheaval, which threatened to overturn existing social, 
cultural and ethnic hierarchies. Containing what traditional elites considered “radical” change and 
making the world safe for a return to the liberal capitalist order that had marked the long nineteenth 
century would require intellectual leadership on a global level. The “strongest weapon” in this fight 
against radicalism, CEIP director James T. Shotwell told an audience of East Coast luminaries in 
1921, was “knowledge under control.”16  
 
In emphasizing this social and ideological context, I depart from many recent studies of interwar 
internationalism and global activism more broadly by viewing the transnational field as inexorably 
structured by the power derived from economic, social and cultural capital. I argue that the 
proliferation of non-governmental actors did not herald the emergence of a “transnational civil 
society” in the sense of a Habermasian public sphere, removed from and subversive of existing power 
structures and creating a reservoir of action for those without a voice in the traditional diplomatic 
process.17 Transnational coalition-building was not exclusively or even predominantly a tool of the 
marginalized and a catalyst for progressive reform.18 As the CEIP’s utilization of links to financial 
and political elites in several countries demonstrates, the transnationalization of politics could thrive 
on and, indeed, perpetuate power. 
 
The attempt to stabilize the international system through elite networking clearly failed in the short 
run, as neither the CEIP nor the “international mind” of its liberal allies were able to prevent Europe 
from once again entangling the world in a global conflict. Nevertheless, the body of knowledge 
                                                 
16 James T. Shotwell, Intelligence and Politics (New York: The Century Co., 1921), 21. 
17 A number of recent approaches—e.g. cultural internationalism, transnational civil society or transcultural history—
share this essentially normative approach, cf. Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Eckhardt Fuchs and Matthias Schulz, “Globalisierung und transnationale 
Zivilgesellschaft in der Ära des Völkerbundes: Zur Einführung,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 54, no. 10 
(2006): 837–39; Jürgen Kocka acknowledges that “civil society” is an inherently normative concept but argues that 
that is “more an opportunity than a burden,” cf. Jürgen Kocka, “Civil Society from a Historical Perspective,” European 
Review 12, no. 1 (2004): 68; Madeleine Herren suggests that mapping non-governmental groups in the orbit of the 
League of Nations may point the way toward a “history of subaltern diplomacy,” cf. Madeleine Herren, Martin Rüesch, 
and Christiane Sibille, Transcultural History: Theories, Methods, Sources (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 139. 
18 The tendency of transnational history to neglect the dimension of power has i.a. been criticized by Patel, “Überlegungen 
zu einer transnationalen Geschichte,” 631–632; Daniel Rodgers, “Bearing Tales: Networks and Narratives in Social 
Policy Transfer,” Journal of Global History 9, no. 2 (2014): 304; Clavin, “Time, Manner, Place,” 628–629; Arnd 
Bauerkämper, “Ambiguities of Transnationalism: Fascism in Europe between Pan-Europeanism and Ultra-
Nationalism, 1919–39,” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London 29, no. 2 (2007): 66; see also Anne-
Isabelle Richard, “Competition and Complementarity: Civil Society Networks and the Question of Decentralizing the 
League of Nations,” Journal of Global History 7, no. 2 (2012): 233–56. 
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produced by transnational expert communities during the interwar years endured and soon provided 
the bedrock for a reconstruction of global order. My research shows that many features of the new 
form of post-1945 institutionalized global governance—its emphasis on commercial liberalism and 
its hierarchical structure, for instance—can be traced back to technical discussions that took place 
years or decades earlier, frequently under the auspices of American foundations. Furthermore, the 
CEIP’s interwar activism produced a new technique of transnational coordination that would prove a 
lasting innovation. When in the nationalist atmosphere of the 1930s the public legitimacy of 
international solutions reached its nadir, the Carnegie Endowment began to follow up on its 
transnational policy forums with education campaigns aimed at stripping policies of the “taint” of 
internationalism. From the CEIP-financed National World Court Committee in the United States in 
the early 1930s to Carlo Sforza’s campaign for a Franco-Italian customs union in the 1940s—activists 
learned to ease the adoption of internationalist policies by reframing them as authentic expressions 
of a country’s national character. Constructing policy agreement beyond the confines of national 
political systems and reintegrating the results as the favored position of national interest groups thus 
became a mechanism for shaping domestic as well as international institutions. 
 
 
Global governance in times of crisis: the historical context 
Tracing this process, and the CEIP’s role within it, entails de-centering our understanding of what 
constitutes mainstream or “common sense” solutions in international politics. The liberal program 
advocated by the foundation and its partners—free trade, collective security, cultural 
internationalism—may seem unremarkable today but was at the time often a minority position in the 
larger clash of ideologies. No international public opinion data exists for the interwar period but there 
can be little doubt that a poll conducted in 1920—among, for instance, cotton farmers in the American 
South, small-scale manufacturers from the Loire, steelworkers from the Ruhr and bankers from the 
City of London—would have found much more diverse views on which policies were best suited to 
provide peace and prosperity in a globalizing world than the same survey conducted thirty years later. 
This was especially true where liberal internationalist solutions advocated by the foundation entailed 
significant adoption risks: as many critics pointed out, being the first country to reduce armaments or 
the first market to open its borders to cheap global imports could expose a society to great harm if 
others did not follow suit. Breaking this interwar prisoner’s dilemma required a broader acceptance 
of similar visions of global order among most major countries. The story told in this study is thus less 
one of inventing new policies than of “making” certain ideas conventional across different polities. 
When contemporary critics noted that, compared to other philanthropic enterprises such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Brookings Institution, the CEIP’s contributions to public debates 
11 
 
lacked intellectual ambition and academic rigor,19 these shortcomings were very much a function of 
its priorities: not generating new knowledge but distributing the “right” ideas, building coalitions and 
brokering compromise between existing concepts was the foundation’s chief concern. 
 
Specifically, I trace the rise of the CEIP’s networks during the interwar years to a conjunction of four 
historical developments that marked the national and international histories of the interwar years and 
that will be referred to frequently throughout the narrative: a crisis of liberalism that particularly 
affected elites, competition between multiple visions of globalization, a gap in global governance 
during the interwar period and the rising role of technical expertise in the making of foreign policy: 
 
The interwar crisis of liberalism. The CEIP’s main constituency was a transatlantic liberal milieu that 
experienced the First World War and its aftermath as a disorienting breakdown of social order, both 
nationally and internationally. Many of the foundation’s partners were closely linked to a 
cosmopolitan, nineteenth century, liberal governing consensus embodied by such institutions as 
France’s Parti Radical, the British Reform Club or the Republican Party in the American Northeast 
that struggled to find answers to many contemporary challenges:20 democratization, urbanization, 
woman suffrage, diversification of populations through migration, etc. Traditional political liberalism 
was steadily losing ground at the polls to challengers on the left and on the right, while the Russian 
Revolution and short-lived Soviet republics in Germany, Hungary and Italy served as constant 
reminders of the possibility of even greater, revolutionary change.21 Interpreting recent global events 
as part of a general rebellion against the established order, this milieu tended to be equally skeptical 
of international change. Rather than embracing the Wilsonian program of national self-determination, 
European economic and imperial liberals and many of the American East Coast elites associated with 
the Endowment worried about the effects of tampering with existing international hierarchies between 
rulers and ruled. Against this backdrop, the CEIP’s transnational networking fit within a pattern of 
old-guard liberal intellectuals, politicians and international businessmen seeking contacts with like-
minded partners in other countries. By negotiating compromise positions between conceptions of 
                                                 
19 E.g. the Carnegie Corporation spoke disparagingly of the CEIP’s “[s]econd-rate international law program,” cf. “FPK 
Notes for Talk with Eliot Wadsworth in Washington,” 30 December 1941, Series III.A, Box 73, Folder 3, Carnegie 
Corporation Records, RBML Columbia; on the larger field of American scientific philanthropy, esp. John Krige and 
Helke Rausch, eds., American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012); Katharina Rietzler, “Experts for Peace: Structures and Motivations of Philanthropic 
Internationalism in the Interwar Years,” in Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements 
between the World Wars, ed. Daniel Laqua (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 45–65. 
20 The concept of a “crisis of classical modernity” was originally applied to interwar German society by Detlev Peukert, 
cf. Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity, trans. Richard Deveson (London: Allen 
Lane, 1991), 275–276. 
21 Cf. Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1999); Zara Steiner, The 
Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919–1933 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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liberalism on both sides of the Atlantic they were hoping to work toward the preservation of a global 
order they had come to regard as synonymous with progress and “civilization.” 
 
Contested globalization. Closely intertwined with economic liberals on Wall Street and with 
American political circles, it would seem natural to connect the CEIP’s promotion of internationalism 
with the country’s emergence as a global power and with the gradual decline of American 
“isolationism.”22 Within the larger context of transnational activism at the time, however, such clear 
categories provide only limited utility. Outreach beyond national borders was a strategy pursued by a 
range of actors with diverse social backgrounds and political leanings, including nationalists and even 
fascists. In 1921, a League of Nations handbook of international non-governmental organizations 
listed over three hundred associations with diverse social backgrounds and political leanings, from 
the International Colonial Institute to the Anti-slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, from the 
International Chamber of Commerce to the International Congress of Working Women.23 
Globalization—the rise of integrated markets and technology which brought countries ever-closer—
had become a widely recognized process by the turn of the century, and even the First World War had 
merely temporarily diverted global flows rather than changed the direction of the process.24 The 
debates of the 1920s and 1930s were less a confrontation between “internationalists” and 
“nationalists”/“isolationists” but a competition between different visions of a global polity and the 
balance between national and international authority.25 Open questions related to real or perceived 
trade-offs between national welfare and global stability, between the ongoing legacy of imperialism 
and a universal right to national self-determination, between a democratic and a hierarchical world 
order. Was the way of the future a workers’ international, a harmonious coexistence of equal and 
                                                 
22 On what is often called the “first wave” of globalization see esp. Christopher A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 
1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); Jürgen Osterhammel, 
The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014). 
23 Cf. League of Nations, Handbook of International Organisations (associations, bureaux, committees., etc.) (Geneva: 
League of Nations Secretariat, 1921); cf. Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism, 63  
24 Cf. Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century 
Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 1–4; Frank Ninkovich, Global Dawn: The Cultural 
Foundations of American Internationalism, 1865–1890 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 19–22; 
Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, 
ACLS Humanities E-Book (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 20–21; see also Martin H. Geyer and 
Johannes Paulmann, “Introduction: The Mechanics of Internationalism,” in The Mechanics of Internationalism: 
Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War, ed. Martin H Geyer and Johannes Paulmann 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3–4. 
25 Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 3; 
Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, “Introduction: Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments 
and Movements, 1880s–1930s,” in Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–
1930s, ed. Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), esp. 5–7; Daniel 
Laqua, “Democratic Politics and the League of Nations: The Labour and Socialist International as a Protagonist of 
Interwar Internationalism,” Contemporary European History 24, no. 2 (2015): 175–92. 
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largely autarchic colonial empires, a world federation or a loosely organized set of nation states?26 
What advocates for a liberal internationalism such as the CEIP decried as “isolationism” were 
oftentimes concepts based on patently different notions of whose rights, whose freedoms and whose 
values should be enshrined in global political, economic and judicial regimes.27 
 
The interwar governance gap. Most of the CEIP’s officers and European associates had grown up 
during the second half of the nineteenth century, in an era marked by an increasingly global circulation 
of goods, capital and ideas. This “first phase of globalization” was based on a pax britannica during 
which the institutions of the British Empire—the Royal Navy, the Bank of England—were widely 
recognized, however grudgingly, as essential to preserving international stability.28 Already showing 
signs of fragility before 1914, this system of informal global governance did not survive the war, 
calling into question the future of global flows and movements. Formal, multilateral institutions such 
as the League of Nations could have filled this gap, but there was no automatic mechanism for 
implementing the results of discussion taking place at Geneva and elsewhere into national policy. 
Furthermore, the United States and the Soviet Union—two crucial states—were initially missing 
altogether from the League’s membership roll. The insufficiency of global institutions became even 
more apparent throughout the 1930s when states were unable to formulate a coordinated response to 
the Great Depression and the League of Nations failed to present a united front against German, 
Japanese and Italian acts of aggression. Taken together, these events illustrated a gap in formal 
governance which encouraged non-governmental actors such as the CEIP to fill the void, hoping that 
informal, transnational deliberations could become venues for reaching at least provisional consensus 
on contested issues. 
 
The government intellectuals. Enter the role of the technical foreign policy expert: while the CEIP 
usually made headlines for its association with some of the most powerful statesmen of its time—
Aristide Briand, Gustav Stresemann, Edvard Beneš, Benito Mussolini—its broader base was 
comprised of international jurists, academic economists, historians and philosophers, bureaucrats of 
international organizations and lower-level ministerial officials at the forefront of foreign policy 
                                                 
26 Approaching the problem from this angle necessitates taking seriously the challenges to the liberal internationalist 
vision voiced by the right and the left as well as questioning the premises of the liberal project itself. See for example 
Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2012); Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds., Competing Visions of World Order: 
Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Sluga, Internationalism in 
the Age of Nationalism; Christof Mauch and Kiran Klaus Patel, The United States and Germany during the Twentieth 
Century: Competition and Convergence (Washington, DC: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
27 For a re-interpretation of “isolationism” along these lines see Christopher McKnight Nichols, Promise and Peril: 
America at the Dawn of a Global Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
28 Cf. Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World, 450–461; Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 128–132. 
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debates in their respective countries. These “intellectuels de gouvernement” (Noiriel) had become 
influential actors at a time when states increasingly turned to scientific knowledge to exert control 
over their territories and citizens.29 This was also true for the foreign policy sector, and the aftermath 
of the war witnessed the founding of academic institutions and social groups that became nuclei 
around which national foreign policy establishments coalesced. This phenomenon has been well-
researched for the United States and Great Britain, where the Council on Foreign Relations and the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) have provided institutional continuity.30 But 
similar developments can be shown for other European countries, where in addition to academia—
the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Paris or the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in 
Berlin—League of Nations societies often performed comparable functions for forming an 
internationalist elite consensus.31 In the absence of more formal mechanisms, networking and 
consensus formation between these functional elites created informal structures of global governance. 
Additionally, making academic expertise a precondition to participation in policy discussions inserted 
a new layer between public discourse and government action, thus effectively counteracting some of 
the contemporary tendencies toward democratization of the political process. 
 
Situated at the intersection of academic research, governments and public education, the CEIP’s 
lasting contribution to this field did not usually consist of suggesting specific solutions to the 
problems of the time. Rather, its long-term impact lay in establishing, along with its partners, the 
normative framework within which experts and the wider public discussed competing knowledge 
claims. If the present study mostly frames this overarching project as “liberal internationalism,” this 
                                                 
29 Gérard Noiriel, Les fils maudits de la République: l’avenir des intellectuels en France (Paris: Fayard, 2005), 105; on 
the rise of the governmental expert since the late nineteenth century see Marion Fourcade, Economists and Societies: 
Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain, and France, 1890s to 1990s (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2009); Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order 
(London: Routledge, 2004). 
30 On the history of foreign policy expert communities see esp. the work of Diane Stone, Inderjeet Parmar and Andrew 
Williams: Diane Stone, Knowledge Actors and Transnational Governance: The Private-Public Policy Nexus in the 
Global Agora (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Inderjeet Parmar, “Institutes of International Affairs: Their 
Roles in Foreign Policy-Making, Opinion Mobilization and Unofficial Diplomacy,” in Think Tank Traditions: Policy 
Analysis Across Nations, ed. Diane Stone and Andrew Denham (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 
19–33; this literature usually emphasizes the Anglo-American axis cf. Priscilla Roberts, “The Transatlantic American 
Foreign Policy Elite: Its Evolution in Generational Perspective,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 7, no. 2 (2009): 
163–83; Priscilla Roberts, “‘All the Right People’: The Historiography of the American Foreign Policy 
Establishment,” Journal of American Studies 26, no. 3 (December 1992): 409–34; Andrew Williams, “Why Don’t the 
French Do Think Tanks?: France Faces up to the Anglo-Saxon Superpowers, 1918–1921,” Review of International 
Studies 34, no. 1 (2008): 1–16; Inderjeet Parmar, “Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years: Idealism and Power 
in the Intellectual Roots of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations,” International Relations 16, no. 1 
(2002): 53–75. 
31 Cf. Jean-Michel Guieu, Le rameau et le glaive: les militants français pour la Société des Nations (Paris: Presses de la 
fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2008); Christian Birebent, Militants de la paix et de la SDN: les 
mouvements de soutien à la Société des nations en France et au Royaume-Uni, 1918–1925 (Paris: Harmattan, 2007); 
Steven Korenblat, “A School for the Republic? Cosmopolitans and Their Enemies at the Deutsche Hochschule Für 
Politik, 1920–1933,” Central European History 39, no. 3 (2006): 394–430. 
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is not to suggest an equivalency with the term frequently encountered in IR literature. Interwar 
internationalism could be progressive or conservative, pacifist or Socialist, sometimes even Fascist,32 
and usage of the term “liberal” in this context is mainly intended to denote the fact that the majority 
of those closely associated with the CEIP self-identified as liberals. They were generally dismissive 
of “pacifism,“ a term that connoted a principled rejection of inter-state violence and was 
contemporaneously understood as a challenge to the nation state—an idea that centrist liberals usually 
regarded as too radical.33 “Wilsonianism”—another possible descriptor for this movement that is 
today a popular shorthand for liberal internationalism34—would be problematic as there were 
significant differences between the American President’s program of national self-determination and 
liberation and the goals of the CEIP-associated internationalists, who placed more emphasis on 
stability, even if this meant upholding imperial structures.35 
 
As a project on transnational encounters, the goal here is not to posit or even “read back” into the 
sources a certain notion of liberal internationalism but to observe the formation of transnational 
consensus—which often hinged on the historical ambiguities that interwar liberalism entailed.36 The 
lasting impact of the CEIP’s activities was not to construct a coherent vision of liberal 
internationalism or a recognizable “Carnegie school” of international relations that could be traced 
into the post-1945 era. Rather, it promoted and popularized answers to a series of epistemic questions: 
Are patriotism and internationalism inherently incompatible? Can the national interests of the great 
powers be reconciled with a world governed by international law? Does the free movement of goods 
                                                 
32 Cf. Alan Dawley, Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 21–24; David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 45–47. 
33 This was not necessarily an accurate reflection of pacifist views. As Sandy Cooper points out, most pacifists regarded 
defensive wars as legitimate and supported their national governments during the First World War, cf. Sandi Cooper, 
Patriotic Pacifism: Waging War on War in Europe 1815–1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 160; 
Martin Ceadel has coined the italicized term “pacifists” for those only conditionally opposed to warfare, cf. Martin 
Ceadel, Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854–1945 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 7–8. 
34 Cf. Amos Perlmutter, Making the World Safe for Democracy: A Century of Wilsonianism and Its Totalitarian 
Challengers (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); in a transnational context, cf. Erez Manela, 
The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
35 In addition, identifying an ideology with a long historical pedigree with a particular leader is inherently problematic. 
E.g. there is a great degree of overlap between Wilson’s ideas and those of nineteenth century, particularly Italian, 
liberalism, cf. Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati, “Giuseppe Mazzini’s International Political Thought,” in A 
Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini’s Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International 
Relations, ed. Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3; Stefano 
Recchia, “The Origins of Liberal Wilsonianism: Giuseppe Mazzini on Regime Change and Humanitarian 
Intervention,” in Just and Unjust Military Intervention: European Thinkers from Vitoria to Mill, ed. Stefano Recchia 
and Jennifer M. Welsh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 237–62. 
36 See esp. Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005); Jeanne Morefield, Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-
Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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and capital promote peace or incite war? By virtue of the foundation’s politics, the effects of its 
interventions in favor of mostly traditional liberal projects amounted to placing a thumb on the scale 
of transnational politics. In the long run, it thus influenced debates whose outcome ultimately 
determined which values and interests would govern a globalizing world.37   
 
 
Networks, culture and power: methodological considerations 
A natural starting point for conceptualizing networking among foreign policy experts is the “power 
elite” approach pioneered by Marxist sociologists C. Wright Mills and William G. Domhoff,38 Here, 
personal interconnections between governments, corporations and cultural institutions are interpreted 
as instruments of a small ruling class that consciously exerts control over society. Over the course of 
the last two decades, this research agenda has been broadened to take account of the transnational 
dimension of power, for instance by tracing the emergence of a “transnational capitalist class” that 
shapes a world order conforming to its economic interests.39 In addition to downplaying the often 
divergent and sometimes clashing interests of business managers, the notion of a unified elite hinges 
on a rational choice approach to power that gives short shrift to the role of identity formation in 
shaping interests. Neither the professed globalism of twenty-first century enterprises nor the self-
styling of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century captains of industry as builders and defenders 
of the nation are direct expressions of immutable laws of economics. As business history has shown, 
corporations and entrepreneurs have proven surprisingly adept at flourishing under most types of 
regimes and conditions—whether war and peace, autarchy or free trade.40 Economic elite domination 
theories also cannot easily account for the large presence of academics in internationalist circles, a 
group whose economic interests—to the extent that they were in play at all—were intertwined with 
national education establishments. 
                                                 
37 Cf. David Singh Grewal, Network Power: The Social Dynamics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008), 2; Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International 
Organization 46, no. 1 (January 1992): 1–35; Jasmien Van Daele, “Engineering Social Peace: Networks, Ideas, and 
the Founding of the International Labour Organization,” International Review of Social History 50, no. 3 (2005): 435–
66. 
38 Cf. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); G. William Domhoff, Who Rules 
America? (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967); G. William Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State: How 
Policy Is Made in America (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990). 
39 cf. Kees Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1998); Leslie Sklair, 
“The Transnational Capitalist Class and the Discourse of Globalisation,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 
14, no. 1 (2000): 67–85; William Robinson and Jerry Harris, “Towards a Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the 
Transnational Capitalist Class,” Science & Society 64, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 11–54. 
40 See for example the ability of Alberto Pirelli to build his international tire business under Fascist rule in Italy, cf. Angelo 
Montenegro, “The Development of Pirelli as an Italian Multinational, 1872–1992,” in The Rise of Multinationals in 
Continental Europe, ed. Geoffrey Jones and Harm G. Schröter (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993), 184–200. 
For an approach that takes questions of identity into account, cf. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., Ruling America 




To connect economics and culture in a more pluralist fashion, the Gramscian concept of cultural 
hegemony offers a constructive alternative. Inderjeet Parmar employs Gramsci’s notion of “state 
spirit” to explain how the officers of America’s major foundations paved the way for a Pax Americana 
that ultimately served U.S. national and corporate interests.41 As Helke Rausch and John Krige point 
out, such a unidirectional conception of foundation work downplays the inherently reciprocal nature 
of intellectual exchanges,42 and, it may be added, risks becoming an anachronistic backward 
projection of post-1945 developments were it to be applied to the interwar period. The CEIP’s concept 
of the “international mind” is thus a necessary corrective to the “state spirit”: intellectual elites and 
business leaders came to conceive of their actions as part of the global public good, especially in 
instances where they ran counter to their government’s positions and to the democratically determined 
preferences of the voting public. As institutions that facilitated knowledge transfers, transnationally 
active foundations provide a window into how this globalism was constructed through processes of 
appropriation and localization that are central to relational approaches to historical inquiry.43 
Oftentimes, upon further scrutiny, even evidently “American” or “European” ideas and policy 
prescriptions turn out to be co-productions of coalitions that do not neatly conform to national or 
regional categories. 
 
The approach taken in this thesis to investigate this co-production of knowledge is to view the 
transnationalization of politics from the perspective of social practice within networks. As this 
terminology suggests, Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, in which actors gradually internalize 
cultural predispositions in interaction with their environment, plays a key part in my theoretical 
framework.44 Interests, whether the “national interest” formulated by a state’s bureaucracy or the self-
                                                 
41 Cf. Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the 
Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 5–6; Inderjeet Parmar, “Conceptualising the 
State-Private Network in American Foreign Policy,” in The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The 
State-Private Network, ed. Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford (New York: Routledge, 2006), 21. 
42 Cf. John Krige and Helke Rausch, “Introduction: Tracing the Knowledge-Power Nexus of American Philanthropy,” in 
American Foundations and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century, ed. John Krige and Helke 
Rausch (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 8–9. 
43 On the historical debate see esp. Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée 
and the Challenge of Reflexivity,” History and Theory 45 (February 2006): 30–50; Jürgen Osterhammel, 
“Transferanalyse und Vergleich im Fernverhältnis,” in Vergleich und Transfer: Komparatistik in den Sozial-, 
Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften, ed. Hartmut Kaelble and Jürgen Schriewer (Frankfurt/Main: Campus-Verlag, 
2003); similar questions of knowledge diffusion and appropriation are also discussed in the IR field, cf. Amitav 
Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian 
Regionalism,” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 239–75; Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and 
National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999): 84–114. 
44 Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (London: Routledge, 
1984); Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); for 
Bourdieu’s relevancy to international history see esp.  Peter Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘Cultural Turn’ and the 
Practice of International History,” Review of International Studies 34, no. 1 (2008): 155–181; 
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interest of an individual, are ultimately grounded in cultural preferences that are the result of practice. 
While Bourdieu locates the relevant institutions for inculcating and reproducing the dominant cultural 
reference systems in national contexts—specifically France—this thesis views transnational networks 
as sites for the production as participants conceived of their contributions in terms of larger projects 
that corresponded with their own cultural backgrounds and with that of the transnational space in 
which they participated. These overarching narratives constituted what Daniel Rodgers has called 
“stories”: they integrated networks around common discourses, drew boundaries against competing 
knowledge claims and provided the normative and emotional force that allowed associated policy 
prescriptions to travel across borders.45 The belief that they worked for a greater good—by 
reconstructing a liberal legal order or by preserving peace through economics—animated liberal 
internationalists and unified activists across national and professional divides. Of course, the 
definition of what constituted the greater good was ultimately rarely unrelated to an actor’s 
professional and economic interests; as Bourdieu observes: “Ideology is an illusion consistent with 
interest, but a well-grounded illusion.”46 
 
Utilizing network analysis techniques to explain historical change is not without its problems and the 
current study makes no claim to methodically employing social network tools, as developed by 
sociologists and political scientists, on an analytical level.47 On the other hand, the accounts of 
connections, intersections and coalition building between national and transnational groups that form 
the core of this thesis could not have been reconstructed without a working road map of at least that 
section of the internationalist field that received most of the CEIP’s philanthropic attention. During 
the course of my research I have compiled a database matching participation in CEIP programs with 
membership information for about one hundred national and transnational organizations, comprising 
just over eight thousand individuals. The value of this method is that it brings to the surface 
connections that are sometimes buried deep in the archival record, links that can then be pursued with 
                                                 
45 Cf. Rodgers, “Bearing Tales,” 308; Rodgers’ terminology is similar to the approach of sociologist Harrison White, cf. 
Harrison C. White, Identity and Control: How Social Formations Emerge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008); Ann Mische and Harrison White, “Between Conversation and Situation: Public Switching Dynamics across 
Network-Domains,” Social Research 65, no. 3 (1998): 695–724; on linking discourses and networks see also Wolfgang 
Neurath and Lothar Krempel, “Geschichtswissenschaft und Netzwerkanalyse: Potenziale und Beispiele,” in 
Transnationale Netzwerke im 20. Jahrhundert: Historische Erkundungen zu Ideen und Praktiken, Individuen und 
Organisationen, ed. Berthold Unfried, Jürgen Mittag, and Marcel van der Linden (Leipzig: Akademische 
Verlagsanstalt, 2008), 69; Jan Fuhse, “The Meaning Structure of Social Networks,” Sociological Theory 27, no. 1 
(2009): 51–73; Wolfram Kaiser, “Bringing History Back in to the Study of Transnational Networks in European 
Integration,” Journal of Public Policy 29, no. Special Issue 2 (2009): 223–39. 
46 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 74. 
47 Christoph Boyer has warned that the inflationary use of networks metaphors often comes down to the banal proposition 
that “everything is somehow connected to everything,” cf. Christoph Boyer, “Netzwerke und Geschichte: 
Netzwerktheorien und Geschichtswissenschaft,” in Transnationale Netzwerke im 20. Jahrhundert: Historische 
Erkundungen zu Ideen und Praktiken, Individuen und Organisationen, ed. Berthold Unfried, Jürgen Mittag, and 
Marcel van der Linden (Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 2008), 47. 
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the research tools commonly employed for writing culturally informed international history. This is 
particularly important as network theory reminds us that it is not always the most obvious, most 
frequently used connections but the “weak ties” linking otherwise unconnected actors that can have 
the most impact by transmitting new information.48 
 
On a methodological level, highlighting the practice dimension of transnationalism entails viewing 
the CEIP not primarily as an institution wielding cash in pursuit of a pre-set agenda but as an 
organization that facilitated the intermingling of economic, social and cultural capital. By investing 
in its network, the CEIP complemented its financial resources with the academic qualification, 
political connections and social status of its associates. In terms of research strategies, this has implied 
a shift away from the practice of seeking to demonstrate influence by tracing major grant payments 
to research institutions, as is often the case in studies of scientific philanthropy.49 In fact, about two-
thirds of the CEIP’s expenditures did not take the form of direct subsidies but went into scholarship 
programs, publication projects, conference organization, etc.50 Diverse as these activities were, at the 
logistical level such foundation programs usually consisted of numerous small reimbursements to 
individuals (travel expenses, honoraria for articles) that, collectively, tell a larger story. Fig. A 
illustrates how the CEIP financed communication and mobility within a growing interpersonal 
network that connected policy research institutions, advocacy groups and international 
organizations.51 This is not to suggest that asymmetrical power relationships were absent from 
interactions. This aspect will be more fully explored in Chapter 2, however, in brief, I argue that the 
CEIP influenced internationalist networks through processes of inclusion/exclusion and by setting 
broad parameters for debates. Like magnets dropped into a field of metal balls, the foundation’s 
interventions created clusters around certain concepts and institutions, stimulating activity and 
attracting further resources.  
                                                 
48 Cf. Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 1360–80; see 
also the related concept of brokerage between networks, cf. Ronald S. Burt, Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction 
to Social Capital (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Alain Degenne and Michel Forsé, Introducing Social 
Networks (London: Sage, 1999), 124. 
49 A marked exception is Christian Fleck’s study of the Rockefeller Foundation’s social science programs, cf. Christian 
Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen: Zur Erfindung der Empirischen Sozialforschung (Frankfurt/Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2007). 
50 A necessarily somewhat schematic attempt to group the foundation's expenditures for the Fiscal Year 1926/27 shows 
about 100,000 dollars in direct subsidies, about 240,000 dollars in CEIP-initiatives (conferences, publication projects, 
travel grants) and a substantial overhead of 200,000 dollars (salaries, office expenses), cf. CEIP Year Book 17 (1928), 
179–182. 
51 This connection between interpersonal and inter-group networks was first empirically described by Ronald Breiger, 






Fig. A – Institutional affiliations of CEIP partners to national policy institutes, national advocacy 
organizations, transnational and international organizations, 1919–39.52 Gray lines denote non-CEIP 





                                                 
52 The sample includes both programs run from the CEIP headquarters and those linked to the Centre Européen: Carnegie 
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State of the Art 
Research on the international programs of America’s major philanthropic foundations has expanded 
greatly over the course of the last twenty years. In the wake of the Second World War, these 
institutions were mainly discussed as part of the American historiographical debate over 
internationalism and isolationism,53 in which non-governmental groups drew scrutiny for their role 
in building elite consensus in favor of an assertive foreign policy at home and exporting American 
institutions abroad.54 In recent years, a new body of research has emerged that is marked by a greater 
interest in those who received foundation funding, and in the cooperation and co-production of 
knowledge. Reflecting a growing dissatisfaction with a unidirectional “Americanization” frame at a 
time of transnational approaches to history, newer studies emphasize multiple actors and perspectives, 
as in Helke Rausch’s and John Krige’s “circulation of knowledge” approach.55 Particularly, scientific 
philanthropy has emerged as a field of study suited to highlighting the interactive nature of intellectual 
exchanges. Studies by Giulliana Gemelli, Christian Fleck and Katharina Rietzler have focused on the 
reciprocal impact of foundation programs as scholars and knowledge travelled back and forth across 
the Atlantic, particularly in the social sciences.56 All of these studies share a new attention to the local 
contexts and consequences of the programs of America’s major philanthropies.57 
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A major impulse for the historiography of America’s major philanthropic foundations has resulted 
from the expansion of the field of international history to encompass the actions of non-state actors 
and matters of culture, transnational connections, knowledge systems and identity construction.58 In 
particular, the international history of the interwar period has expanded greatly since the first 
pioneering studies of the 1990s.59 Marrying intellectual with international history, historians such as 
Mark Mazower and Ian Tyrrell highlight the impact of ideas on global events.60 International 
organizations such as the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization have drawn 
renewed attention for their role in shaping the standards and practices of a globalizing world.61 The 
last decade has produced a wealth of detailed studies on the sprawling field of what Akira Iriye has 
called “cultural internationalism”—League of Nations Associations, women’s groups, study 
committees, and other INGOs—covering a wide range of social, national and cultural contexts.62 
Although this work is ongoing, the first synthetic treatments of this field point towards the need to 
revise our understanding of the period as marked by opposing forces of “nationalism” and 
“internationalism” or “liberalism” and “totalitarianism.” Just as not all transnational activism was 
liberal in today’s understanding of the term, neither were all nationalists opposed to forms of 
cooperation across borders.63  
 
This new focus on processes of knowledge construction and identity formation in international 
relations has brought with it a heightened attention to the impact of policy communities, advocacy 
groups and transnational interest coalitions on the history of the interwar period.64 Once viewed as 
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inconsequential, interwar “idealists” have been reappraised by i.a. Cecilia Lynch, Guido Müller and 
Daniel Laqua, demonstrating how societal actors made an impact in national and international politics 
through advocacy campaigns and transnational networking.65 The importance of expert knowledge 
networks in shaping ideas of global governance is drawing increasing attention.66 While this literature 
has recently turned more toward questions of gender, other categories of concern to social 
historians—especially race and class—have so far played only a minor role. Top-level networks of 
business and government elites remain under-researched and the few studies that explicitly tackle the 
social dimension of transnational elite formation in the interwar period still tend to have a narrow 
Anglo-American focus that does not reflect the trend toward broader perspectives.67 For instance, the 
breadth of research on pacifist and women’s groups stands in marked contrast to the almost complete 
absence of interest in one of the most influential transnational lobby organizations of the time: the 
International Chamber of Commerce.68 
 
 
Sources, scope and structure of the thesis 
The main source material for the study consists of contemporary published material, newspaper 
accounts,  autobiographical writings, as well as three different types of archival holdings: the 
institutional records of non-governmental and international organizations such as the Carnegie 
Endowment, the Carnegie Corporation or the League of Nations; archives of governmental 
                                                 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Kiran Klaus Patel and Patricia Clavin, “The Role of International 
Organizations in Europeanization: The Case of the League of Nations and the European Economic Community,” in 
Europeanization in the Twentieth Century. Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 110–31. 
65 To give only a few examples: Lynch, Beyond Appeasement; Guido Müller, Europäische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach 
dem Ersten Weltkrieg: das Deutsch-Französische Studienkomitee und der Europäische Kulturbund (München: 
Oldenbourg, 2005); Laqua, Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World 
Wars; Casper Sylvest, British Liberal Internationalism, 1880–1930: Making Progress? (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2009); Daniel Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Thomas R. Davies, “Internationalism in a Divided World: The Experience of the 
International Federation of League of Nations Societies, 1919–1939,” Peace & Change 37, no. 2 (2012): 227–52. 
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bureaucracies that openly or quietly cooperated with the CEIP or sought to influence its activities 
such as the U.S. State Department or the French, German and Italian foreign offices and, lastly, the 
personal papers of key CEIP officers and their European collaborators such as Nicholas Murray 
Butler, Philip Jessup, Moritz Julius Bonn and Carlo Sforza. Particularly on the European side, the 
impact of the twentieth century’s upheavals, of war and persecution, has often made it necessary to 
revert to secondary records as many personal and institutional archives were either destroyed or lost. 
In addition to the legacy of state-sponsored violence on the conditions of archival records, research 
regarding the impact of transnational networks on foreign policy more generally faces the challenge 
of seeking to highlight processes that ran counter to central tenets of the self-conception of the early 
twentieth century nation-state: the sovereignty and cultural self-sufficiency of the nation. State 
archives conformed to these narratives by producing paper trails that documented decisions as the 
result of internal governmental deliberations. When policy impulses were received from non-
governmental or even foreign sources, these ideas were usually quietly incorporated into the 
bureaucratic process without dwelling on their unorthodox provenance.  
 
The archives of non-governmental organizations are not necessarily a rigorous corrective to this 
picture. In the case of the CEIP, record-keeping was often deliberately fragmented.69 The foundation 
was keenly aware that it operated in a legal gray area, as American law criminalized private 
diplomatic activity designed to “influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government.”70 Its 
annual reports treated payments to European institutions obliquely and the surviving archival record 
allows for only a partial reconstruction of concrete money transfers. This is at least partly because 
material with potentially sensitive implications was routinely destroyed to avoid embarrassing and 
probing questions in the event of public investigations or unintended disclosures. In a particularly 
stark example, shortly after U.S. entry into the Second World War the CEIP’s New York office 
collected and reviewed all correspondence relating to its past German grantees. A few weeks later, 
the files were restored to their original locations, presumably absent any evidence that could have 
proved inconvenient in light of the new geopolitical constellation.71 Given the availability of 
secondary documentation, especially personal archives, there is no reason to believe that such gaps 
hint at dark conspiracies. It is a reminder, however, that archives of NGOs are not immune to 
contemporary political and cultural pressures, and should be approached with the same level of 
skepticism as more overtly political sources. 
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The main focus of this study is the transatlantic dimension of the CEIP, particularly that portion of its 
work that fell within the ambit of the Centre Européen, the foundation’s representation in Paris and 
its sole foreign office for most of the interwar years. The Carnegie vision was of course much broader 
and, in fact, nearly global. Few efforts were made to establish contacts in Africa, which was still 
largely viewed as the concern of Europe’s colonial powers, but the CEIP’s cultural diplomacy did 
encompass Asia, especially Japan and China.72 Its presence in Latin America, intensified in the early 
war years to counter Axis influence, is a subject awaiting further study in its own right. On balance, 
however, the concentration of political power in the capitals of the Old World and of policy expertise 
in European and North American research and educational institutions made this almost by default a 
primarily transatlantic story. For instance, even when including colonial territories and dominions, 
only about fifteen percent of the foundation’s almost one thousand “depository libraries”—the 
institutions that regularly received the CEIP’s publications—lay in either Latin America, Africa, Asia 
or Oceania.73 This obvious underrepresentation of vast areas of the globe was not necessarily specific 
to the CEIP, but was a hallmark of most interwar foreign policy discussions, ensuring that the balance 
of knowledge-power would track with political, military and economic might. 
 
Transnational approaches to historiography have the potential to destabilize periodizations derived 
from political or diplomatic history by highlighting processes that cross conventional divides. The 
present study does indeed highlight continuities in the activism for international coordination and 
organization that stretch beyond the period of the two world wars. If I have nevertheless chosen 1940 
as a “soft” cut-off date for this study, this is mainly because the war, the founding of the United 
Nations with U.S. participation, and later, the advent of the Cold War with its imposition of a bipolar 
order, changed the structural environment in which the foundation operated. While many of the ideas 
that the CEIP had promoted thrived, and the foundation resumed its work on the Continent with a 
gradual reopening of the Centre Européen in 1946, these new activities bore little continuity to the 
day-to-day operations of the interwar period. This was, in addition to the changed external conditions, 
also a function of changes to the organization itself: many of the CEIP’s established partners had 
passed away or relocated, and with Butler’s own resignation and death soon after the war, many of 
the foundation’s interpersonal networks broke down or were reconfigured. 
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The following account is broadly divided into three parts: the first two chapters provide an outline of 
the socio-cultural contexts and of the techniques underlying the CEIP’s activism in the United States 
and in Europe, followed by three chapters that serve as case studies of transnational negotiation 
processes, culminating in a concluding chapter that traces the connections made during the interwar 
years into the Second World War and beyond 1945.  
 
The first chapter situates the activism of the Carnegie Endowment in the multifaceted interwar 
discourse on world order. I argue that, rather than showing a clear-cut divide between 
“internationalists” and “isolationists” on the one hand and “Europe” and “America” on the other hand, 
interwar debates were marked by divergent visions about the future of a globalizing world that were 
extensions of broader socio-economic and cultural cleavages within societies. The CEIP was closely 
aligned with institutions of a pre-1914 liberal cosmopolitan milieu which advocated for an 
international order based on the principles of individual liberty, minimal state intervention and 
commercial liberalism. Especially in the wake of the First World War, members of this milieu looked 
on wearily as competing ideologies rose to prominence on the left and the right, bearing their own 
knowledge claims on which policies contributed to international peace. With nationalism in the 
ascendance, Socialist revolutions taking place across Europe, and domestic and international power 
relations in flux, many traditional liberals believed that transnational outreach was needed to restore 
an “ordered civilization.“ In this chapter I thus argue that controversies over collective security, 
international law or commercial relations not only aimed at shaping international affairs but 
ultimately at defining the domestic balance of power within nations through their interaction with the 
outside world. 
 
The techniques of the Carnegie Endowment’s philanthropy are the focus of the second chapter, which 
centers on the foundation’s campaign for an “international mind” in Europe. Rather than adopting a 
diffusionist approach to the CEIP’s transatlantic philanthropy, the chapter argues that the foundation’s 
strategy is best understood as promoting informal structures of governance by financing 
communication and coordination among foreign policy elites. Under an approach that seeks to trace 
the promotion of specific ideas or techniques, the CEIP’s propagation of the “international mind”-
language appears quixotic, as the term was never associated with any concrete meaning. Instead, I 
argue, it served as a marker for a transnational community committed to a liberal interpretation of 
internationalism. By promoting such discourses and policing networks through inclusion/exclusion 
mechanisms the foundation and its associates slowly edged out competing knowledge claims. 
 
Three thematic chapters then analyze the CEIP’s contribution in the major fields of cultural, legal and 
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economic internationalism. Chapter four documents the CEIP’s efforts to heal Europe’s rifts in the 
wake of the First World War by fostering Franco-German cultural exchange. In the mid-1920s, with 
the Cold Peace of the immediate post-war years beginning to thaw, the American foundation began 
to move beyond its traditional base in Paris. Its concerted outreach campaign to Berlin opened up a 
transnational space that enabled French and German academic elites to meet on supposedly neutral 
ground, a largely fictitious conceit as foreign ministries continually monitored and influenced the 
proceedings. The close ties to French and German foreign policy elites enabled the foundation to 
realize one of the most concrete results of the CEIP’s interwar activism: the Kellogg-Briand Pact. By 
linking this treaty to the cultural philanthropy that preceded it, the chapter highlights the dual purposes 
of foundation programs: while pursuing concrete projects to further certain concepts or ideas, they 
also create a network of partners that allow for ad hoc coordination and cooperation that can have a 
direct impact on international relations. 
 
This larger project of constructing a rule-based international community failed in the first half of the 
1930s, a breakdown that forms the core of chapter five. The key role of American philanthropic 
foundations in the development of the discipline of international law is frequently noted, however, 
the chapter shows that the CEIP’s programs aimed at more than creating a body of academic 
knowledge. Sponsorship of community institutions such as the Institute de Droit International and the 
Hague Academy of International Law aimed at fostering an internationally-minded legal expert 
community, in close contact with national governments, that could help govern the world by removing 
contentious issues from the inherently particularist and nationalist nature of public debate. Legal 
conferences and international tribunals would provide venues where compromises between 
competing great power interests could be quietly reached and codified into international law.  
Ostensibly aimed at creating structures for the adjudication of conflicts that would base international 
affairs on the rule of law rather than European power politics, this project of juridifying international 
relations prepared the ground for a CEIP-led effort to negotiate the adherence of the United States to 
the World Court in 1929. Yet, from its inception, the legal internationalist project was marked by 
unresolved tensions between the claim to provide equal protection of the law and the aim to fortify 
international, especially colonial, hierarchies. The chapter proposes that the failures of both the 1929 
World Court initiative and the larger undertaking to juridify international relations were as much due 
to the contradictory ideological underpinnings of the enterprise as to the increasing political 
headwinds of the 1930s. 
 
With hopes for a functioning legal system of collective security dashed, the CEIP shifted its attention 
to economics. The final thematic chapter documents the foundation’s work in cooperation with the 
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International Chamber of Commerce to establish an “economic peace” in the second half of the 1930s, 
a liberal international commercial and financial regime that would bridge political differences. The 
close involvement of American, Dutch and Belgian businessmen and politicians illustrates the 
converging interests of externally oriented U.S. business elites and representatives of smaller, 
industrialized countries in the restoration of a unified European market. Economic self-interest was, 
however, only part of the equation, as “economic peace” was fundamentally a concept aimed at 
preempting the spreading cultural nationalism threatening the status of established liberal elites in 
ways above and beyond their financial bottom lines. The notion that economics could be divorced 
from politics proved deeply flawed and led the CEIP and the ICC down a narrow path between peace 
advocacy and National Socialist propaganda for a “fair” redistribution of Europe’s resources. Yet, the 
two organizations succeeded in rallying both American and European business communities around 
a cultural consensus of business internationalism that closely resembled that of the nineteenth century 
era of British-led globalization—this time with the United States in the driver’s seat. 
 
The transnational sphere that the CEIP had supported and nurtured largely collapsed soon after the 
German invasion of Poland in September 1939, as travel and communication was impeded. The final 
chapter traces the mid- to long-term consequences of the CEIP’s interwar activism by tracing the 
discourses the foundation had promoted into the phase post-war planning and reconstruction. While 
national historiographies often seek to locate post-war arrangements in governmental planning and 
decision-making processes, I argue that many of these activities relied on the same transnationally 
connected experts that the CEIP had worked with during the war. In the United States, East Coast 
internationalist institutions such as the CEIP, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Council on Foreign 
Relations became transmission belts for the insertion of interwar discourses into the work of official 
American planning bodies that would shape much of the post-war international architecture. 
Meanwhile, former European grantees performed similar functions in their own countries. Thus 
integrated into official government channels, a significant portion of the body of knowledge produced 
by the foundation and its allies during the preceding decades was brought to bear on the reconstruction 
of world order.  
 
In his intellectual history of global governance, Mark Mazower highlights the continuities in 
institutions and ideas that shaped an interconnected world.74 In this genealogy, the interwar period 
stands as an era of a peculiar divergence between institutional arrangements and popular ideas: while 
the League of Nations provided the most elaborate structure of international organization the world 
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had yet seen, there was little public enthusiasm for the idea of liberal global governance. During a 
time of national antagonisms and calls for social change traditional liberal ideas of commercial 
liberalism and international cooperation had fallen out of favor both with voters and with 
governments. For traditional liberal elites, cooperating across borders to embed their political and 
cultural preferences in the collected expert knowledge on international law, economics and cultural 
relations thus became an alternative route to preserve their ideas and interests. Insulated from the 
pressures of mass democracy and nationalism, the story of the Carnegie Endowment’s networks in 
the interwar period is thus also part of the circuitous success story of a liberal version of 









































1. An ordered civilization: The crisis of liberalism in America and Europe 
 
 
“The European who wants to understand the core issues of the United States would do best not to 
disembark in New York. New York is not America,” wrote German economist Moritz Julius Bonn in 
1925 after an extensive tour of the country.75 The sentiment was echoed two years later by British 
author Ford Maddox Ford in the title of his book New York Is Not America.76 Admonitions of men 
like Bonn and Ford came at a time when narratives of America as a land of boundless progress and 
modernity enjoyed immense popularity in Europe. The City on the Hudson, with its soaring skyline, 
its immigrant neighborhoods, the jazz bars of Harlem, seemed like the embodiment of American 
modernity—the “Americanization” that was spreading to the Old World, eliciting hopes for and fears 
of the future.77 Meanwhile, what Bonn and Ford saw in their travels to the United States was a more 
ambiguous attitude toward those changes. Rather than celebrating the vibrant city whose port had 
long been America’s door to the world, many Americans had come to regard the nonconformist, 
heterogeneous and immigrant culture of the metropolis as foreign.78 By the 1920s, associations with 
cosmopolitan New York had become so politically toxic in many parts of the country that when New 
York Governor Alfred E. Smith ran for the presidency in 1928 he lost all but eight states to Herbert 
Hoover after a campaign filled with anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant and anti-urban sentiment.79 At all 
levels of society groups were forming to defend the prerogatives of Anglo-Saxon Americans, noted 
Moritz Julius Bonn, founding circles and societies directed against “those who are different, think 
differently or want different things.”80 
 
For interpreting the history of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, an organization which 
by the mid-1920s had become deeply intertwined with the social fabric of the American metropolis, 
there is a cautionary reminder in New York’s status as a contested symbol of modernity.81 Since the 
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interwar years, the activities of American foundations in Europe have often been interpreted as an 
axis of “Americanization,” spreading American practices and ideas to the Continent and increasing 
the soft power of the United States while opening up new markets for the country’s expanding 
economy.82 Conversely, there is a literature that casts the CEIP as a “foundation for internationalism” 
that worked tirelessly to overcome the American people’s traditional ”isolationism,” effectively 
Europeanizing their conception of foreign policy. Both approaches share a reliance on national frames 
and metaphors of interpenetration and resistance that were products of the very debates they are 
studying: “isolationism,” the notion that Americans in the interwar years simply turned their back on 
the world, was a concept originally promoted by organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment to 
cast foreign policy decisions as a choice between backwardness and modernity, between fear and 
reason, between participating in history and negating its laws.83 Meanwhile, the notion of 
“Americanization” in a non-American context, as a form of cultural imperialism, was devised by 
those on the other sides of the debate to delegitimize unwelcome cultural and social phenomena as 
foreign, essentially violent impositions.84 
 
Such national frames were of course crucial in structuring the way people thought about the world, 
particularly during the interwar years. Yet, it is also important to keep in mind that the protagonists 
whose story will be told in the following pages—the CEIP’s officers, trustees and European 
associates—had experienced a very different world: they had grown up at a time when one could 
travel from Bordeaux to Saint Petersburg without so much as being asked for a passport. A Swedish 
professor and an American businessman meeting in a Paris hotel lounge could most likely converse 
either in French or in German, and the gold exchange standard meant that neither one had to worry 
about fluctuating exchange rates. Often called the “first phase of globalization,” this period rested on 
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a cosmopolitan worldview that embraced the ideas of traditional liberal writers: the free trade theories 
of Richard Cobden, the emancipatory ideas of Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Giuseppe 
Mazzini.85 One school of thought holds that this liberal governing consensus was eclipsed by the final 
quarter of the nineteenth century as political culture became suffused with imperialism, Social 
Darwinism and biological racism.86 This view has been challenged in recent years, as a series of 
studies on nineteenth century intellectual history have demonstrated that much of the transformation 
took place within the liberal tradition itself: by the end of the century the liberal belief in the universal 
equality of all human beings was tempered by hierarchical narratives of progress and civilization.87 
 
What did change, however, was the emergence of a robust backlash against the free circulation of 
goods, ideas and people and, implicitly or explicitly, against the liberal milieu that had shaped the 
entangling of societies. In the 1880s, British producers reacted with vehement protests to a flood of 
German imports. In the United States, the country’s westward expansion was largely financed with 
credits originating in London and running through Wall Street; but the free movement of capital 
created boom and bust cycles that periodically plunged Western farmers into misery. The result were 
conspiratorial tracts that accused New York banks of having established “complete control of the 
political machinery” of the nation and enabling its “bondage” to the British Crown.88 A form of 
globalization that exposed large segments of societies to forces beyond their control had the potential 
to fuel international tensions while also exacerbating diverging interests within countries. This was 
particularly the case as industrialization, urbanization and globalization processes were also recasting 
the relationships between classes, races and genders. Just as New York was not representative of 
America, neither were Hamburg merchants culturally or politically aligned with Pomeranian 
landowners, nor the bankers from the City of London with Yorkshire textile workers. 
 
The argument presented in this chapter is that the CEIP’s transnational networking grew out of these 
tensions as part of the transnationalization of politics in the early twentieth century. People recognized 
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that their fate was increasingly determined by the policies and norms governing an integrating world 
and formed transnational coalitions to affect change. This trend was accelerated when the First World 
War became the catalyst for what Detlev Peuker has called a “crisis of classical modernity,”89 
destabilizing existing domestic and international constellations and creating expectations of 
(sometimes radical) change. Rather than constituting binary opposites—as “internationalists” versus 
“nationalists” or “isolationists”—participants in the ensuing debates were advocating for different 
models of an international system, grounded in competing norms and interests. U.S. Senator William 
E. Borah, one of the spokesmen of the country’s “isolationist” faction articulated one alternative 
narrative in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations: while liberal internationalists saw the new 
“nearness” to the peoples of Europe and Asia as giving rise to mutual understanding and cooperation, 
the reverse was actually true. Just as proximity led the tenants of densely populated cities to be 
suspicious of their neighbors and lock the doors of their apartments, greater interdependence between 
nations had increased not decreased international strife. Meanwhile on his father’s farm, with no 
neighbor to be encountered within miles, the door had always stood open.90 Clearly, Borah implied, 
the rural model of society was more applicable to the international level than the urban vision. 
 
The purpose here is not to suggest a new “primacy of domestic politics” in which economic interests 
directly drive foreign policy or, for that matter, political ideology. It is to suggest, however, that to 
understand the emergence of ideas on global governance they have to be located in the specificity of 
contemporary politics, the social cleavages and cultural tensions of the time, and not in an ideal-type 
Wilsonian internationalism.91 Non-governmental organizations in the foreign policy sector such as 
the CEIP are uniquely suited to studying these contexts. They are institutions which, above all, try to 
shape the way people think about international affairs. They are thus venues in which the beliefs and 
interests of participating actors are translated into narratives and norms for a globalizing world. 
Locating the CEIP’s leading figures and the participants in the foundation’s programs in their socio-
cultural milieus is central to exploring their self-conception and the type of liberal internationalism 
they wanted to construct—or re-construct. 
 
 
“A Small Phalanx of Eminent Men”: The Carnegie Endowment before 1914 
On 10 December 1910, Andrew Carnegie assembled a group of twenty-eight men at the headquarters 
of the Pan-American Union in Washington, DC, where the trustees of his latest philanthropic 
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endeavor were presented with a gift of ten million dollars. The question as to how this large sum of 
money was to be employed mystified not only the press, but the new trustees themselves. The New 
York Times reported that the philanthropist had not offered any concrete ideas for projects and that 
the assembled gentlemen had brought no plans of their own to the table: “Few of them have thought 
of the matter sufficiently to be prepared with any specific ideas.”92 Their hesitancy was 
understandable in light of the magnitude of their task. Carnegie’s charge to his trustees was nothing 
less than effecting the “speedy abolition of war”. In fact, as a sign of Carnegie’s can-do optimism and 
his openness to an evolving agenda for his foundation, he already envisioned a way forward after 
warfare had vanished from the face of the earth. In that case, the board was to determine which 
pressing problem facing mankind could be tackled next in order to “advance the progress, elevation 
and happiness of man.”93 
  
It was not only this allusion to the language of the Declaration of Independence that made the CEIP’s 
founding appear as a quintessentially American story. As an institution built on the immense wealth 
of an American industrialist it was testimony to the vibrancy of the country’s business sector and to 
the nation’s rising power and prosperity. It owed its existence to a democratic public space which 
encouraged private sector participation in the affairs of government. And it stood, last but not least, 
for the immigrant success story of Andrew Carnegie, who had come to the United States with his 
parents from Scotland at age twelve and built an empire of steel in the aftermath of the American 
Civil War.94 Carnegie had been among the first to recognize the potential of the Bessemer process for 
large scale steel production and by 1900 his company dominated the U.S. market. When in 1901 he 
sold his entire business venture to the banker John Pierpont Morgan for 480 million dollars, the deal 
made Carnegie one of the, if not the single wealthiest man in the world. However, success in the 
American industrial sector with its cut-throat business practices had come at a price to his public 
reputation. After the violent suppression of a strike at his factory in Homestead, Pennsylvania, left 
twelve people dead, many Americans regarded Carnegie as the epitome of the ruthless industrial 
baron. Public opprobrium surely played a role in Carnegie’s decision to reinvent himself as a leading 
philanthropist. Over the course of the following two decades, he donated most of his fortune, building 
an array of institutions bearing his name: the Carnegie Institution of Washington (1902), the Carnegie 
Hero Fund (1904), the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1905), the Carnegie 
Corporation (1911), to mention only a few. With this generosity, Andrew Carnegie set an example for 
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several of his fellow industrialists, who followed suit with such institutions as the Russell Sage 
Foundation (1907), the Rockefeller Foundation (1913) and the Rosenwald Fund (1917).95 
 
For all its rootedness in American events, the CEIP’s founding was also part of a larger, nearly global 
story: the quest for public reform, for social “progress” in the early twentieth century. By the late 
1800s, industrialization had transformed societies bordering on the North Atlantic, producing new 
challenges and giving rise to parallel and interconnected reform efforts to bring the tools of modern 
science and the machinery of the administrative state to bear on problems of social organization in 
the modern age.96 From harsh working conditions to urban poverty, illiteracy, and alcoholism—the 
targets of reform were varied but at its heart what in an American context is usually called the 
“Progressive Movement” was part of often transnationally connected efforts to address the injustices 
and inequalities of the time by creating new institutions and lobbying for the intervention of the 
regulatory state.97 In founding the CEIP, Andrew Carnegie and his associates worked from the 
assumption that the same approach that was at the time producing improvements in urban planning 
and public hygiene could also be applied to the problem of war and peace. Reform institutions such 
as the Carnegie Endowment would commission research on the major causes of international conflict 
and thus help formulate policies for a more stable, equitable and peaceful world order. 
 
The CEIP’s place in this broader movement—and that of America’s major philanthropic foundations 
more generally—illustrates a significant feature of the genesis of social change in the early twentieth 
century: the story of social reform was not always one of progressive insurgents storming the bastions 
of an entrenched conservatism but was frequently led from the top.98 The gentlemen Carnegie had 
assembled in December 1910 hardly fit the bill of grassroots pacifists seeking to reign in callous 
elites. By most sociological markers they and the remainder of the eighty persons who would serve 
as CEIP trustees before the Second World War were a remarkably homogeneous and powerful 
                                                 
95 On the wider field of American philanthropy see esp. Olivier Zunz, Philanthropy in America: A History (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2012); Patricia Rosenfield, A World of Giving: Carnegie Corporation of New York: A 
Century of International Philanthropy (New York: PublicAffairs, 2014); Krige and Rausch, American Foundations 
and the Coproduction of World Order in the Twentieth Century; Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, ed., Philanthropic 
Foundations: New Scholarship, New Possibilities (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999). 
96 Cf. Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 3; Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations, 245–248. 
97 Cf. Morton Keller, Regulating a New Society: Public Policy and Social Change in America, 1900–1933 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 1; Daniel Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism” 10, no. 4 (1982): 113–32; 
Peter G. Filene, “An Obituary for ’The Progressive Movement,” American Quarterly 22, no. 1 (1970): 20–34; despite 
such differences, however, many maintain the utility of progressivism as a useful category of historical analysis, cf. 
Dawley, Changing the World, 3–8. 
98 The ambivalent relationship between progressivism and the American business elite has been pointed out by historians 
since the 1960s, cf. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Re-Interpretation of American History, 1900–
1916 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–
1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). 
37 
 
group:99 they were exclusively male, mostly wealthy, overwhelmingly Protestant—the only Jewish 
trustee, Oscar S. Straus, died in 1926—and virtually all of them traced their family history to Britain 
or Germany. Only a few of them had ties to the traditional organized peace movement in the United 
States but this did not make their abhorrence of war any less sincere. Many of the trustees belonged 
to a generation that had experienced the Civil War or its aftermath during their youths—“lame men, 
men with a blue patch to hide an eye that had been destroyed, men upon crutches,” as Andrew J. 
Montague described his childhood experiences in Virginia.100 Overall, this biographical background 
clearly shaped their views on the means by which world peace would finally be achieved. Just as 
America’s rapid industrial development had been steered by energetic “men of affairs” they believed 
that the cause of peace necessitated not so much pious exhortations by Christian preachers but the 
pragmatism and intellectual leadership of the nation’s best and brightest.101 
 
The programmatic outlook these men represented was closely associated with the two cities that 
became the CEIP’s main bases of operation in the United States: Washington, DC, and New York. 
Many of the trustees were part of what Priscilla Roberts has identified as the first and second 
generation of the American foreign policy establishment that led the push for a more expansive 
interpretation of America’s national interest.102 They were the international lawyers, colonial 
administrators and strategists who shaped America’s initial ascent to world power status:103 Elihu 
Root had served as Secretary of War under President William McKinley and devised the outlines of 
colonial governance for the Philippines before serving as Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909.104 
Joseph H. Choate, perhaps the nation’s leading trial lawyer, had spent six years as ambassador to 
London and represented the United States at the Hague Conference of 1907. Throughout the interwar 
years, past government service in foreign policy positions would continue to be a well-traveled path 
toward CEIP trusteeship. Over the course of its first three decades the Board would include eight 
former secretaries or assistant secretaries of state, ten former ambassadors and eleven active or retired 
congressmen. Impressed by America’s growing clout as an industrialized nation they were less 
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idealistic promoters of peace than proto-realists, the first “managers of state power” (Alan Dawley), 
comfortable with an assertive pursuit of the national interest, even as they sometimes wrestled with 
the implications of territorial expansion and rule over foreign peoples for America’s democratic 
polity.105  
 
Lobbying the White House and the State Department for a more active, outward-looking American 
foreign policy was part of the CEIP’s raison d’être. Andrew Carnegie had timed its creation in 1910 
to lend support to an initiative by President Howard Taft, who had just announced his support for U.S. 
participation in binding international arbitration treaties.106 Taft’s proposal came to nothing but one 
legacy of this founding history was that a general orientation toward the federal executive remained 
built into the foundation’s infrastructure: “The principal office of the association shall be in the City 
of Washington, in the District of Columbia,” decreed section one of article II of the CEIP’s charter.107 
Its original headquarters at 2 Jackson Place—the adjacent buildings No. 4 and No. 6 were purchased 
a few years later—placed the foundation near the heart of the administrative center of American 
foreign policy.108 The Endowment’s offices looked out onto Lafayette Square, whose southern 
boundary was formed by Pennsylvania Avenue and the White House. Only two hundred meters of 
open space separated the peace organization from the residence of the President of the United States; 
the Executive Office Building housing the State, War, and Navy Departments was literally down the 
road. Meanwhile, the CEIP’s greater physical distance from the Capitol poignantly symbolized the 
foundation’s belief that foreign policy was more properly handled behind the closed doors of the 
executive than openly debated in the halls of Congress. 
 
While Washington, DC, was the city of the practitioners of the country’s newly assertive foreign 
policy, its strongest constituency was located further north, in cosmopolitan New York. A city that 
was rapidly growing into the world’s financial hub, New York had much to gain from America 
becoming more engaged with the world and it is thus not surprising that almost one third of all trustees 
lived in the Greater New York City area, either directly in Manhattan or in the wealthy suburban areas 
of Long Island and New Jersey. These trustees were partially drawn from New York’s traditional 
social elites of merchants and bankers, such as William Jay Schieffelin, Jr., owner of a wholesale drug 
company and scion of the Vanderbilt family.109 Later on, they also represented rising professions such 
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as corporate managers Thomas J. Watson of IBM and Harper Sibley, who chaired the boards of, 
among others, the New York Life Insurance Company, the Western Union Telegraph Company and 
the Hollister Lumber Company. Well-represented were also lawyers working for major Manhattan 
law firms, for instance Arthur A. Ballantine of Root, Clark & Buckner or John Foster Dulles of 
Sullivan & Cromwell. Particularly close was the connection between the Carnegie Endowment and 
the most prominent of the Wall Street merchant banks—J.P. Morgan & Company. Former Morgan 
partners such as George W. Perkins, Robert Bacon and Dwight W. Morrow were a constant presence 
on the Board and in the interwar years the firm’s general counsel John W. Davis became one of the 
CEIP’s most influential trustees.110 
 
Wall Street—Carnegie Endowment—Washington. The mingling of economic interests and peace 
activism embodied by the CEIP’s Board of Trustees would seem to imply a rather straightforward 
interpretation of the foundation’s function in American politics: philanthropy as a vehicle by which 
an ascendant corporate America sought to impose its preferred foreign policy on the nation. This was 
certainly the view of contemporary critics such as journalist Upton Sinclair, who pointed to the 
“interlocking directorates” that tied the CEIP to the “American plutocracy” as indications of influence 
peddling.111 Recent historiography has been more skeptical about such direct, causal links, yet, studies 
by Ellen Condliffe Lagemann or Inderjeet Parmar that adopt a Gramscian perspective in stressing the 
CEIP’s role as an instrument for establishing cultural hegemony share the earlier critics’ focus on the 
identities and interests of the trustees.112 While the strands that connected the foundation to America’s 
business elites are certainly vital to understanding its activities, a closer look at the actual functioning 
of the Endowment during its first three decades yields surprisingly little support for theories of 
economic elite domination. Despite the illustrious names of the trustees, the CEIP’s true center of 
gravity lay elsewhere—with the foundation’s permanent staff of academics. 
 
Significantly, the CEIP as an institution was anything but a smooth, centrally run machine, on which 
a unified approach could have been imposed. Rather, the type of organization that emerged over the 
course of its first two years resembled three coexisting, sometimes only loosely coordinating 
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fiefdoms. The Washington office, in addition to housing the foundation’s Secretariat, was also home 
to the Division of International Law, under the authority of James Brown Scott. Already during its 
second year, the foundation established a second foothold in New York with the purchase of a five-
story building on Manhattan’s West 117th Street, adjacent to Columbia University’s campus in the 
Morningside Heights neighborhood, thus laying the groundwork for what became the foundation’s 
almost symbiotic relationship with one of America’s ascendant academic centers. The new office 
served as headquarters for the Division of History and Economics, headed successively by Columbia 
professors John Bates Clark and James T. Shotwell, as well as for the Division of Intercourse and 
Education under the university’s president Nicholas Murray Butler.113 The three divisional directors 
enjoyed large discretion over the administration of their respective units, which left the presidency of 
the Endowment, held initially by Elihu Root, with the largely ceremonial task of presenting a uniform 
image to the outside world rather than of enforcing a single philosophy within the organization.  
 
This structure effectively negated much of the trustees’ statutory power to set foundation policy as it 
left the board with remarkably little sway over its directors.114 Butler, Shotwell and Scott were all 
accomplished academics or academic administrators by the time they assumed their CEIP positions 
and, in contrast to other major philanthropies, they served on an unsalaried, voluntary basis. Secure 
in their careers, the directors had little reason to feel compelled to serve as academic auxiliary troops 
for the East Coast’s moneyed interests and they even frustrated most of the Board’s legitimate 
attempts to exercise its oversight role.115 This development was further abetted when early in its 
history the Board decided that Endowment funds should only be spent on original, CEIP-organized 
initiatives rather than handed out as subsidies to existing organizations. The policy appears to have 
originally been intended to protect the Endowment’s coffers from influential persons—including 
trustees—soliciting funds on behalf of their own pet projects.116 But the effect of this decision was 
that it made the trustees more dependent on the expertise of the directors and their full-time staff. 
With originality and seamless integration into existing programs the benchmarks by which new 
expenditures were judged, the busy trustees usually deferred to the knowledge and experience of 
those most familiar with the subjects. “It is a bad policy to have your directors your masters,” Trustee 
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Montague once complained during a meeting. “No corporation would do business that way.”117 Yet, 
for at least the first two decades of its operations the trustees remained a largely passive presence. 
Even on the seven-member Executive Committee that had to sign off on all of the CEIP’s expenditures 
it was the directors’ opinions that counted most.  
 
There was good reason for the board’s silence for, despite its hands-off approach, the CEIP’s policies 
usually tracked closely with the trustees’ preferences and expectations. The academics who steered 
the foundation lacked the personal wealth or prominent family names of their nominal overseers, yet, 
they, too, considered themselves part of the nation’s leadership elite. As Thomas Bender has noted, 
the rise of the East Coast research university in the late nineteenth century was inseparable from a 
broader movement to establish exclusive and selective social and cultural institutions that addressed 
elite concerns over the rising political influence of lower social classes.118 As professors of history, 
law and education at premier institutions of higher learning the CEIP directors considered themselves 
legitimate gatekeepers to the nation’s levers of power. The directors exhibited a variety of views on 
the social issues of their times,119 but, on balance, they shared the view of the trustees that change 
needed to be gradual and that even in a democratic polity decision-making needed to be guided by 
established elites—especially in matters as important as questions concerning war and peace. 
 
The man who best exemplified this convergence of worldviews was Nicholas Murray Butler, who 
over the course of the first fifteen years emerged as the dominant figure in the Endowment. His 
Division of Intercourse and Education was the largest of the CEIP’s three sections and later he would 
succeed Elihu Root to the Endowment’s presidency. He eventually came to dominate the board with 
a mixture of deference to the trustees’ social status and unwavering conviction in his own abilities as 
an intellectual leader.120 A succinct testament to Butler’s views on political and intellectual leadership 
is a brief collection of speeches he published in 1907 under the title True and False Democracy. To 
Butler, the individual members of a community constituted both “the people” and “the mob,” 
depending on the quality of leadership guiding them.121 Left to their own devices or misled by 
demagogues, citizens would gravitate toward short-sighted and selfish, but ultimately unsound, 
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solutions. To steer a community on a path toward progress and long-lasting prosperity required both 
wise politicians and intellectual leaders able to bring citizens to a clear-sighted understanding of the 
issues at hand. What the United States and the world needed was an “aristocracy of intellect and 
service,” a “small phalanx of eminent men” that would make the difference between progress and 
decline.122 For Butler, cultural institutions such as the CEIP and Columbia University, were thus key 
components of a liberal democracy as they elevated public discourse, trained capable leaders and 
prepared the ground for political decisions. 
 
For Butler and his fellow directors such views of joint leadership were grounded in their everyday 
lived experience as their academic sphere and the world of the trustees intersected in multiple public 
and private spaces. Many of the trustees and some of the directors, especially Butler, were engaged 
in Republican Party politics123 and they saw each other regularly while serving on the boards of other 
charities and philanthropies. Perhaps the clearest example of a shared social space pertained to the 
practice of joint upper-class sociability associated with the contemporary gentlemen’s club. Among 
the members of New York’s exclusive Century Association, for instance, were all three of the 
foundation’s divisional directors as well as at least twenty-seven trustees.124 Shaped by (mostly 
informal) selection criteria that allowed access to a variety of professions while effectively excluding 
women, racial minorities and those of lower income, elite clubs played a key role in integrating 
America’s upper class across sectoral divides.125 In this way, the club and the CEIP performed quite 
similar functions for the construction of shared knowledge and values across an upper segment of 
American society through the dual process of excluding large portions of potentially dissenting voices 
while eliding the social contingency of the views of its members. To Butler, the club was “a land 
without rich or poor, without rank or station, without title or outward marks of distinction.”126 It was 
the very homogeneity of such institutions that often left members with the impression of representing 
the mainstream of American thought on any given issue. 
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In summary, the Carnegie Endowment’s institutional arrangements are evidence of an organization 
in which cultural production was not directly subjected to economic interests but in which the two 
spheres engaged in a much more symbiotic relationship than is usually assumed. It was a site where 
economic, social and cultural forms of capital were joined to the benefit of all involved. The 
foundation’s businessmen-trustees freely dispensed money from the endowment fund with few 
questions asked while the directors returned the favor by awarding academic honors—for instance 
the almost obligatory Columbia University honorary doctorate—and by inviting trustees on 
foundation-sponsored trips abroad. In the process, the trustees and directors collectively constituted 
themselves as members of the (mostly Republican) East Coast’s foreign policy establishment with 
broadly shared ideas on the principles that should guide foreign relations. As Shotwell later described 
this intermingling of spheres, Butler “got his opinions very largely [from the] crowd in the Union 
League Club or in one of the Republican centers, where they had no knowledge whatever of the real 
American public opinion.”127 Fitting as it was in a domestic context, Shotwell’s assessment was too 
narrow in one significant aspect: while the CEIP’s directors and trustees rarely went beyond class, 
race and gender divides to solicit opinions, the same did not hold true for national boundaries. Already 
at the moment it was created, the Carnegie Endowment rested on preexisting networks that 
encompassed elites in several countries. 
 
A liberal internationalism: The founding of the Centre Européen 
That the quest for world peace and international stability would require, above all, transatlantic 
outreach was one of the starting propositions of the Carnegie Endowment. In the years leading up to 
1910, the major European powers had spun a web of military alliances and now a series of political 
crises, especially in the Balkans, left little doubt as to where the peace of the world was most 
threatened. Accordingly, establishing a presence in “those countries of Europe with which questions 
of peace and war are much more pressing and difficult“128 than in the United States was pursued with 
great urgency. The foundation’s Executive Committee first broached the issue at its third meeting on 
13 June 1911 and quickly dispatched Nicholas Murray Butler across the Atlantic to survey the 
situation on the ground. Arriving at a time when the Agadir Crisis between France and Germany over 
control of Morocco brought Europe to the brink of war, Butler settled on Paris as the most promising 
location for an office, later crediting the choice of the French capital with the “long primacy of France 
and of the city of Paris in international affairs and the use of the French language in formal diplomatic 
                                                 
127 Reminiscences of James T. Shotwell, June 1949, Nicholas Murray Butler Project: Oral History, 1951–1971, Oral 
History Office, Columbia University, 9. 
128 CEIP Year Book 1911, 21. 
44 
 
intercourse”.129 But while the CEIP was eager to act, its arrival on the Continent was not without 
possible pitfalls. Its deep pockets dwarfed the resources available to any of the European peace 
societies and hence the entire structure of the CEIP’s initial European organization was intended to 
avoid any impression of American domination.130 The Centre Européen that was inaugurated with 
little fanfare on 23 March 1912 at 24 rue Pierre Curie in Paris thus looked less like the headquarters 
of a self-assured, new global player than like an understated joint venture. It shared its office space 
with the French Association de la Paix par le Droit, whose managing officers Jean Jules 
Prudhommeaux and Jules Louis Puech also became the center’s secretary and assistant secretary.131 
 
Who were the Europeans that entered into a partnership with the American foundation? A first, if not 
entirely accurate, picture is provided by the Centre Européen’s first official contacts on the Continent: 
a thirty-member Advisory Council officially created to help set the policy of the new center as well 
as sixteen Special Correspondents who were requested to deliver occasional reports on the state of 
the cause of peace in their home countries. Both groups were politically and nationally diverse and 
included many of the most prominent pacifists of the time: Bertha von Suttner, Ludwig Quidde, 
Norman Angell, Henri La Fontaine.132 If it seemed somewhat incongruous for the temperamentally 
conservative CEIP to call principled, even radical pacifists such as von Suttner and Angell into its 
service the reality was that, as a group, these men and women were never intended to have a direct 
impact on the Endowment’s policies. The members of the Advisory Council served on a purely 
“honorary” basis, Butler assured the trustees, and their “duties [were] merely advisory.”133 Not all of 
the CEIP’s connections were created equal as many contacts were maintained either for the sake of 
political expediency or to enhance the foundation’s credibility within the European peace movement. 
 
A better guide to the social, cultural and political milieu that welcomed and sustained the CEIP’s 
European outreach is a man like Paul-Henri-Benjamin d’Estournelles de Constant, the Advisory 
Council’s first president, who gradually emerged as the Centre Européen’s de-facto director.134 A 
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retired French diplomat and now senator for the liberal Parti Radical, d’Estournelles de Constant 
already looked back on a long and distinguished career as an advocate for peace that had earned him 
the Nobel Price for Peace two years earlier. Although in the Senate he often led a lonely fight for 
peace, he was anything but a radical firebrand, holding, for instance, complete disarmament to be 
incompatible with the nation’s dignity. D’Estournelles de Constant was also already well-acquainted 
with the CEIP’s leading figures, having initiated an organization that prefigured many of the 
foundation’s early transatlantic networks: the Conciliation Internationale (CI). Founded in 1905, this 
peace organization had spread quickly to other parts of Europe and across the Atlantic by setting up 
national sections in several countries.135  
 
De Constant’s CI may be said to represent an alternative founding story of the Carnegie Endowment 
that challenges the narrative of American outreach to Europe and turns it on its head: “Be not 
deceived—in fact the Endowment is the child of the Conciliation,” d’Estournelles de Constant later 
reminded Elihu Root of the original relationship between the two organizations.136 Indeed, many of 
the key figures in the CEIP’s founding—Andrew Carnegie, Butler, Root, Robert Bacon, Joseph H. 
Choate—had started out as the American section of CI and when the CEIP arrived on the Continent 
in 1911, CI became the initial bedrock of its European network—more than two-thirds of the members 
of its Advisory Council were drawn from its ranks.137  
 
From the beginning, the CEIP was thus allied with a “very elitist” organization (Tournès)138 that was 
closely tied to Europe’s traditional liberal, bourgeois milieu. Its members were intellectual leaders 
teaching at premier academic institutions such as the Sorbonne or the University of Berlin—Henri 
Bergson, Wilhelm Julius Foerster, Heinrich Lammasch. Many were members of parliament for liberal 
political parties—Léon Bourgeois, Philip Stanhope, Albert Apponyi. They often belonged to elite 
social institutions such as London’s Reform Club or the Institut de France and wrote for liberal press 
outlets (Journal des débats, Westminster Gazette, Vossische Zeitung). Almost all of them were already 
participants in the thriving field of cultural internationalism as participants in such institutions as the 
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Inter-parliamentary Union, the International Postal Union or the Permanent Court of Arbitration.139 
This was, in short, the section of the international peace movement that Martin Ceadel has italicized 
as “pacifists” rather than “pacifists”.140 Situated at the intersection between peace activism and the 
political establishment, they considered war less an absolute evil to be condemned in moralistic terms 
than a threat to domestic and international order, to economic growth and personal liberty. 
 
The socio-cultural background of the CEIP’s European associates was representative of a key 
ambiguity in the history of early twentieth century internationalism: the tension between the liberal 
reform impulse and the quest for stability and order during times of social change. As a number of 
recent studies have shown, the internationalist movement was not so much an emancipatory 
counterweight to inequitable conditions but emerged from the same “liberal muddle” (Morefield) that 
also inspired competing ideologies.141 Deeply invested in the cause of international reform, the 
CEIP’s European partners were certainly no apologists for oppression and empire. Yet, just as their 
American colleagues on the Board of Trustees, they were by most sociological markers—class, 
education, gender, race—part of a privileged group and, on balance, their activism reflected the biases 
and prejudices of this background. Their internationalism was shaped by traditional liberal tenets, 
such as the belief that patriotism and internationalism were two sides of the same coin.142 But they 
also drew inspiration from more recent ideas circulating in academic and intellectual circles at the 
time: Spencerian Social Darwinism,143 German historicist economics,144 Henri Bergson’s philosophy 
of creativity.145 In the traditionally Anglo-centric literature on the history of liberal internationalism 
the impact of this intellectual tradition, fraught with complexity and ambiguity, has frequently been 
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For instance, perhaps the single overarching theme of d’Estournelles de Constant’s peace activism 
was his belief that Europe was facing an “onslaught of universal competition” from other parts of the 
world that made it unconscionable for governments to continue to waste their resources on intra-
European quarrels such as the Franco-German conflict over Alsace-Lorraine. Promoting peace at 
home would enable “joint external action, in the East and in the Far East.”146 The proximate trigger 
for such cultural pessimism was a “Yellow Peril” discourse common in early twentieth century 
intellectual circles in the wake of the Chinese Boxer Rebellion and the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904.147 Underlying d’Estournelles de Constant’s urge to protect the Old World’s global supremacy, 
however, was a broader turn within the liberal intellectual tradition toward support for imperial 
projects as a means for elevating the nation and mankind in general. While not in favor of brutal 
conquest, he, along with many of the CEIP’s European allies, strongly supported the idea of a 
reformed colonialism that stressed the civilizing aspect of imperial governance. Originally founded 
on the principle of the equality of all, Europe’s Imperial Liberalism had taken the reformist spirit of 
the liberal outlook, projected it outwards and justified a hierarchical world order by excluding so-
called “inferior peoples” from the domain of liberalism’s protection of the individual.148 
 
D’Estournelles de Constant’s cooperation with the CEIP was directly related to this pursuit of 
European cultural hegemony as he had identified the United States as the decisive factor that could 
reinvigorate Western Civilization. Frequent travel to the United States, addressing American 
audiences and building networks with American opinion leaders was part of a project to “make [the 
American people] realize the incalculable service they could render to civilization, as well as to 
themselves.”149 For one, he thought that the economic vigor and political stability of American 
republicanism, particularly the country’s federal architecture, could serve as an example for Europe’s 
development: 
It is important that the great transatlantic republic should so act as to stand out in contrast to 
the weaknesses of the Old World; that it should set an example of numerous and varied states 
federated together in liberty; that it should thus affirm the possibility of a form of progress 
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incredible to the Old World.150 
In addition to serving as a role model, d’Estournelles de Constant also expected the United States to 
assist the Europeans in more tangible ways. The Eight-Nation Alliance that had suppressed the Boxer 
Rebellion in China had contained a sizeable American contingent, leading the CI president to hope 
for a more permanent military alliance. In the long term, he envisioned a world in which a Pan-
American and a European confederation would join forces to defend Western Civilization against the 
“barbarism” of Asians and Africans, of Buddhists and Muslims.151 
 
D’Estournelles de Constant’s views on transatlantic partnership can, of course, not be easily 
generalized for the entirety of the Carnegie Endowment’s diverse array of European associates. The 
case of its first European director does, however, exemplify some key points that applied generally 
across the foundation’s activities both in its initial phase and in its later years: Firstly, those who 
cooperated closely with the CEIP usually did so within the context of overarching political, 
ideological or professional agendas that need to be taken into account when analyzing the 
foundation’s initiatives. Their support for the CEIP was part of a strategy to elevate, to 
transnationalize contemporary issues that they believed exceeded the grasp of the single nation state. 
Whether it was the future of European culture in an interconnected world, the stability of international 
markets or Franco-German animosity—European liberals who turned to the CEIP were concerned 
about issues not easily settled through national political systems. 
 
Secondly, the discourses that circulated in this transnational arena need to be viewed as part of the 
practice of early twentieth century elite sociability. For instance, d’Estournelles de Constant’s 
frequent invocation of “civilization” was characteristic for a field replete with references to 
“civilizational progress,” the “civilized world,” “Western civilization,” etc.—thus referencing a 
concept that was a pervasive but also nebulous feature of nineteenth and early twentieth century 
intellectual discourse.152 This lack of precise meaning was characteristic of a transnational field that 
habitually operated with abstract slogans such as the “rule of law,” the “international mind,” “Franco-
American” or “Anglo-Saxon friendship.” These were, above all, integrating social constructs that 
allowed speakers to rhetorically claim participation in a work towards a greater good while drawing 
boundaries against those external to the identity. Significantly, these boundaries were highly 
dependent on context and were constantly renegotiated as speakers presented their ideas in academic 
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journals, at conferences and receptions, while conversing in hotel lobbies or in the salons of ocean 
liners. For instance, during a U.S. lecture tour, CEIP Advisory Council member Albert Apponyi 
framed a talk on the history of his native Hungary as the story of a “bulwark of Occidental 
Civilization” against the “barbarian hordes of the East”153—thus placing Hungary and his American 
audience on the side of civilization while implicitly assigning many parts of Eastern Europe to a less 
flattering category. 
 
Thirdly, wherever the boundaries were drawn, a common feature of these transnational identities was 
an unabashed elitism and paternalism. “Nations touch at their summits. It is always the highest class 
which travels most, knows most of foreign nations,” nineteenth century British journalist Walter 
Bagehot had proclaimed.154 This view was certainly shared by the liberal internationalists connected 
to the CEIP, who considered international affairs a métier rightfully reserved to the best and the 
brightest. Participants in institutions such as Conciliation Internationale and the Carnegie Endowment 
tended to see their role not so much as giving agency to the voiceless and powerless but as constituting 
themselves as an internationalist vanguard destined for intellectual leadership. “Our members, 
mutually informed and interconnected, contribute to the maintenance of peace through their influence 
on public opinion, through the press, through parliaments and through governments themselves,” the 
CI’s program declared.155  
 
This transnational leadership was seen as all the more important as in the years following the Centre 
Européen’s founding the liberal ideals of the movement were becoming distinctly unfashionable. The 
CEIP had originally intended to complement its presence in Paris with an office in London, but with 
Britain and Germany locked in a naval arms race Butler judged that there was little utility in coming 
to the aid of a movement whose level of public support was “scanty in the extreme.”156 With Europe 
moving from crisis to crisis, few of its citizens were in the mood to discuss ideas of civilizational 
progress and universal brotherhood. Reflecting on the rise of nationalism and militarism in his own 
country, d’Estournelles de Constant lamented that the national spirit had become “wilfully falsified 
and obscured” and that even many of his friends failed to see the “patriotic character” of his 
endeavors.157 This was the atmosphere in which the CEIP launched its first major initiative on the 
Continent, an attempt to defuse Europe’s increasing polarization over events in Southeastern Europe. 
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In July 1913, as the Second Balkan War was drawing to a close, the Endowment commissioned an 
international group of experts to tour the region, investigate the situation and compile an authoritative 
report. Objective facts were to cut through the propaganda produced from all sides. Coordination 
between New York, the Centre Européen and the investigators proved time consuming, however, and 
the enterprise would take almost a year to complete.158  
 
The following summer, Butler was travelling in Europe just as the Continent was again approaching 
the brink of war. The CEIP director responded to the rising tensions by first rushing the Balkan 
Report—which distributed blame fairly widely across all parties—to the press and then calling a 
series of emergency meetings between the foundation’s European partners, chaired by d’Estournelles 
de Constant. The two men evidently hoped that assembling prominent citizens from the major powers 
at the Centre Européen for informal discussions could help defuse the situation by establishing a set 
of agreed-upon facts and perhaps tentative recommendation for a resolution of the conflict. The 
CEIP’s partners would then return to their respective countries and use their authority as leaders of 
public opinion to dampen nationalist passions. Indeed, the Centre Européen meetings, held less than 
two weeks before the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, produced consensus that the “spirit 
of militarism” had become a threat that was “sufficient to cause alarm for the near future.”159 Despite 
such unanimity of purpose the CEIP’s activists soon discovered, as did advocates for peace across 
Europe, that their calls for restraint would go unheeded. 
  
“Anarchy”! The war and the crisis of liberalism 
With the start of the First World War both the liberal internationalist field and the larger peace 
movement foundered. National borders became much less permeable, impeding transportation and 
communication, as Butler experienced firsthand when he was only able to escape the European 
conflagration after a circuitous journey through the Italian port of Genoa.160 Many German, French 
and Belgian activists, including the Centre Européen’s secretaries Jules Prudhommeaux and Louis 
Puech, left their desks and were drafted into national war service.161 Even more damaging to the field 
was the ideological polarization that ensued as artists and intellectuals sought to contribute to the 
national struggle by joining the war of ideas. D’Estournelles de Constant was among the leading pre-
war voices for peace who now argued against a quick, negotiated settlement. Prussian militarism 
would have to be defeated before justice could be restored, and that meant fighting until victory.162 
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On the other side, one of the foremost intellectuals of the German CI section, historian Karl 
Lamprecht, signed the Aufruf an die Kulturwelt, a document intended to associate Germany’s 
academic elite with the war effort by brusquely denying German war crimes in Belgium and accusing 
Germany’s adversaries of having perverted civilization with an assault on Germany’s unique 
Kultur.163 Although most Americans were shocked by the news of German atrocities in Belgium and 
France, the CEIP at first sought to remain aloof and instructed the Centre Européen to halt most of its 
activities. At a time when America debated its role in the struggle, the Endowment was not to be seen 
as violating U.S. neutrality. 
 
This changed with America’s entry into the war in April 1917, when the Carnegie Endowment joined 
the global trend of intellectuals rallying around the flag. To the great consternation of American 
pacifists who were looking to the foundation for support in trying times the CEIP abandoned its peace 
rhetoric and supported the war effort unconditionally.164 On 1 November 1917, the Executive 
Committee passed a resolution declaring victory over imperial Germany “the most effectual means 
of promoting international peace.” All CEIP stationary was replaced with a new letterhead carrying 
the banner “Peace Through Victory”165 and the Board of Trustees pledged an entire year’s worth of 
income—half a million dollars—to support reconstruction projects in France and Belgium once the 
war had been won.166 Eager to portray its Centre Européen as an integral part of the war effort the 
Paris office was rebranded as an information center for visiting American soldiers and officials, run 
in close cooperation with organizations such as the Comité France-Amérique and the American 
University Union. In a peculiar demonstration of loyalty, the Centre Européen even stopped a subsidy 
for La Paix par le Droit, the journal edited by its own secretary. Prudhommeaux had come under 
public criticism in France for his allegedly insufficient support for the war effort after having 
advocated for a timely, negotiated peace.167 
 
As disorienting as the start of the war had been for liberal internationalists, its conclusion and 
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aftermath was even more significant for the foundation’s future outlook. Neither those who had served 
the CEIP before 1914 nor those who would rise to positions of prominence in the organization over 
the course of the following two decades experienced the Great War at an age that would have made 
the event the defining, formative experience of their lifetime.168 Already set in their careers and 
worldviews, they tended not to share in the radical political and ideological responses that the war 
had engendered among the youths worldwide and generally expected that the cataclysmic violence 
would soon be followed by a return to a state of normalcy. The international system would return to 
a version of the pre-1914 order, fortified by new institutions such as a League of Nations, demobilized 
workers would return to their factories, women would again confine themselves to domestic work 
and discharged troops from Africa and India would, once returned to their home countries, accept the 
reestablishment of regular colonial rule. 
 
This was not what happened. At the end of the global upheaval class, gender and race relations were 
in flux, with many of those who had traditionally been politically marginalized demanding change: 
Socialist movements worldwide were in the ascendancy and in many countries women fought 
successfully for the right to full political participation.169 Global racial hierarchies were also 
becoming less stable, especially during what Erez Manela has called the “Wilsonian Moment” of 
1918/19 when people the world over harbored hopes for “a radical transformation of their status in 
international society.”170 Looking to work jointly for a more equitable world order, groups often 
reached out across national borders. Originally founded in The Hague in 1915, the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) became a strong voice for peace as well as for 
class and gender justice. The first Pan-African Congress was held in Paris in 1919 to coincide with 
the peace negotiations and the following year Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement 
Association held its first international congress in New York, marking the rise of Black 
Internationalism and Pan-Africanism. To these movements, the horrors of the war pointed to 
fundamental social imbalances that needed to be addressed through decisive reform if the world was 
to avoid another catastrophe.171 A speaker at the first post-war convention of the Deutsche 
                                                 
168 On the First World War as a formative generational event that brought about a shift in zeitgeist, cf. Beate Fietze, 
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Friedensgesellschaft (DFG) expressed the mood of the times when he assailed the timidity of his 
association’s leaders: “To be moral you have to be radically moral, because there is no non-radical 
morality. That’s why pacifism, too, will either have to be radical or it will not be at all.”172 
 
This outburst of reform enthusiasm was disquieting to many in the CEIP’s traditional, liberal milieu. 
The public statements and private correspondence of the foundation’s active and future associates 
during this time give testimony to a profound sense of disorientation, voiced in the language of 
disintegration and chaos: “destruction of social order” (Robert Lansing), “destructive anarchy” 
(d’Estournelles de Constant), “imminent revolution and collapse“ (Gilbert Murray).173 The world 
seemed to have become “a vast shouting and screaming mob, with fists shaking in the air and each 
trying to outscream his neighbors," an alarmed CEIP President Elihu Root told the trustees.174 The 
Russian Revolution, Communist uprisings in Germany, Hungary and Italy, or Mahatma Gandhi’s 
Noncooperation Movement in India—quite disparate events were viewed as part of a “retrograde 
movement” (d’Estournelles de Constant), a “phantasmagoria of figures and faces and events […] and 
turbulences” (Butler) against which the pre-1914 world was romanticized as an era of tranquility.175 
 
The causes advocated by groups on all sides of these issues highlights how transnational activism 
was often an extension of domestic conflicts, an attempt to circumvent political opposition at the 
national level. WILPF called on members of its twenty-one national sections to work toward land 
reform and increased taxation in their countries “to awaken and strengthen among members of the 
possessing classes the earnest will to transform the economic system in the direction of social 
justice.”176 D’Estournelles de Constant, meanwhile, seized on his connections to the Carnegie 
Endowment to rally support for the policies he thought would save the French republic. Convinced 
that radicalism was bred by economic hardship, he had long advocated for a policy of development 
(mise en valeur) that would channel funds currently used for armaments into infrastructure projects 
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in France and in its colonies.177 The CI leader’s ideas were in close accord with those of his fellow 
Parti Radical member and Minister of the Colonies Albert Sarraut, who wanted France to invest 
heavily in its overseas possession in the belief that economic growth would put a halt to Communist 
insurrection and bids for self-determination.178 As both men were struggling to convince the French 
political class to abandon its focus on physical security from Germany, d’Estournelles de Constant 
wrote to CEIP president Elihu Root, praising Sarraut’s ideas and urging Americans to work with 
France toward a benign colonial policy that would “bring about happy results for the future of 
civilization.”179 
 
European concerns over events in the Middle and in the Far East were shared in New York. At the 
December 1920 meeting of the Board of Trustees Nicholas Murray Butler launched into a passionate 
and alarmist speech, which the board members considered so important that they took the unusual 
step of instructing the secretary to have it reprinted in full in the CEIP’s upcoming annual report. In 
a lengthy monologue, Butler warned of the danger of a revolutionary wildfire spreading across the 
globe, a “highly organized and desperately made attack of a fanatical faith on the enlightening 
principles of Western civilization.” Communism would make “an immense appeal to Oriental people” 
due to their communal culture and the new creed would soon spread to the heart of the British Empire, 
to Persia and India.180 As Butler explained at the next meeting, there was reason to suspect a larger 
agenda beneath all the strife: a bid by the East to challenge the West’s supremacy by taking “control 
of the stage of civilization, instead of allowing Europe and America to occupy without challenge the 
place which they have dominated so long.”181 Protecting Europe’s colonial possession appeared to be 
essentially in America’s national interest. 
 
The sources of unrest that really concerned Butler and many of the CEIP trustees, however, were a 
very different kind of “colonies”—the diversifying immigrant communities in major American cities 
that they associated with the threat of an alien radicalism. The director’s cri de cœur at the board 
meeting was fueled by nativist and anti-Communist sentiments shared by many Anglo-Saxon elites 
at the start of the 1920s. “We are disposed to laugh at Bolshevism […] and to pooh-pooh the idea of 
it ever menacing this country. I wish that we were less cocksure than we are,” Robert Lansing warned 
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fellow board member John W. Davis. “Some day your friends on Wall Street may find their palatial 
homes alight with torches and ringing with the cries of the mob.”182 A striking visual representation 
of this siege mentality was produced in 1920 by a New York State Senate Committee which, in a local 
variant of the Palmer Raids, led police operations against institutions suspected of spreading 
socialism, anarchism and other seditious ideologies.183 As a preparatory step the committee had drawn 
up a map of “racial colonies” of Russian and Polish Jews spreading in menacing blood red across 
Manhattan from population centers in the Lower East Side, Harlem and the Bronx (fig. 1a). To men 
like Butler, Lansing and Davis, the radicalism of anti-colonial activists in Asia was a cause for 
concern in so far as it was seen as feeding a global, illiberal movement against the established order. 
The “barbarism” they were most concerned about emanated not from Indochina but from political 
and intellectual circles on the Lower East Side. 
 
 
Fig. 1a. “Map of the borough of Manhattan and part of the Bronx showing location and extent of 
racial colonies,” 1920. CEIP’s Morningside Heights neighborhood at center-left. (Courtesy of the The 
Lionel Pincus & Princess Firyal Map Division, The New York Public Library) 
 
 
As this example shows, the transnationalization of politics did not necessarily imply that those who 
cooperated were working towards identical goals—the logical link between d’Estournelles de 
Constant’s concerns about Indochina and Butler’s anti-radicalism was tenuous, at best. The glue that 
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linked diverse local projects often consisted of shared discourses rather than shared interests. 
Coalitions were built on concepts that could either be strategically appropriated or serve as 
foundations for forming more permanent transnational communities. For instance, in the early 1920s 
a discourse condemning global “imperialism” became a common frame of reference for reform 
movements across a wide political spectrum from the Communist International, to the women’s rights 
activists of WILPF, to German republican activists, to even the American Association for Outlawry, 
a group run by Chicago lawyer Salmon O. Levinson that was closely allied with Senator Borah’s 
“isolationists” in the U.S. Senate.184 In the words of political theorist Leonard Woolf there was an 
economic motive linking inequality and exploitation at home and abroad:  
[J]ust as the holder of capital in Europe has been enabled to exploit the worker and consumer 
economically for his own profit, so the white man armed with the power of the modern state 
[…] can reduce to subjection, and then exploit economically for his own profit, the land and 
labour of the less developed Asiatic and African.185 
Imperialism in this sense became a symbol signifying that the current international system was rigged 
against a large number of people—be they cotton producers in India, factory workers in the Ruhr or 
farmers in the American Midwest. To the liberal vision of a world peacefully interconnected by 
commerce, finance and travel they objected that the current system was based on domination, 
coercion and cut-throat competition. It were these iniquities, anti-imperialists argued, that bred war. 
 
A competing discourse frequently employed by those in favor of a return to the pre-war status quo 
was that of a disruption of the civilizational process. There were few attempts to define what precisely 
“civilization” entailed but one feature of this discourse was a radically different view of the value of 
empires: an institution anti-imperialist reformers regarded as standing for oppression appeared to 
many conservatives and traditional liberals as representing order, peace and continuity in governance. 
Even liberals from the former Central Powers respected the British Empire as the embodiment of the 
cosmopolitan civilizational values they cherished, safeguarding global transportation and serving as 
the “crossroads of world trade.”186 Similarly, the Habsburg Empire elicited sympathy from many 
liberals in Allied countries and the Wilsonian concept of national self-determination which had been 
used to justify its breakup was widely viewed with suspicion. To James Shotwell, it was “a most 
dangerous shibboleth” that had destroyed the “heritage of a thousand years of European culture by 
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erecting impassable frontiers” throughout the Continent.187 That multi-ethnic Austria-Hungary was 
now falling into “suffering and poverty and economic disorganization” appeared as an ominous sign 
for civilizational progress and a harbinger for future “disorder,“ according to Elihu Root.188 
 
In this debate between competing narratives of social progress liberal internationalists seemed to be 
steadily losing ground. Already on the defensive in the nationalist environment prior to 1914, social 
changes after the war increasingly placed them in a minority position. In many countries changes to 
election laws—woman suffrage, inclusion of lower income men, lowering of voting ages—created 
more diverse electorates. Mass media was becoming a pervasive feature of people’s daily lives, 
making politics, including foreign policy, a topic of wider and often more polarized debate.189 These 
changes facilitated the rise of mass political movements on the right and the left, squeezing the 
traditional liberal parties that many of the CEIP’s associates were affiliated with and assigning some 
of them to electoral obscurity.190 “Liberalism, in the eyes of the electors, had become an intrusion on 
the main issue of Socialism versus Conservatism,” a British CEIP partner later wrote of his party’s 
fate in those years.191 Subjectively, the CEIP’s milieu of powerful and influential men saw themselves 
as the main losers of the rise of mass democracy in the early twentieth century. As educated gentlemen 
they had historically claimed to embody “public opinion” and were now disconcerted as inclusive 
elections, the media and public opinion polls challenged their preeminent position.192 Elections 
consisting of a “simple count of the noses in an unorganized mob” were worth no more than “a throw 
of the dice,“ complained John W. Davis, and even the more progressive-minded James T. Shotwell 
worried about the effects of placing power “in the  hands of the ‘unintelligent’,“ which had been done 
“on a colossal scale”.193 
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Paradoxically, on the major issue that defined American foreign policy debates after the war the CEIP 
found itself on the same side as those it denounced as the “mob”. The foundation never officially took 
a stance on the debate surrounding the Treaty of Versailles but in 1919/20 many of the CEIP’s most 
prominent officers and trustees, including Nicholas Murray Butler, James Brown Scott and Elihu 
Root, were in the “reservationist” camp that opposed American membership in the League of Nations 
in its current form.194 While this may seem to destabilize the previous analysis it merely underscores 
the point in a different way: Butler’s and Root’s earlier writings and later activities leave little doubt 
that they fundamentally supported the idea of a League and that their objections to the Covenant—
regarding, for instance, insufficient protections for the Monroe Doctrine—primarily resulted from the 
intense politicization of the issue. As loyal Republicans, they were concerned that President Wilson 
was using the peace treaty to drive a wedge between the party’s Midwestern and its Eastern 
Establishment wing in the run-up to the 1920 election, thus preventing the party they viewed as most 
representative of the “intelligent” elements of U.S. society from recapturing the presidency.195 Butler 
himself launched an ill-fated run for the Republican nomination that year196 and his inability to openly 
advocate for the League under these circumstance underlines the extent to which foreign policy was 
no longer the purview of liberal elites but had become an object of mass-democracy. 
 
 
Towards an “ordered civilization” 
America’s absence from the League of Nations was only one aspect, albeit an important one, of a 
larger, systemic problem that was to define international politics in the interwar years: the 
international institutions that had replaced the nineteenth century voluntary organizations and the 
liberal governing consensus were never able to provide stability by compelling international 
coordination, resulting in a gap in global governance. The “collapse of globalization” (Robert Boyce) 
or “end of globalization” (Harold James) usually associated with the Great Depression was prefigured 
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by the institutional weakness of formal governance mechanisms after the war.197 Extensive 
international public and governmental support for the League of Nations project in 1919 masked the 
extent to which the League was an institution whose moment already appeared to have passed by the 
time it was created. It was a liberal internationalist project in an age of nationalism, an organization 
designed to “preserve peace in a world of peace” that fit poorly with the polarized political atmosphere 
surrounding international relations in the early 1920s.198 For all the talk of peace, at a time when 
political rhetoric was replete with muscular (and masculine) assertiveness the idea that sovereign 
states would put their right to exert military power or even their deeply felt material and immaterial 
claims to an international vote seemed—depending on one’s politics—either futuristic or old-
fashioned.199 
 
Liberal elites were quick to blame mass democracy for the impasse. In reality, the democratization of 
international affairs in the interwar period was far from comprehensive—for instance, most foreign 
services retained their elitist character200—but in the eyes of liberal internationalists, increased 
responsiveness to public opinion was making governments less willing to pursue long-term goals of 
international security and financial stability. The unifying theme of republican Germany’s foreign 
policy was a single-minded focus on overturning the war guilt paragraph of the Treaty of Versailles, 
a popular project at home that did little to overcome the country’s post-war isolation abroad.201 French 
internationalists worried that the “petulant, whining and demanding” tone with which the Quai 
d’Orsay pursued its quest for military security alienated key allies.202 That the United States was 
rightfully entitled to collect the war debts it was owed by France and Great Britain was habitually 
affirmed by successive administrations but struck American liberals as bad manners as well as bad 
                                                 
197 Cf. Robert W. D. Boyce, The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of Globalization (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012); James, The End of Globalization; hegemonic stability theory links this instability at least in part to 
the waning power of the British Empire, cf. Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (London: 
Allen Lane, 1973), 291–308; Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic 
Order (Princeton University Press, 2011), 93–97. 
198 Statement by Elihu Root, CEIP Board of Trustees Meeting, 7 December 1920, p. 54, Box 14, CEIP US. 
199 As Peter Jackson shows for the French case, in the patriotic atmosphere of 1919 the League of Nation was largely 
viewed as an idealist project for the future, cf. Jackson, Beyond the Balance of Power, 323–324; in Germany, 
principled support for the League quickly became a minority position in the Reichstag, cf. Joachim Wintzer, 
Deutschland und der Völkerbund, 1918–1926 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), 43–45. 
200 Cf. Peter Krüger, “Die deutschen Diplomaten in der Zeit zwischen den Weltkriegen,” in Eliten in Deutschland und 
Frankreich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Strukturen und Beziehungen: Band 1, ed. Rainer Hudemann and Louis 
Dupeux (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994), esp. 288; Georges-Henri Soutou, “Les élites diplomatiques françaises et 
allemandes au XXème siècle,” in Eliten in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Strukturen und 
Beziehungen: Band 1, ed. Rainer Hudemann and Louis Dupeux (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994), 304–305. 
201 Cf. Klaus Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich: Deutsche Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler, 1871–1945 (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1995), 383–422; Gottfried Niedhart, Die Außenpolitik der Weimarer Republik, 3rd ed., 
(Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2013), 77–78; Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik der Republik von Weimar (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985), esp. 121. 
202 Georges Lechartier, “Impressions d’Amérique,” Le Correspondant 302 (July 10, 1926): 10–11. 
60 
 
economics.203 Public “ignorance” appeared to be driving states to eschew policies liberals held 
essential to the long-term interests of nations and to preserving international stability. “We are now 
confronted with the problem of how most widely to insure the maintenance of international peace and 
the carrying forward of an ordered civilization,” Butler told the CEIP trustees.204 
 
Despite the urgency of the diagnosis, the Carnegie Endowment’s initial response to the new 
challenges necessarily reflected the political constraints of the times. The United States remained 
formally at war with Germany, Austria and Hungary until July 1921, making comprehensive and 
inclusive activism impossible for an American organization. The League of Nations was equally off 
limits as long as the issue was a matter of political controversy in the United States.205 Thus the 
foundation initially continued its post-1917 habit of focusing funds and energy on improving inter-
Allied relations. The foundation’s wartime reserves were now spent on ambitious reconstruction 
projects, such as the municipal library of Reims, the university library of Leuven and the restoration 
of the town of Fargniers, to include building a park-like “Place Carnegie,“ a post office, a library, 
public baths as well as a boys’ and a girls’ school.206 It almost seemed as if the foundation had moved 
into the construction business, however, there was an additional, social dimension to these 
expenditures. “[M]oney doesn’t amount to anything except as it serves to stimulate the activity of 
men throughout the years,” Elihu Root once summed up the CEIP’s method.207 The high profile 
reconstruction projects were intended to attract public attention and bring people from both sides on 
the Atlantic together in a common task.  
 
There was a specific political context to these efforts. By the early 1920s the Franco-American 
alliance was in poor shape. Already disappointed by the terms of the Peace Treaty, French public 
opinion had been further aggrieved when a promised Guarantee Pact in which Britain and the United 
States would have vouched for French security did not materialize. Many Americans, meanwhile, 
viewed France’s incessant calls for military and financial assurances as ungrateful and stubborn.208 
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With the two partners appearing to drift ever further apart, Butler and d’Estournelles de Constant took 
it on themselves to almost single-handedly reverse the mistakes of politicians and repair the Franco-
American friendship they believed to be crucial for the survival of civilization.209 When in the 
summer of 1921 Butler was scheduled to travel to Europe for the first time since the war in order to 
inspect the foundation’s various reconstruction projects, the two men decided to seize on this 
opportunity to turn the trip into a public demonstration of America’s continuing interest in Europe 
and, especially, France.  
 
Utilizing his press contacts, Butler actively fuelled public speculation that he was acting as a private 
envoy for the Warren G. Harding administration. In a disclosure almost certainly based on a leak by 
Butler himself, the New York Times revealed that days before sailing the CEIP director had been 
received at the White House for lunch before accompanying President Harding “to the Chevy Chase 
Club for a round of golf.”210 The idea of officiousness was eagerly taken up by the French media, 
which used Butler’s unsuccessful run for the presidency the previous year—he had garnered about 
seven percent of the vote at the Republican Convention—to play up Butler’s stature in American 
society. Le Figaro, with little regard for statistical facts, told its readers that “if it had not been for a 
few missing votes” it could have been Butler, not Harding who would have occupied the White 
House.211  Less enthusiastic was the Communist L’Humanité, which called Butler a “well-known 
friend of ‘France’” and reminded its readers: “You know who ‘France’ is.”212 
 
Who was “France”? Or, more generally, who were the partners with whom the CEIP initially wanted 
to restore international stability? Butler’s French sojourn provides a helpful case study as the Centre 
Européen’s staff diligently kept track of the director’s roughly one hundred and forty personal 
encounters. In the first place, Butler interacted with senior academics and those endowed with public 
honors.213  Almost a quarter of his French interlocutors were members of the Institut de France, many 
of these the immortels of the Académie française (Henri Bergson, Jules Cambon). Many were senior 
military officers, veterans of France’s war effort (Ferdinand Foch, Joseph Joffre, Philippe Pétain) or 
part of hereditary or economic elites, members of the nobility or of the haute bourgeoisie.214 The 
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politicians Butler met—ministers, senators and deputies—generally belonged to centrist parties 
(Aristide Briand, André Tardieu, Raymond Poincaré), with a distinct bias towards the members of the 
ruling bloc national.215 D’Estournelles de Constant accurately summed up this group as “the most 
eminent thinkers,” “statesmen” and “the elite of Parisian society.”216 But perhaps more instructive 
than those who the CEIP director met were those who did not make his appointment book: 
representatives of France’s main Socialist party SFIO or of the powerful Confédération générale du 
travail (CGT), such as Léon Blum or Léon Jouhaux, were conspicuously absent from Butler’s 
itinerary. 
 
The CEIP’s “France” was essentially representative of the politics of the transnational space that was 
to open up in the shadow of the foundation’s interwar programs and investments: intended as a 
sanctuary for a beleaguered liberalism, it was marked by a sharp cut-off toward the left and a much 
softer boundary toward the right. Butler articulated his vision for a world order founded on 
transnationally connected liberal elites in the keynote event of his journey, a public address at the 
Cour de Cassation on 18 July 1921. Nominally an exposé on current political thought in the United 
States, Butler ended his remarks on a more “universal” note in which he sketched the liberal values 
on which he wanted both domestic and international relations to be based. Taking his inspiration from 
the French motto liberté, égalité, fraternité, Butler emphasized the paramount importance of 
individual liberty to human progress. Equality, on the other hand, was subordinate and only applicable 
to a person’s legal status as economic equality would undermine development and lead to “social, 
political and economic death.”217 But he reserved most of his praise for the concept of fraternité, 
which he viewed as the stabilizing link between freedom and equality:   
Brotherhood is the solution to many problems that divide individuals as well as nations. Make 
men equal before the law, take away all the privileges, extinguish all injustices and, as old 
Mazzini said: ‘Liberty to all men of good will, under the command of the wisest and the best.’ 
Make man free, teach him to be fraternal and in return you achieve real equality […]218 
D’Estournelles de Constant reported on the success of Butler’s visit in a lengthy and enthusiastic 
report to the CEIP Trustees. In particular, the closed-door Centre Européen and the CI meetings that 
Butler had attended struck him as representing “the spirit of the family opposed to destructive anarchy. 
Noah’s Ark, if you wish.”219  
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The CEIP’s initial post-war efforts to restore an “ordered civilization” thus mainly aimed at reviving 
the role of liberal elites as arbiters of meaning in the conduct of international relations. The goal was 
to foster “a field of comraderie” among “a body of loyal, devoted citizens of various nations,” of 
“men qualified to be leaders of opinion” as Root and Butler explained at a meeting of the Board.220 
D’Estournelles de Constant urged the Endowment to “contribute more than ever to the instruction of 
individuals and peoples” in order to make the citizens of all countries “understand their true 
interests.”221 But the limitations of the CEIP’s method of conducting public diplomacy from the top 
soon became apparent. In November 1921, Aristide Briand crossed the Atlantic to personally lead the 
French delegation at the Washington Naval Conference disarmament talks, an event the foundation 
had long hoped would restore unanimity of purpose among the major powers and signal the beginning 
of the end of the “grave disorder sweeping across Europe.”222 Hosting a dinner for the French prime 
minister at New York’s Lotos Club, Butler continued the project of his Paris trip, casting France as 
the defender of “our western civilization” against the hordes of barbarism.223 Yet, all this preparation 
could not prevent the Conference from turning into another low point for Franco-American relations 
as the French delegation, pointing to their country’s unique security requirements, resisted meaningful 
disarmament proposals. Even CEIP President and American delegate at the conference, Elihu Root, 
reflected America’s exasperation with the former ally by openly cursing Gallic intransigence.224 
 
As the immediate post-war years drew to a close, criticism of the CEIP’s genteel version of 
internationalist outreach began to mount. Edward Ginn, founder of the World Peace Foundation, 
deemed the entire enterprise impractical as it was missing the “live wires” that would connect it to 
public opinion.225 Christian Lange, head of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and a CEIP special 
correspondent felt that the Centre Européen’s entire organization was unrepresentative of European 
circumstances as most key figures were either Frenchmen or “entirely French in […] outlook.”226 
While such opinions were mostly voiced behind closed doors, public pressure mounted as well when 
in 1924 journalist Arthur Ruhl published in Survey magazine what appears to have been the first in-
depth, reported profile of the Carnegie Endowment ever published. He had happened to have arrived 
for his assignment in Washington just as the international peace activist of WILPF were holding their 
congress in the city.  
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Fig. 1b. The Carnegie Endowment’s Centre Européen during the interwar years. (CEIP Year Book 
1926, p. 62 post; CEIP Year Book 1933, 98 post) 
 
Ruhl was impressed by the divergent approaches to the problem of peace taken by the two 
organizations and his final article made no secret where his sympathies lay. Why was the CEIP in the 
business of building “model squares, including shower baths and bowling alleys” in France while 
doing little to “bridge the chasm” the war had left between the peoples of the world?227 Between the 
Russian Revolution, unrest in South America and the election victories of the Labor Party in Britain 
and the Cartel des Gauches he saw “a general social overturn” that made the CEIP establishment look 
out of touch with the modern world. What he saw among the women at the WILPF Congress was a 
“passion for peace” that seemed like a breath of fresh air after visiting the staid Endowment 
headquarters at 2 Jackson Place: “Theirs was not the psychology of opportunists and pussyfooters, 
but of Christians and crusaders.”228 Ruhl’s article did much to set the tone of subsequent criticism of 
the CEIP as backwards looking and conservative. A Harper’s writer later summed up this cliché of 
the CEIP as the “rich aristocrat” among the peace societies: “sumptuous offices; flawless banquets to 
visiting diplomats; directors all in Who’s Who, average age seventy years; budget, $687,846; 
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Conclusion: The End of Liberal Internationalism? 
One year before Ruhl’s article was published, the Centre Européen had moved. Ready to abandon the 
cramped, shared apartment at rue Pierre Curie, d’Estournelles de Constant had arranged to purchase 
a five-story building at 173 Boulevard Saint-Germain in Paris’ highbrow sixth arrondissement (fig. 
1b). The new headquarters was in every way the visual representation of the CEIP’s concept of a 
distinguished transnational space: a grand, eighteenth century townhouse with vaulted windows and 
decorative sculpture-work. A former salon had been converted into a lecture hall, providing a 
dignified space for the type of exclusive, semi-public events the foundation intended to host. In the 
summer, a roof terrace afforded enticing views of the surrounding neighborhood and gave guests an 
opportunity for enlarging their circle of acquaintances while engaging in relaxed, post-lecture 
causerie. “The establishment there is almost perfect,” an impressed James Shotwell noted after his 
first visit. “The garden on the roof is much more beautiful than anyone could possibly have imagined. 
Little rock gardens filled with gay flowers […] and the foliage of ivy and box plants just as green as 
in the best of gardens down below.”230 The symbolism of the CEIP’s evident pride in its new base of 
operations was not lost on Arthur Ruhl who criticized the “unctious preoccupation with the charms 
of what is, after all, a working headquarters rather than a pleasant club.”231 
 
At a time when social movements were transforming the nature of politics, when public opinion was 
increasingly made through the mass media and grassroots organizing, the CEIP’s predilection for all 
things elite and bourgeois made the foundation appear to belong to a different era. A useful way to 
conceive of this apparent paradox is to view the type of transnational networking practiced by the 
Carnegie Endowment and the Conciliation Internationale as a bid to restore pre-war hierarchies by 
monopolizing cultural and social capital. Their move into an exclusive transnational space 
corresponds to Bourdieu’s concept of a “race” in which advantaged groups move onto a new level 
“to maintain the scarcity and distinctiveness of their assets.”232 At a time when an expanded franchise 
was diluting their domestic political power and mass cultural and social phenomena—nationalism, 
anti-colonialism, Socialism—were challenging their cultural hegemony, traditional liberal elites 
constructed new spaces of exclusivity and distinction to jointly work for the reconstruction of an 
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“ordered civilization.” The private correspondence of participants suggests that most did not conceive 
of this movement as a political project. However, as Ruhl noted, it was almost inevitable that a 
homogenous cadre of “eminent, self-perpetuating gentlemen” would tend “unconsciously to 
eliminate all that does not fall in with the habitual point of view of those more or less like 
themselves.”233 
 
The liberal internationalist activism represented by the CEIP and its allies reflected the uncertain 
prospects of their political philosophy. The nineteenth century had been liberalism’s apogee as visions 
of a strong state receded and Europe’s bourgeois elites united behind liberal national projects.234 In 
the aftermath of the war this state of affairs came increasingly under attack as voters rejected liberal 
parties at the polls and cherished causes such as free trade faced strong headwinds. Four years of war 
had demonstrated liberalism inability to guarantee peace and stability and mass movements such as 
socialists and communists on the left and the representatives of the Jeune Droite or the Konservative 
Revolution on the right explicitly challenged the liberal claim to leadership.235 Meanwhile, many 
European societies struggled with economic hardships due to post-war reconstruction and the end of 
the heady days of industrialization, shifting the political debate to questions of how to manage 
competing interests in an age of limited resources, questions to which classical liberalism did not 
have ready-made answers.236 The base of the CEIP’s brand of internationalism were those opposed 
to nationalist particularism, Socialism’s international workers’ solidarity but also to a Wilsonian 
program viewed as corrosive of established institutions.237  
 
Nevertheless, by the mid-1920s the growing criticism from even generally sympathetic observers of 
the foundation’s diminishing ability to influence public opinion had reached a level of urgency that 
was not easily brushed aside. It became apparent that the Carnegie Endowment had reached the end 
of a road in terms of tactics, if not strategy. One event that triggered the overdue process of 
reassessment was the death of d’Estournelles de Constant in May 1924. The passing of its European 
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director was a serious blow as de Constant had “practically been the entire organization” in Europe, 
as Butler privately acknowledged.238 Yet, it also created an opening for significant change and the 
following year would not only see a comprehensive reform of its European presence but also the 
resignation of President Root and a review of the foundation’s entire programmatic posture. The years 





























                                                 













































The honor of delivering the keynote address at the 1926 reunion of the Geneva Institute of 
International Affairs (GIIA)—an illustrious, international gathering of academics and bureaucrats—
went to Alfred Zimmern, the newly appointed deputy director of the League of Nation’s Institute of 
Intellectual Cooperation. The speech started on a slightly awkward note, however, as Zimmern tried 
to tactfully dodge the announced topic of his talk—“The Development of the International Mind” —
in order to address the subject that was really on his mind: the League’s intellectual cooperation 
program. He opened his presentation by apologetically explaining that the original subject had been 
“assigned” to him although he was “not very much in love with that phrase.”239 Zimmern’s uneasiness 
notwithstanding, over thirty years later international lawyer Quincy Wright would cite this very 
speech as evidence that recognition of the need for a conciliating “international mind” had been a 
widespread phenomenon during the interwar years. Seemingly independent of each other, 
intellectuals had settled on this term to describe a vital remedy for the nationalist strife destabilizing 
the world at the time. Whether willingly or not, Alfred Zimmern had posthumously become part of 
the great movement towards an “international mind” in the 1920s.240 
 
Wright’s observation has since been repeated by generations of historians of interwar internationalism 
who have noted the movement’s puzzling attachment to this particular phrase. Jeanne Morefield has 
noted that “one cannot help but be struck by the almost numbing repetition of the term,” which seemed 
to have virtually become “a prerequisite for participation in League-associated think-tanks.”241 This 
apparent preoccupation with the spiritual dimension of international politics has sometimes been 
ascribed to the lingering influence of German idealism on internationalist thinking242 while others 
view it as an artifact of the psychological construction of the nation.243 In fact, the phrase’s origin was 
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almost disappointingly prosaic: originally coined by Nicholas Murray Butler before the war, by the 
1920s the “international mind” had become part of the CEIP’s international branding campaign, 
pushed along by the Division of Intercourse and Education. Zimmern’s speech in 1926, for instance, 
was part of an event that was partially sponsored by the foundation and at which CEIP director James 
Brown Scott was in attendance. Nevertheless, the swift incorporation of the “international mind”-
language into interwar discourses does pose the question: what did people mean by it and why did 
the CEIP’s signature term spread so widely through interwar foreign policy circles? 
 
In this chapter I argue that the proliferation of the “international mind” discourse highlights a new 
development that, starting in the interwar period, would have a profound impact on the conduct of 
international affairs—networking between foreign policy institutions in several countries became a 
means to creating informal mechanisms of global governance and of pursuing political agendas 
through transnational channels. The CEIP did not invent this idea but became one of the key sponsors 
of communities of foreign policy elites by investing not primarily in individual scholars or institutions 
but in mobility between different actors. At the same time that academic and scientific knowledge 
was becoming more nationalized and fundamentally associated with the state,244 governments’ 
increasing reliance on expert advice also opened up the policy process to outside interventions. This 
became a key precondition that allowed non-governmental actors such as the CEIP to advance their 
agendas. 
 
This argument is mainly based on two conceptual claims. Firstly, in terms of historiographic context, 
it posits a broader definition of foreign policy institutions than is often employed in a literature that 
traditionally takes the simultaneous and interrelated founding of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (Chatham House) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in 1919 as its point of 
departure.245 The lack of similar initiatives in other countries, notably Germany, Italy and France, has 
tended to make the historiography of top-level foreign policy networks a very Anglo-Saxon story. 
According to IR historian Andrew Williams, France fell behind Anglo-American innovative thinking 
on multilateralism and international organization by clinging to a “backward-looking and emotional” 
approach, concluding that the French “effectively wrote themselves out of the debate about the global 
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Yet, discussions on the future of international affairs were not tied to one specific organizational type 
as a broadening literature on related institutions has demonstrated: international relations departments 
at major universities, research institutes for international politics and economics, transnational 
institutions, often affiliated with the League of Nations, such as GIIA or the Institute for Intellectual 
Cooperation all thrived in the interwar period.247 Broadening the lens even further, organizations 
usually categorized as pacifist or internationalist societies—i.e. advocacy groups—often had much 
closer connections to policy discussions than one would assume.248 For instance, under closer scrutiny 
many of the major League of Nations societies turn out to have been not so much grassroots advocacy 
groups for peace and cooperation but public-private partnerships, partly financed by foreign 
ministries to facilitate foreign policy debates between different sectors of society. All of these 
institutions represented different positions on the spectrum of a new intermediary space between the 
work of academic expertise, political decision-making in governmental bureaucracies and the public.  
 
Secondly, the chapter focuses its analysis of the impact of philanthropic interventions on the social 
dimension of knowledge construction. The importance of foreign policy expert networks to interwar 
internationalist philanthropy—especially that of the CEIP and the Rockefeller Foundation—is 
increasingly attracting attention.249 Most studies approach this subject with the methodological tools 
usually employed for investigating scientific philanthropy by seeking to demonstrate the 
dissemination of specific knowledge systems through pecuniary incentives, especially grant 
programs.250 A closer look at the actual practice of the CEIP’s interventions, however, underlines how 
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contemporary assertions of promoting science need to be historicized. The emergent social sciences 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century largely sought to imitate the popular natural and life 
sciences that had become so closely associated in the public imagination with material and 
civilizational advancement. In the process, the term “scientific” became so pervasive and laden with 
normative associations that, as John Hepp points out, it became almost a synonym for “good.“ Claims 
to realism and empiricism were a means of associating new academic fields such as the study of 
international relations and international law with the supposedly masculine virtues of the hard 
sciences, as opposed to more subjective and impressionistic modes of knowledge production.251 This 
was particularly true for the CEIP, which, unlike e.g. the Rockefeller Foundation, never made an 
effort to systematically formulate what it considered “science.” Rather than tracing the dissemination 
of scientific knowledge systems, this chapter seeks to analyze the foundation’s “international mind” 
campaign in order to explore the social conditions under which knowledge was constructed and 
codified. 
 
The starting point for the CEIP’s efforts to promote an “international mind” in Europe was an internal 
reform process that took place in 1924/25. Originally set in motion in the wake of d’Estournelles de 
Constant’s death, this process was accelerated and widened to the entire organization when Nicholas 
Murray Butler took over the Endowment’s presidency the following year. While his new office 
invested him with little additional power, it allowed him to make his favored phrase the hallmark of 
all CEIP activities. Evidence of this change is easy to find, as soon after Butler’s takeover the 
“international mind” was everywhere in evidence: it dominated the foundation’s press releases; it was 
imposed on recipients, with book donations to public libraries labelled “International Mind 
Alcoves”;252 it was used unremittingly in internal office correspondence, sometimes in creative ways 
(“internationally-minded”).253 It is, however, much more difficult to identify what the substantive 
change behind this rhetoric was.  
 
At its most basic level, promoting the “international mind” in itself constituted a shift in the CEIP’s 
posture as, for the first time, the foundation claimed to have an agenda of its own. Not wanting to be 
seen as aggressive American missionaries, much of the CEIP’s pre-1914 spending in Europe had 
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simply been directed at the Bureau international de la paix in Berne, which, in turn, distributed these 
funds among various European peace societies.254 This created a double-barrier between the 
foundation and the actual usage of money, making the CEIP dependent on the aims of other (usually 
pacifist) organizations. The ambitious reconstruction projects of the early 1920s, while viewed 
internally as an effective tool for fostering transatlantic amity, never became publicly associated with 
a coherent philanthropic approach. In this situation, uniform adoption of the “international mind” 
language signaled that the foundation had begun to pursue a recognizable program. The challenge 
that remained was to reconcile this new assertiveness with the concerns about resistance to foreign 
domination that had originally led CEIP leaders to eschew such an explicit agenda in the first place. 
While this tension would always remain problematic, the foundation gave an indication of how it 
hoped to resolve it by first acquiring a new group of European partners. 
 
 
Government intellectuals: Reforming the Centre Européen 
In July 1924, two months after d’Estournelles de Constant’s death, CEIP Trustee Andrew J. Montague 
arrived in Paris for a mission in crisis management. Since the loss of its director, the Centre Européen 
had appeared to drift aimlessly and the impressions gained by Montague during his ten days in Paris 
confirmed the foundation’s fears: ever since the war, the Paris bureau had effectively functioned as 
an extension of d’Estournelles de Constant’s personal office and his death had, in Montague’s 
estimation, not even left a sufficient core on which to base a reorganization effort.255 Even the Centre 
Européen’s auditor admitted that the bureau was overstaffed and that the director’s loss had left “a 
profound void and a lack of occupation.”256 Montague, however, did not come unprepared. In sending 
the Virginian on his mission, Nicholas Murray Butler had already anticipated difficulties and 
suggested broad outlines for a comprehensive reform of the CEIP’s European presence: a permanent 
American representative was to be put in charge, assisted by a new administrative body that would 
replace the old Advisory Council—“a small but effective committee of consultation and advice.” 
Montague endorsed both ideas when he drew up recommendations after his visit and proposed 
selecting “reputable and influential men […] a composite of publicist and statesman, with strong 
humanitarian sympathies” for the new committee.257 
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Fig. 2a. Meeting of the Comité d’Administration in June 1934. Standing, left to right: Henri 
Lichtenberger, J.A. Spender, Guillaume Fatio, Moritz Julius Bonn, Georges Lechartier, Pal Teleki, 
Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron, Alfred Nerincx, Earle Babcock; seated: Albert von Mensdorff, Carlo 
Sforza, Nicholas Murray Butler, André Honnorat, Piero Misciattelli. (CEIP Year Book 1935, 74 post) 
 
 
Indicating the political sensitivity of transnational activism at this level, the plan was put into practice 
the following summer with cooperation and consultation of the French government and at least tacit 
acquiescence of the U.S. administration. The foundations for the Comité d’Administration were laid 
on the evening of 23 June 1925 at a private dinner given by Butler at Paris’s elegant hotel Plaza 
Athénée, with former and future Prime Minister Aristide Briand and the American Ambassador 
Myron T. Herrick in attendance.258 What emerged from the meeting was not only agreement to the 
plan of enlisting the services of a small group of European advisers but also on the preliminary 
composition of such a body, including the identities of the German (Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron), 
Austrian (Josef Redlich) and Greek members (Nicolas Politis) who were to participate. The French 
representatives slated for a position on the Comité were all personally in attendance at the Plaza 
Athénée that night: mathematician Paul Appell, literary scholar Henri Lichtenberger, journalist 
Georges Lechartier and politician André Honnorat.259 They formed the core of a group that would 
eventually grow to fourteen members (fig. 2a); all in all twenty-one persons would serve on the 
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Comité until it was dissolved shortly before the Second World War.260 
 
There was much continuity between the new Comité d’Administration and the old Advisory Council 
in terms of the social, cultural and political profile of its members. The CEIP’s European associates 
continued to come from middle class or lower nobility backgrounds and, as for gender representation, 
the Comité was even less diverse than the previous body—not a single woman was invited to join the 
group. French, the traditional language of European diplomacy, remained the working language, 
effectively restricting membership to those who had enjoyed a comprehensive classical education. In 
political terms, the Comité moved the CEIP even closer to Europe’s traditional liberal milieu than had 
previously been the case. For instance, all three British members were fixtures of the country’s liberal 
intelligentsia and deeply tied to the Liberal Party’s institutional infrastructure. J.A. Spender and 
Alfred Gardiner were both former editors of liberal newspapers, the Westminster Gazette and the 
Daily News, respectively. Spender and Gilbert Murray were also both part of the leadership of the 
National Liberal Federation, a loose consortium of British liberal organization and all were members 
of the Reform Club.261 German Moritz Julius Bonn was an active member of the Berlin branch of the 
Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP), well-connected among the capital’s liberal establishment and 
once ran unsuccessfully for a DDP Reichstag nomination.262 With one notable exception, no self-
described conservatives, fascists, socialists or communists ever served on the Comité.263  
 
What differentiated the Comité d’Administration from its predecessor—and thereby signaled the 
CEIP’s new approach in seeking to promote the “international mind” in Europe—was that it was 
manifestly a working committee. Members of the Advisory Council had been recruited with a view 
to their eminent social status in the hopes that their credibility would inoculate the Centre Européen 
against charges of undue interventionism. Already at the time of its founding in 1911, the median age 
of Council members had been sixty-eight. In contrast, the members of the new Comité were, with 
few exceptions, in the prime of their careers. With a median age of fifty-six in 1925, they had been 
selected on account of their current, active affiliations rather than based on past service. Even more 
significantly, the majority of the Comité’s members belonged to a new category of actors in foreign 
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policy debates. Unlike the members of the Advisory Council, few of them were prominent 
personalities in their own right but collectively they were well connected among a group of scholars 
and technical experts at the intersection of academia, government and the public that was becoming 
more and more central to shaping foreign policy debates. 
 
The emergence of this field owed much to the peculiar legacies of the First World War, as the conduct 
of the conflict and the method of its settlement had made the boundaries between government and 
civil society more porous. The total mobilization of societies for war and later the complexity of 
issues debated at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 had exceeded the expertise of traditional 
ministerial bureaucracies. Consequently, voices of outside experts had gained new weight. In addition 
to CEIP directors James Shotwell and James Brown Scott, several later members of the Comité 
d’Administration participated in the peace negotiations. Hungarian geographer Pal Teleki had led his 
government’s study group in preparation of the conference, at which his own cartographic work on 
the country’s ethnic composition became central to Hungary’s territorial claims.264 German economist 
Moritz Julius Bonn was in Paris to advise his delegation on economic and financial issues while 
international law professor Nicolas Politis participated as Greek foreign minister.265 The presence of 
academic experts during negotiations was of course not a radically new development. Governments 
had always relied on outside advice and especially since the two Hague Conferences in 1899 and 
1907 international lawyers, often associated with the peace movement, had taken on a more visible 
role in assisting foreign offices.266 What was new, however, was not only the depth of involvement 
but also the breadth of disciplines that were sought out by the state: experts in economics, geography, 
history, ethnography, etc. were called into service to assist in the war effort and to help formulate 
national policy positions in preparation of negotiations. 
 
In many cases these “scholars hastily and in some cases injudiciously summoned from their books to 
legislate for an anarchic world,” as one participant described them later, did not disappear in the ivory 
tower after they had left Paris.267 One of the legacies of the peace settlement was that it 
institutionalized financial and legal questions as a key aspect of international relations. Interwar 
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diplomacy revolved around complex issues such as war debts, reparations, disarmament regulations 
or the rights of minorities, ensuring that governments’ reliance on technical expertise would continue 
to grow.268 The war thus hastened the formation of a new class of actors between government, 
academia and public policy which Gérard Noiriel has termed the “government intellectual” 
(intellectuel de gouvernement).269 These experts derived their immediate political influence from 
acting as governmental advisers, technical delegates at international conferences or informal envoys. 
They shaped discussions within academic disciplines and engaged an educated public by publishing 
articles in journals and newspapers that usually catered to select and influential audiences. It was this 
new field that became the main target for the CEIP’s efforts to propagate the “international mind,” 
and the members of the Comité d’Administration were exemplary of this shift. 
 
A claim to special expertise, usually in the form of academic credentials, was the main common 
characteristic of members of this field. Some were part of the rapid institutionalization of academic 
research in the field of international relations in the interwar period with universities endowing chairs 
for international politics across Europe and worldwide.270 Half of the members of the Comité had 
served as university professors at some point in their career and a number had participated in the 
founding of new research institutes that provided training opportunities for future civil servants. As 
rector of the Sorbonne, Paul Appell oversaw the founding of the Institut des Hautes Études 
Internationales (IHEI) in 1921. A cooperative arrangement between the university’s law faculty and 
the French government, especially the Quai d’Orsay, the institute was intended as a school for future 
diplomats and focused primarily on instruction in international law, economics and history.271 Moritz 
J. Bonn taught at a similar German institution, the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHP), which, 
although also catering to a wider audience, cooperated with the Wilhelmstraße in training future 
diplomats.272 The CEIP also maintained close relations with another German institution, the Institut 
für Auswärtige Politik (IAP) in Hamburg, founded in the wake of the war by its frequent contributor 
Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy.273 Scholarly credentials, however, were not the only possible 
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source of expertise in this field. Dutch businessman Ernst Heldring and Swiss banker Guillaume Fatio 
were also part of the Comité, where they could claim detailed, personal knowledge on the 
international financial and commercial flows that were shaping international relations. 
 
Intermittent or permanent government service was another marker of the new expert field. 
Government intellectuals often saw it as their patriotic duty to bring their specialist knowledge to 
bear on the issues of the day by advising ministers, serving on official commissions or representing 
the state during international negotiations. For Bonn, the Paris Peace Conference was the start of a 
career as one of the German government’s key experts on reparations policy, advising delegations to 
the Brussels, Genoa and Rapallo conferences and serving on the German delegation to the World 
Economic Conference in 1927.274 Nicolas Politis abandoned his academic career in international law 
to fully join the Greek foreign service as Ambassador to France while continuing to stay engaged 
with the latest developments in the legal field. As a professor of German literature and language with 
numerous contacts on the other side of the Rhine River, Henri Lichtenberger informally advised 
successive French governments on Franco-German relations.275 By framing their expert knowledge 
in ways that made them accessible to governments, these men participated—however indirectly—in 
the formulation of national interests and strategies, a fact that made them attractive partners for a non-
governmental organization such as the CEIP. 
 
National governments and their bilateral negotiations were no longer the only sites where 
international politics was made. As administrative officials, lawyers, judges and committee members, 
government intellectuals performed and constructed international relations through new institutions 
of global governance such as the League of Nations Secretariat, the International Labor Office (ILO) 
or the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). Spanish Comité member Rafael Altamira y 
Crevea was a PCIJ judge of the first hour and Josef Redlich would join the court in 1931. The two 
former law professors Politis and Bo Östen Undén represented their respective governments as 
delegates at League Assembly meetings. More broadly, government intellectuals such as the Comité 
members were central to the functioning of the League’s technical sections that in recent years have 
increasingly received scholarly attention as important venues for the development of norms and 
standards governing all aspects of international life.276 For instance, Gilbert Murray had been 
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instrumental in setting up the League’s International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC), 
whose central committee included James T. Shotwell and Pal Teleki, while Lichtenberger and Politis 
were active in the movement’s national sections.277 The service of government intellectuals on League 
commissions was significant because it challenges the notion that the nation state reigned supreme 
during this time. As Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessels have shown, discussions in these 
settings were shaped to a significant degree by the professional or ideological commitments of 
members and of League officials278—including, potentially, allegiances to non-governmental groups.  
 
Finally, government intellectuals saw it as their task to elevate public discourse on international 
relations by publicly sharing their insights. Not only the journalists on the Comité—J.A. Spender, 
Alfred Gardiner and Georges Lechartier—but also many other of its members regularly published 
opinion pieces on international affairs in mass circulation newspapers, such as The Times and Berliner 
Tageblatt, as well as more in-depth analyses in high-brow publications such as the Revue des deux 
Mondes and Europäische Revue. A significant new institution for engaging an informed public on 
matters relating to foreign affairs was the League of Nation society. As president of the LNU’s 
executive committee, Gilbert Murray was an influential voice in an organization boasting half a 
million members, making the LNU perhaps the politically most influential interwar NGO.279 With 
Paul Appell and Moritz J. Bonn the Centre Européen’s Comité also included board members of the 
French and German League of Nations societies.280 While these organizations had often started at the 
end of the war as advocacy groups for a liberal, conciliatory peace settlement, by the mid-1920s many 
of them—particularly the LNU, the AFSDN and the DLfV—had developed into a very different, 
essentially corporatist, direction. Their board membership reflected the interests of a broad array of 
social and political groups and their activities were partially financed by national governments. Thus 
reorganized, League of Nations societies worked to harmonize foreign policy conceptions between 
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the government and influential sectors of society while mobilizing public support for the 
government’s negotiating positions in front of an international audience.281 
 
In summary, in its attempt to spread the “international mind” in Europe, the CEIP relied on a group 
of well-connected members of national foreign policy establishments whose professional background 
and social activities reflected the increased role of technical expertise and public engagement in the 
making of foreign policy. These men also embodied the ambiguous effect of the new age of expertise 
on international politics: on the one hand, academic knowledge emerged as a battleground in foreign 
affairs with governments enlisting scholars to justify political demands, consequently increasing 
nationalist polarization.282 On the other hand, the opening of the policy process to often 
transnationally connected expert communities called the autonomy and self-sufficiency of national 
governments into question. Historians have famously speculated whether John Maynard Keynes’s 
sympathy and affection for the German banker and financial expert Carl Melchior at the Paris Peace 
Conference influenced his negative assessment of the Treaty of Versailles.283 This encounter was 
merely symptomatic of a much larger phenomenon as Paris 1919 became a catalyst for cross-border 
contacts between experts that would intensify over the following years. Even a cursory look at the 
composition of the delegations shows that many of those present at Paris would later become central 
figures in interwar foreign policy discussion as government officials, academic experts at 
international conferences or leaders of non-governmental organizations.284 
 
 
“Fat Boys”?  Grant-making and narratives of national sovereignty 
When the members the Comite d’Administration gathered for the first time around a large conference 
table at the Centre Européen in Paris in October 1925, the meeting was officially chaired by Henri 
Lichtenberger. There was little doubt, however, that the focus of attention was a quiet, unassuming 
man in his mid-forties who sat right across from him.285 Although he nominally was only present to 
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listen in on the conversations of the CEIP’s European advisors, Earle Babcock, the new director of 
the Centre Européen who had been personally nominated by Butler, would have a significant say over 
which of their proposals would eventually be approved by New York headquarters and thus become 
part of CEIP policy. When Babcock had reached Paris a few months earlier he participated in the 
arrival of the latest American export to Europe—the foundation manager. Two years later, an 
anonymous writer in the New Republic satirized the new philanthropic professionals who were 
becoming more and more central to the functioning of American research institutions as the “Fat 
Boys.” With the “consciousness of millions behind them” these men exuded an air of competence 
that stemmed less from a thorough understanding of the issues at hand than from their mastery of the 
process: “[T]hey seemed to know everything, although in reality they only knew about everything. 
They […] knew what was going on but it was always the fact that something was going on, rather 
than what that something was, which seemed to interest them.”286  
 
Babcock was strikingly unrepresentative of this cliché. As a professor of Romance languages and 
literature on leave from New York University his academic credentials were impeccable and his local 
knowledge was also beyond reproach. He had run the school of the American Red Cross in Paris 
during the latter stages of the war and then served as director of the American University Union in 
the French capital from 1920 to 1921. His friends praised him as a man of “rare diplomacy” who 
naturally steered clear of controversy: “He did not argue, nor did he ever show resentment. When 
compromise seemed impossible, he would immediately divert the matter into a different channel.”287 
Neither under Babcock’s leadership nor under the aegis of his successor Malcolm W. Davis in the 
second half of the 1930s, was there much evidence of the blustering displays of financial power that 
the New Republic had mocked. 
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Fig. 2b. Major CEIP subsidies to existing groups and institutions in Europe, 1919–39. 
 
This cautious attitude was reflected in the Centre Européen’s decision-making processes. We might 
expect the CEIP’s campaign for the “international mind” to have consisted of an effort to sponsor 
research in the social sciences that conformed to a set of ideas and practices favored by the foundation. 
Grant requests were indeed considered at all meetings of the Comité d’Administration, yet, except in 
those rare cases when a member personally made a forceful case for approving a specific grant, few 
of these applications were ever approved. In fact, an overview of grants, subventions in the Centre 
Européen’s French office parlance, approved by the bureau during the following fifteen years appears 
to point toward a rather disappointing performance (fig. 2b). None of the institutions which received 
money through the Paris bureau were elite research institutes in the strict sense of that word and even 
when including payments to European institutions through the New York office the picture remains 
unimpressive. Most organizations received no more than a few thousand dollars per year, far below 
the five- or six-figure sums routinely handed out by the Rockefeller Foundation. 
 
What accounts for this apparent lack of activity? A possible reason for the CEIP’s hesitancy to 
distribute funds would be simple economics. While its annual income of about half a million dollars 
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was enough to command public attention, the foundation was not in the same league as the top players 
in the philanthropic field. The Rockefeller Foundation’s and the Carnegie Corporation’s vast 
endowment funds supported budgets that were more than ten times larger and, in fact, throughout the 
1920s and 1930s the CEIP had to petition the Carnegie Corporation for assistance to cover its budget 
shortfalls.288 On the other hand, it is easy to overstate the Endowment’s financial woes. Its narrowly 
defined scope of furthering international peace meant that resources could be concentrated on a much 
smaller field. Furthermore, the potential European recipients of CEIP grants were usually either cash-
strapped academic institutions or advocacy groups, mostly organized as voluntary associations, with 
little revenue beyond a few hundred annual membership contributions. “I do not know how the 
Carnegie grant originated,” an astonished British activist wrote after surveying his organization’s 
financial records, “but it is in rather a different category from the money collected in this country, 
which is trivial in comparison with it.”289 With the exception of Britain’s Chatham House and League 
of Nations Union, few European institutions could sponsor activities that even approached the scale 
of the programs of America’s major philanthropies (fig 2c).290 
  
Rockefeller Foundation, Social Sciences Division (US) 2,617,000 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (US) 585,000 
League of Nations Union (UK) 138,000 
Royal Institute of International Affairs (UK) 94,000 
Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (GER) 72,000 
La Paix par le Droit (FR) 4,500 
Association Francaise pour la SDN (FR) 1,800 
 
Fig. 2c – Annual income of a sample of academic, policy and advocacy organizations in U.S. 
dollars, ca. 1930.291 
 
In fact, it was partly this very imbalance in terms of financial prowess that led the CEIP to eschew 
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grant-making on a larger scale. Its low profile, represented by Babcock’s “rare diplomacy,” was a 
matter not of economics but of political culture. The process by which a society formulated its 
national interests and the strategies to pursue them was considered a crucial component of national 
sovereignty, the exclusive domain of the citizens of a given state. Accepting money from the CEIP—
an organization that stood outside the national community and made no secret of promoting a partial, 
internationalist viewpoint—always carried the seeds of scandal for European research institutes or 
advocacy groups. As Butler noted, many Europeans feared that under the cloak of philanthropy the 
CEIP was furthering “American domination or American dictation in European affairs.”292 Once 
publicly revealed, Carnegie funding of a European organization could quickly be used by critics both 
on the right and the left to charge the recipient with having sold out to shadowy foreign interests or 
having become part of capitalist machinations. In those cases where institutions did ask for and accept 
money from the Americans they usually showed no inclination to advertise that fact. 
 
The CEIP was sensitive to such concerns and went out of its way to provide some degree of protection 
through a combination of unorthodox accounting practices and opaque public statements. For 
instance, there was no attempt to bring to the attention of the French public the fact that the Carnegie 
Endowment had been instrumental in founding AFSDN with a grant that was at least partially 
funneled through d’Estournelles de Constant’s Conciliation Internationale. The CEIP continued to 
support the French pro-League activists with an annual subvention until at least the mid-1920s, a fact 
that went unmentioned in the Endowment’s public reports.293 Even more sensitive were financial 
relationships that crossed the former battle lines of the war. Until the late 1920s, the foundation’s 
annual reports only obliquely referred to “cooperation” with German peace societies while actual 
payments were disguised in a manner more reminiscent of espionage techniques than of philanthropy: 
funds originating in New York were first deposited into the Centre Européen’s bank account at 
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, then transferred via Crédit Industrielle & Commerciale to a Swiss 
account in Basel, care of CEIP Special Correspondent Otfried Nippold, before finally making their 
way to the intended German recipients.294 
 
The problem of avoiding public opprobrium did not become any less salient as the CEIP moved 
progressively toward cooperation with technical foreign policy experts. One of the first initiatives of 
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the Centre Européen under its new leadership had been a formal cooperation agreement between the 
CEIP and the Sorbonne’s IHEI. Throughout the academic year, lectures on international relations 
were held at the foundation’s headquarters at Boulevard Saint-Germain that mainly featured IHEI 
instructors and were part of the Institute’s regular curriculum. Again, this arrangement was not 
publicly labelled as a subsidy even though the expenses of roughly 100,000 francs per year would 
have made it—if paid through IHEI rather than to the instructors directly—one of the foundation’s 
largest ongoing grant programs in Europe.295 Even this setup, however, appears to not have entirely 
quelled French concerns of becoming too closely identified with a foreign financier and over the 
course of the following years a tug-of-war developed that pitted the foundation’s desire to advertise 
its accomplishments against IHEI’s preference to omit any public mentioning of the arrangement. 
Eventually, a disappointed Earle Babcock came to very much “doubt that the Institute regards its 
collaboration with the Centre Européen as the same source of pride” as the Americans did.296 
 
Political pressure emanated not only from Europe, however, as in the United States, too, the CEIP’s 
overseas connections were frequently scrutinized for evidence that it was being used by foreign 
powers to influence the American public. Already before the war the CEIP had been mentioned in the 
context of conspiracy theories alleging that New York bankers and the City of London were 
conspiring to defraud American farmers and workers of the fruits of their labor. In March 1914, 
Secretary James Brown Scott was summoned before a Senate Committee investigating lobby 
influences on American politics, where he was compelled to produce detailed documentation on the 
CEIP’s expenditures.297 The episode left a profound impression on the young foundation. Firstly, 
secrecy and deliberately patchy record-keeping became part of its modus operandi as the directors 
remained mindful of the possibility of future Congressional subpoenas. Secondly, it became the 
starting point of the foundation’s alienation from the legislative branch as the suspicion that 
nationalists in Congress wanted to squash the Endowment became a lasting concern. Thirdly, it was 
the initial impetus for the CEIP’s gradual relocation from Washington to New York. As an 
organization based in the federally administered District of Columbia, any charter of incorporation as 
a tax-exempt organization would have had to be approved by Congress. “[We] came to the conclusion 
that the charter was going to be so amended before it got through Congress that it would be equivalent 
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to taking our money away from us,” Elihu Root later quipped.298 
 
After the war, the CEIP’s European connections continued to be scrutinized by those suspecting East 
Coast elites of unpatriotically colluding with foreign economic and imperial interests. Behind the 
foundation’s campaign for international understanding the Chicago Daily Tribune suspected nothing 
more than a sly maneuver by the British to trick Americans out of their deserved war debt payments. 
To the Tribune, the “international mind” was not so much transforming Europe but enfeebling 
America, while Britain steadfastly adhered to the “‘national mindedness’ which the Carnegie 
endowment is striving to transmute in America into an enlightened ‘international mindedness.’”299 
Criticism also came from the U.S. government, which watched the foundation’s dealings on the 
Continent with weary suspicion of its implications for American diplomacy. When in 1924 James 
Shotwell returned from one of his numerous trips to Geneva, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes 
personally threatened him with criminal prosecution under the Logan Act for conducting 
unauthorized negotiations with foreign governments.300 Just as Europeans needed to avoid the 
appearance of becoming beholden to American interests, a too close association with institutions 
linked to European governments also carried risks for the CEIP. Especially Butler was acutely aware 
that the trustees would not have countenanced a development in which the foundation would have 
become widely regarded as an unpatriotic agent of foreign powers. 
 
These public pressures had a direct effect on the CEIP’s philanthropic strategy. One of the trustees 
later charged that a significant part of the foundations spending had constituted “patronage dispensed 
by Dr. Butler to titled persons whose contribution in America to the cause of peace is, to use the 
kindest word, vague.”301 Outside critics shared this view, claiming that the foundation was mainly 
focused on hosting “champagne banquets” and “provid[ing] rich sinecures for a favored group.”302 
An analysis of a sample of all grants paid through the Centre Européen in the years 1927 to 1931 
would seem to corroborate such allegations, indicating the eclectic variety of recipients: they included 
academic and semi-academic institutions in the field of international relations research such as the 
DHP or the University of Vienna. A second category comprised institutions that furthered the public 
education and publicity concerns of the foundation, such as payments to the Austro-American 
Institute of Education or the Ligue Francaise d’Education Morale. A significant number of payments, 
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however, went to causes and organizations that had an, at best, tenuous relationship to the CEIP’s 
stated objectives such as the 30,000 francs that went to La Bienvenue Francaise, a public diplomacy 
charity founded by Marshal Ferdinand Foch that tended to prominent visitors to France, or the 8,000 
francs that went to Paul Appell’s widow for unspecified “educational work.” The vast majority of 
items fell in between these categories—showing a reasonable connection to the foundation’s mission 
but also clearly directed toward long-standing or recently acquired friends and political allies of the 
foundation.303 
 
These “grants” often came with so few strings attached in terms of a concrete and verifiable 
contribution to a clearly defined goal that they resembled less contractual arrangements, openly 
negotiated quid pro quos, than charitable gifts. Yet, rather than conceiving of these acts as spendthrift 
generosity or eccentricity, as the CEIP’s critics charged, it is helpful to view them as a consequence 
of the political climate in which the foundation was operating. “You just fritter away the money in 
little things that don’t amount to much. You please some particular individual but you don’t make any 
impression on public opinion,” Butler once expressed his own frustration at these expenditures.304 
Rather than interpreting such payments through the lens of scientific philanthropy it thus appears 
more apt to view them in light of sociological and anthropological approaches to commodity 
exchanges that interpret gift-giving as allowances “with a view to creating, maintaining or 
regenerating the social bond” (Caillé).305 Bourdieu, following the classic study by Marcel Mauss, 
emphasizes the implied obligations that accompany a gift and the asymmetrical power relationship 
that follows from accepting it.306 The CEIP’s grant making in Europe centered on accruing social 
capital through a network of associations in which the patronage of its argent d’influence (Tournès) 
created new contacts, reaffirmed existing links and generated good will. It was not any single 
transaction that counted—gratitude for grants, as all forms of social capital, could be fleeting and was 
not easily converted into concrete action—but the accumulation of small acts.307 
 
This was also where the function of the Comité d’Administration and its relationship to the CEIP’s 
leadership comes into clearer view. For purposes of public presentation, participation of respected 
European academics, journalists and civil servants in the foundation’s decision-making process was 
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designed to address local concerns over the legitimacy of American intervention. Its internal function, 
however, was to provide the foundation with a road map to its European field of activities. Through 
the members of the Comité, the CEIP directors gained local knowledge on the social and political 
dynamics both between and within societies. Discussions, both at the formal meetings of the Comité 
and during informal social gatherings, alerted the foundation’s officers to opportunities and pitfalls, 
to key relationships that needed to be cultivated and to persons and institutions that should better be 
avoided.308 Yet, the direct grant payments that resulted from the Comité’s deliberations were 
frequently more intended to provide the atmosphere for the larger work of the foundation than in itself 
perpetuate the “international mind.” 
 
 
“To link up people like yourself and myself…”: Knowledge as practice 
“Keep the initiative in your own hands. Do not wait for persons to come to you, but seek them out 
and make sure that the influence of our undertaking grows steadily in proper and helpful quarters”—
those were Butler’s marching orders to his new Paris director when Babcock took over the Centre 
Européen.309 The CEIP president’s energetic enthusiasm underlines the change in the CEIP’s 
European strategy toward actively trying to shape internationalist activism rather than merely 
financing it. This started with the Centre Européen itself. Among Butler’s original instructions was 
to make “the building a center for international activity.”310 A ground-floor library was set up whose 
international press selection attracted a diverse audience of students, teachers and journalists from 
over three dozen countries. Its lecture hall became the venue for regular presentations and discussion 
rounds that brought in a cast of internationally renowned foreign policy scholars and practitioners. In 
addition to conducting its own programs, the CEIP also rented out or donated part of its office space 
to other internationalist ventures, further cementing its claim to becoming one of Paris’s premier 
addresses for the discussion of international relations.311 The heart of the operation, however, was the 
Centre Européen’s new bureaucracy that tended to the correspondence that kept the Paris office in 
daily touch with the American headquarters and with its contacts throughout Europe. At the time 
when Babcock arrived in Paris in the summer of 1925 he had led a permanent staff of five. Four years 
later, that number had almost tripled as a growing number of secretaries, typists, stenographers and 
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archivists were needed to keep up with the flow of correspondence. Total salaries during the same 
time period more than quadrupled from 75,180 to 331,705 francs as annual expenditures for work 
conducted through the Centre Européen increased sixfold from 10,000 to 60,000 dollars.312 
 
In cooperation with their colleagues in Washington and New York the men and women in Paris 
initiated and supervised an array of new programs that the foundation claimed to be conducive to 
furthering the “international mind.” Butler’s Division of Intercourse and Education organized 
educational transatlantic trips for journalists, academics and lawyers, sending American economists 
to Europe and European journalists to the United States. The division was also a main driving force 
behind academic exchange programs both between continents and within Europe. It sent German 
professors to lecture in Southern France and Polish historians to speak in Berlin. The Division of 
International Law instituted the Academy of International Law at The Hague, a summer school that 
since 1923 brought an international student body in touch with some of the most eminent teachers of 
international law.313 Meanwhile, Shotwell’s Divisions of Economics and History invested virtually 
all of its energy and resources into writing an Economic and Social History of the War (ESHW). It 
was a project of monumental proportions that would take more than a decade to complete and 
ultimately comprised over one hundred and fifty volumes.314 
 
As variegated as these projects were, there was a common theme to the CEIP’s philanthropic 
initiatives: most of these endeavors were ultimately designed to foster communication and 
cooperation among many of the same professional elites in the foreign policy sector that formed the 
core membership of the Comité d’Administration. Whether exchange programs, lecture tours or 
publication projects—in addition to the immediate educational or research objective of a project the 
common denominator was to promote travel and cross-border contacts among members of national 
foreign policy establishments. Thus, in addition to producing a comprehensive history of the social 
impact of the First World War, Shotwell’s ESHW also represented a decentralized network of authors 
and national editorial committees that included some of the world’s foremost economists and political 
scientists: John Maynard Keynes, William Beveridge, Charles Rist, Luigi Einaudi, David Mitrany. 
The idea was, Shotwell wrote to IAP director and members of the German committee Albrecht 
Mendelssohn Bartholdy, “to link up people like yourself and myself,” those that the CEIP director 
felt represented “the saner movement for international understanding.”315 
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This “saner movement” appeared to be first and foremost a highly educated one. An analysis of a 
sample of about eight hundred of these program participants shows that the majority of them—at least 
two-thirds—were academics.316 About fifteen percent were in government service (ministers, 
bureaucrats, members of parliament) while the remainder were distributed more or less evenly among 
private sector professionals (businessmen, bankers, lawyers), journalists and officers of other non-
governmental organizations. Just as with the members of the Comité, most of these programs were 
not directed at developing promising, young talents but at those already well-established in their 
professional careers. American international lawyers Pitman B. Potter and Philip C. Jessup, who both 
launched their careers with CEIP fellowships in international law, were the exception rather than the 
rule. The median year of birth was 1877, meaning that most participants were in their late fourties 
and fifties. Female representation was low at only about three percent. While many lesser-known 
names fill the participant lists among those who accepted CEIP funding were also some of the most 
influential voices in interwar foreign policy debates: André Siegfried, Ernst Jäckh, Philip Noel Baker, 
William E. Rappard, Georges Scelle, Walter Simons, Arnold Wolfers, Jacob Viner and John B. 
Condliffe. 
 
By adopting a philanthropic strategy aimed at the interpersonal level, at sponsoring social practice 
rather than institutions, the CEIP effectively circumvented the constraints that political culture 
imposed on its ability to directly fund organizations that were closely associated with national 
governments. Its growing interpersonal network was always intended to simultaneously serve as a 
web linking organizations via the institutional affiliations of its members. “If we can possibly effect 
even the beginnings of a cooperation between the [Deutsche] Hochschule [für Politik] in Berlin, the 
Institut [des Hautes Études Internationales] in Paris and the [Royal] Institute [of International Affairs] 
in London, we shall have gone along well,” Butler encouraged Babcock in 1926.317 Just as the 
composition of the Comité d’Administration established links between the foundation and major 
European research institutions and advocacy groups, mapping the professional affiliations of 
participants in the CEIP’s major projects produces a similar picture of a dense web of contacts. It was 
this network that Alfred Vagts, who had served as a secretary for Shotwell’s war history project at the 
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IAP during the 1920s, later described tongue-in-cheek as “something akin to an international cartel” 
between foreign policy think tanks and educational institutions (cf. fig. A, p. 18).318 
 
From the perspective of those who participated in these activities, the Carnegie Endowment was an 
institution responding to a demand among experts for community institutions that could supersede 
the particularism of national academic cultures and narrow-minded political debates. Many of those 
who utilized the foundation’s forums were also regular contributors to other transnational community 
institutions: the Williamstown Institute of Politics, the Geneva Institute of International Relations, the 
Union internationale des Associations pour la Societé des Nations or the Institute of International 
Education—most of which also received some kind of direct or indirect CEIP assistance.319 The spirit 
that these institutions strove for amounted to a “scientific”, technical consensus that would stand in 
striking contrast to the inability of politicians to reach political compromise and it was this 
transnational identity that participants usually referred to as constituting the “international mind.” 
 
For instance, Comité member Georges Lechartier was impressed by a four-day conference held at 
Briarcliff, NY, in 1926 and organized jointly by the CEIP and the American Academy of Political 
Science. Strolling through the picturesque Hudson River landscape between lectures and round table 
discussions and debating disarmament policies with an international cast of experts that included 
David Hunter Miller, Isaiah Bowman and Ludwig von Mises, Lechartier imagined himself as a 
student in Aristotle’s Lyceum. Just as the casual meeting of minds of the ancient Greek thinkers had 
laid the foundations of Western philosophy, the informal gatherings of disinterested scholars of 
international relations could set the world on a path toward peace. In the calm atmosphere of the rural 
setting, experts were quickly able to arrive at solutions to even the most contentious problems of the 
time, espousing opinions that were “sometimes contrary to those officially recognized.”320 Lechartier 
was aware that their answers would not be adopted overnight. Discussions among experts, even if 
conducted “in all good will and sincerity” could not produce silver bullets as the implementation of 
policies was dependent on the public’s readiness to accept them. But what conferences such as 
Briarcliff could contribute was to found bonds between experts based on “mutual esteem” and 
“cooperation in a common task.”321 They could hasten the formation of the “‘international mind’, the 
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only antidote against the selfishness of nations.”322  
 
Nicolas Politis reported a similar experience from his participation in the Hague Academy of 
International Law, which he credited with “forg[ing] an international scientific outlook.”323 To Politis, 
the “international mind” was above all the recognition that “other peoples have the same rights that 
we do” and it were institutions such as the Hague Academy that could instill this belief: “You have 
to get people used to thinking about international affairs as what they really are, that is to say, a 
complex web of interests of different countries; and to examine them objectively, without hidden 
national motivations, with a sense of duty.”324 Carlo Sforza, after having attended the Williamstown 
Institute of Politics, praised the “spirit of disinterestedness” that had marked the proceedings.325 This 
was not only true in terms of national but also political viewpoints, as Sforza failed to see any 
acrimony between Democrats and Republicans among the American participants.326 The cooperative 
mindset of scholarly debate appeared to be conducive to depoliticizing and denationalizing issues. 
 
The CEIP’s quest for an “international mind” in the 1920s is thus best conceptualized as reflecting a 
widespread interest among highly educated, transnationally connected elites in finding technocratic 
solutions that could overcome both the cultural polarization between peoples inherited by the war and 
the dysfunction of the international system left in its wake.327 The positivist idea of the “national 
interest” as an object of research, susceptible to empirical study by international specialists was, in 
practice, a call for the transnational construction of policy positions: by personally familiarizing 
themselves with the political constraints driving, for instance, disarmament policy in France or 
immigration policy in the United States, experts would return to their national institutional settings 
with an understanding of the red lines that their own government could not cross without negotiations 
breaking down or even ending in confrontation. Inserted back into national debates through 
participants’ contacts with the state and the public, it was hoped that such consensus could forestall 
the brash assertions of national interest and national honor that had accompanied the battle cries in 
1914. “Slender enough seem the cords thus flung across from our lands to others,” Henry Suzzallo of 
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching once described the CEIP’s role in 
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promoting such informal contacts, “but their accumulation with time will make them cables of lasting 
power, stretched and twisted skilfully by [Butler’s] persistent and patient hands.”328 
  
 
Branding the “International Mind”: Knowledge as discourse 
As the above statements indicate, the CEIP’s European associates conceived of the “international 
mind” as an inherently apolitical phenomenon. The goal was to arrive at an “objective” appreciation 
of national interests by stripping away all national and political biases. Yet, as with all technocratic 
movements, there was an unmistakable political dimension to the endeavor.329 It strove to shift power 
to a new set of actors—the experts—thus supplanting their values and preferences for those of the 
voting public. This was, in the first place, a means of transnationalizing politics through a process of 
inclusion and exclusion. For instance, when the Comité d’Administration discussed the target 
audience for the Centre Européen’s new journal L’Esprit International they were in effect debating 
who was deemed qualified to participate in debates on international relations. Georges Lechartier was 
particularly concerned with reaching foreign ministry bureaucrats and journalists while others 
suggested university professors, members of parliament and senior statesmen.  Banker Alfred Nerincx 
brought up “the leading members of the boards of directors of the major banks, of big businesses” 
while Nicolas Politis urged not to forget wealthy gentlemen who had retired to the countryside.330 
Yet, while the foregoing has mainly analyzed the “international mind” as a practice, a mode of 
interaction, the origins and dissemination of the discourse point toward another means by which 
transnational power was constructed. 
 
By the mid-1920s the “international mind” discourse already had a longer history that reached back 
to the founding days of the CEIP. On the morning of 15 May 1912, Nicholas Murray Butler, the then 
newly minted director of the CEIP’s Division of Intercourse and Education, delivered the opening 
address at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, a venerable gathering that since 
1895 had brought international peace activists and dignitaries to an imposing resort on a ridge in the 
southern Catskill Mountains. Butler had alluded to the “international mind” as early as 1910 but it 
was in this speech that for the first time he expounded at length on the concept. He also supplied the 
delegates with a definition of the term, which—most likely on account of Butler’s typically 
improvised, ad-hoc delivery—was a rather stilted and not particularly memorable expression of the 
widely shared belief in a liberal internationalism as part of a teleological development toward a more 
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civilized and peaceful world: 
The international mind is nothing else than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and 
business, and that habit of dealing with them, which regard the several nations of the civilized 
world as friendly and co-operating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing 
commerce and industry, and in spreading enlightenment and culture throughout the world.331 
Butler could not quite claim to have invented the phrase, which had occasionally appeared in social 
reform and peace activist circles since the turn of the century.332 But it was Butler’s programmatic 
use in his Lake Mohonk speech, followed several months later by the publication of his book The 
International Mind, which clearly marked the point at which the term started to gain widespread 
currency.333 
 
Over the course of the following three decades, encouraging adoption of the “international mind” 
phraseology throughout the internationalist field became a primary preoccupation for the CEIP’s 
Division of Intercourse and Education as it was viewed as a measure of the Endowment’s rising 
influence. With his natural grasp of public relations Butler assiduously monitored that its use was 
consistent across the CEIP’s various activities and, rather curiously in light of its obvious 
shortcomings, even insisted on maintaining the precise wording of his original Lake Mohonk speech. 
The CEIP’s trademark was translated into several European languages and when in 1927 the Centre 
Européen launched its own journal there was little question that the new publication would be named 
L’Esprit International, complete with a French version of Butler’s definition on its inside cover. With 
a view toward future translations of the new periodical the president reminded Earle Babcock of the 
paramount importance of maintaining consistency: “If they make a German edition, be sure they use 
the same translation Die Internationale Gesinnung that we have statedly used heretofore. I send you 
the German version of the phrase and its definition.”334 Throughout the 1920s, the CEIP’s European 
partners, especially the members of the Comité d’Administration, helped propagate this discourse in 
their home countries. Educating Europeans to live together peacefully apparently required, as a first 
step, to teach them Carnegie-speak. 
 
Success was almost immediate in Great Britain, where already during the war the CEIP’s preferred 
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terminology began to be adopted by the developing field of IR scholarship. In 1916, J.A. Hobson 
devoted an entire chapter of his book Towards International Government to the subject and after the 
war the first two incumbents of the world’s first IR chair at the University of Aberystwyth, Alfred 
Zimmern and Charles K. Webster, would make use of it, either with or without direct attribution to 
Butler.335 But the phrase soon spread far beyond academia across the internationalist and peace 
movements and into mainstream politics. In 1920, Liberal Party politician Charles Masterman 
advertised his New Liberalism as striving for understanding and cooperation between all nations and 
the “formation of an international mind.”336 Perhaps more surprisingly given the term’s bourgeois 
provenance, it also gained widespread acceptance on the political left, with H.G. Wells writing in 
1921 that for Europe to survive there had to be a realignment of “moral and intellectual forces in the 
direction of creating an international mind.”337 Taking its cues from Wells, the Labour Party’s 
publishing arm instituted a book series dedicated to contributing to the “international mind” that 
distributed such definitively non-CEIP-approved material as Leonard Woolf’s critique of economic 
imperialism and Communist Party leader Raymond W. Postgate’s historical account of the workers’ 
international.338 The wider the CEIP’s terminology was adopted, the more detached it appeared to 
become from any definite meaning. 
 
In Germany, where many remained wary of an internationalism primarily associated with the Allied 
victors, the “international mind” never quite filtered down into the public discourse, however, thanks 
to the efforts of Comité member Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron it did develop a life of its own as an 
instrument of public diplomacy. One of Prittwitz’s achievements on behalf of the foundation was to 
tie Prussian Minister of Culture C.H. Becker, an early German advocate of cultural diplomacy, to the 
foundation. Becker soon signaled his approval of the CEIP’s mission by liberally invoking den 
internationalen Geist in his public speeches.339 The discourse also entered the Wilhelmstraße and 
German-American diplomacy via Erich’s brother Friedrich Wilhelm, the German ambassador to the 
United States. When Ambassador von Prittwitz und Gaffron received an honorary doctorate from 
Syracuse University in 1929 he demonstrated his thorough grasp of the CEIP’s transnational networks 
by turning his acceptance speech into an exploration of the conceptual links between Butler’s idea of 
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an “international mind” and Comité member Henri Lichtenberger’s notion of “international 
citizenship.”340 Becker’s and Prittwitz’s invocation of Butlerian terminology was a clear sign that 
governments were discovering the utility of adopting the language of non-governmental organizations 
in their pursuit of foreign policy goals.341 
 
Given such diverse uses and contexts there is a case to be made that the discursive side of the 
“international mind” campaign did not amount to much beyond an exercise in vanity on the part of 
the CEIP. By establishing Butler’s signature phrase as what became essentially a synonym for 
“internationalism” it was scoring a symbolic success at the expense of any definite meaning and thus 
failed to promote any concrete policies or practices. Such an interpretation would, however, give little 
weight to the power constituted by the practice of language itself as a process that continually 
structures social relations and impacts knowledge production. According to Bourdieu, language is not 
produced in a neutral space of free speech but is constructed by educational processes that involve 
the “symbolic domination” of those passively or actively accepting normalized modes of 
expression.342 Accordingly, appropriation of the “international mind” discourse often proceeded 
along a path of unequal power relationships that were reproduced in the act of adaptation and learning 
on the part of the foundation’s European partners. Although, as has been, shown, the CEIP was careful 
to avoid overt signs of domination, that did not mean that European institutions did not adjust their 
rhetoric in the hopes of accessing the foundation’s superior resources. Whether they were already 
working with the CEIP, were in the process of applying for assistance or simply wanted to 
demonstrate goodwill to preserve the option of future grant applications, many connected to Europe’s 
academic institutions and internationalist associations adopted the foundation’s terminology at least 
partially in recognition of the organization’s financial clout. 
 
An indication for this process is that the incidence of international-mindedness seemed to increase 
markedly in the proximity of institutions either benefitting from American philanthropy or closely 
associated with CEIP partners. As may be expected, the CEIP-initiated Hague Academy of 
International Law was a particularly fertile ground for this discourse. In the years 1925 to 1930 alone, 
at least nineteen speakers explicitly referenced the “international mind” during their courses343  and 
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in some years the published proceedings of the Academy even featured an index entry for the 
concept.344 GIIA, the site of Alfred Zimmern’s speech in 1926, received a subsidy of 7,500 dollars 
from the Carnegie Endowment that year. A cumulative impact of American funding may have been 
at play in the work of the League of Nation’s ICIC and its affiliated institute which, while receiving 
only token contributions from the CEIP, relied increasingly on grants from the Rockefeller 
Foundation and from the Carnegie Corporation, particularly for the establishment of the International 
Studies Conference in the late 1920s. During the second half of the 1920s and the first half of the 
1930s the ICIC would emerge as a key proponent of the “international mind” language and of related 
concepts such as the notion of a “League of minds” and the establishment of a regional esprit 
Européen.345 In accepting CEIP-supplied language European and international institutions were thus 
tacitly acknowledging the foundation’s claim to representing the mainstream of internationalist 
thought. 
 
To the individual speaker or writer conforming to such speech conventions must have seemed rather 
trivial—a shrewd act of slightly reframing an organization’s established agenda that could secure the 
goodwill of a rich benefactor. Yet, the subtle power of the “international mind” was that, cumulatively, 
repetition of a discourse can structure a field to the detriment of competing terminologies and their 
associated knowledge claims. In E.H. Carr’s seminal critique of the internationalist movement, 
published in 1939, the British IR scholar accused internationalists of using the language of altruism 
to obscure the self-interested and even imperialist nature of the global order they were seeking. “Just 
as pleas for ‘national solidarity’ in domestic politics always come from a dominant group,” Carr 
argued, “pleas for international solidarity and world union come from those dominant nations which 
may hope to exercise control over a unified world.”346 Carr’s caricature of a uniformly utopian 
movement missed much of the complexities of internationalist activism but his critique of the 
tendency of idealist language to reproduce existing inequalities had merit. After all, if the root causes 
of war were primarily spiritual there was no pressing need to address issues of economic inequality 
between nations and social tensions within them. This made the “international mind” discourse 
particularly compelling to a liberal milieu seeking to fortify the international system against claims 
for the redistribution of power and resources, whether they came from “radical” social reformers, 
anti-imperialist internationalists, anti-colonial movements or propagandists for irredentist European 
                                                 
344 See entry “Esprit International, son développement,” Recueil des cours 31 (1930), 724. 
345 On American philanthropy and the ICIC see Rietzler, “Experts for Peace: Structures and Motivations of Philanthropic 
Internationalism in the Interwar Years,” 54–57; Renoliet, L’UNESCO oubliée, 206–207; on the ICIC’s internationalist 
concepts cf. Laqua, “Internationalisme ou affirmation de la nation ?,” esp. 206–207; Richard, “Huizinga, Intellectual 
Cooperation, and the Spirit of Europe, 1933–45,” 245–247. 
346 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 109. 
98 
 
governments. Although, like any figure of speech, the “international mind” was open to interpretation 
and appropriation, its specificity in comparison with competing discourses lay in its linkage between 
greater international integration and the preservation of the domestic and international status quo. 
 
Many of these competing discourses that were gradually pushed aside predated the CEIP and 
represented strikingly different visions of race, social and gender relations. Eight years before Butler 
introduced the “international mind” at the Lake Mohonk Conference, women’s rights activist May 
Wright Sewall expressed broadly similar ideas at the third congress of the International Council of 
Women (ICW) in Berlin. Her presidential address cast the Council’s activism in terms of a developing 
Weltgeist or “world spirit” that brought the peoples of the earth into closer contact. The ICW’s 
understanding of this Weltgeist was an emphatically egalitarian one. Sewall decried an understanding 
of internationalism that all too frequently presumed the domination of small nations by larger powers, 
placed rich above poor and the few above the many. Against this conception the ICW presented itself 
as a nascent transnational, democratic space in which each woman was treated equally without regard 
“to her nationality, her race, her religion or her social station.”347 A different reformist variant that 
Butler would have almost certainly been familiar with was espoused by his Columbia University 
colleague Brander Matthews. He, like Butler, touted the “international mind” of well-travelled men 
versed in the perspectives of other peoples, but to Matthews, the exponents of this spirit were 
Christian progressive reformers participating in the Interchurch World Movement and in the Federal 
Council of Churches. The goal of these internationalist connections was to design common standards 
on labor regulation, safety standards and female integration into the work force with the ultimate 
objective of determining “the most equitable division of the products of industry that can ultimately 
be devised.”348 
 
It was at this point, in rejecting the demands of what some contemporaries called the “Have Nots”—
those seeking to effect a redistribution of power and wealth through the international system—where 
the “international mind” discourse intersected with the new expert communities the CEIP was seeking 
to bolster.349 While the phrase was appropriated widely and often in unintended ways, its central use 
was as a marker for a liberal internationalism that saw the future of the international system neither 
in the solidarity of workers worldwide nor in national particularism. The interpretation of the 
“international mind” promoted by the foundation and by most of its liberal associates framed the 
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challenge of international stability as a problem requiring expert-guided, incremental reform and 
education, rather than sweeping social change and state intervention. Thus, while the CEIP was 
careful to avoid imposing concrete concepts on its European audience, it did exert an influence on 
the broader expert field by setting the parameters of debates and defining problems. For instance, the 
sheer size of the project and diversity of the authors made James T. Shotwell’s war history project 
appear as a politically neutral project. Yet, the very subject of the study made it an essentially liberal 
project. The overarching social effect of the war that Shotwell wanted to highlight with the mountain 
of evidence his authors were assembling was the increase of “government control in wartime.”350 By 
demonstrating the suppression of individual freedom and free enterprise under conditions of modern 
warfare he wished to bolster the liberal case for peace.351 
 
 
Conclusion: Transnationalism and the duality of persons and groups 
In 1974, sociologist Ronald Breiger published “The Duality of Persons and Groups,” an article that 
would become highly influential for the developing field of social network analysis.352 Building on 
Georg Simmel’s theories of sociability, Breiger demonstrated in mathematical form how links 
between individuals also constitute connections between the institutions they are affiliated with, and 
vice versa. Fifty years earlier, the Carnegie Endowment had intuitively acted along those same lines. 
Forced to exercise great caution in directly and overtly sponsoring institutions whose work was 
considered part of the state’s sensitive arcanum of foreign policy, the foundation invested in links that 
ensured cross-border communication and cooperation between those associated with research 
institutions and advocacy groups. The foundation’s sponsorship of community institutions and 
exchange programs between transnational expert communities became key to the establishment of 
what participants hoped would constitute a web of informal governance during a time of 
dysfunctional international politics. 
 
Both the historiography of internationalism and disciplinary histories of international relations theory 
have traditionally attempted to read back into the interwar period an opposition between “idealism,” 
viewed as a precursor to liberal internationalism, and “realism.”353 The CEIP’s interventions in both 
intersecting fields demonstrates the ahistorical nature of such an enterprise. The supposedly idealist 
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rhetoric of the “international mind” was fundamentally about the recognition of and negotiation 
between competing national interests. Participants did not dispute the legitimacy of states pursuing 
discrete goals on behalf of their citizens but thought that in the absence of effective mechanisms for 
preventing those interests from spawning global conflict it was incumbent on a transnationally 
connected elite to bring these different conceptions into alignment. At the same time, the socio-
cultural background of foreign policy professionals affected which societal goals they viewed as 
legitimate and conducive to the common good. Even after the reform of its philanthropic activities in 
the mid-1920s, the CEIP continued to represent the interests of those in favor of a liberal variety of 
internationalism and its views on what constituted “radical” or “socialist” systems of knowledge often 
filtered down well beyond its immediate network of associates. 
 
Speaking after Alfred Zimmern at the 1926 session of the Geneva Institute of International Relations, 
James Brown Scott presented the work of the foundation to the assembled experts. “We believe in 
conference, we believe in intercourse, and we believe in the printed page,” he succinctly summarized 
the CEIP’s methodology.354 Of these, it was particularly the first technique that stressed the essentially 
collaborative nature of what the foundation was trying to accomplish. “Conference”—whether in 
open forums or behind closed doors—among selected representatives of national elites promised to 
unite critical actors behind specific policies which could then be introduced into political contexts in 
several countries. The following three chapters present case studies of this mechanism as the CEIP 
sought to broker consensus in the fields of cultural, legal and economic internationalism. While these 
conformed roughly to the foundation’s divisional organization they were, in fact, interrelated projects 
that had been present in its activities since the very beginning and which, at different times, occupied 
the attention of the entire foundation. Their rise and demise reflected the foundation’s continual 
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Under heightened security the Carnegie Endowment’s Centre Européen launched the year 1926 with 
an event sure to draw attention to the foundation’s work on improving Franco-German cultural 
relations. Its invitation to renowned German author Thomas Mann to speak at 173 Boulevard Saint-
Germain on 20 January had attracted widespread publicity well in advance.355 Yet, after a talk by 
theater critic Alfred Kerr at the Sorbonne the previous night had been interrupted by Serbian 
nationalists, the CEIP, fearing public controversy at the more high-profile event with Mann, decided 
at the last minute to restrict attendance to only a handful of invited guests, leaving even much of the 
press excluded.356 The nervousness was understandable. Less than a decade earlier, Mann had played 
a highly visible role in Germany’s wartime propaganda when he had declared democracy, liberalism 
and internationalism alien to German culture, but now he had come to Paris with a more conciliatory 
message.357 “[T]ime and circumstances place certain obligations on an author,” Mann had told 
Nicholas Murray Butler in accepting the assignment, assuring the president that it would make him 
proud if he were able to contribute even slightly to “good intellectual relations between our two 
countries.” The evening was a milestone that highlighted the recent progress that had been made in 
Franco-German reconciliation but also demonstrated how fraught with political tensions cultural 
relations still were, even if conducted on supposedly neutral, American ground. 
 
The intertwining of culture and politics represented by Mann’s lecture was characteristic of mid-
1920s Franco-German relations, often labelled as the time of the “Spirit of Locarno.” Yet, culture and 
diplomacy were often more codependent than that label, with its implication of the primacy of 
politics, would suggest. Instead of only appearing on the scene after the ink had dried on the treaties, 
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civil society actors such as peace societies,358 youth groups,359 lobby organizations,360 associations 
promoting Franco-German361 and European362 cultural exchange as well as a transnational coalition 
of supporters of the League of Nations363 all contributed to a widespread discourse of conciliation 
that allowed diplomatic activity to proceed. Furthermore, this Franco-German activism was 
embedded in a broader movement centered on the League of Nation’s ICIC that promoted cultural 
exchanges, particularly among elites, as a cure for the hyper-nationalism that had thrust the world 
into war.364 As has frequently been noted, the Carnegie Endowment was an almost ubiquitous 
presence in this transnational cultural space.365 
 
The previous chapter has described how in the mid-1920s the CEIP changed its philanthropic strategy, 
shifting most of its resources toward support for a field of transnationally connected foreign policy 
experts at the intersection of academia, government and the public. The very existence of this field 
was predicated on the belief that internationalist activism and government service could be 
reconciled, in other words that nationalism and internationalism were not in contradiction. 366 “Pro 
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patria per orbis concordiam” had been Conciliation Internationale’s official motto before the war, but 
after 1914, governments had discovered control over culture—the symbolic frameworks within which 
people make sense of the world—as an integral part of ensuring the loyalty of their citizens. 
Crossborder cultural encounters could now often trigger suspicions of disloyalty. Restoring a version 
of the liberal identity of the patriotic internationalist was consequently an essential goal of the CEIP’s 
activism. Thomas Mann’s visit to Paris did not only proceed with the full blessing of the French and 
German governments but became itself a site for informal consultation. A dinner hosted for Mann at 
the German embassy and attended by the French ministers Édouard Daladier, Anatole de Monzie and 
Paul Painlevé—the first such event since the war—provided a welcome opportunity for unofficial 
Franco-German consultations. At some point during the evening, Mann encountered the German 
Ambassador Leopold von Hoesch, still agitated from a heated discussion with Painlevé on troop 
reductions in the Rhineland.367 
 
In addition, the “Spirit of Locarno” or the “international mind,” in CEIP terminology, was not a 
politically neutral category. To fellow German author Kurt Tucholsky the rarefied atmosphere of 
Thomas Mann’s visit appeared antiquated in an age of popular democracy and mass mobilization. 
This type of activity would never “reach the masses” and was in the end nothing more than a 
“harmless parlor game.”368 To many on the political left, such as Tucholsky, high-minded enterprises 
reminiscent of the “League of Minds” advocated by leaders of the intellectual cooperation movement 
such as Gilbert Murray, Henri Bergson and Salvador de Madariaga were doomed from the start as 
they did not address the social iniquities fueling international instability.369 They considered social 
peace, not appeals to a unifying humanist spirit a precondition for international peace.370 Those 
aligned with the CEIP, usually approached the problem from the other direction: elites needed to work 
together to stabilize the international system to prevent further social upheaval. 
 
The Franco-German conflict certainly gave much evidence to support such views. CEIP officers and 
trustees watched wearily as the contentious politics of security and reparations appeared to destabilize 
both countries. Especially the year 1923 became a tipping point, as the French Occupation of the Ruhr 
and the German government’s passive resistance efforts pushed the Weimar Republic to the brink of 
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collapse. There were certainly also economic considerations at play. Before 1914, Germany had been 
the third largest export market for the United States and soon after the war American businesses were 
eager to move back into the German market. Antagonism between Germany and America’s ally 
France was a problem because it retarded the normalization of business relations.371 “American 
business interests are thoroughly dissatisfied with the present policies of the Department of State,” 
CEIP Trustee Robert Lansing noted as early as February 1922, expressing a common concern that 
timid American diplomacy was impeding the exploration of new markets.372 Helping the French build 
a bridge of conciliation across the Rhine River, Butler told the trustees, could do more “to pave the 
way toward a peaceful Europe in the next hundred years than […] all the armies and navies and 
reparations and recriminations.”373 
 
Concerns that the nationalist acrimony of the conflict was undermining social order were also shared 
by many elites in Germany and France. Moderate figures on the French center-left, especially from 
the foreign policy elites of the Cartel des Gauches under Prime Ministers Édouard Herriot and 
Aristide Briand as well as a coalition of liberal republicans and conservative Vernunftrepublikaner 
who supported the policies of Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann became the main European 
partners in the CEIP’s Franco German programs.374 Two men who stood at the center of these 
activities were Sorbonne professor of German literature Henri Lichtenberger, who served as the 
foundation’s designated specialist on outreach to Germany and became a founding member of the 
Comité d’Administration in 1925, and German economist Moritz Julius Bonn, who had worked with 
the foundation since 1922 and joined the Comité five years later. Although both men were prominent 
protagonist in the internationalist academic community of the 1920s this memory quickly faded after 
the Second World War and historiography has only recently rediscovered their contributions in the 
course of renewed interest in civil society actors in international relations.375 
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Although the two professors thrived in very different fields they shared key experiences, largely on 
account of belonging to the same generational cohort, that later motivated their internationalist 
activism. Born in 1864 and 1873, respectively, Lichtenberger and Bonn had spent the formative early 
parts of their careers in the international atmosphere of late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
European academia. Bonn, the scion of a Jewish banking family from Frankfurt, had studied at 
Heidelberg, Munich, Vienna and at the London School of Economics and conducted field studies for 
his doctoral dissertation on the British colonization of Ireland. He met his future English wife while 
travelling in Italy and spent a year surveying German and British colonies in Africa before settling in 
Munich and then in Berlin as director of the commercial college (Handelshochschule). While not as 
well-travelled as his German colleague, Lichtenberger’s upbringing and early career were similarly 
marked by multiple border-crossings that gave rise to a hybrid, or at least flexible, identity. Born into 
a protestant Alsatian family, he had experienced the German attack on Strasbourg in 1870 as a child. 
After early studies in Paris at the Lycée Condorcet and at the Sorbonne he returned to Alsace for 
additional training at the German-speaking University of Strasbourg. One of the foremost figures of 
early twentieth century German studies in France, Lichtenberger started his teaching career at the 
University of Nancy before moving to the Sorbonne in 1905 as professor of German literature. 
 
Coincidentally, both for Lichtenberger and for Bonn the first personal contact with the United States 
was closely tied to the epoch-making events of 1914, each having just arrived in America for guest 
professorships at Harvard University and the University of Berkeley, respectively. The experience of 
witnessing the self-immolation of the Old World from the perspective of the ascending Atlantic power 
must have left a lasting imprint on the two scholars and perhaps partly explains their later interest in 
the United States and their readiness to work with an American foundation. During the following war 
years, the professors participated in the breakdown of the pre-1914 academic community as they 
placed their scholarly and intercultural expertise in the service of their nations. Recalled to Paris in 
early 1915, Lichtenberger spent the war in intelligence work for the French government, analyzing 
German press reports and contributing to the propagandistic literature. Bonn stayed in the United 
States until the American declaration of war in 1917 and, after a hasty transatlantic crossing to avoid 
detention as an enemy alien, he joined the staff of the German foreign office to perform functions that 
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were quite similar to Lichtenberger’s in the American section of the press division.376  
 
After the end of the war Lichtenberger and Bonn, like many Europeans, regarded American 
involvement in European affairs as crucial to the reconstruction of the Continent. Their views on this 
question show the range of economic, geo-strategic and cultural arguments that were made both in 
Germany and in France.  Lichtenberger saw Franco-German reconciliation and American economic 
assistance as inestricably linked as antagonism between the two adversaries was “the great obstacle” 
which kept Americans from joining a European collective security structure. Once this problem was 
solved, American financial aid would start flowing and help stabilize the European economy.377  To 
the life-long Anglophile Bonn sound relations between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon countries 
seemed essential to the survival of Europe and in his autobiography he would call improving these 
relations his “main task” in life.378 Like many of their countrymen, Bonn and Lichtenberger looked 
to the United States for support, mediation and particualrly financial assistance to solve the seemingly 




“These venomous snakes”: The CEIP in aid of German republicanism 
That the Carnegie Endowment would assume a mediating role in these controversies was initially a 
rather counterintuitive proposition. Given the foundation’s support for the Allied cause during the 
war and its deep ties to Franco-American friendship societies, the CEIP did not give the appearance 
of aspiring to become a neutral broker. Especially compromising in the eyes of nationalists from the 
former Central Powers was the direct involvement of Endowment personnel in the drafting process 
of the despised peace treaties. The two American delegates on the commission which had authored 
the war guilt paragraph at Versailles were now both closely associated with the CEIP: James Brown 
Scott, director of the Division of International Law, and trustee Robert Lansing.379 Even years later, 
this legacy could elicit strong reactions, as Scott discovered when he traveled to the University of 
Heidelberg to deliver a lecture on the judicial foundations of state authority. Prepared to take the stage 
at the scheduled hour, it was instead the university’s rector Karl Heinsheimer who took to the podium. 
Addressing a capacity audience of students and faculty, Rektor Heinsheimer announced that in a 
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backstage meeting Professor Scott had failed to give him assurances that he would not reiterate his 
belief that Germany bore the main responsibility for the Great War. The event was cancelled and the 
audience was asked to go home.380 In light of such associations, officials at the German foreign 
ministry usually ranked the foundation, with its “hostile and spiteful attitude towards Germany,” as a 
threat to German foreign policy goals rather than as an asset.381  
 
This feeling of distance and distrust was mutual, as German peace activists discovered when in 
October 1921 one of their own, Professor Friedrich Dessauer, a physicist and radiologist from 
Frankfurt, visited the United States.382 One of the first German academics to receive an official 
invitation to visit the United States after the war, Dessauer was linked to pacifist circles around the 
German Conciliation Internationale section and he carried with him a letter of introduction to 
Nicholas Murray Butler in the hopes of reviving pre-war contacts. His attempt to pay his respects to 
the Columbia President went badly awry when instead of receiving the German professor Butler sent 
his assistant Henry Haskell to deliver what amounted to a complete rebuke. Lingering hostility toward 
Germany as well as the formally still existing state of war between the two countries made 
cooperation impossible at the moment, Haskell explained. As delighted as he was that there were so 
many outstretched hands from German pacifists, the CEIP was unable to meet them at the moment 
“as the danger of harming the pacifist idea would harm the entire world, while the benefits would 
only accrue to Germany.”383 German liberals, many of whom had gained the erroneous impression 
that animosity against Germany in the U.S. was much lower than in Britain or France, were dismayed 
and alarmed. “We Germans must not allow ourselves to harbor any illusions,” Dessauer reflected at 
the end of his journey. “This country was at war with us—mightily and resoundingly.”384 Forwarding 
Dessauer’s report to the German foreign office, Walther Schücking, a member of parliament for the 
liberal DDP and  a central figure in the German peace movement, noted with palpable distress: 
“Frankly, I am personally embarrassed by how distanced even members of this milieu are treating 
us.”385  
 
In light of the tense political atmosphere, Butler’s Division of Intercourse and Education took a 
cautious approach to the issue of re-establishing the foundation’s former German network. To avoid 
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potentially scandalous direct links with Germany, any activities were initially conducted “entirely 
through the European Bureau.”386 This placed the matter squarely in the hands of the Centre 
Européen’s director Paul d’Estournelles de Constant, who would consequently emerge as one of the 
foremost voices for a rapprochement between French and German peace activists.387 Using his 
excellent contacts within European pacifist circles as well as the cash at his disposal through the CEIP, 
de Constant helped broker one of the earliest instances of institutionalized Franco-German 
cooperation after the war. Since December 1921, the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (LDH) and the 
German Bund Neues Vaterland/Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte (BNV/DLM) had commenced 
negotiations for future cooperation. The following January, the two associations, both staunchly 
republican and mainly comprised of social democratic and socialist intellectuals, reached an 
agreement that culminated in a joint condemnation of “Prussian militarism” at a meeting in Paris.388  
 
D’Estournelles de Constant had sponsored the German delegation’s trip to this meeting with one 
thousand Francs, courtesy of the Centre Européen, and during the following years two of the 
BNV/DLM’s leading members, its chairman Hellmut von Gerlach and professor Friedrich Wilhelm 
Foerster of Munich emerged as the CEIP’s leading contacts in Germany.389 Officially listed as special 
correspondents, Foerster and von Gerlach wrote regular reports on conditions in Germany that were 
frequently circulated among the Endowment’s Trustees. Yet, the generous annual compensation of 
10,000 Francs each man received was not strictly intended as remuneration for these reporting 
services but, as internal documents noted, for “propaganda” in support of a peaceful, republican 
Germany.390 At a time when economic turmoil and hyperinflation had wiped out much of the 
resources of German activists, the CEIP’s hard currency, furtively routed through a Swiss bank 
account, quickly became a central factor for the survival of this field. In early 1923, Henri 
Lichtenberger transmitted an urgent plea by the BND/DLM for additional funds, noting that the 
association’s balance as of 31 December 1922 had been “42,875 Marks, or, according to the day’s 
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exchange rate about ONE DOLLAR.”391 
 
Unsurprisingly, French and German authorities reacted very differently to the CEIP’s embrace of the 
German pacifist left. Hoping to bolster Foerster’s and von Gerlach’s efforts to hasten the “withering 
of the reactionary spirit,” the Quai d’Orsay approvingly watched the travels of the two activists to 
France and Belgium and discreetly provided them with documentary evidence for German war 
crimes.392 Many of the CEIP’s partners in Paris were in close touch with the French government, 
which surely encouraged them to support the Endowment’s support for German anti-militarists.393 
Such minor assistance notwithstanding, upon further reflection pacifist reliance on American 
generosity should have eased rather than heightened concerns that men such as Foerster and von 
Gerlach were secretly in the employ of the French state. That was not, however, how the German 
nationalist right or the Wilhelmstraße, for whom any deviation from a complete renunciation of 
German war guilt amounted to betrayal, viewed the matter. Especially when, starting in 1925, the 
BNV/DLM launched a campaign to reveal the secret rearmament programs of the schwarze 
Reichswehr its activists were branded as traitors. Having learned that Foerster had reported on these 
illicit military schemes to the CEIP and even urged Wall Street not to lend Germany “a single cent” 
until the country was again in compliance with the Treaty of Versailles, the ambassador in Washington 
encouraged his colleagues back in Berlin not to give a moment’s rest in their “fight against these 
venomous snakes.”394  
 
The controversy illustrates how, especially in the charged atmosphere of post-war Franco-German 
relations, internationalist activism had become virtually synonymous with disloyalty in official 
quarters. Governments gladly lent support to pacifist groups abroad in the hopes of weakening the 
patriotic resolve of their adversaries while treating domestic activists working for international causes 
with great suspicion. Otto Gessler, the German minister of defense at the time, would decades later 
still speak with contempt of those who had supposedly used the “plentiful funds of the Carnegie 
Endowment” to “(knowingly or unknowingly) work in the service of French militarism and 
chauvinism.”395 Meanwhile, the French government was equally wary of the Wilhelmstraße 
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exploiting French “minds that are new to matters of foreign policy” to influence public opinion in 
Germany’s favor.396 Even the French diplomats’ reports on Foerster and von Gerlach show a certain 
ambivalence about the moral rectitude of pacifists in general: admiration for those working against 
the spirit of German militarism at great personal risk was paired with a latent distaste for men who 
were prepared to undermine their own government. In von Gerlach’s inner circle, the French 
ambassador to Berlin wrote, there were virtually “no real Germans” but only “semi-English, semi-
French, semi-Swiss, and other hybrids for whom, for these personal reasons, internationalism has 
become a law onto itself.”397 
 
Particularly in Germany, the nationalist atmosphere of the post-war years made public advocacy for 
internationalism a difficult task. Discourses that were widely accepted by liberal internationalists 
could spark heated debates once brought out into the open, as Nicholas Murray Butler discovered 
personally when he published an open letter on New Year’s Day 1925 in the liberal Berliner Tageblatt. 
Intended as an opening gambit to broaden the CEIP’s involvement in the country, the article described 
a Manichean struggle between a liberal and forward-looking Germany and a reactionary, Prussian 
and militarist Germany—a popular frame among French and German activists at the time.398 
Germans, Butler told his readers, simple needed to renounce the latter, admit their responsibility for 
the war, pay their reparations in full and rejoin hands with their American friends. As Ambassador 
Jusserand, with whom Butler had shared his letter before publication, reported not without a hint of 
glee at the president’s naiveté, the reaction was resoundingly negative: Butler was inundated with 
hate mail from Germany decrying his “lack of morals” for repeating the great lie of German 
responsibility for the war and for belonging to a country “whose betrayal had caused the misery of an 
innocent, pacifist and virtuous Germany.”399 
 
As Butler discovered, the CEIP’s close association with the outspoken pro-republican wing of the 
German peace movement was proving an obstacle to restoring relations with Germany on a more 
official level. The foundation’s subsequent abandonment of these connections has sometimes been 
interpreted as a calculated sacrifice to buy access in Berlin.400 Yet, it should not be overlooked that, 
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given the CEIP’s generally conservative politics, its association with the German pacifists had always 
been an uncomfortable fit and as early as 1922 Butler had personally vowed to not give any more 
money “to the German Peace Societies or any other peace societies in Europe.”401 Both the CEIP and 
the BNV/DLM supported the emergence of a strong republican constituency in democratic Germany 
that would favor good neighborly relations with France. On most other issues, however, the 
traditionalist Endowment and the German activists, solidly aligned with the political left, parted ways. 
Drawing inspiration from the Fabian Society, the 1918 program of the BNV/DLM had dedicated the 
organization to “cooperating towards the realization of socialism.”402 The BNV/DLM also took a 
much dimmer view of Great Power politics and colonial expansion than the CEIP. Its activities aimed 
explicitly at the “peaceful union of all peoples (not only the white ones!)” The fight against 
colonialism and imperialism would later lead the organization to join the Liga gegen koloniale 
Unterdrückung, a communist group led by Willi Münzenberg with close ties to Moscow.403  
 
The CEIP’s sponsorship of Franco-German pacifists in the early 1920s then appears more as a 
coalition of necessity than one founded on shared ideological commitments. For the French and 
German activists the CEIP provided not only funding in times of economic uncertainty but also a 
crucial neutral ground that afforded protection from allegations of selling out to the enemy. 
Meanwhile, for the CEIP the American political discourse of the time would have made it all but 
impossible to be associated with any Germans who did not accept the terms of the Peace Treaty and 
who were not prepared to unreservedly condemn Prussian militarism.
404
 The CEIP’s period of 
reorientation from 1923 to 1927 was then not merely a change in personnel: in addition to marking 
the transition from peace activists to foreign policy experts, the greater role of men such as Henri 
Lichtenberger and Moritz Julius Bonn signaled an attempt to change the cultural parameters within 
which liberal internationalists operated. Butler, had already identified the challenge ahead as early as 
1918 in a brief article titled “A Nationalistic Internationalism” that framed the issue with his 
characteristic grasp for language: “the development of that true internationalism which rests upon 
nationalistic spirit and loyalty as a foundation, and which instead of denying and lessening patriotism 
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adds to its significance and value […].”405 
 
Weltbürgertum: Cultural internationalism for a nationalist world  
In February 1922, d’Estournelles de Constant appointed Lichtenberger as the CEIP’s special 
rapporteur for relations with the neighboring country, setting up the Sorbonne professor’s  first visit 
to Berlin after the war in order to survey the opinions of German elites towards France. 
Lichtenberger’s internal reporting shows him impressed both by the fragile state of the Weimar 
economy with its attendant social tensions and by the opportunity that this state of affairs presented 
for Franco-German conciliation among moderate and even conservative elites. His analysis was 
surprising not only because it challenged conventional wisdom in France that cooperation was only 
possible with the republican left but also in light of Lichtenberger’s personal views. While not a 
political activist, the Nietzsche scholar made no secret of his skepticism of capitalism, materialism 
and traditional hierarchies and of his sympathy for Germany’s left-wing pacifists.406 Lichtenberger 
nevertheless made a point of meeting some of Berlin’s more prominent center-right politicians, 
including Reichstag members Gustav Stresemann of the Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP) and Otto 
Hoetzsch of the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP) as well as businessmen such as publisher Hans 
Humann, a close acquaintance of conservative industrialist Hugo Stinnes (DVP).407 What he found 
was a growing fear of violent revolution from either the right or the left, a development that was “very 
dangerous for Germany as well as Europe.”408 Franco-German detente, Lichtenberger discovered, 
was held as the key to stabilizing social relations: “The most reasonable men of affairs say that we 
must end the fever that could lead to a dangerous state of anarchy, clean up the economic situation, 
reconstruct Europe, [and] find a tolerable modus vivendi with France.”409  
 
In the short term, Lichtenberger’s mission was marred by unfortunate timing. The public version of 
his observations was published right at the start of the Ruhr Crisis, making his calls for an alliance of 
moderates seem disconnected from reality.410 Soon, however, reactions to the crisis on both sides of 
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the Rhine would create new opportunities. Raymond Poincaré’s decision to respond to German 
obstructionism on reparation payments by moving French troops into the Ruhr grudgingly received 
public support from French internationalists such as pro-League activists of the AFSDN. Beneath the 
surface, however, the Ruhr Crisis exacerbated latent tensions between the liberal, pro-League 
internationalists and Poincaré’s conservative Bloc National to the point where a complete break 
occurred during the election campaign of 1924.411 To Henri Lichtenberger, the episode “marked a 
turning point” that begged the question of whether Germany and France would chart a course toward 
inevitable war or start the process of reconciliation.412 While the French professor placed most of the 
blame on the German side, he also held a low opinion of French strategy in the conflict. The 
government had “deliberately” alienated the United States and Britain and given rise to “accusations 
of imperialism” in the Anglo-Saxon press.413 
 
The growing disaffection of liberal intellectuals such as Lichtenberger coincided with similar 
developments within parts of the French business community. As Laurence Badel has shown, France 
in the interwar period saw for the first time the formation of a coherent milieu advocating for the 
interests and the liberal philosophy of major business enterprises—large retailers, exporters and 
producers.414 Against foreign and economic policies they viewed as beholden to the interests of small 
shopkeepers and peasant farmers—the “cult of the small” (Becker and Berstein)—they advocated for 
policies that stressed efficiency, mass production and the free circulation of goods and services within 
a European market.415 Viewed from the perspective of productivity there was a strong case for 
reconciliation, founded on the belief that the French and German economies were inherently 
complementary. The obvious opportunities for synergies and cartelization between the industrial 
bases of the two countries—particularly between Alsatian iron ore and the coal of the Saar and the 
Ruhr basins—were lost neither on policymakers nor on French heavy industry but the government 
was seeking cooperation on terms favorable to the country’s security interests. The clock was ticking, 
with Germany set to regain sovereignty over its commercial policy on 10 January 1925 under the 
Versailles peace terms, which could have resulted in impregnable divisions between the French and 
German markets.416 During Lichtenberger’s Berlin visit, industrialist Hugo Stinnes even suggested 
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that he personally travel to Paris to negotiate an agreement with Poincaré. Lichtenberger judged this 
proposition to be naïve. Business was not a sphere independent from politics. In the highly charged 
atmosphere of Franco-German relations the appearance of industry leaders and politicians colluding 
behind the peoples’ back was likely to inflame popular sentiment even more.417  
 
Political compromise would have to be preceded by a change in the cultural parameters constraining 
international conciliation and the following years saw the creation of a network of cultural institutions 
that combined—sometimes uneasily—the liberal economic pragmatism of business elites with the 
liberal internationalism of intellectuals and conservatives’ concerns about social stability at a time of 
international strife. Among the organizations that emerged after 1923 to promote Franco-German and 
wider European cultural exchanges were the Paneuropean Union (1924), the Europäischer 
Kulturbund (1924), Komitee für europäische Verständigung (1924) the Comité Franco-Allemand 
d’Information et de Documentation (1926) and the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft (1926).418 In 
this field, Henri Lichtenberger, backed by the funding and the infrastructure of the Carnegie 
Endowment, emerged as one of the central actors.419 Through membership in such organizations as 
the Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, the Comité Franco-Allemand, founded by Luxembourg 
industrialist Emile Mayrisch, and the Union Douanière Européenne, Lichtenberger hoped to play his 
part in creating a “solidarity of interests” in the economic and cultural fields that would form a 
“salutary counterpoint to the still prevailing political distrust.”420  
 
Disaffection with official foreign policy was also one of the forces contributing to the founding of 
international relations research institutes during the interwar years. Hamburg’s Institut für Auswärtige 
Politik (IAP), the secretariat for Shotwell’s war history project in Germany, had been founded shortly 
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after the war through an initiative by the Warburg banking family and like-minded hanseatic 
merchants who, as a former employee recalled, were alienated with the inability of Berlin’s 
administration “to ‘deliver’ victory—to put it in mercantile terms.”421 The problem, according to these 
merchants and bankers, was that the German Reich was still run on the mentality of a “land-locked 
people like the old Prussian state,” hindering international conciliation and trade expansion.422 
Financed as a public-private partnership between the banking community and Hamburg’s state 
government headed by liberal mayor Carl Wilhelm Petersen (DDP), the Institut was intended to help 
broaden that perspective through scholarly and public debate and eventually by helping train officers 
for Germany’s foreign service.423  
 
This was the route through which Moritz Julius Bonn had entered the CEIP’s orbit. When in July 
1921 Shotwell brainstormed names of possible German partners with members of the Inter-Allied 
Reparations Committee in Berlin, Bonn’s name came up almost immediately. The economist was 
“strongly recommended” by all of Shotwell’s French and Italian contacts as an “open minded” and 
“fair-thinking” individual and the following year the professor was contracted to draft a general 
outline for part of the series, receiving a moderate honorarium of one hundred dollars.424 Bonn was a 
supporter of the Weimar Republic, a member of the DDP and he considered himself a liberal. 
Nevertheless, like many in the CEIP’s orbit, his liberalism often appeared to hark back to pre-1914 
political institutions—the German monarchy, the Manchester School of economics. He never 
concealed his lingering attachment to the Hohenzollern court and to the haute bourgeois sociability 
of the bygone era, while he deplored the “lack of manners” of republican Berlin.425 Modern 
parliamentary democracy appeared to him mainly as a system in which key interest groups “divide 
the national dividend for their own sectional purposes.”426 As one of the German government’s 
foremost reparations experts, Bonn considered himself a true patriot and his initial reaction to the 
Ruhr Crisis displayed none of the anxiety the event had caused among French internationalists—
Bonn even wrote to the government offering to take in a foster child “of someone expelled from the 
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Ruhr.”427 But as the crisis dragged on and the government’s bankrolling of “passive resistance” strikes 
ruined state finances to the point of the breakdown of Germany’s monetary system, the price of the 
administration’s actions came into stark relief. Bonn would later denounce the government’s 
brinkmanship as “criminal” and the affinity of Weimar officials for “bold, totally improvised 
maneuvers” as the bane of the first German republic.428 In Bonn’s analysis, the bickering between the 
two nations distracted from the larger problem of the time, which he called the “Crisis of European 
Democracy”: a global challenge to national and international hierarchies, a rise of the “Have Nots” 
against the “Haves” that had upturned Europe’s established order.429 
 
Among the venues through which Bonn sought to reorient German foreign policy thinking away from 
a narrowly nationalist mindset was the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (DHP). Founded in 1920 to 
educate a new class of public administrators for the new Weimar democracy, the school’s main 
clientele were entry-level government bureaucrats and other part-time students who attended the 
school’s evening classes to bolster their résumés. When viewed against the backdrop of Germany’s 
intense political polarization at the time, the school stood out as a relatively broad tent, with liberals 
such as Bonn teaching next to social democrat Rudolf Hilferding (SPD) and conservative nationalist 
Otto Hoetzsch (DNVP).  Its center of gravity, however, were the restrained Vernunfrepublikaner such 
as C.H. Becker and Bonn, who accepted the Weimar democracy as a necessity of modern life.430 
Becker had been instrumental in the DHP’s founding, hoping to break the stranglehold of Prussian 
militarism and nationalism on the educational system as well as on the broader administration. His 
inaugural address exhorted the school to interpret its eponymous Germanness “not in the chauvinist 
sense of hating and reflexively combatting all things foreign” but as a constructive contribution to the 
“cultural life of all humanity.”431 As was the case with the IAP in Hamburg, private sector groups 
interested in a more outward looking German administration looked favorably on such efforts. While 
the DHP was mainly financed by the Prussian education ministry, Berlin’s major banks contributed 
about RM 50,000 to the school’s annual budget.432 Funding remained precarious, however, and so in 
the winter of 1925/26 the school’s energetic director Ernst Jäckh traveled to New York to meet with 
potential American sponsors interested in improving their relationship with Germany, including 
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bankers Owen D. Young and Paul Warburg, Henry S. Pritchett of the Carnegie Corporation and 
Nicholas Murray Butler.433 
 
The timing of the DHP’s initiative could not have been more auspicious. Only a few months earlier, 
Butler had included German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann on the mailing list for a 1925 survey 
of world leaders requesting advice for future CEIP initiatives. Pushed by its Washington ambassador, 
Ago von Maltzan, who urged immediate action “before the iron goes cold again,” the Wilhelmstraße 
drafted a sympathetic reply by Stresemann. They also included instructions to the Washington 
Embassy for a face-to-face meeting, where more detailed discussion of Germany’s hopes for the 
Endowment’s future work could be discussed.434 At the meeting on 13 November 1925 between the 
embassy’s counselor Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff and Butler at the president’s Columbia University 
office, the issue of German participation in the CEIP’s activities was at the top of the agenda. Besides 
voicing criticism over the general lack of visibility of Germans in the foundation’s programs, 
Dieckhoff insisted that Butler should seek out partners who “truly represent Germany.”435 Following 
its standard practice of avoiding as far as possible giving any cause for public controversy, Foerster 
and von Gerlach were not immediately dropped but rather eased out over the course of several years. 
436 With Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron and Moritz Julius Bonn, two men who enjoyed the trust of 
their government were selected to represent Germany on the newly formed Comité d’Administration, 
 
The rapprochement continued in June 1926, when Earle Babcock and later Butler arrived for their 
first post-war visits to Germany. Meetings with DHP staff and its political supporters took center 
stage and both C.H. Becker and Gustav Stresemann, as faithful supporters of the DHP, praised the 
school to the Americans in the highest terms. The lobbying campaign did not fail to make an impact. 
By late 1926, Butler had made up his mind to make the DHP the center piece of the Endowment’s 
activities in Germany: “Dr. Jäckh and the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik were both commended to 
me in explicit terms […] by Dr. Stresemann and Dr. Becker, the Cultus Minister. If we are to work 
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with the new Germany, we must work with her spokesmen and representatives.”437 This course of 
action was also widely supported by the newly created Comité d’Administration. For Lichtenberger 
the shift toward the DHP fit perfectly with his position that the CEIP needed to reorient itself toward 
Germany’s centrist Catholics, industrialists and nationalists and away from those who had “taken the 
side of France against their own country” like Foerster and von Gerlach.438 Nicolas Politis took the 
opportunity to denounce the CEIP’s old course in strong terms: in the past the Endowment had 
developed a reputation as a pacifist organization that required its supporters to subordinate patriotism 
and national interest to its higher purpose, a program which doomed the foundation to insignificance: 
“To the extent that the Carnegie Endowment orients itself towards pacifism, it will not have any 
practical impact in Europe.”439  
 
The CEIP’s cooperation agreement with the DHP was officially concluded in the winter of 1926/27. 
It encompassed the creation of a Carnegie Chair for International Relations at the school that would 
be successively held by temporary lecturers of international renown. Among those who would hold 
this title were Moritz Julius Bonn himself, André Siegfried, William E. Rappard and Albert Thomas, 
director of the ILO. In 1929, the CEIP also added a permanent holder of the chair, selecting historian 
Hajo Holborn for the position. The genesis of the CEIP-DHP cooperation illustrates the outline of the 
coalition of European actors that supported the CEIP’s cultural internationalism in the mid-1920s: 
from the center-left internationalist Lichtenberger to more conservative German Vernunftrepublikaner 
such as Bonn and C.H. Becker. The academic research and advocacy institutions these men were 
affiliated with reflected the growing disaffection of liberal elites with the methods, if not the goals, 
of their countries’ foreign policy bureaucracies. Many of these initiatives—the IAP, the DHP, the 
UDE—were at least partially financed by members of the banking and business communities who 
were alienated by a political discourse that appeared to be mainly based on nationalist flag-waving 
rather than a cooly calculated pursuit of national interests. They participated in a common project that 
rejected both an extreme form of nationalism that threatened to destabilize the Continent and an anti-
capitalist and anti-imperialist internationalism that threatened existing social institutions. 
 
The development of different varieties of “new internationalisms” is so frequently observed in the 
historiography of transnational movements as to have become almost a fixed feature of the 
literature.440 These parallel findings indicate how internationalism was a constantly shifting 
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phenomenon that was perpetually redefined and reinvented. As Glenda Sluga notes, this process 
usually entailed narrowing the parameters of what had always been a diverse movement, based on 
inherently ambiguous liberal precepts, “through the excision of unwelcome ideas, people, and 
politics.”441 The various lectures, exchanges and debate forums organized by the CEIP in Europe 
became a platform for those who wished to tone down the socially reformist aspects of internationalist 
rhetoric and emphasize continuity with existing institutions: the state, the church, the capitalist 
economy. Intellectuals such as Lichtenberger, Thomas Mann, Ernst Robert Curtius and Yves de la 
Brière and politicians such as the French and Prussian ministers Anatole de Monzie and C.H. Becker 
participated in a widespread interwar discourse of reconciling nationalism with internationalism: the 
“international mind” could not be built by “erasing all features of national ideologies” (Becker); 
international cooperation was an “extension and natural crowning” of true patriotism (de la Brière); 
positing an opposition between the two made for a “wrong-headed and disastrous alternative” 
(Curtius).442 Shotwell once described the CEIP’s field of associates as those “who have a clear 
realization of the primary demands of patriotism but maintain [their] international ideals strengthened 
on a much more practical basis, for that very reason.”443 
 
Henri Lichtenberger gave a characteristic expression of this discourse in a speech at the University 
of Berlin during a trip that was partly sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment. Under the title “What 
is Citizenship of the World?” (Was ist Weltbürgertum?), Lichtenberger only paid passing tribute to 
the high idealism of principled pacifists. The main purpose of his talk was to clarify that neither 
nationalism, nor a belief in the inevitability of warfare, nor anti-democratic politics were necessarily 
incompatible with Weltbürgertum. Had not Friedrich Nietzsche wedded a progressive, European 
vision with authoritarian politics, Lichtenberger asked his audience of students, professors and high 
government officials. Had he not been as much a “champion of hierarchy” and “a steadfast foe of 
democracy and socialism” as any conservative? The professor outlined a dialectical opposition 
between extreme nationalism on the one hand, whose denial of international interdependence belied 
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the facts of modern life, and an exaggerated cosmopolitanism that uncritically endorsed 
industrialized, urban modernity, leading to a “complete Americanization or even to catastrophe.” 
Clearly, a synthesis was needed: “The modern man is almost by necessity at once a citizen of the 
world and a nationalist.”444 
 
 
The Committees for Security and Disarmament: Affirming or subverting the state? 
In addition to making internationalism compatible with the ideological preferences of French and 
German business communities, Weltbürgertum as defined by Lichtenberger was also a gesture toward 
government officials on both sides of the Rhine at a time when new opportunities for cooperation 
were opening up. The CEIP’s relationship with official Paris had alwas been cordial, particularly 
during d’Estournelles de Constant’s tenure as director of the Centre Européen. His death had briefly 
set off alarm bells at the Quai d’Orsay, particularly when it heard the rumor that the CEIP was 
considering moving the entire office to Brussels. The diplomats feared a disastrous “moral effect” 
that “would benefit our country’s adversaries” and considered having the ambassador personally 
intervene with Butler or Root to avoid such a blow.445 
 
Meanwhile, the electoral success of the Cartel des Gauches in May 1924 had brought to power a new 
set of foreign policy actors. While no less committed to safeguarding French security than his 
predecessors, the foreign ministry under Aristide Briand was more inclined toward seeking the 
necessary guarantees in a multilateral framework. Over the course of the next six years the CEIP was 
able to deepen its relations with Quai d’Orsay officials such as Jacques Seydoux and Alexis Leger as 
well as with the larger orbit of foreign policy voices on the center-left such as Albert Thomas, Arthur 
Fontaine, Julien Luchaire and Paul Painlevé. Vocal affirmations of patriotism were designed to 
facilitate access by shielding activists working toward internationalist solutions from suspicions of 
subversion. To avoid any impression of working at cross-purposes with the French government, Henri 
Lichtenberger conscientiously reported all his interactions with Germany to the authorities and it was 
perhaps due to encouragement from this side that the professor sometimes strayed from the course 
outlined by New York. When in March 1925 the German presidential election was shaping up as a 
contest between the pro-republican camp around Wilhelm Marx and the conservative-monarchist 
camp around Paul von Hindenburg, Lichtenberger tried to secretly funnel 10,000 Francs out of the 
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CEIP’s coffers to von Gerlach in support of the pro-republican campaign.446 
 
Similarly, the German government’s sudden embrace of the foundation was directly tied to a tactical 
shift in German foreign policy. Beginning in 1923/24 and under the leadership of Foreign Minister 
Stresemann, the country began to abandon its uncompromising opposition to the Treaty of Versailles 
in favor of a more flexible approach that stressed international cooperation and that placed great 
emphasis on improving German-American relations. For one, the United States mattered because of 
the Foreign Office’s new focus on economic issues as leveraging Germany’s industrial resources into 
political power became the linchpin of the country’s new foreign policy. What was sorely needed to 
boost Germany’s economy after the effects of war and the breakdown of Germany’s monetary system 
during the hyperinflation of 1923 was American credit. As Stresemann himself wrote in the CFR’s 
journal Foreign Affairs in 1924, “the lack of available capital caused by the destructive effects of the 
monetary inflation” was the key impediment to Germany’s development and hence the main factor 
constraining “her ability to make reparation payments.”447 Cooperation with the CEIP, whose reports, 
the Wilhelmstraße was sure, were read by a “number of very influential and powerful people,” thus 
promised an opportunity to exert a positive influence on Germany’s image with the very East Coast 
establishment whose support the government was seeking.448 Furthermore, as one of the risks of the 
new policy was further alienation from France, as closer German-American relations could not but 
exacerbate security concerns in Paris, participation in the Endowment’s Franco-German exchange 
activities would provide further positive publicity.  
 
The German government’s hopes to make the CEIP part of its diplomatic outreach to the New World 
were not in vain. Starting in 1925 and reaching into the early years of the National Socialist regime, 
Berlin consistently found a sympathetic audience at Morningside Heights in its efforts to project the 
image of a new, a kinder and gentler Germany to the American public—at one point Shotwell publicly 
praised the German republic as an “unprecedented experiment in the politics of peace” and a 
“laboratory for the study of pacific international affairs.”449 Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron worked 
closely with the German government, including officials at the Foreign Office and at the Prussian 
Ministry of Education to improve the effectiveness of German propaganda. He handed over minutes 
of the Comité d’Administration’s meetings and privately took credit for having turned the activities 
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of the Division of Intercourse and Education in Germany’s favor.450 Similarly, whenever the 
Wilhelmstraße wanted to highlight how the reparations burden was crushing the Germany economy 
Mority Julius Bonn’s international standing made him an attractive messenger.451 In 1927, Berlin even 
felt emboldened to pursue the ultimate price: enlisting the CEIP in its efforts to revise the despised 
war guilt paragraph by seeking financing for a purportedly independent historical study that was in 
effect designed to exculpate the Central powers.452 This was a step too far. In declining the 
application, James Shotwell claimed diplomatically that the CEIP was no longer interested in 
investigating the past but wanted to “face rather the problems of the present and the future.”453 
 
This utilization of the new transnationally connected expert space by national governments for 
cultural diplomacy purposes was, however, only one side of the coin. Another effect of the CEIP’s 
sponsorship of cultural internationalism in Western and Central Europe was that it contributed to, and 
often pioneered, the formation of transnational foreign policy networks that could function as a 
counterbalance to national particularization. The foundation’s Franco-German networks demonstrate 
how cultural internationalism became an essential component of the CEIP’s general strategy of 
furthering informal governance mechanisms through elite networking. The “international mind,” in 
other words, was especially concentrated along the Rhine River. By the mid-1920s, men such as Henri 
Lichtenberger and Moritz Julius Bonn were at the core of a sprawling interpersonal network that 
connected government intellectuals at research universities, foreign-policy-focused institutes and 
domestic interest groups.  
 
An initial attempt to harness these connections was made in January 1925 when Henri Lichtenberger 
organized a meeting at the Centre Européen for what would become the French affiliate of the 
Komitee für europäische Verständigung, a network that was to serve as a forum for “unofficial 
international conversations on the great problems of European politics.” The project stagnated, 
however, as Lichtenberger and his French colleagues judged the German committee insufficiently 
representative of Berlin’s foreign policy elite. While the French section, featuring members such as 
Paul Painlevé and Louis Loucheur, was well connected among ruling Cartel des Gauches circles, 
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Lichtenberger expressed concern that the German side around Alfred Nossig and Wilhelm Heile was 
too distant from the government.454 
 
A more successful venture grew out of Shotwell’s ESHW network. For over three years, Shotwell 
had periodically assembled an American study group on security policies. Its members—Frederic 
Keppel, Stephen Duggan, John Bates Clark, Henry S. Pritchett—were mainly drawn from the 
Carnegie Endowment’s East Coast orbit and helped the director formulate liberal internationalist 
policy alternatives to those pursued by the American government.455 Now, in the spring of 1925, 
Shotwell sought to establish corresponding French and German counterparts to this group. The start 
was made in Germany, where in April 1925 a security policy study group (Ausschuß zum Studium der 
Fragen der Friedenssicherung) was formed. In addition to including prominent legal and military 
experts, the world of business and banking was well represented on the Committee. From liberal 
Hamburg came banker Carl Melchior of M.M. Warburg & Co. and Mayor Carl Wilhelm Petersen 
while the steel and coal industries of the Ruhr and the Rhineland were represented by Otto Wiedtfeldt 
of Krupp AG and Konrad Adenauer, the mayor of Cologne and future West German chancellor. As 
Shotwell noted with evident pride, the membership of the Ausschuß represented “as authoritative” a 
perspective on foreign policy matters as could be found in Germany and while it did not include any 
Wilhelmstraße officials it was practically “next door to the Government.”456  
 
Nominally, the group met under the sponsorship of the German society for international law but in 
reality it was Shotwell and the IAP who were leading the enterprise. The idea was, Shotwell explained 
to Carl Melchior, that in the modern age governments were faced with problems of increasing 
complexity. Yet, bureaucracies remained attached to the same, traditional approaches leading to 
potentially calamitous results: “The business of government can no more be run by surrender to 
prejudice than can any other business.” It was the task of private citizens with special expertise to 
conduct preliminary studies, prepare the ground for informed government action and thus guide 
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nations out of their “childhood stage.”457 At its first session the study group had a spirited discussion 
on the risks entailed in Germany joining a collective security system in its currently weakened 
military state but finally passed a resolution that Germany should enter the League of Nations “with 
a sincere will of co-operation in international matters,” a result that was promptly communicated to 
the Foreign Office. Finally, as if to highlight the commercial issues implicitly at stake in the 
deliberations, the were joined for dinner by Carl Duisberg, President of the main employers’ 
association Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie (RDI), and American Ambassador Jacob Gould 
Schurman.458 
 
After several delays, a French counterpart to the German committee was finally formed in late 
November 1925 under the chairmanship of Arthur Fontaine, a member of the French editorial board 
of the ESHW, and with the assistance of Henri Lichtenberger. It was less politically diverse than its 
German counterpart, however, like Lichtenberger’s previous effort it was well connected among the 
foreign policy circles of the Cartel des Gauches: Albert Thomas of the ILO and Léon Jouhaux of the 
CGT represented organized labor. International jurist Georges Scelle and Julien Luchaire, director of 
the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, were both close to the Quai d’Orsay. Meanwhile Fontaine 
himself and industrialist Henri de Peyerimhoff of the Comité central des houillères de France 
guaranteed that business interests would not be absent from the discussions. At the first meeting, 
Henri Lichtenberger was designated as liaison with the German committee.459 
 
A few weeks before the first meeting of the French group, representatives of some of Europe’s major 
powers had gathered at the Swiss town of Locarno and concluded a series of treaties in which 
Germany, France and Belgium pledged to respect their mutual borders, paving the way for German 
membership in the League of Nations. Once the signatures were affixed to the Locarno Treaties, 
Shotwell privately boasted to Butler about his role in the chain of events, noting that members of the 
German delegation had been in close touch with members of his Ausschuß and had studied its reports 
closely.460 This claim of a direct impact is almost certainly overblown. The German committee was 
only formed after negotiations between France, Britain and Germany were well underway. 
Government policy remained driven by a variety of factors and the activities of even well-connected 
internationalists were certainly not the overriding ones. What the CEIP had contributed to the political 
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process was the financing of a space for encounters between “patriotic” Germans and Frenchmen that 
aided in removing the public stigma from making common cause with the former enemy. 
 
The early 1920s had shown that as long as internationalism and transnational outreach remained 
widely associated with disloyalty to the nation and with radical political views, even social groups 
keenly interested in Franco-German rapprochement would stay on the sidelines. The years after 1923 
saw an effort on the part of the CEIP and its European allies to brand a variety of internationalism 
that respected existing institutions—including the primacy of the nation state and capitalism—and 
was apt to become the shared identity of a new internationalist coalition stretching from the French 
center-left to German conservatives. The core representative of this discourse was a group of 
transnationally connected foreign policy elites that saw no contradiction between patriotic citizenship 
and technocratic cooperation across national borders. A typical expression of this identity can be 
found in a rule Shotwell proposed for the operating procedures of the three corresponding Committees 
for Security and Disarmament. Apparently responding to concerns by some participants, he suggested 
that two types of memoranda should be produced: the first category would consist of research papers 
relating to ongoing negotiations and national strategy, which would only be shared within the national 
group and with foreign ministry officials; a second set dealing with the “underlying principles upon 
which sound policy might be built” would be given wide circulation among all three national 
groups.461 It is easy to see the appeal of this idea of an internal firewall, as it allowed participants to 
simultaneously see themselves as faithful advisers to their government and as custodians of 
international stability through transnational cooperation and negotiation. 
 
The political implications of this construction of a technocratic identity observed on the discursive 
level were again mirrored at the interpersonal level as informal cultural parameters effectively erected 
barriers around this new transnational space. The fact that practically no women participated in the 
CEIP’s Franco-German initiatives was not an accident, as it delineated a space of supposedly 
masculine scientific study from religious, emancipatory or Socialist peace associations with their 
sizeable female participation. Indeed, there appears to have been virtually no overlap between the 
senior ranks of the American Peace Society and any of the CEIP’s new cultural internationalist 
activities. Nor were activists of anti-imperialist groups such as WILPF or the American Association 
of Outlawry such as Emily Balch, Salmon O. Levinson or John Dewey invited. Meanwhile, the 
national-internationalist identity no longer accommodated some of the CEIP’s earliest European 
                                                 




partners, such as Ludwig Quidde of the DFG and Otfried Nippold and Hellmut von Gerlach of the 




“An American Locarno”: The transnationalization of politics and the origins of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact 
The formal inauguration of the Carnegie-Lehrstuhl in the spring of 1927 was a major social event in 
the German capital. On noon of 1 March 1927, professors, diplomats, government officials and 
reporters filed into the auditorium of the Bauakademie on Berlin’s Schinkelplatz to hear James T. 
Shotwell’s inaugural lecture as the first professor to hold the CEIP’s Carnegie Chair of International 
Relations at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. After an introduction by the president of the 
Reichsgericht Walter Simons, Shotwell delivered his address “Are we at a turning point of world 
history?” to a full auditorium that included such dignitaries as Chancellor Wilhelm Marx and 
American Ambassador Jacob Gould Schurman, lending the event the desired air of official 
sanction.462 Shotwell’s lecture received wide coverage in the German press, which commented 
favorably on the generosity of the Carnegie Endowment, the oratorical and linguistic abilities of the 
speaker and the magnificence of the occasion. Almost lost on his German audience, however, was a 
concrete political suggestion that Shotwell made toward the end of his talk: the United States had so 
far abstained from participation in the League of Nations for fear of being dragged into unnecessary 
European wars but had not the Locarno Treaties pointed the way toward a stable European structure? 
“In a similar way, and I am speaking solely for myself, the treaty could be adapted to the situation of 
the United States,” Shotwell proposed.463 This suggestion for an extension of the Locarno Treaties 
was, as Ernst Jäckh would later observe, the initiating impulse for the Kellogg-Briand Pact—the 1928 
international treaty that solemnly renounced war as an instrument of national policy but it widely 
regarded to have had little to no positive effect on the stability of the international system.464 
 
That the Kellogg-Briand Pact today stands mainly as a symbol for naïve idealism reflects a long 
historiography that did so little to clarify its origins that Michael Dunne has justly called the Pact 
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“one of the most misunderstood episodes in US foreign relations.”465 After the initial contemporary 
literature had mainly served the purpose of claiming credit for this contribution to international 
peace,466 in 1952, Yale historian Robert H. Ferrell would set the tone of the forthcoming 
historiographical debate with a highly critical study of the Pact’s origins. In Ferrell’s reading, the year 
1927 saw an outburst of “immature American idealism,” a sudden and irrational enthusiasm for peace 
which was further stoked by elites whose vain activism proved ”almost as benighted as the public 
they sought to lead.”467 Manipulated by a Trojan Horse offer by Aristide Briand, the State 
Department, unable to rebuff the offer in the face of the unreasonable zeal of the American people, 
was at last able to defuse the trap by turning the treaty into a noble-sounding but ultimately pointless 
multilateral declaration against war. European cunning and sophistication had thus exposed, but not 
triumphed over, the American public’s “appallingly naïve” conception of international affairs.468 This 
common interpretation illustrates the downsides of a state-centered approach to analyzing what was 
very much a transnational event: an attempt on the part of the CEIP and its European allies to utilize 
the networks and discourses developed over the course of the preceding years to overcome domestic 
American opposition against joining a European security system. 
 
Was the United States a European power? Or rather, should the United States place its considerable 
economic and political power in the service of maintaining the European balance of power and social 
status quo? The Locarno Treaties had turned into a Rohrschach test for these questions. For liberal 
European foreign policy elites the United States belonged naturally in Europe as American culture 
was “a genuine offshoot of the English-Scottish Europeanism,” as Bonn wrote.469 American liberal 
internationalists, too, considered U.S. participation in Continental affairs more and more urgent. To 
them, Locarno demonstrated that the rest of the world was becoming more integrated while America 
was standing on the sidelines, potentially finding itself shut out of important markets and dangerously 
isolated. “Europe has, constructively, left us incontestably behind. She leads—we trail,“ wrote Arthur 
Bullard of the League of Nations Association in 1925.470 Those who had always opposed American 
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membership in European institutions considered the Locarno Treaties a long-overdue pronouncement 
of separation between the Continents. This included, on the one hand, American and European 
nationalists who preferred the preservation of distinctive national cultural and political spheres to the 
entangling tendencies of the modern technology and culture.471 On the other hand, many anti-
imperialist peace activists condemned the new treaties as merely affirming the status quo and not 
tackling the social root causes of conflict. 
 
The Kellogg-Briand initiative was essentially an attempt by liberal internationalists to settle this 
debate by using their superior access to governmental bureaucracies. The architecture they invisioned 
is contained in a draft treaty prepared by Shotwell and his Columbia colleague Joseph P. Chamberlain, 
the core duo of the American Group on Arbitration and Disarmament. In drawing up their proposal 
in advance of the Kellogg-Briand negotiations the professors took Shotwell’s call for an “American 
Locarno” literally. The treaty was in effect “a mosaic of texts,“ as Shotwell himself put it, blending 
articles adapted from existing U.S. treaties with clauses inserted from the Locarno accords, often 
verbatim.472 The intended effect was to both demonstrate faithfulness to American foreign policy 
traditions and to integrate the United States into the European collective security system as developed 
by the 1925 treaties. In fifteen articles the draft outlined an ambitious structure of collective security 
and collective action that amounted, in effect, to a new Concert of Powers, under participation of the 
United States.473  
 
Shotwell’s initiative bore several of the hallmarks of the transnationalization of politics. For one, it 
relied strongly on the CEIP’s interconnected foreign policy experts. This was less the case in Germany 
since, as Shotwell later told Bonn, it had been a strategic necessity to initiate treaty negotiations from 
France.474 The CEIP director had, however, utilized his Berlin stay to gauge the mood of official 
Berlin. He had met privately with Germany’s secretary of defense Wilhelm Groener, who assured him 
that he had “no objections whatever” to the contents of the speech, and the following week Shotwell 
travelled to Geneva for a meeting with Gustav Stresemann.475 Arriving in Paris on 15 March, the 
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director discussed his plans with Arthur Fontaine and Albert Thomas, both members of the French 
Committee for Security and Disarmament. It was Fontaine, who agreed to bring the plan to Briand’s 
attention and finally arranged a meeting between the French foreign minister and Shotwell. Having 
been informed by a correspondent in Paris of the role of the CEIP’s internationalist networks in having 
initiated the proposed pact, Senator Borah called the news “extremely interesting” but “by no means 
surprising.”476 
 
Secondly, symbolic communication, i.e. culture, was a key component of the endeavor. The plan 
finally agreed on by Shotwell, Fontaine and Briand was that the latter would seize the upcoming tenth 
anniversary of American entry into the war to stage a bold, public signal that could “re-capture 
American opinion.”477 Shotwell himself was to draft a speech for Briand that would resonate with the 
American people. Despite some apprehensiveness as to the legality of his extra-diplomatic activities 
Shotwell agreed and, working with Earle Babcock’s assistance from the Centre Européen, drafted an 
appeal to the American people to be delivered by Briand on 6 April. The centerpiece of the 
Briand/Shotwell letter, published through the Associated Press, was an offer by France to “enter into 
an engagement with America mutually outlawing war, to use your way of expressing it.”478 The 
reference to the language of “outlawry” was no accident. Shotwell had appropriated the language of 
anti-imperialist internationalism because it had “attained a definite place in the thinking of large 
sections of the Middle West through the eloquent advocacy of those in Chicago who had coined it 
and had become its advocates.”479 For European audiences, Earle Babcock coordinated publicity with 
Comité member Georges Lechartier of the Journal des Débats, Jean Martin of the Journal de Genève 
and Prittwitz von Gaffron in Berlin under the headline “an American Locarno,“ thus seeking to 
harness the positive connotations of the earlier agreement.480 With Comité member Gilbert Murray 
lining up the support of the League of Nations Union, the foundation had the world’s largest 
internationalist organization working to overcome the British government’s strong reservations to the 
proposal.481 
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Finally, the origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact illustrate the contested nature of transnationalism as 
various coalitions seek to advance their causes. Stirred into action by Briand’s use of the “outlawry” 
language, the chief activist of the Midwestern peace movement, S.O. Levinson, quickly travelled to 
Paris to negotiate with the French authorities. A concerned Shotwell instructed Babcock to “take great 
pains to disassociate Briand Proposal from Levinson,“ however, shutting out the Midwestern activists 
would not be as easy as the CEIP had hoped.482 Over the course of the following weeks Briand’s chef 
de cabinet Alexis Leger held a long series of alternating meetings with S.O. Levinson and Earle 
Babcock, leaving both sides of the debate with the impression that they were driving French policy.483 
Yet, when the Quai d’Orsay finally forwarded a concrete draft treaty to the American government it 
became clear that neither side had gotten what they wanted. J. Theodore Marriner, of the State 
Department’s Western European Affairs Division, noted that the French proposal was apparently 
“intended to give the effect of a kind of perpetual alliance between the United States and France.”484  
 
In the six months of negotiations that followed, the State Department successfully impressed on the 
French government that a bilateral treaty would never pass the U.S. Senate and consequently the 
treaty was opened up to a wider circle of signatories. Berlin enthusiastically greeted the initiative as 
a step binding America closer to European affairs. Although there were serious reservations on the 
part of Great Britain, the ultimate toothlessness of the treaty provisions convinced Whitehall that the 
Pact would not threaten British imperial interests.485  In the form that it was signed in Paris on 27 
August 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact is unrecognizable from the ambitious security structure liberal 
internationalists had hoped for when they launched the initiative. By the end of the negotiations, all 
that was left was the general declaration of principle that has left many contemporary observers and 
most modern readers with the impression of a poorly thought-through, idealist pipe-dream.486 
 
 
Epilogue: The culture of technocracy 
In the immediate post-war years the CEIP had built its reputation as a broker in Franco-American 
relations at a time when public scorn of anyone suspected of colluding with the enemy was still high 
in the post-war France and Germany. Over the course of the following years, as concerns over the 
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effects of international conflict on social cohesion grew, the CEIP cooperated with institutions such 
as the IAP and the DHP to nurture a transnationally connected foreign policy elite that served as a 
check on the power of unilateralists in European corridors of power while simultaneously blocking 
access to “radicals” who proposed sweeping limits to national sovereignty and to domestic social 
institutions. Circumscribing the group identity of those deemed qualified to formulate the national 
interest and providing for a steady interchange of ideas between national foreign policy 
establishments became the main objective of the CEIP’s cultural internationalism. Legitimated by its 
claim to special expertise, the ideological and sociological composition of this new in-group showed 
remarkable continuity to the old liberal order, before the advent of social mass-movements and 
broadly representative popular democracy. By making the affirmation of existing social institutions, 
especially the nation state and a liberal capitalist economy, a precondition for participation, this form 
of cultural internationalism erased many competing ideas on the construction of a legitimate global 
order. Representation was effectively limited to middle class and haute bourgeois men with center-
left to center-right political views.  
 
There were, of course, legitimate reasons to think that a world in which the foreign policies of all 
major powers were governed by a similar politically centrist, technocratic consensus would be more 
conducive to international stability and peacekeeping. As the creation of the Committees on Security 
and Disarmement shows, some expected these connections to enable liberal internationalists to 
directly influence government action, effectively constituting an enlightened technocratic governing 
elite. As James T. Shotwell explained to Mendelssohn Bartholdy in connection with the German 
committee: while the work of organizing a study group could be burdensome and tedious, the ultimate 
payoff was the reward of being in control of “a very powerful instrument for affecting international 
policies at some crucial juncture.”487 Yet, while the homogeneity of this group certainly fostered 
consensus formation, the history of the Kellogg-Briand Pact demonstrates the problems with this 
essentially elitist strategy. Men such as James T. Shotwell, Moritz Julius Bonn and Henri 
Lichtenberger found it easy to get a hearing among academics, government officials and businessmen. 
Beyond these circles, however, public support for their ideas was limited. Even the larger liberal 
internationalist advocacy organizations such as the ASFDN, La Paix par le Droit or the DLfV, usually 
had no more than a few thousand members and served mainly an educated, middle class audience.488 
This was far below the millions reached by political parties, labor unions, or, for that matter, even the 
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tens of thousands of supporters of the major peace societies. Thus, while the CEIP’s network had 
been able to launch the initiative leading to the adoption of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, even the 
appropriation of the popular “outlawry” language could not camouflage the fact that there was no 
widespread support for the “American Locarno” that liberal internationalists were hoping for.  
 
The biographies of Henri Lichtenberger and Moritz Julius Bonn after 1927 are testaments to the 
dashed hopes connected to these projects. While the actions of internationalists contributed to 
undermining notions of national sovereignty, decisions by national governments continued to be the 
determining factor not only in the success or failure of their initiatives but also of their personal lives 
in matters of professional success, personal freedom and even life and death. Henri Lichtenberger 
documented the rise of National Socialism and the concomitant disintegration of his decade-long 
work for Franco-German comity in a series of articles for Esprit International.489 Seventy years after 
the occupation of Strasbourg, he witnessed Germany’s third attack on France in his life-time as a 
terminally ill man. Henri Lichtenberger died in November 1941 in Biarritz, on the Atlantic Coast. 
 
Moritz Julius Bonn’s career was interrupted when he was expelled from the Handelshochschule in 
April 1933 and forced to flee Germany for Britain via Austria. An internationally renowned 
economist, fluent in French and English and with professional contacts across Europe and North 
America, Bonn’s prospects for the future appeared nevertheless less dire than that of most other 
Jewish refugees. In fact, both Yale University and the University of California at Berkeley were eager 
to secure his services. In 1935, the Emergency Committee in Aid of Foreign Displaced Scholars 
agreed to finance part of his salary and it is easy to envision Bonn thriving in a milieu that afforded 
many of his former fellow DHP colleagues to revive their academic careers.490 In light of his wife’s 
family in England, however, Bonn turned down all American offers for permanent employment and 
chose to make London his new home. Pre-war Britain did not prove a hospitable environment for the 
émigré. Bonn’s fame as an economist had always stemmed more from his eloquent and frequently 
incisive public interventions than on his scholarly contributions to the field. As a public intellectual 
he had thrived at the intersection of academic expertise, government service and the media. With the 
British government weary of the motives of Continental émigrés and the British public in no mood 
for his interpretation of German affairs, Bonn was never able to revive his professional fortunes or 
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his political influence.491 
 
From the perspective of the Carnegie Endowment, the Kellogg-Briand episode stands out as the high-
tide of the foundation’s attempts to directly influence international relations. If there was an 
encouraging sign in the document, it was the very universalism of its language. Since the nineteenth 
century, international conventions placing limits on the use of force, such as arbitration treaties, had 
routinely contained exceptions for all disputes involving matters of “national honor.” By formulating 
reservations and asserting a sphere of national sovereignty that was beyond the reach of international 
law or international institutions, governments routinely reaffirmed the notion that nationalism and 
internationalism were fundamentally in conflict. The universal language of the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
contained no similar exceptions, leaving especially the British government initially puzzled. The 
United States was obviously not proposing to overturn the Monroe Doctrine by suggesting that 
American interventions in the Western hemisphere were now illegal. But if the State Department did 
not insist on expressing such a reservation, how could Britain assert its own special interests, 
particularly in Egypt? The answer was, the U.S. administration indicated, that such exemptions did 
not need to be expressly formulated since they were already implied.492  
 
Rather than positing an idealist internationalism in which national self-interestedness was 
disappearing, the Pact thus took the primacy of the interests of the major powers as its point of 
departure from which international order would be constructed. Internationalism was not in 
contradiction to nationalism. It was an assumption that was, not least, grounded in the understanding 
that the diplomatic and academic experts formulating the national interests of the major powers would 
have the “international mind” to appreciate and respect the interests involved on all sides. In the 
following years, the foundation intended to build on this first step to construct a more durable 
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When in 1934 Austrian legal scholar Josef L. Kunz surveyed the literature of his discipline he noticed 
something peculiar. While up to 1914 and throughout the war his colleagues had devoted much time 
and effort to the task of elucidating the rules governing the conduct of war, since about 1920 the 
subject appeared to have mysteriously vanished from the pages of academic journals. A look at the 
lectures and courses held at the major institutions of the field—the International Law Association, the 
Institute de Droit International, the Hague Academy of International Law—confirmed his suspicion: 
just a few decades after the Hague Conferences had set in motion the task of codifying the laws of 
war hardly anybody seemed to be studying the subject anymore. The Inter-parliamentary Union had 
even passed a resolution discouraging any further efforts in this direction. It was as if the mere 
possibility of armed conflict had dropped out of sight. Kunz was certain that this widespread lack of 
interest could not be accidental: “Quite to the contrary, it is deliberate and part of a predetermined 
policy; it is often regarded as a great achievement of our time, [...] as a decisive step on the road that 
leads toward the elimination of war.”493 What Kunz, an Austrian émigré and a Rockefeller fellow at 
the time of his realization, did not appear to realize was that a significant part of the incentive structure 
of interwar legal scholarship was shaped by the priorities of American philanthropy. All of the 
institutions Kunz had mentioned were recipients of Carnegie or Rockefeller grants, part of an effort 
to develop an “international law of peace” as a remedy for war. 
 
The interwar years were a key moment in the development of international legal standards. With new 
international institutions transforming the practice of diplomacy, many scholars abandoned positivist 
conceptions of justice for projects to establish a durable international legal regime, leading to a 
sometimes bewildering array of codification initiatives grouped around the League of Nations and 
the international academic community. Recent studies have highlighted how the development of 
international law was shaped by Eurocentric standards as jurists sought to stabilize relations between 
the major powers while leaving the sovereign rights of non-Western nations in doubt. From concepts 
of national sovereignty to the origins of an international human rights regime—coding existing global 
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hierarchies into emergent law was integral to the legal internationalist project.494 The deep 
involvement of U.S. philanthropy—especially the CEIP and the Rockefeller Foundation—in 
codification initiatives was thus a means for ensuring that American voices were present in the 
process.495 Not only did legal internationalism speak to the paradigmatic claim of American 
philanthropy to improve social relations through the application of scientific knowledge and rational 
organization. The idea was that replacing the inherently volatile competition between European 
empires with a stable structure based on American-style rule of law also allowed foundations to 
present themselves as acting in the nation’s best traditions and interests. There was hardly an 
organization more closely associated with this approach than the CEIP. From Andrew Carnegie to 
Elihu Root to James Brown Scott, many of the key figures of the foundation were long-standing 
proponents of international legal institutions.496  
 
There was, however, an additional, social dimension to this story. The argument of this chapter is that 
the legal internationalist project of the interwar years was inseparable from an effort to create 
structures of governance through the juridification of international relations. By defining and 
adjusting the boundaries between the political and the judicial, internationalists sought to make 
formerly political conflicts justiciable by legal institutions. This effectively recast the relationship 
between the public, the nation state and the international system by inserting a mediating figure: the 
international legal expert. In cases where the ideological primacy of national sovereignty clashed with 
the demands of international interdependence the transnational community of international lawyers 
would resolve conflicts through adjudication, arbitration, negotiation and also education. The endless 
conferencing that has been noted as characteristic of the interwar codification debates497 was not 
merely incidental to this project but rather one of its constituent parts. It constituted a closely 
circumscribed group of no more than two hundred legal advisers, national and international 
bureaucrats and justices of international tribunals that became central to the conduct of modern 
diplomacy, forming a new reservoir of knowledge-power.498  
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Fostering communication and coherence among this group was the common thread that ran through 
the CEIP’s interwar legal philanthropy. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that in the first half of 
the twentieth century the CEIP’s Division of International Law practically managed international 
legal scholarship in the United States. Elihu Root and James Brown Scott were the founding figures 
of the American Society of International Law whose American Journal of International Law was run 
from the CEIP’s headquarters.499 Taking into account fellowships, exchange programs and 
publication initiatives there was hardly an American professor of international law who had not at 
one point been a direct beneficiary of Carnegie funding. The foundation’s influence also extended to 
Europe, where CEIP officers were represented on editorial boards and the foundation disbursed 
annual subsidies to about a dozen journals in ten countries.500 Throughout the interwar period it paid 
for the establishment or the upkeep of community institutions such as the Institute de droit 
international (IDI)—the “central bank of symbolic credit” of international jurisprudence501—the 
Hague Academy of International Law, the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales and the Grotius 
Society; it promoted contacts through travel grants; it fostered communication by publishing and 
distributing monographs. Building a transnational community of theoreticians and practitioners of 
international law effectively delineated the experts from the amateurs and “objective knowledge” 
from idealistic aspirations. The juridification of diplomacy was, in the CEIP’s eyes, a means of taking 
contentious international conflicts out of the realm of small-minded national debates and placing them 
into the hands of a community of men of a truly “international mind.” In addition to making 
international law, the foundation wanted to make lawyers international. 
 
This was not merely a theoretical issue for the foundation but one that was attached to a concrete 
political project: securing American adherence to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), 
or “World Court,” an issue that acquired great salience after the Kellogg-Briand Pact had been signed.  
“[W]e cannot renounce war as an instrument of policy unless we have something to take its place,” 
wrote James T. Shotwell in 1927 as the CEIP’s campaign for the Kellogg-Briand Pact was reaching 
its climax.502 At a Board of Trustees meeting the following year President Butler explained that while 
it had been essential to refrain “from any formulation of the next step […] to give the Senate a chance 
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for ratification” now was the time for further action.503 At the time it seemed like a logical next step 
as the PCIJ enjoyed unusually broad popular support in the United States. Eastern Establishment 
groups were for it; most pacifist organizations were for it; every single interwar U.S. administration 
was for it.504 Underneath this superficial unanimity, however, lay strikingly divergent conceptions of 
what constituted justice on a global scale. As noted before, the CEIP’s activism was tied to the 
promotion of a specific version of interantionalism over its alternatives. 
 
What many working towards a legal international order associated with the idea of a World Court 
was nothing less than a complete revision of the ethical underpinnings of international conduct along 
anti-imperialist and anti-interventionist lines.505 Already at the Paris Peace Conference the Euro-
centric moorings of international law had come under attack. An amendment to the Covenant of the 
League of Nations declaring the “equality of all races” an inviolable principle had received a majority 
of votes only to be rejected on dubious procedural grounds. In the 1920s, Pan-Asian activists and 
Black Internationalists formulated visions of a global order in which solidarity among non-European 
states would put an end to imperialist exploitation.506 In the United States, the continuing unequal 
treatment of nations served to underline the alien nature of an international system still shaped by 
European ambition and aggression. “They believe in imperialism. We do not”—such was Senator 
Hiram Johnson’s characterization of the transatlantic divide.507 Many peace activists begged to differ, 
finding the United States well on its way to emulating Europe in its dealings with the Western 
Hemisphere—the National Council for Prevention of War suggested that the occupations of 
Nicaragua and Haiti constituted “incipient imperialism.”508 This is not to imply that these discussions 
could be easily mapped onto a politics of multicultural solidarity. Especially in the American South 
and West the public discourse of adherence to a global judicial regime was ripe with racially tinged 
fears that foreign justices could soon rule on the legality of Asian exclusion or examine discrimination 
against African-Americans.509 But bracketing the American anti-imperialist discourse was the fear 
that exploitation abroad would beget domination at home. Inequality on the international plane would 
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set the stage for rule by an international elite in Washington, New York and London, undermining the 
republican form of government. 
 
To the CEIP such concerns seemed overblown. Inequality was a fact of international life and an 
established feature of the laws of nations. Andrew Carnegie himself—in clear agreement with the 
1907 Hague Conventions—had dedicated the foundation to bringing about the abolition of war 
between “so-called civilized nations,” thereby placing colonial warfare beyond the ambit of the 
CEIP’s charter, and Butler’s definition of the “international mind” had contained the same caveat.510 
To the foundation’s officers and trustees international law was not primarily an instrument of 
emancipation but of entangling nations in a web of agreements—the “rules of conduct which regulate 
the dealings of civilized States” in the words of J.P. Morgan partner Dwight Morrow—that created 
the preconditions for commerce and finance to prosper on a global scale, raising the standard of 
civilization for everybody.511 The mistreatment of entire ethnic groups at the hands of European 
colonizers elicited no sympathy at Morningside Heights but it was shared prosperity rather than 
sentimental appeals to the equality of man that would ultimately render colonial exploitation 
unnecessary and anachronistic. In the same vein, the CEIP was scornful of America’s often bullying 
behavior toward the Western Hemisphere and it applauded the advent of the Good Neighbor Policy 
in the 1930s. But the fact that the United States had pressing interests in Latin America and a right to 
pursue them seemed beyond question. “[W]e do control the destinies of Central America,” American 
Assistant Secretary of State and CEIP trustee Robert E. Olds acknowledged in 1927, “and we do so 
for the simple reason that the national interest absolutely dictates such a course […].”512 This positive 
attitude towards the exercise of power earned the foundation the enmity of anti-imperialist critics, 
who accused the CEIP of “sprinkl[ing] foot-powder on the pages of American publications to ease 
the boot of imperialism on to the American people.”513 
 
This chapter explores the ideological foundations and the political consequences of CEIP support for 
a space of juridified governance through the lens of the at first convergent but ultimately divergent 
career paths of two international lawyers: American law professor Philip C. Jessup and Greek 
diplomat Nicolas Politis. The two jurists crossed path in 1929 in Geneva when the foundation sent an 
aging Elihu Root and a young Philip Jessup to abroad to reach an agreement on American adherence 
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to the World Court in a little-studied instance of transnational negotation. More broadly, however, the 
interwar careers of the two men, closely intertwined with the CEIP’s legal programs, shine a light on 
the ideas and political projects underlying the interwar project of replacing war with law. 
 
Making war aggressive: Nicolas Politis and the codification of international law 
Only months after the establishment of the CEIP’s Division of International Law in 1911, Nicolas 
Socrates Politis, recently appointed Professor of International Law at the Sorbonne, was among the 
recipients of a circular letter asking for advice on possible lines of actions for the new enterprise. At 
the time, the professor’s elaborate reply, spanning eleven neatly handwritten pages, received only a 
perfunctory acknowledgment.514 Within a few years, however, Politis, now the Greek ambassador to 
France and an omnipresent League-insider, would become one of the foundation’s key partners in 
furthering the codification of international law in pursuit of a global order based on the rule of law. 
He joined the curatorium of the Hague Academy of International Law, lectured at the Geneva Institute 
of International Relations and became a member of the IDI, serving as its president from 1937 to 
1942.515 Politis was a founding member of the Comité d’Administration in 1925, consequently taking 
on a more public role as a spokesperson for the foundation. He published in L’Esprit International 
and delivered lectures at the Centre Européen while the Endowment furthered his standing in the legal 
community by distributing copies of his books and articles to hundreds of libraries around the world. 
In return, the CEIP benefited from the ambassador’s well-established links to Europe’s political class 
as well as from the lawyer’s sharp intellect and political acumen—Earle Babcock was initially 
somewhat shocked by the “aggressive clearness of [his] remarks” but praised his “most suggestive 
and helpful” ideas.516 Politis’ international standing and dedication to the work of the foundation—
despite his numerous obligations he did not miss a single meeting during the first eight years of the 
Comité’s operation—made him, next to Carlo Sforza, the anchor of the CEIP’s European 
organization. 
 
What made Politis such a compelling partner for an organization seeking to make an impact in Europe 
was not only his prominence but his border-crossing identity, an inbetweenness that allowed him to 
address disparate audiences and pursue projects in multiple venues. Born on the Greek island of Corfu 
in 1872, he had studied international law in France where he attended two of the country’s grandes 
écoles, the Faculté de droit of the Sorbonne and the École Libre des Sciences Politiques. Politis then 
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embarked on an academic career as a professor of international law at the universities of Aix-en-
Provence, Poitiers and Paris before joining the diplomatic ranks of his home country. In 1919, he 
attended the Paris Peace Conference as foreign minister and afterwards became ambassador in Paris, 
while also serving regularly as Greece’s delegate at the League of Nations. Multilingual, 
independently wealthy, he was equally at home in the ivory tower of international jurisprudence, 
among the operatives of the Quai d’Orsay and in Geneva’s League circles. He was able to switch 
fluidly between the register of diplomatic negotiation and the idealist rhetoric of internationalist 
evangelism. Politis’ views on international law captured the hope of many liberal promoters of the 
young discipline that legal mechanisms could bring peace and stability to the European continent. 
“No longer is everything contained in the nation,” Politis was convinced, and as “life beyond 
[national] borders” was starting to “organize itself,” Politis wanted to play his part.517 
 
What drew Nicolas Politis toward close cooperation with an American foundation? Among the 
complex, overlapping allegiances of interwar international lawyers, loyalty to the nation still occupied 
a preeminent position and any inquiry into motives needs to take account of the diplomatic positions 
of national governments.518 As a Greek civil servant, Politis was associated with his country’s liberal 
wing under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos that had been friendly to the Entente during the 
war and now sought to align Greece with the West against the preferences of the pro-German, 
monarchist camp. Internationalism and cooperation with the Western powers was thus in line with 
the political program of his party. As a diplomat representing one of Europe’s smaller nations, a global 
order based on international law and collective security also served the interest of protecting weaker 
states from the predations of the great powers.519 In addition, as a long-time resident of France and 
fixture of Parisian society, Politis was also closely associated with the French government. From this 
perspective, his labors on behalf of international institutions served the interest of stemming future, 
particularly German, aggression through effective collective security mechanisms. 
 
The interwar years were also a time when legal scholars increasingly pursued projects of international 
community-building, such as the formation of a European institutional order, and legal historians 
have repeatedly stressed the centrality of notions of international solidarity to Politis’ legal 
philosophy.520 Less well explored is the extent to which many interwar jurists, troubled by the rise of 
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Asia and Europe’s loss of military and economic power in the wake of the First World War, conceived 
of this interdependence in culturally or racially exclusionary terms. Politis was well-read in the 
transnational, Social Darwinian literature that predicted the coming of a war between the races. 
Lothrop Stoddard saw a “rising tide of color” washing against the dams of Europe’s colonies and 
Albert Sarraut saw an “aggressive revolt of [non-white] races, solidarized in an assault on and a siege 
of the European position.”521 Europe, Politis believed, was “in full crisis.” Only if the major countries 
such as England, France and Germany recognized that “[t]he dream of universal domination, which 
has haunted the great powers, has seized to be even conceivable,” could Europe’s hegemony, which 
to him was equivalent to prosperity and stability, be salvaged.522 What was at stake was not only the 
future of colonialism, but the future of the “white race,” as the rise of the “colored peoples” posed an 
immediate economic challenge that would in the future develop into a military threat.523 In the context 
of this adversarial narrative Politis saw the decision of the United States to abstain from collective 
security mechanisms as all the more vexing: “The steadfast insistence of the United States on its 
traditional policy of neutrality has created an insurmountable obstacle to the progress of international 
order.” By refusing to participate in the new European order the United States had “assumed a heavy 
burden of responsibility before the civilized world.”524  
 
Both for Politis and for the Carnegie Endowment, writing the law of nations was a means to bridging 
the political chasm between the Old World and the New. When in the second half of the 1920s many 
of his colleagues became disillusioned with America’s reclusiveness and turned from global 
conceptions of international order to regional solutions, Politis stressed the importance of avoiding a 
continental rift.525 Throughout the 1920s Politis pursued the juridification of international relations in 
close cooperation with the foundation, both through the League of Nations and in the realm of the 
sprawling field of private codification initiatives. When in 1925 the CEIP offered 40,000 dollars to 
the Institute de Droit International “for the purpose of a speedy codification of the international law 
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of peace,” it fell to Nicolas Politis, chairman of the IDI’s Consultative Committee—the Institute’s 
link to the CEIP—to respond to this offer.526 As legal scholars have pointed out, interwar jurists 
approached the daunting task of setting down the rules by which the world was to be governed with 
an almost perplexing optimism and Politis was no exception.527 Although he was somewhat 
concerned about the “overwhelming” scope of the work ahead this was nothing that could not be 
resolved through careful planning and an intelligent division of labor between the IDI’s experts. Given 
careful preparation Politis estimated that it would take “two sessions at the most”—equaling four 
years—for the Institute to “fully complete its work on the codification of the body of public 
international law of peace.”528 
 
His goal of integrating the United States into the collective security structure directly informed Politis’ 
main juridical project of the interwar years—arriving at a universally recognized definition of 
aggressive warfare. The notion that “aggression” was the key marker that rendered military action 
illegitimate had gained widespread acceptance following the German invasion of neutral Belgium at 
the beginning of the First World War. The Covenant of the League of Nations had solidified this idea 
by setting up a system of collective security that would protect the territorial integrity of member 
states “against external aggression.”529 Yet, what constituted such acts of aggression remained ill-
defined. States with far-reaching interests and possessions such as Great Britain preferred to define 
“wars of aggression” narrowly in order to retain their right to intervene, even militarily, in pursuit of 
imperial interests. Smaller states seeking protection from precisely these kinds of interventions sought 
a broader interpretation.530 The absence of a clear definition meant that, in practice, the task of 
declaring a military incident an act of aggression and invoking collective security would fall to the 
League Council. This was a major stumbling block for American participation in collective security, 
as giving a political body largely viewed as an instrument of European power politics the authority 
to potentially commit American troops was politically untenable. Even James T. Shotwell admitted 
that the fuzzy category of aggression opened the door to abuse as “most aggressive wars have been 
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camouflaged as defensive.”531  Taking the authority to define aggression out of the realm of politics 
and into the supposedly objective sphere of law promised to, as Politis told the League’s General 
Assembly, “facilitate the entry into the League of that great Republic of which we are all thinking.”532 
 
A favorable opportunity presented itself in 1924, when Politis and Edvard Beneš—two longstanding 
partners of the CEIP—were appointed joint rapporteurs for the drafting of the “Protocol for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes,” better known as the Geneva Protocol, which sought to 
transform the League of Nations into a robust system of collective security.533  Among the papers 
circulated by the League Secretariat ahead of the deliberations was an obliquely titled “Draft Treaty 
of Disarmament and Security Prepared by an American Group”—drawn up by Shotwell and David 
Hunter Miller on behalf of the American Group on Arbitration and Disarmament—that radically 
reinterpreted the meaning of aggression. It depoliticized the issue by handing authority over all 
international disputes to the PCIJ; any state which refused the World Court’s jurisdiction was 
automatically declared an aggressor.534 But Shotwell and Miller aimed at more than solving a policy 
problem. Under the heading “Outlawry of Aggressive War” their preamble had the high contracting 
parties “solemnly declare that aggressive war is an international crime.”535 By fusing the terminology 
of crime and illegality favored by American anti-imperialist pacifists with the collective security 
language of the League Covenant, Shotwell and Miller hoped to find a rhetorical middle ground. Lest 
they be misunderstood in Geneva, the authors added that the term “outlawry,” while not “accurate 
from the legal standpoint,” had acquired “great vogue” in America, particularly among League critics. 
Adopting some of the key phrases of this movement would make the purpose of the Protocol more 
comprehensible to Americans and thus “further its understanding and popular acceptance.”536 
 
The fate of this memorandum at Geneva is a textbook case of how non-governmental contributions 
were quietly inserted, absorbed and adapted into official action. In the weeks before the Council 
meetings, Shotwell activated his web of European contacts—Gilbert Murray, Alfred Zimmern, Justin 
                                                 
531 CEIP Year Book 16 (1927), 111. 
532 Cf. James Brown Scott, “Interpretation of Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations,” The American Journal 
of International Law 18, no. 1 (1924): 112. 
533 On the background of the Shotwell-Miller Draft and its impact on the Geneva Protocol see Carl Bouchard, “Le ‘plan 
américain’ Shotwell-Bliss de 1924 : une initiative méconnue pour le renforcement de la paix,” Guerres mondiales et 
conflits contemporains, no. 202–3 (2001): 203–25; Webster, “The Transnational Dream,” 506–507; Josephson, James 
T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America, 121; Shotwell, Autobiography, 183–184. 
534 James T. Shotwell, “A Practical Plan for Disarmament: Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security Prepared by an 
American Group,” International Conciliation, no. 201 (1924): 311–71; see also “Annex 4: Draft Treay of 
Disarmament and Security Prepared by an American Group,” in League of Nations, Arbitration, Security and 
Reduction of Armaments, 261–264. 
535 Shotwell, “A Practical Plan for Disarmament: Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security Prepared by an American 
Group,” 343. 
536 Ibid., 352; cf. Bouchard, “Le ‘plan américain’,” 209. 
145 
 
Godart, among others—to present the project favorably to British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald 
and French premier Édouard Herriot.537  These efforts paid off as in his opening speech to the League 
Assembly MacDonald expressed his approval for depoliticizing aggression. “There are questions that 
can only be settled by the trained expert lawyer,” MacDonald declared, while modifying the original 
Shotwell-Miller proposal by substituting “arbitration courts” for the PCIJ.538 Now safely rebranded 
as the “MacDonald Proposal,” Politis and Beneš were free to pursue this approach without reference 
to an extra-League source in their respective drafting committees. What remained, however, was to 
insert the language of illegality that Shotwell and Miller had viewed as crucial to gaining Americans’ 
trust. At a meeting chaired by Politis, Norwegian delegate and CEIP Special Correspondent Christian 
Lange took up this issue, urging his colleagues that the Protocol’s preamble should be worded to 
“impress public opinion” even in countries that were “not yet [League] Members but whose co-
operation was both desirable and necessary.” Borrowing heavily from the American draft while 
somewhat garbling its “outlawry” terminology Lange’s text asserted that “a war of aggression is a 
breach of [...] solidarity and an international crime involving the outlawry of the State guilty of such 
a war.”539 The entire Geneva Protocol was eventually rejected by a newly elected, Conservative 
British government540 but it marked a major step in the juridification of international conflicts and 
started a larger scholarly debate on the definition of aggression, especially in CEIP-sponsored law 
journals.541  
 
“It is quite plain that public opinion is everywhere moving toward agreement upon a definition of 
what constitutes aggression in international relationships,” Butler was pleased to note in the wake of 
the Geneva Protocol, and the foundation’s partner Nicolas Politis continued to be at the forefront of 
that movement.542  In 1927, he was appointed rapporteur of the League’s Committee on Security 
Questions, tasked with preparing the ground for the World Disarmament Conference, at which 
                                                 
537 Cf. James T. Shotwell, “Diary During the Making of the Geneva Protocol,” Box A, Shotwell Papers, RBML Columbia. 
538 Minutes of the sixth plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 6 September 1924, League of Nations, Arbitration, 
Security and Reduction of Armaments, 11. 
539 Minutes of the ninth meeting of the Third Committee, 25 September 1924, ibid., 201, 281; typically, Lange did not 
directly reference the Shotwell-Miller proposal. As a general rule, only those who opposed it explicitly referred to the 
“American Draft” while those in favor of the approach downplayed its provenance. 
540 Cf. Peter J. Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace: The League of Nations in British Policy 1914–1925 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 326–327; Patrick Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace After World War I: America, Britain and the 
Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 201–206. 
541 Hans Wehberg noted that during the League Assembly’s discussions on the Protocol “attention was drawn repeatedly 
to the importance that was attached to the definition of the aggressor in the American plan,” cf. Hans Wehberg, “Le 
Protocole de Genève,” Recueil Des Cours. Académie de Droit International. 7 (1925): 22; for contributions to this 
debate see e.g. Clyde Eagleton, “The Attempt to Define Aggression,” International Conciliation 13 (1930): 581; Hans 
Wehberg, “Der Verteidigungs- und Exekutionskrieg als Sicherung eines angegriffenen Staates,” Friedenswarte 29 
(1929): 33–38; Quincy Wright, “The Concept of Aggression in International Law,” The American Journal of 
International Law 29, no. 3 (July 1935): 373; Georges Scelle, “L’aggression et la légitime défense dans les rapports 
internationaux,” L’Ésprit international, no. 39 (July 1936): 372–91. 
542 CEIP Year Book 14 (1925), 50. 
146 
 
distinctions between aggressive and defensive armaments were expected to become crucial. In a 
widely noted memorandum submitted in his new role, Politis slightly revised the idea of the Shotwell-
Miller/Politis-Beneš approach of 1924. The Geneva Protocol’s branding as the aggressor that state 
which refused to submit a dispute to international arbitration had since come under criticism for being 
impracticably vague. Politis’ new suggestion included a larger role for League institutions while 
taking care not to revert to an overtly political procedure: in the event of hostilities the League Council 
would declare an immediate cease-fire and the party first to breach this truce would be deemed in the 
wrong.543 Although attracting much attention at the time, the proposal was never officially adopted 
by the League, setting the stage for Politis’ final contribution to the subject when in 1933 he submitted 
a second memorandum to the same Committee. Frustrated after a decade of having participated in the 
“vain attempt […] to devise suitable formulae for crystallising this somewhat evasive idea of 
aggression,” the diplomat adapted a proposal made by the Soviet delegation that defined aggression 
through an enumeration of prohibited acts, such as invasion of territory, seizure of vessels, naval 
blockades, etc.544 This so-called Politis Definition was never formally enshrined into international 
law but became part of a number of bilateral treaties and thus the most widely accepted test for 
aggression before the Second World War. 
 
The quest to define aggression was emblematic of how the agendas of non-governmental actors 
stimulated interwar codification debates, a legacy that, in this specific case, would span from the 
Geneva Protocol, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact via the Politis Definition to the Nuremberg Trials and 
most discussions of the concept of wars of aggression ever since.545 Just as in its activism for the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, the CEIP and its partners rarely challenged the hierarchical global order but 
appropriated the language of anti-imperialist social movements—the criminality of all war—while 
effectively working to stabilize the status quo. James Brown Scott liked to point to Thomas Jefferson 
and the Declaration of Independence to claim that not only all men were created equal but that all 
states enjoyed equality in international relations.546 Yet, in practice, all CEIP officers took a distinctly 
more pragmatic approach to inequality. To Shotwell, the full protection of international law could 
only apply to “civilized powers equal in sovereignty” and the international order needed to reflect 
“varying degrees of political development.”547 Nicolas Politis made a similar point in a series of 
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lectures delivered at Columbia University in the summer of 1926, when he asserted that equality in 
international relations meant only that all states had an equal right to appeal to the protection of the 
law, not a guarantee that all states would be treated alike: “material and moral equality does not 
exist.”548 The CEIP’s transnational activism was, again, not seeking to overcome inequality in the 
international system but creating coalitions among those who wanted to perpetuate it. 
 
Critics seized on these internal contradictions to point out that, rather than politics being replaced by 
justice, the juridification of international relations merely transposed imperialism into the legal field.  
Upon reading the Geneva Protocol, British IR professor Philip Noel-Baker observed that, the 
document’s high-minded language of arbitration notwithstanding, the underlying conception of 
aggression was “the simplest and most obvious that there could be: aggression is resort to war.”549 
Since the major powers did not regard colonial interventions, police actions or other military 
incursions into foreign territory in pursuit of their national interest as warfare in the strict sense of the 
word, such a test necessarily invited differing interpretations. American jurist Clyde Eagleton even 
doubted the motives behind the entire enterprise, as distinguishing between two kinds of warfare was 
inherently about reserving the right to pursue the former while declaring illegitimate the latter. With 
a view of the conflicting interests of the “Haves” and the “Have-Nots” in the international system 
Eagleton argued, somewhat hyperbolically, that outlawing international aggression would render 
unjust “the only usage of war that could perhaps be justified: war undertaken to uphold a specific 
legal right.”550 In a characteristically unrestrained comment on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Chicago 
Daily Tribune expressed a common critique of international law as a smokescreen for the imperialist 
interest of Europe’s major powers: 
Their privilege of fighting the smaller peoples, of coercing the smaller whites as well as 
gassing the black and tans, is unabridged and unimpaired. […] The United States is in up to 
the ears, a party to the realistic scheme of Europe, agreeing to it and supporting it in the name 
of peace.” 551 
 
Preventing such heated rhetoric from spilling into the diplomatic process was integral to the 
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internationalist legal project. The juridification of international relations with its blurring of lines 
between politics and law sought to create a space of dispassionate, transnational negotiation. In that 
sense, it was not essentially a legal but rather a political project to begin with. The community of 
international lawyers constituted itself as a realm of scholarly objectivity and scientific rationality in 
which competing national interests could be reconciled.552 Codification of the “international law of 
peace” was thus not simply the creation of a body of knowledge for governing the world but also 
involved promoting the “international mind” of a group of gentlemen that could perform this 
knowledge. The result was a pragmatic approach that placed its faith less in the letter of the law than 
in the character of the lawyer. In a revealing slip which was quickly corrected by his colleagues, 
Nicolas Politis had expressed this idea of international jurists as essentially diplomatic actors outside 
the bounds of traditional state-based diplomacy in an early draft of his report for the Geneva Protocol. 
The job of arbitrators under the new system of collective security, Politis argued, was to “give proof 
of statesmanship rather than to show knowledge of legal science.”553 In practice, the strategy of 
juridification thus concentrated a new form of legal power among a group of academics, judges and 
counselors with a complex set of allegiances to governments, international institutions, personal 
friendships and intellectual projects. Given the social and cultural homogeneity of this group—about 
ninety percent of the exclusively male members of the IDI hailed from Europe or North America—it 
was questionable to what extent their views represented a truly comprehensive grasp of the world’s 
problems.554  
 
Nevertheless, legal internationalists were aware that as long as international law remained the 
exclusive discourse of a small, transnational elite there was little hope for it ever gaining widespread 
acceptance. Nicolas Politis addressed the challenge of spreading the “international mind” beyond the 
hallowed halls of jurisprudence in one of his Columbia University lectures: “It will not be enough, 
however, for the professors of international law to acquire this mind themselves. Their conviction 
must be deep enough for them to feel that it is their mission to spread it even to the popular classes.”555 
If international law was to endure, its proponents needed to be more than diplomats and negotiators—
they needed to be educators. The cooperation of Shotwell, Politis and others in the codification 
debates had aimed at keeping the door open for the United States to join a collective security system 
based on the rule of law. Ultimately, however, it would have to be the American people, through their 
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elected representatives, who needed to walk through it. 
 
 
“A net-work of personal relationships”: Philip C. Jessup and the campaign for the PCIJ 
In December of 1925, Philip Jessup, then a twenty-nine year old Columbia University lecturer of 
international law, went to Washington, DC, with a special mission in political activism on behalf of a 
broad coalition of non-governmental organizations. The treaty of American adherence to the World 
Court had been pending before the Senate ever since President Harding had first submitted an 
accession treaty in 1923 and now, with the crucial final vote imminent, Jessup was to help coordinate 
cooperation between internationalist and peace groups. The trip was technically not funded by the 
Carnegie Endowment, however, as President of Columbia University, Butler had signed off on his 
employee’s leave of absence as an example of “genuine University service,” thus obviating the need 
for the CEIP to become involved in a domestic lobbying campaign.556 Jessup’s task was complicated 
by the progressive breakdown of an uneasy truce within the pro-Court coalition that had sent him in 
the first place. That summer, pro-League and anti-League supporters of the PCIJ, including James T. 
Shotwell and Outlawry leader Salmon O. Levinson, had agreed to jointly lobby the Senate to vote in 
favor of adherence in exchange for an American push to revise international law along anti-imperialist 
Outlawry lines. But around the time of Jessup’s arrival in the capital this so-called “Harmony Plan” 
had fallen apart when Shotwell, as unofficial leader of the pro-League faction, withdrew his support. 
With the debate over the Geneva Protocol and the Locarno Treaties indicating ever closer cooperation 
among European states, a compromise position no longer seemed possible, Shotwell told Levinson.557 
From now on, the Carnegie Endowment would pursue American adherence to the Court on its own 
terms—relying on its financial resources and its transnational connections. 
 
In these efforts, Philip Jessup would play a pivotal role as both negotiator and educator. Born in 1897 
as a native New Yorker and son of a prominent lawyer, Jessup’s career was hardly a study in upward 
mobility. His academic career marked him as a protégé of some of the most influential figures of the 
first generation of America’s foreign policy wise men. His decision to study international law was 
inspired by none other than Elihu Root, who, when Jessup returned from military service in France 
to resume his studies at Hamilton College, was a scholar in residence at the school. Before committing 
himself to this career Jessup discussed his decision with two other eminent lights of American 
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jurisprudence—John Bassett Moore and James Brown Scott.558 The young man’s studies at Yale and 
Columbia University—two institutions of elite formation par excellence—further solidified Jessup’s 
membership in the American elite. His first formal association with the Carnegie Endowment came 
in his final year of studies when he was awarded a CEIP Fellowship in International Law.559 
Immediately after he graduated in 1924, he joined the State Department as an assistant solicitor before 
returning to academia after a year to work as a lecturer and then assistant professor of international 
law at Columbia. 
 
As for many of his generation of liberal internationalists, Jessup’s activism was fueled by his wartime 
service and the desire to prevent a repeat of the massive suffering he had personally experienced. He 
never displayed the same scorn with which some of his older, more conservative colleagues regarded 
religious or social reformist pacifists and during his World Court campaigns he demonstrated a 
willingness to work constructively with anti-imperialist pacifist and women’s groups. But by 
temperament and upbringing he remained an heir to the conservative progressive tradition of 
Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root. From them he inherited a belief in an evolving global community 
that needed to be ordered through the gradual development of international law and structures for 
arbitration and adjudication of conflicts.560 Jessup’s legal philosophy, progressive as it was, displayed 
an almost Burkean conservatism in its emphasis on experience and incremental change and avoidance 
of sweeping theoretical claims: “The principle is that no progress is made in international affairs by 
leaps and bounds; that all progress has come by very slow and deliberate steps, one step after the 
other, until finally an advance is made from the position in which we find ourselves.”561 In regard to 
policy-making Jessup agreed with his establishment elders that foreign relations were too important 
a field to be left to the same caustic dynamics of electoral politics that shaped domestic affairs.562 His 
work on behalf of organizations such as the CEIP and his participation in public debate on 
international issues came out of a firm belief in the expert community’s obligation to elevate public 
discourse by bringing its expertise to bear on the issues of the day, thus helping to steady the ship of 
state.  
 
Upon arriving in Washington in late 1925, Jessup, working out of temporary quarters at the Cosmos 
Club, started lobbying Senators, coordinating with his former colleagues in the State Department and 
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establishing contact with grassroots organizations. He worked particularly closely with Esther Lape, 
the energetic director of Edward W. Bok’s American Peace Award organization, the later American 
Foundation. Like Jessup, Lape saw the Court fight not as an end in itself but as a first step toward 
aligning the United States with the new structures of international governance with the ultimate goal 
of attaining League membership.563 One of the main obstacles on this path was the instrument of so-
called “advisory opinions.” These documents issued by the PCIJ were authoritative interpretations of 
international law on which much of the League of Nation’s concrete work on issues ranging from 
public health to minority questions rested, making them a key, non-negotiable function of the Court 
in European eyes. In the U.S. context, however, they were a millstone around the neck of Court 
activists. Firstly, advisory opinions allowed opponents of the League of Nations to link the PCIJ to 
Geneva as the “League Court.” Secondly, Court critics believed that the instrument would give hostile 
European governments undue leverage over American security and domestic policy, specifically the 
Monroe Doctrine and immigration restrictions. Finally, and on a most basic level, American 
jurisprudence knew no comparable institution to these advisory opinion, making it easier to brand the 
PCIJ as alien to American legal culture and as essentially a political, not a legal tribunal.564  
 
Jessup’s and Lape’s campaign was only partially successful. Throughout the Senate debate populist 
opponents of the Court seized on the involvement of prominent East Coast groups as evidence that 
international bankers were trying to foist an institution on regular American workers that would 
ultimately mean “their ruin and their slavery.”565 A speaker at a rally of the Friends of Irish Freedom 
in New York on 29 December 1925 attacked the “Carnegie World Court” and its Anglo-American 
propaganda network.566 In January, the Senate finally voted for American adherence but only after 
attaching five reservations to the original treaty. The first four of these were seen as uncontroversial, 
but the fifth reservation, addressing the much contested issue of advisory opinions, stipulated that the 
United States would only join if no such opinions would be issued on matters “in which the United 
States has or claims an interest.”567 The word “claims” turned this reservation into a poison pill since 
it made the U.S. government the sole judge of how broadly the concept of national interest could be 
construed. In September, a conference of the PCIJ’s signatory nations accepted the first four American 
reservations but objected to the fifth on the grounds that the United States could not be allowed to 
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accede on any basis other than equality.568 To American observers the public rebuke of the U.S. Senate 
by the conference of signatories appeared as a harbinger of things to come, with one American 
journalist interpreting it as “the first expression of [a] United Europe against the United States.”569 
The world’s powers seemed to be forging an ever closer alliance—and the United States remained 
shut out. 
 
With the official diplomatic process having ended in a stalemate, the pro-Court forces switched to 
informal channels. In January 1927, Esther Lape traveled to Europe as their informal to investigate 
how the situation could possibly be salvaged. Over the course of two weeks Lape held informal 
discussions with Secretary General Eric Drummond, Henri Rolin, Dag Hammarskjold and other 
diplomats, jurists and journalists who had been closely involved with the Court debate. Drummond 
recommended a new push for an international conference to consider the Senate’s reservations, but 
the suggestion that immediately struck a nerve with Lape came in a conversation with Henri 
Fromageot, the legal adviser of the Quai d’Orsay and leading French strategist on the subject. Instead 
of launching another round of official negotiations, he proposed that a small group of experts drawn 
mainly from the major powers should engage in “entirely unofficial conversations” and arrive at an 
interpretation of the Senate’s fifth reservation that would satisfy all sides. Fromageot was sure that 
placing the issue in the hands of legal experts, removed from public pressure and the cacophony of 
diplomatic voices that was common in Geneva, would result in a negotiated solution “in a few 
hours—perhaps a few minutes.“ Any agreement reached would later have to be ratified by an official 
conference but the actual negotiations should be conducted outside of traditional diplomatic 
channels.570 The proposal raised serious questions of legitimacy since it aimed at circumventing 
America’s democratic institutions and potentially infringed on the rights of smaller World Court 
member states. Nevertheless, Lape submitted what struck her as an “immensely useful” idea to Elihu 
Root, the doyen of the American World Court community, but with the Kellogg-Briand negotiations 
capturing the attention of the international legal community after the summer of 1927 no immediate 
progress was made.571 
 
That the Quai d’Orsay had not forgotten about the plan became apparent within days of the signing 
ceremony for the Kellogg-Briand Pact. At the ninth meeting of the League’s General Assembly in 
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September 1928 the French delegate René Cassin introduced a seemingly routine resolution 
suggesting that the upcoming tenth anniversary of the PCIJ was a convenient opportunity to revise 
its statutes in light of the Court’s recent working experience. There were genuine problems with the 
PCIJ’s procedures, including its quorum requirements and a lack of qualification on the part of some 
of the judges, but to most observers the primary motivation behind the maneuver was no secret. Once 
Cassin’s resolution was adopted and the League Council decided to appoint a Committee of Jurists 
to work out recommendations, those familiar with the issue, including Arthur Sweetser and Nicolas 
Politis, pushed for the inclusion of an American delegate. Elihu Root’s name was at the top of the list 
even if few appear to have seriously expected a positive response in light of the elder statesman’s 
advanced age. His eventual acceptance was greeted with delight both in Europe, the United States 
and, particularly, at Morningside Heights.572 While the Carnegie Endowment had not been involved 
in the run-up to the Root invitation, Nicholas Murray Butler immediately took charge of the situation 
and over the course of the next three months the foundation’s New York, Washington and Paris offices 
effectively became Root’s secretariat, press bureau and logistics service. In addition, the Endowment 
agreed to pay for the services of a qualified assistant and, after Root had asked Butler for his “brightest 
young man,” the mission fell, once again, to Philip Jessup.573  
 
The press in Europe and America followed the Root-Jessup mission with considerable anticipation. 
Few observers believed the assurances of the State Department that Root was merely participating in 
the Committee in a private capacity. As one member of the League Secretariat observed dryly: “Mr. 
Root is not coming over here […] to discuss the retirement age of the Judges.”574 In fact, how much 
importance the U.S. Government attached to the trip is illustrated by a special arrangement that kept 
Secretary Kellogg in office for an additional month so that the handover to Henry L. Stimson would 
not occur during the Geneva negotiations.575 Yet, those closely involved also knew that the journey, 
while of the utmost importance for the future of the World Court, was almost entirely about symbolic 
politics. Jurists and diplomats on both sides knew that the question of granting special privileges to 
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the United States or insisting on adherence on the basis of equality was of little practical import. 
America’s special status was implied by its economic and political might and few doubted that any 
initiative for an advisory opinion that could alienate the U.S. Government would be quietly squashed 
well before it reached the stage of official deliberation. The PCIJ condemning Washington’s reliance 
on the Monroe Doctrine was no more likely than the Court finding London in breach of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact for an intervention in India. Conversely, the idea that the United States would use its 
influence to arbitrarily stymy the League of Nations at every turn, as was suggested in the European 
press, seemed equally far-fetched as the U.S. Government had little to gain from obstructionism but 
was in fact vitally interested in European stability. The solution was, as CEIP trustee Norman Davis 
suggested to Kellogg, to paper over the differences by “re-draft[ing] the Fifth Reservation in such a 
way as to reduce the fear of both sides and to enable each to claim at least a partial victory.”576 
 
As befitting an exercise in informal transcontinental diplomacy, the outlines of the compromise were 
sketched in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Having left New York late at night on 15 February 1929 
on the MS Augustus, Jessup and Root spent the crossing sketching drafts for a new Protocol of 
Adherence that would address concerns on all sides of the issue. Before leaving the United States, 
Root had held a series of friendly meetings with Senate leaders, including William Borah, Claude A. 
Swanson and Thomas J. Walsh, with Secretary of State Kellogg and with both outgoing President 
Coolidge and president-elect Herbert Hoover. Once the two lawyers settled into Geneva at the 
beginning of March, they used the final week of the Council meeting to sound out Drummond, 
Chamberlain, Briand and Stresemann, all of whom offered their support for the project. Root and 
Jessup eventually settled on a procedural strategy designed to minimize any interaction with the 
League’s institutions to avoid “tainting” the eventual compromise by association. As a result, the 
question of U.S. adherence was barely discussed in the Council session and instead was immediately 
passed to the overtly non-political and technical Committee of Jurists. 
 
Given the nature of the American reservations, Root and Jessup expected opposition to come mainly 
from Latin America and Asia. Since any agreement would need to be ratified by the fifty-five 
signatory nations of the PCIJ, a group that included Cuba, Uruguay and Venezuela, the United States 
would essentially be asking Latin American countries to exempt inter-American relations from the 
protections of international law. “Certainly it is embarrassing,” commented the Wall Street Journal, 
“that opposition to [American adherence] comes chiefly from just that part of the world in which our 
asserted special interest lies.” Always keeping in close touch with Jessup’s and Root’s activities, the 
                                                 




New York Times’ Clarence K. Streit reported from Geneva that “American circles” were “doing their 
utmost” to ease the concerns of Latin American states.577 Indeed, the next day, Root, Jessup and 
Arthur Sweetser met with diplomats from Cuba, Chile and Venezuela at the League Secretariat to 
secure the support of the South and Central American republics. Unofficial representatives or not, 
according to Jessup’s diary the unequal power relationship between the United States and Latin 
America was palpable: the Chilean delegate eulogized Root’s contributions to inter-American 
relations before pledging his assistance while Aristides de Aguero y Bethancourt stated acidly that 
Cuba “would support anything the U.S. proposed,” leading Root to equally sarcastically counter that 
he hoped the Cuban would never feel compelled to vote against his conscience. The next morning, 
all three endorsed the project without reservations when at the League Council’s session Austen 
Chamberlain suggested assigning the question of U.S. adherence to the legal experts.578  
 
The Committee of Jurists was an institution that epitomized the new intermediary space between 
national governments, international institutions and public audiences which allowed non-
governmental organizations to make an impact. The Committee drew its authority from the fact that 
its apparent independence was, to some extent, an optical illusion. With Cecil Hurst, Henri Fromageot 
and Friedrich Gaus, its twelve members included the legal advisers to all three major European 
powers, thus ensuring close cooperation with the governments represented on the Council.579 Such 
proximity to Europe’s capitals notwithstanding, the jurists were also members of the legal expert 
community with its overlapping professional and social affiliations that went well beyond the 
confines of the nation state. With Politis, Root and Jessup the Committee included three CEIP 
partners. Both Root and Politis were members of the IDI and all in all six Committee members had 
recently participated in the CEIP’s Hague Academy of International Law. Social and cultural capital 
as members of the legal community—“a certain net-work of personal relationships” as Root called it 
later—rather than governmental credentials qualified for this form of expert diplomacy and provided 
the basis for compromise.580 In Root’s understanding its purpose was to remedy the fatal flaw that the 
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U.S. Senate had formulated its reservations without any regard for the European situation. The jurists 
would seek to change that by effectively redrafting the critical points “as if someone from the other 
side was sitting in on the formulation of the reservations.”581 In effect, the goal was to introduce an 
element of multilateral negotiation to the American legislative process. 
 
The Committee met from 11 to 19 March and, as Fromageot had originally suggested, the cordial 
atmosphere among the jurists proved a poignant counterpoint to the years of public acrimony that had 
preceded it. The final document, based on the Root-Jessup plan and finalized by a small drafting 
committee consisting of Root, Cecil Hurst and Nicolas Politis, finessed the question of advisory 
opinions by not giving the United States a blanket veto but allowing it to raise objections if it saw its 
national interest threatened. If the other powers decided to proceed regardless, America would be free 
to immediately leave the Court “without any imputation of unfriendliness.”582 The only counter-
proposal during the deliberations had come from Politis, who had worried that the proposed scheme 
did not go far enough in expressing the special status of the United States. It was useless to deny that 
some states were more powerful than others, he told his colleagues, and the equality envisioned by 
the Root draft was in any case “theoretical” and not a reality. Politis’ draft would have institutionalized 
the American veto power in a four-member committee comprised of representatives of the League 
and the U.S. Government. Root and Jessup held such a formal veto unnecessary and Politis withdrew 
his draft, acknowledging that he did not wish to be “more American than the Americans 
themselves.”583 In its final form the Root Protocol neatly encapsulated the international jurists’ regard 
for the United States Senate. As Court critics immediately pointed out, enshrining a guarantee against 
“unfriendliness” in a legal document was hardly a serious endeavor as it was impossible to know 
under what political circumstances a hypothetical American exit would take place. Jessup and Root 
were perfectly aware of this. For them, concerns that disagreement over the definition of America’s 
foreign policy interests could trigger a transatlantic stand-off were simply overblown. They were 
convinced that in case of a difference of opinion “practical experience, as well as common sense, 
would find no difficulty in determining whether an interest of this country was touched [...].”584  
 
With agreement established among the legal community, attention shifted back to the national level 
and here the challenges to ratification were formidable. Already during the Geneva mission, Senator 
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Borah had shifted markedly from the conciliatory tone of his talk with Root to a more skeptical stance. 
Once the Protocol was published, he announced his full opposition to the plan and predicted a 
contentious fight in the Senate.585 Jessup and Root were both aware that the expected populist 
campaign about to sweep the nation that would portray the Court as alien to American culture and 
incompatible with the country’s interests could hardly be countered by solemn declarations of East 
Coast elites. Already in 1925, Root had argued that a “gathering of distinguished gentlemen from the 
eastern seaboard at Washington for the perfectly plain purpose of overawing the Senate would 
inevitably cause resentment.”586 For Jessup, the defeat of 1926 had instilled a lifelong concern with 
the need to educate the American people through channels other than the Council on Foreign 
Relations or the Foreign Policy Association, groups that did not “reach down to the great mass of the 
voters.”587 In a series of articles in the American Federationist, published by the American Federation 
of Labor, Jessup tried to get “in touch with the great mass of people” who knew little about foreign 
policy by engaging them on their own terms. In plain-spoken, sometimes folksy language (“You can’t 
climb to the top of the ladder till you put your foot on the first rungs”) he made the case for United 
States adherence to the PCIJ to an audience of three million unionized workers that could not be 
reached through law journal articles or the New York Times.588  
 
One month after the unofficial diplomats’ return from Europe, the American foreign policy 
establishment began to map out a battle plan for the new fight in the Senate. On a Monday morning 
in late May 1929, Elihu Root’s apartment on New York’s Fifth Avenue became the site for a strategy 
meeting that, in addition to the two negotiators, included James T. Shotwell (CEIP), James G. 
McDonald (Foreign Policy Association), Stephen P. Duggan (Institute of International Education), 
John Foster Dulles (Council on Foreign Relations), Frederick P. Keppel (Carnegie Corporation) and 
Henry S. Pritchett (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching). It was precisely the type 
of exclusive gathering that had led the Hearst papers to denounce Root as the “emissary of 
international bankers” and the Chicago Daily Tribune to question his integrity by casting the Geneva 
excursion as in the “best tradition of a corporation lawyer” and wondering just who Root’s client was 
in this case.589 In his opening presentation Root shed light on the legal intricacies of the final Protocol. 
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The main purpose of the meeting, however, was to lay the groundwork for the upcoming campaign 
for Senate ratification. Root reminded his guests that it was essential to establish an organizational 
structure as soon as possible and to find the person who would coordinate the fight: “You have got to 
have somebody who will be willing to do the work and know beforehand who it is going to be, and 
that someone has to get a staff and personnel organized. That person ought to begin right off without 
delay.”590  
 
That person would turn out to be the CEIP’s trusted expert on World Court outreach, Philip Jessup. 
In the coming years he led the Eastern Establishment’s advocacy campaign through a newly created 
institution—the National World Court Committee (NWCC). The NWCC united a broad coalition of 
peace and women’s group behind support for the Root Protocol. Its diverse membership was 
reminiscent of the “Harmony Plan” coalition of 1925, including Eastern Establishment 
representatives but also activists from pacifist organizations such as WILPF, the Federal Council of 
Churches, the National Committee on Cause and Cure of War and even Salmon Levinson himself.591 
Behind the pacifist veneer, however, was a very different structure. The NWCC was not a grassroots 
organization funded by membership fees from hundreds or thousands of activists but a centrally run 
advocacy operation that relied on contributions from a milieu that had more than just an idealist stake 
in internationalism: donors included the presidents of multinational corporations such as Alfred P. 
Sloan, Jr., of General Motors and Thomas J. Watson of IBM. Money also came from corporate lawyer 
and Council on Foreign Relations founding member Paul D. Cravath, from Thomas Lamont of J.P. 
Morgan & Co. and from John D. Rockefeller, Jr. The balance of the budget was carried by the 
Carnegie Endowment, which made an annual contribution of 2,000 dollars to the enterprise.592 
 
As secretary of the NWCC, Jessup saw the bureau’s role as a “central clearing house” whose bustling 
activity would create the impression of a fervent movement and pull the grassroots organizations 
along. It was to line up the support of key interest groups such as the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States and the American Federation of Labor. Most important of all, it was to translate the 
technical language of the World Court debate into “publicity which appeals to the man on the 
street.”593 Yet, from the beginning the organization was hobbled by latent tensions between the groups 
and, despite its wealthy benefactors, by erratic funding that never allowed the NWCC to develop its 
infrastructure. At times money was so scarce that Jessup had to collect second-hand office furniture 
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and on several occasions the bureau was in danger of having to close altogether.594 Jessup later 
deplored that the lack of funds had made “consistent steady educational work” very difficult and that 
the peace groups had found it impossible to “keep the large constituencies roused to intense 
activity.”595 These structural problems were compounded by events beyond the NWCC’s control. The 
Root Protocol had been expected to come up for ratification in the fall or winter of 1929/30 but in 
October the New York Stock Exchange crashed, signaling the end of the prosperous 1920s and 
steering the national conversation far away from an American contribution to collective security. Few 
issues looked less appealing to U.S. Senators in 1930 than finding new ways to tie the fate of America 
to other parts of the world. As Congress became focused on protective tariff legislation, Stimson tried 
to rally his President behind the Court issue with martial language. Since Kellogg, Coolidge and Root 
had already deployed the “infantry” it was now the President’s duty to support them with his 
“artillery,” even if it meant taking “the hounding of the Hearst papers for a year.” The embattled 
Hoover, however, was not inclined to take on more controversy and let the issue slide.596  
 
In light of the unglamorous end of the 1929 push for American membership in the PCIJ the Root-
Jessup mission has subsequently received scant attention. It is an episode that nevertheless stands as 
a striking example for the emergence of transnational governance mechanisms beyond the nation-
state level. Rather than being initiated by authorized representatives of the participating governments, 
the origins of the 1929 Committee of Jurists lay squarely among informal networks within the legal 
expert community, which took matters into its own hands once the regular ratification process in the 
United States had reached a stalemate. It would, however, be overstating the matter to say that 
international lawyers challenged or circumvented state authority. Once established, the composition 
of the Committee of Jurists ensured that negotiations proceeded under general guidance of 
governments, with Secretary of State Kellogg personally monitoring progress on the American 
side.597 Professional and ideological commitment to the nation remained central to the self-conception 
of the international legal community and experts derived their influence and prestige in large parts 
from friendly relations with governmental bureaucracies. 
 
What the transnationalization and juridification of international relations did succeed in was to 
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remove, at least temporarily, contentious political issues from the sphere of public debate, as could 
be seen by the overwhelmingly benign press coverage that the Root-Jessup mission received. Philip 
Jessup’s National World Court Committee was then an attempt to localize the transnationally 
produced compromise by combining the money of the Eastern Establishment with the local 
manpower and credibility of local grassroots organizations. An elaborate plan drawn up by Jessup in 
the summer of 1931 envisioned identifying the ten states most likely to deliver swing votes on the 
Court issue so that the NWCC could then focus its campaign entirely on building public support in 
these states to force the senators’ hands. To gain local standing, the Committee would have recruited 
prominent supporters on the ground and built state-level organizing infrastructures, supported in each 
case by an NWCC secretary (”if possible a war veteran”) who would furnish data, coordinate with all 
local organizations and track the senators’ public statements. Jessup had estimated the cost of this 
scheme at 50,000 dollars, far beyond the NWCC’s means, but the method of embedding a 
transnationally negotiated consensus in local contexts through the medium of mass communication 
and local organizing became an innovation that the CEIP would return to in later years.598 
 
 
“Mazes of Ambiguity”: The Italo-Ethiopian War and the failure of judicial diplomacy 
The year 1935 became an annus horribilis for the partisans of international law. During the 
intervening years, in which the Protocol of Adherence had languished in the Senate, confidence in 
the legal foundations of collective security had been shaken by a series of events that demonstrated 
the limits of detaching law from politics. In March 1931, a closely divided PCIJ issued an advisory 
opinion against a proposed customs union between Austria and Germany. The decision proved 
especially controversial in the United States, where critics used it to bolster the case that the Court 
was merely a smokescreen behind which the enduring political rivalries of European powers 
continued unabated. Doubts about the even-handedness and efficacy of international law were 
compounded six months later by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, a direct challenge to collective 
security that went largely unanswered by the League or the Court, to which the incident was never 
submitted. Against this backdrop, the U.S. Senate defeated the Root Protocol in January 1935, almost 
six years after Root’s and Jessup’s journey to Geneva, falling seven votes shy of the required two-
thirds majority. Meanwhile, even as the Senators debated American adherence to the PCIJ, a crisis 
was brewing in another part of the world that would demonstrate the failure of the interwar project of 
a law-based collective security structure in such a comprehensive fashion that by the end of the year 
many observers saw Europe on course toward another major war. 
                                                 




Late in the afternoon of 5 December 1934, fighting broke out at the fort of Wal Wal in the disputed 
desert border region between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. Italian designs on Ethiopia had 
lingered ever since they had remained unsatisfied during the post-war peace settlements. After years 
of border skirmishes Benito Mussolini now used the Wal Wal incident to escalate the situation and 
order the Italian army to prepare for a full-scale invasion. Emperor Haile Selassie I appealed to the 
Council of the League of Nations, which, in an attempt to buy time, advised both parties to submit 
their dispute to an arbitration procedure under the stipulations of the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928. 
Historians have usually treated the resulting Wal Wal Commission as a side-show to the main story 
line—the failure of the League’s collective security infrastructure to deal effectively with divisions 
among Europe’s major powers.599 France and Britain did not wish to antagonize Italy at a time when 
National Socialist Germany was flaunting its international obligations, and on 14 April 1935 the three 
countries concluded the Stresa Agreement, which affirmed the united front against Hitler in return for 
what Mussolini regarded as a carte blanche for his African expansion plans. Ethiopia thus fell victim 
to the politics of national interests, which had trumped the principles of international law. 
 
Yet, this is not precisely what happened. Before the League Council ever took up the issue the arbitral 
commission did in fact give Ethiopia an opportunity to contest Italy’s actions in front of a body 
invoking the authority of international law. Although a negative decision might ultimately not have 
stopped Italy, nor changed the minds of the French or British governments, at least there can be little 
doubt that an unequivocal condemnation of Italy as an aggressor state would have placed significant 
pressure on the League. The Wal Wal Commission was thus a public test case for the application of 
precisely the kind of legal mechanisms that the CEIP and its partners had been developing for a 
quarter of a century. In fact, the Endowment routinely offered conference rooms at its Centre 
Européen as a symbolically meaningful venue to arbitration commissions and in light of the high 
profile of this conflict it was particularly eager to play a role. The offer of utilizing the continental 
headquarters of an American foundation as a neutral ground, supposedly removed from European 
power politics, was rejected at the last minute when the Italian delegation learned of the close 
association between the CEIP and anti-fascist Carlo Sforza.600 The foundation’s associate Nicolas 
Politis, however, would play a central and at times enigmatic role in the ensuing events. 
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Politis entered the dispute in the spring of 1935 when he assisted the Ethiopian government’s French 
legal adviser Gaston Jèze in drawing up the original appeal to the League Council. Most observers at 
the time expected him to be named one of the Ethiopian arbitrators. Under the terms of the Treaty of 
1928, a commission of four was to investigate the claims of both sides regarding the border incident 
and render its decision.601 Both sides would be represented by two arbitrators of their choosing, 
virtually guaranteeing a tie. Much would then depend on the selection of an independent fifth 
arbitrator, agreed to by both sides, whose vote would break the deadlock. Selecting Politis for one of 
the two original slots seemed logical considering Ethiopia’s traditional commercial and cultural ties 
to Greece and the fact that Politis and Emperor Haile Selassie were personally on friendly terms. 
Upon further scrutiny, however, Politis’ allegiances were less straightforward than contemporary 
observers assumed. Greek politics was slanting strongly rightward during 1935/36, first with the 
prime ministership of regent Georgios Kondylis and then under the authoritarian Fourth of August 
regime of Ioannis Metaxas, which was partially inspired by Mussolini’s Italy.602 Politis, the perceptive 
public servant, had noticed the changing political winds in time and trimmed his sails accordingly by 
offering muted support to the royalist cause.603 In 1936, he would fully embrace the Metaxas regime 
and serve as its diplomatic representative. Furthermore, it was doubtful to what extent the Hellenic 
context even shaped the outlook of the Greek diplomat. The Italian foreign service considered him a 
“client of France at Geneva” whose traditional enmity towards Mussolini would be moderated by the 
French interest in upholding the Stresa Front.604 
 
From the very beginning the Ethiopian government discovered that the terrain of international law 
was anything but a level playing field. While Italy designated two experienced diplomats with 
thorough legal training, Ethiopia’s search for arbitrators necessarily took it to the open market for 
judicial expertise, with all the potential for mixed loyalties and competing agendas that this implied. 
The Italian foreign ministry immediately exploited this weakness by seeking to block the country’s 
access to legal representation altogether. After receiving Ethiopia’s invitation both Politis and 
Swedish law professor Bo Östen Undén, who would soon join the CEIP’s Comité d’Administration, 
were forced to decline after Italy’s diplomats successfully pressured their governments to intervene.605 
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For a while Italy even argued that the selection of foreign arbitrators was impermissible on principle, 
but Rome soon discovered the advantages of facing opposition whose loyalty to their cause was at 
least open to question. Gaston Jèze’s presentation to the League Council was judged so weak by the 
British delegation that they suspected he might have been acting at the behest of the French 
government.606 Ethiopia’s designated arbitrators did not inspire much more confidence in those 
closely watching the proceedings. Jèze’s compatriot Albert Geouffre de Lapradelle was widely 
suspected to be corrupt while American Pitman B. Potter privately admitted to the U.S. Consul in 
Geneva that he felt more allegiance to the survival of the League of Nations than to the Ethiopian 
government. This was a problematic attitude given that it was generally expected that Italy would 
leave the League if it lost its case.607 
 
The Commission held its first organizational meeting in Milan on 6 June before reconvening at The 
Hague later that month to review evidence and hear testimony. The proceedings turned antagonistic 
when in a series of articles the French newspaper Le Temps revealed that Jèze intended to corner the 
opposition by presenting Italian maps that clearly showed Wal Wal to be in Ethiopian territory.608 The 
stridency of the Ethiopian case alarmed not only the Italian delegates, who subsequently refused to 
let Jèze present any evidence at all, but also raised concerns in Paris that Italy was losing the battle 
over public opinion. Prime Minister Pierre Laval quietly tasked his education minister with informing 
Professor Jèze that his advocacy on behalf of Ethiopia was “shocking” and incompatible with his 
professional identity as an “employee of the French government.”609 With the Commission now 
deadlocked, the search for a tie-breaking fifth arbitrator began in earnest and in a surprising twist both 
parties nominated Nicolas Politis to cast the decisive vote, only three months after he had been 
rejected by Italy as an Ethiopian representative. In fact, this time it had been Laval who had suggested 
Politis as a compliant candidate to the Italians and once the selection had been personally approved 
by Mussolini the Italian foreign office remained in close touch with the Greek diplomat to ensure that 
there would be no negative surprises.610 Although to the general public the nature of these 
arrangements remained obscure there was little doubt in League circles that the system was being 
gamed. There were “mazes of ambiguity,” an American diplomat reported to Washington, “respecting 
the roles played in this matter by Jeze, Lapradelle and Politis.”611 
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While France’s and Italy’s backroom dealings certainly put the Ethiopians at a disadvantage, the 
larger story was not that the arbitral system was being circumvented but that it worked very much as 
intended. In his private discussions with the Italian diplomats Politis had promised nothing more than 
to apply the law impartially, referencing his own definition of aggression from two years earlier. And 
indeed, when Italian diplomats analyzed the Politis Definition they discovered that the statesman had 
buried a stipulation in his report that, in keeping with the tradition of finessing seemingly universal 
prohibitions to give the great powers some amount of leeway, effectively called one of its main 
markers of aggression into question. In discussing the illegality of invading foreign lands Politis 
specified that the protection of the law applied to all “territory over which a State actually exercises 
authority.”612 Basing national sovereignty on the actual exercise of control rather than on recognized 
borders evidently favored those states which could project superior military force into disputed 
regions, thus establishing possession.613 In this case it provided exactly the kind of cover of legitimacy 
that the Italian government had been looking for. Jèze’s maps notwithstanding, there was no question 
that Italian troops had been occupying the fort at Wal Wal for some time, thus putting them in de facto 
possession. The Italian internal analysis concluded that  
the Politis Report, which is an integral part of three existing international conventions between 
ten or eleven countries of Europe and Asia whose territories represent a third of the world, 
and one half of the world represented at Geneva, confirms that an incident like Wal Wal 
constitutes an act of aggression, in which the attacked has the right to resort to war, without 
being in turn considered an aggressor state.614  
In light of these facts the author noted that Politis would seem “a most fortunate” choice as fifth 
arbitrator.615 
 
Of course the persuasiveness of these arguments in the court of international public opinion hinged 
on more than formal legal analysis, which could have been easily dismissed as legalistic sophistry 
given that Italy’s army was in full mobilization and Mussolini’s public rhetoric left little doubt that 
his decision to go to war was irreversible. The effort to brand Ethiopia as an aggressor derived its 
legitimacy and potency from an intellectual atmosphere that marked the conflict as a global moment 
that focused debates on the politics of race across geographic and cultural divides.616 The possibility 
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of an Italian attack on an independent, non-European state became a powerful rallying cry for anti-
imperialist sentiment across Africa, Asia and Latin America. In Tokyo, the Great Japanese Turan 
Youth League sent an open letter to Mussolini, calling on all “colored brothers throughout the world” 
to “save our poor brother Ethiopia who is going to fall in the clutches of that rapacious White 
Wolf!”617 In Calcutta, a large public demonstration of both Hindus and Muslims called on Indians to 
come to the aide of the beleaguered African nation and Mahatma Gandhi urged sending a volunteer 
Indian ambulance corps.618 This ground-swell of anti-colonialism in turn unsettled publics and 
statesmen in Europe, where British Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare reminded the House of 
Commons that for “every one white man” there were “six coloured men” in the British Dominions. 
Jan Christiaan Smuts, the South African politician and proponent of imperial internationalism, echoed 
these sentiments when he warned that if solidarity with Ethiopia were to spread across Africa, it could 
“make the position of the European much more difficult.”619 It was against the backdrop of this 
discourse of racial confrontation that the exclusively European and American arbitrators were 
conducting their deliberations, with sometimes tangible personal consequences. Gaston Jèze was 
forced to suspend his courses at the Sorbonne after an orchestrated campaign by the Action Française 
to brand him as a traitor to the white race, a servant of “the slave-dealing Negus and the petroleum 
merchants.”620 
 
Culture and public opinion as sites for foreign policy making also brought the Carnegie Endowment 
back into the picture, as the Italian government hoped to capitalize on its connections to the 
foundation to prevent the United States from taking Ethiopia’s side. Starting in June 1935, Comité 
d’Administration member Piero Misciattelli engaged Nicholas Murray Butler with a series of letters 
designed to convert the President to the Italian cause, probably taking encouragement from the fact 
that shockwaves of the conflict were starting to surface right on Butler’s doorstep. African-American 
activists in New York were recruiting and training thousands of volunteers to fight in the anticipated 
race war and in March two hundred Columbia University students, among them many Communists, 
had picketed the Casa Italiana.621 Playing on the President’s cultural anxieties, Misciattelli predicted 
                                                 
617 Quoted in Joseph Calvitt Clarke, Alliance of the Colored Peoples: Ethiopia and Japan before World War II 
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621 “200 Meet Before Sundial Aganst ‘Fascists’ at Casa,” Columbia Daily Spectator, 7 March 1935; on African-American 
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that an intervention by a Western power on behalf of the African nation could “kindle a vast 
conflagration which would probably mean the end of western civilization.” Haile Selassie’s regime 
was “highly barbaric,” the Italian insisted, clearly referencing the CEIP’s familiar language of ending 
war only among “civilized nations.” Italian success could be “a victory for civilization in the Black 
Continent, full of fruitful promise for the Ethiopian population.” With Butler’s anti-communist 
politics and past commendatory statements about Mussolini’s regime in mind, Misciattelli juxtaposed 
the “pitiful spectacle” of France’s and Spain’s “socialistic and pro-Bolshevik governments” with the 
Duce’s “marvelous example of social peace.” Could this not be a model for America to emulate? 
Appealing directly to Butler’s considerable ambition as an intellectual leader, Misciattelli suggested: 
“You, my dear President, […] can create a vast movement of thought and action in the United States 
of America.”622 
 
Butler rather breathlessly reported these exchanges to the State Department in the apparent belief that 
he had just established a back channel to Mussolini that could be used to avert a brutal war: “I have 
every reason to believe that both the Marchese Misciattelli’s letter and my reply have been seen by 
M. Mussolini. This fact increases their significance considerably.”623 There is no evidence that the 
department ever saw any promise in this offer or followed up on it in a systematic way. Most likely 
the professional diplomats saw Misciattelli’s overtures for what they were: an attempt by the Italian 
government to enlist the help of a sympathetic Butler to promote their case for war in the United 
States. This proved, however, an idle hope. For the CEIP President, Misciattelli’s letters confirmed 
every doubt he had ever harbored about the character of Mussolini’s regime. Restoring order in a 
modern world that had lost its bearings—this had been Fascism’s original appeal for Butler. For all 
its illiberal elements, was it not the case that Fascism had been able to “get things done,” to make 
advances in “organizing the human will,” as Butler had always demanded, making it consequently a 
force for progress?624 But since, according to Butler’s progressive teleology, rejection of violence was 
an essential element of civilizational advancement, the Duce’s rush to war finally and conclusively 
proved that he was on the wrong side of history. In the current “more advanced and […] more highly 
civilized era,” nations were supposed to settle their differences “by frank discussion, debate and joint 
action,” Butler informed Misciattelli. Moreover, as Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia would entail the 
breach of numerous international treaties—including the Kellogg-Briand Pact—Mussolini’s actions 
offended the President’s insistence on a system of global security based on firm liberal values. Was it 
not the case that “if governments do not keep their plighted word [...] there can be no world prosperity, 
                                                 
622 Piero Misciattelli to Butler, 19 June and 21 September 1935, Box 125, Folder 5, CEIP US. 
623 Butler to Cordell Hull, 10 October 1935, Box 125, Folder 5, CEIP US. 
624 Address by Nicholas Murray Butler at the Lotos Club, 3 January 1932, p. 28, Box 49, Butler Papers, RBML Columbia. 
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there can be no world peace and there can be no continuing civilization?”625 
 
The day after Butler sent this reply, the result of the “advanced” deliberative response to international 
conflict, based on international law, was unveiled with the announcement of the Wal Wal 
Commission’s verdict at Paris. In an anti-climactic turn of events Politis refused to assign blame to 
either side and did not even publish his arbitral award in an evident attempt to leave the matter entirely 
to negotiations at Geneva. Although the Italians were disappointed that Ethiopia had not been 
condemned, Politis, true to his word, technically based his reasoning on his definition of aggression 
as a challenge to territory that was de facto rather than de jure controlled by a state, thus clearing Italy 
of any obvious wrongdoing. The argument that most resonated with the public, however, was the 
Commission’s finding that “no white officers” had been present at the disputed incident and that the 
locus of the fighting between Ethiopian and native Italian auxiliary troops had been “extremely 
obscure.”626 Ethiopia’s League membership notwithstanding, this observation was an unsubtle appeal 
to the notion that international law only applied to the conduct of “civilized” nations and that the Wal 
Wal incident should accordingly be viewed in a different light. Reporting to CEIP headquarters in 
New York, a relieved Malcolm Davis, who had been in close touch with Politis throughout the 
Commission’s stay in Paris, mocked the fact that Wal Wal had turned out to have started with the 
shooting of a native “Italian sentinel perched in a low tree […] This is the incident that has led to 
menacing the peace […] in Europe.”627  
 
The Wal Wal Commission thus exposed the limits of the interwar project to juridify international 
relations. For all the rhetoric of neutrality and objectivity, Iustititia had never been intended to be 
blind to the realities of power. While European colonialism was entering what would later turn out to 
be its final phase, international law and those who administered it continued to steadfastly defend a 
hierarchical world order. Furthermore, the Commission demonstrated how the practice of judicial 
procedure itself had become an instrument of domination. Its composition epitomized how the CEIP’s 
strategy of promoting supposedly neutral mechanisms of governance by expertise effectively worked 
to keep power of those considered unfit for global leadership. Few countries outside of Western 
Europe and North America possessed the highly specialized expertise required to draw up effective 
legal briefs and successfully argue cases before arbitration tribunals, the League Council or the PCIJ. 
This void was filled by the tightly knit community of jurists connected to the IDI and the Hague 
Academy of International Law, many of whom, in addition to teaching the laws of nations, had a 
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lucrative legal practice on the side.628 Smaller, particularly non-European states enmeshed in 
international disputes had little choice but to turn to this limited market. Far from leveling the playing 
field by making the strength of arguments the determining factor in international disputes, the 
juridification of international affairs opened up new avenues for asserting influence in a similar way 
that financial expertise was used to restructure markets in accordance with political and economic 
interests.629 
 
One year after the Wal Wal Commission, Nicolas Politis outlined the reasoning for his decision in the 
CEIP’s L’Esprit International in terminology that must have come as a shock to the Ethiopians who 
had originally nominated him as their arbitrator. Collective security, in his reading, was above all an 
instrument of racial solidarity driven by “fear of an onslaught of colored races,” which created “a 
community of interests.” Europeans thus finally needed to abandon the “fiction of universality” of 
the League Covenant that appeared to offer equal protection to all nations and band together to assert 
their hegemony over other parts of the world. In hindsight, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict struck Politis 
as having brought about a fortuitous change of mind among European leaders in so far as the prospect 
of successful sanctions had alerted people to the fact that an Ethiopian victory would have been a 
“terrible blow to Western civilization.” In a clash between a European and an African or Asian power, 
Europeans would now be readier to side with the former since “a war between Europeans and between 
whites in general is much more like a civil war than a foreign war.”630 
 
 
Epilogue: Hierarchies and the laws of nations  
In October 1935, Italy, ignoring all calls for restraint, commenced its full-scale invasion of Ethiopia. 
The brutality of the Italian assault with its use of mustard gas, the startling numbers of casualties on 
the Ethiopian side, as well as the mobilization of a society by a Fascist government for conquest, 
foreshadowed, as Aram Mattioli argues, future wars of extermination.631 Once the invasion was 
underway, the League of Nations reversed course, branded Italy as an aggressor nation and voted to 
impose economic sanctions. But reacting to a fait accompli, the major powers were unable to adopt a 
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unified stance so that the measures lacked real force and Italy found them easy to ignore.632 Under 
these circumstances the Comité d’Administration’s meeting in June 1936 turned into a premature post 
mortem of the League’s political and legal infrastructure. In comments addressed at the ineffective 
sanctions regime but that could have similarly applied to the arbitration process that preceded them, 
Moritz Julius Bonn felt reminded of “a battle in which the general in command had the order that he 
should make a great deal of noise, but for Heaven’s sake, not hit!”633 
 
Ultimately, the interwar project of juridifying international relations, promoted by the Carnegie 
Endowment, had failed to secure a peaceful world. Interwar jurists had believed that international 
politics could and should be made largely independent from the disruptive interferences of populist 
politicians and demagogic mass media. Once seperated from this background noise, the national 
interest was amenable to objective description and quantification through scientific inquiry. 
Codifying international law then entailed bringing these competing interests into equilibrium while, 
as a fail-safe, lawyers would bargain compromises behind closed doors whenever conflicts arose. But 
what if violence was not a means to an end but an end in itself? In the Italo-Ethiopian crisis Mussolini 
had given his negotiators strict orders to rather risk sanctions and international opprobrium than agree 
to an even temporary halt of Italy’s march to war.634 That states would so blatantly disregard the 
dictates of self-interest in an interdependent world left internationalists puzzled. It may be noted that 
this interpretation runs counter to the usual criticism of interwar internationalists as idealist 
visionairies who were impervious to the hard realities of power and national interests.  
 
This apparent contradiction is less stark once we view as the main axis of contention who decided 
what the national interest was. At the 1936 Comité meeting an anguished Nicholas Murray Butler 
recounted to his European friends how he had once urged Mussolini to satisfy Italy’s territorial 
demands by purchasing the colony of Angola from the Portuguese, which could have been “bought 
at a fraction of what it has now cost to invade these rocks called Ethiopia.”635 The picture of the 
president of Columbia University bargaining away millions of African colonial subjects to a European 
dictator epitomizes the shaky assumptions on which the legal internationalist project had always been 
based. For all the clashing national perspectives represented at places such as the Hague Academy of 
International Law, the relative ease with which interwar scholars ascertained national interests was a 
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direct function of the cultural and social homogeneity of this transnational in-group. Yet, the claim to 
leadership of these liberal, largely European elites was increasingly questioned from all directions: 
anti-colonial activists, social reformers, illiberal social movements from both the left and the right. 
 
Once the system they had labored to create came undone in the mid-1930s, legal internationalists 
responded in a variety of ways. For Nicolas Politis, the final years before his death in 1942 saw him 
turning toward increasingly authoritarian solutions. Rather than questioning the project of 
establishing world order by legal fiat, the failure of the League’s collective security system moved 
Politis to re-emphasize the need for bringing order to a world drifting towards anarchy. In some of 
his last writings he saw these values most clearly realized in Portugal’s Estado Novo, whose 
authoritarian leader António de Oliveira Salazar he celebrated as “wise,“ “enlightened” and 
“virtuous.”636 What was true for domestic relations was even more important at the international level 
and here, too, Politis increasingly placed his faith in radical solutions enacted on the basis of 
supposedly objective inquiry. Was not Europe’s chaotic demographic composition with its uneasy fit 
between ethnic groups and national boundaries at the heart of the Continent’s continual tensions? 
Drawing on his own experience in negotiating a population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 
1922/23, he suggested that careful planning could solve the problem once and for all.637 The drastic 
measures he proposed amounted to the forced resettlement of ethnic minorities to remove sources of 
international tension and allow for reconstituting international order on a solid foundation: 
It will be necessary to resettle populations to territories in which they do not currently reside, 
and if there are other people with whom they will not be able to live together, these populations 
will have to make room for them. This is a painful procedure, but that is how it is with all 
operations. We must consider the goal that has to be achieved and if it can be accomplished 
by no other means than by this process, it would show a lack of political sense to be held back 
by false feelings.638 
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Politis had drawn attention for his condemnation of the 
Armenian Genocide and for his calls for a new category of crimes against humanity.639 His final 
public writings left a more complicated legacy.640 
 
For Philip C. Jessup the 1929 World Court negotiations were merely the start of a long and 
distinguished career in international jurisprudence and diplomacy (see ch. 7). He served as assistant 
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secretary-general of the Bretton Woods Conference and in the late 1940s and early 1950s became one 
of the rising stars of the State Department as American representative at the United Nations and later 
as ambassador-at-large for Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In ways that must have reminded him 
of the informal diplomacy that he had first witnessed at Geneva, he used his rapport with the Soviet 
ambassador to the United Nations to open a diplomatic channel that led to the lifting of the Berlin 
Blockade in 1949, a contribution Acheson later called a “triumph of the diplomatic art in America.”641 
Jessup’s story came full circle in 1961 when the Kennedy Administration appointed him to the 
International Court of Justice, the successor institution to the PCIJ. 
 
The approach to international affairs that became characteristic of Jessup’s diplomatic career 
highlights the generational difference between the young American and his European and Eurocentric 
elders. Jessup never shared the casual racism he witnessed among his colleagues. In one of his first 
publications as a young scholar, an analysis of the restrictive Immigration Act of 1924, he had dryly 
noted that an academic paper was not the place to “speculate upon the pleasing possibility of Nordic 
supremacy.”642 Sixteen years later, in a radio debate on the outlines of a coming post-war order, 
Jessup’s frustration with the stereotypes of traditional American-European policy was evident when 
he hoped that the U.S. would not “go back to picking up the ‘white man’s burden.’ Surely the fiction 
of white supremacy in the East is gone forever, and personally I’m glad of it.”643 It was a statement 
that could be taken as a motto for Jessup’s post-war diplomatic activities, which dealt in large parts 
with untangling the legacy of European colonialism in Asia and Africa, a mission he chronicled in 
the semi-autobiographical The Birth of Nations.644 
 
Yet, while dismantling the vestiges of European imperial power, the project of reconciling inequality 
and international law remained with Jessup as he became one of the architects of American global 
power. During the war he frequently clashed with his colleague Quincy Wright, whose far-reaching 
goals—an international police force, a world parliament representing mankind in toto instead of 
nation states—he thought foolish.645 Some, including his Columbia colleague Nathaniel Peffer, 
deplored that America was poised to abandon its traditional anti-imperialist stance to pursue a Pax 
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Americana. What had happened to the project of “international cooperation and an interdependent 
world, with law as the substitute for force in international relations”?646 Such arguments did not 
convince Jessup, who believed that to protect stability and peace, international order had to reflect 
established power relations and state interests. In 1945, he organized a graduate study group at 
Columbia University on the question of inequality and in an article for the Political Science Quarterly 
he reminded his readers that it had long become an established practice of international relations that 
“while equality is preached, inequality will be practiced.” He defended the seeming contradiction in 
the United Nations charter between a world order ostensibly based on the equality of sovereign states 
and the obviously inegalitarian principle of the Assembly-Security Council divide: “It is true, as 
Woodrow Wilson said, that ‘all nations are equally interested in the peace of the world’; it is not true 
that all can make equal contributions to its maintenance.”647 It was an argument that clearly resonated 
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5. Merchants of Peace: Internationalists, multinationals and the cultural 
foundations of international economic regimes 
 
 
In the summer of 1933, it appeared to John Maynard Keynes that the world was starting to “shuffle 
out of the mental habits of the prewar nineteenth-century world.” Since the dawn of the British-led 
first period of globalization the belief that the free movement of goods and capital could guarantee 
social welfare and international stability was considered not only an economic insight but “a part of 
the moral law,” Keynes wrote. Now the Great Depression had prompted the realization that, to the 
contrary, economic internationalism caused inequality at home and imperialist struggle to secure 
markets abroad. Keynes’ article was part of a key debate of the 1930s—whether self-sufficient 
national economies or an integrated global economy was the way of the future. It was a debate that 
produced competing claims about the causes of economic growth and unemployment but also hinged 
on the contention of which of the two visions was best suited to guarantee international stability at a 
time when Europe appeared headed toward another destructive war. Keynes himself noted: “We are 
pacifist today with so much strength of conviction that, if the economic internationalist could win this 
point, he would soon recapture our support.”648 As the confident challenge implies, it was a debate 
that for much of the 1930s economic nationalists appeared to be winning handily as the volatility of 
international markets was widely blamed for the economic malaise and, furthermore, for having 
ended the Spirit of Locarno with its promise of peaceful stabilization.  
 
Three years after Keynes’s article, Nicholas Murray Butler reflected on this turn toward the nation in 
a sobering report to the CEIP Trustees: A wave of economic nationalism prevented governments from 
addressing “the economic forces making for disorder and disaster.“ Faced with a crisis of staggering 
magnitude, governments had resorted to a variety of purely national emergency measures that could 
only be “a very temporary palliative.“ “The one practical method to prevent a world breakdown,” 
Butler concluded, “is to cause trade to expand in a normal fashion, by restoring confidence to the 
capital and credit markets of the world.”649 These were more than idle words for at that moment the 
Carnegie Endowment was engaged in an effort to turn the tide of the debate—an ambitious project to 
convince global public opinion that economic internationalism was indispensable to world peace. In 
this endeavor, the foundation found partners in the world of finance and multinational corporations. 
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Builders of global business empires such as IBM President Thomas J. Watson and Dutch entrepreneur 
F.H. Fentener van Vlissingen and economic experts such as Belgian central banker and politician Paul 
Van Zeeland became the main initiators of a close alliance between the CEIP and the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to fight economic nationalism and to restore global markets. The CEIP-
ICC campaign was not an isolated project but ran in parallel to and interacted with the efforts of a 
growing number of academic institutions, international organizations and policy groups.650 But its 
defining feature was its focus on political culture rather than on direct lobbying of policy makers. It 
was via this route of network-building and public advocacy that the two organizations helped prepare 
the ground for the “grand social bargain” of a post-Bretton-Woods era that combined free 
international markets with domestic safety measures to ensure public welfare.651 
 
It appears intuitive to connect changes in international economic regimes—from the demise of British 
imperial free trade via closed national economies to a return to global markets under American 
leadership—to the increasing penetration of European markets by American companies since the 
1920s, which created new stakeholders in open markets.652 In this framework, Cordell Hull’s 
Reciprocal Tariff Agreement Act of 1934, one of of the few interwar initiatives for trade liberalization, 
reflected America’s growing commercial interests and became the first in a long series of steps toward 
the U.S.-led embedded liberalism of the post-1945 era. That the American and European owners and 
managers of companies that stood to profit from the free flow of goods and capital—export-dependent 
businesses or outward-oriented corporations—would have pushed for and aided in the adoption of 
such policies appears evident. It has been argued that their increasingly global interests found social 
expression in the formation of a transnational capitalist class.653 Yet, it is more challenging to identify 
by which mechanisms such interests were brought to bear on the political process or how they were 
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even formulated.654 As will be shown below, actual patterns of political positions taken by business 
leaders in the 1930s support a more pluralist view of economic elites than notions of cohesive class 
interests would suggest. Rather than forming a unified voice for open markets, peak business 
associations on both sides of the Atlantic were still dominated by protectionist sentiment and publicly 
adhered to an ethos of business nationalism.655 Furthermore, rather than growing more central, 
multinational corporations actually constituted a smaller and smaller share of the global economy 
between the 1920s and the 1960s.656 The development of widespread business support for economic 
internationalism and its impact on the political process is as much explanandum as it is explanans. 
 
Such political heterodoxy highlights that, above and beyond rational choice models, accounts of 
changing international regimes need to take seriously the impact of norms, beliefs, ideology and 
cultural preferences.657 As Frank Trentmann has shown, nineteenth century British free trade policies 
rested on widely shared popular beliefs that associated commercial liberalism with prosperity and 
stability.658 The establishment of a liberal trade system under American leadership required a new 
cultural consensus, both at home and abroad. The close association of American economic hegemony 
with changes in cultural practices and patterns of consumption have consequently been interpreted in 
Gramscian terms as the establishment of ideological hegemony by the United States over Europe.659 
But in the United States, as in other countries, political support for economic internationalism varied 
greatly across different regions, economic sectors and classes and should thus not be assumed as a 
given but analyzed as a cultural and political phenomenon. This chapter contends that, albeit only 
politically implemented in the late stages of and after the Second World War and now mainly 
associated with the Cold War confrontation with Communism, the outlines of an economic 
internationalist consensus emerged in the second half of the 1930s as a reaction to the wave of 
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nationalism and expansion of government brought on by the Great Depression. The alliance between 
the New-York-based CEIP and the Paris-based ICC played a key part in this effort by associating the 
free flow of goods and capital with prosperity and peace. 
 
The CEIP-ICC cooperation needs to be viewed in the context of a broader movement among the 
community of economic advisers and “money doctors” grouped around the central banks and foreign 
ministries of the world’s major powers, the League’s EFO, the Bank of International Settlements, 
major universities, banks and corporations in Europe and America.660 It was a network that had been 
key to the informal stabilization of the global economy before the stock market crash and by the mid-
1930s many of its members became disillusioned by what they considered the harmful consequences 
of economic nationalism: lagging economic growth, government regulation of the private sector, 
closing-off of international markets, cultural parochialism and belligerence. Initially pursued to 
outflank the policy decisions of national governments, the process soon found official support in 
export dependent economies such as Belgium and the Netherlands and, increasingly, in the United 
States. Starting in 1935, the CEIP coordinated its activities closely with the State Department to 
promote the Roosevelt Administration’s RTAA program and supported the aspirations of the 
BENELUX countries to develop the Gold Bloc into a free trade area, however, the goal was ultimately 
a more durable and global economic regime. To achieve this desired outcome, economic 
internationalists sought to change the structure and discourse of domestic monetary and commercial 
policy-making among Western powers: in a push to decontextualize, or “depoliticize,” the process, 
authority was slowly transferred away from directly elected officials, who tended to be more 
responsive to protectionist demands, and assigned to experts in independent or executive branch 
agencies. Furthermore, economic internationalists made a normative case for a liberal international 
economic regime that presented free trade as an ethical choice vis-à-vis the narrow self-interestedness 
of economic nationalism. It was especially this latter aspect that was promoted through the CEIP-ICC 
cooperation. 
 
Two caveats need to be added to this narrative of a triumphant economic liberalism: Firstly, the extent 
to which the tenets of economic internationalism were successfully reintroduced into national 
contexts varied widely. The most measurable impact was achieved in the United States, where 
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elaborate public relations campaigns that were fully supported by the administration yielded a 
bipartisan coalition that was as broad as it was deep, combining a virtually united business community 
and a largely sympathetic labor movement. Similar initiatives in Europe were stymied by a lack of 
government support and, eventually, the disruptions of a Continent at war. The most lasting legacy 
here was the construction of advocacy networks that would continue their activism for 
transatlanticism and European integration, particularly in its business-friendly form of a Europe du 
patronat, once peace had been restored.661 Secondly, to the extent that the path taken by interwar 
economic internationalism can be traced to Bretton Woods, the Munich Agreement of 1938 intended 
to appease Germany major way station on that road. Economic internationalists in the 1930s 
propagated a method of addressing systemic imbalances that stripped economic grievances of their 
political contexts to enable dispassionate negotiation. As a result, territorial demands by Germany, 
Italy and Japan, clothed in the language of scarcity of raw materials and population pressures, were 
prima facie viewed as legitimate concerns and as a technical challenge for businessmen and 
international planners to affect a more equitable distribution of resources. In the final years before the 
war, many economic internationalists thus became prominent voices for economic appeasement. 
 
 
Sectoral Conflict and the Challenge to Economic Internationalism 
Economic internationalism had always been part of the Carnegie Endowment’s ancestral DNA. 
Andrew Carnegie himself had called for free trade between the nations of Europe, although he insisted 
that the American protective tariff, which had helped him build his fortune, needed to be preserved.662 
The idea’s roots reached back to the Enlightenment era, to Montesquieu’s hope for the pacifying 
tendencies of “sweet commerce” and to the works of classical economists such as Adam Smith and 
especially David Ricardo. But it was during Carnegie’s lifetime that British writers such as Richard 
Cobden and J.A. Hobson elaborated on these points to create a coherent philosophy of economic 
relations that became the governing ideology of the British Empire’s commercial policy.663 Its chief 
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tenet was that the free movement of goods, capital and workers in an open international market would, 
through an efficient global distribution of labor, maximize prosperity and promote the civilizational 
advancement of man, thus eventually making territorial ambitions and war unnecessary. Of the 
specific policies associated with economic internationalism,664 those that became most relevant 
during the Great Depression were adherence to a stable international exchange rate (i.e. the gold 
exchange standard) and the elimination or reduction of tariffs and quotas on foreign products. Any 
short-term competitive disadvantages and their negative effects on national economies would only 
lead to temporary hardship and eventually be offset by the salutary effects of a growing global 
economy as a rational distribution of labor was established.665  
 
A second source for economic internationalism was the Continental push for European integration of 
the 1920s. French and German industrialists figured prominently among the supporters of 
organizations such as the Pan-European Union or the Union douanière européenne (UDE), which 
advocated for international cooperation on tariffs and eventually for a common European market. 
Belgian politician and industrialist Georges Theunis and Luxembourg’s steel magnate Émile 
Mayrisch were among those pushing, often with support from national governments, for a “Europe 
of producers” (Bussière) through transnational cartelization. American business staid mainly on the 
sidelines as stringent U.S. anti-trust laws made active participation in such arrangements a risky 
proposition.666 To Nicholas Murray Butler, whose expertise in economics was limited and mainly 
derived from a basic familiarity with Enlightenment and Manchester School liberalism, there was no 
question that large-scale, integrated markets were key to prosperity, stability and peace. America 
proved the point. Its rapid industrialization and current prosperity demonstrated the true potential of 
unimpeded capitalism on a continental scale.667 As early as 1915, he had told an interviewer that—
“Just as certainly as we sit here”—the World War would lead to the formation of a United States of 
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Europe as the Old World would look to America for guidance on how to live peacefully in a 
multicultural society composed of dozens of states with distinct identities.668 Careful not to commit 
to any one group or faction, the CEIP supported plans for European integration in general terms 
throughout the 1920s. 
 
Such schemes were adamantly opposed by economic nationalists, who thought the internationalists 
had it backwards: according to Keynes it was the “penetration” of countries by “foreign capitalists” 
that threatened the social fabric and the competition for export markets that drove nations to economic 
imperialism and war.669 According to a National Socialist writer, modern interdependence had created 
a situation too complex and chaotic for governments to leave their citizens at the mercy of the 
“economic clash of the titans,” as governments and monopolies raided the open market for raw 
materials.670 Economic nationalists believed that governments had an obligation to intervene in the 
economy to protect their citizens from the effects of the global market. Drawing on mercantilist and 
romanticist sources they pointed out that economic policy was an instrument of power and should 
thus serve the interests of the nation. The state also needed to take into account the attitude of its 
neighbors, whose hostile actions could force reactions in the interests of national self-preservation. 
Managing currencies and keeping out cheap imports were seen as legitimate techniques to preserve 
social stability and to ward off aggressive foreign competition. Economic policy was thus 
subordinated to a broader set of political objectives, including social welfare and maintaining the 
nation’s industrial and military strength. Most Depression era economic nationalists did not denounce 
the global market altogether, however, to them any restoration of global exchanges could occur only 
after national recovery had been achieved and preferably on terms that placed the burden of 
adjustment costs on other countries.671 
 
Actual developments during the interwar years did not favor economic internationalists. 
Democratization, the growth of nationalism and the downfall of empires in Europe all impeded the 
development of a new globalized economy. A weakened Great Britain could no longer afford to be 
the guardian of international trade and the United States was unwilling to assume the role of global 
hegemon. Meanwhile, 12,000 additional miles of tariff borders had been created in Europe, cutting 
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across established trade routes and hampering economic recovery. In addition, the war had for the 
first time established nationality as an essential attribute in business life as governments tried to 
ensure the security of their supplies and the loyalty of their suppliers. Cognizant of the strategic value 
of a domestic industrial base, the newly-founded states adopted protectionist policies to cultivate an 
environment in which key industries could be nurtured without foreign competition, in what liberals 
such as Moritz Julius Bonn condemned as a “misdirection of capital.”672 Nationalization of business 
also continued to work on a cultural level as the stigma of “trading with the enemy” lingered until 
well into the 1920s between the former Allies and the Central Powers. In the absence of a new, unified 
economic regime, a degree of international stability was ensured through a variety of channels, 
including central bank coordination, the activities of American private investment bankers, consulting 
economists and international institutions such as the League of Nation’s EFO and, starting in 1930, 
the BIS.673 
 
One might expect the owners of internationally oriented businesses to have been at the forefront of 
opposing such a fragmentation of markets, yet business attitudes towards nationalism have always 
been essentially pragmatic and the impact of nationalist policies were not entirely negative.674 Since 
rising trade barriers threatened to make exports unprofitable, foreign direct investment became a 
preferred tool for companies that sought to geographically expand their markets. By investing in or 
buying up competitors in foreign countries multinationals jumped over tariff barriers and competed 
on foreign markets on a level playing field.675 This was reflected in the business models of the two 
men who would later form the core of the partnership between the Carnegie Endowment and the 
International Chamber of Commerce, Thomas J. Watson and Frederik Henrik Fentener van 
Vlissingen.  
 
At the time of the founding of Watson’s International Business Machines in 1924, the   company’s 
cosmopolitan name had been little more than a marketing pitch. But over the course of the next ten 
years IBM pursued a course of international expansion to circumvent tariffs and import quotas by 
directly investing in foreign markets. “[I]n order to protect our interests abroad it has been necessary 
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for us to establish factories in England, France, Germany and Italy,” Watson told President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt in 1935 to illustrate the impact of protectionism on his company. Part of that portfolio 
was IBM’s ninety percent stake in Deutsche Hollerith Machinen-Gesellschaft (DEHOMAG), of 
which Watson boasted “we are now employing more than one thousand people in our German factory 
alone.” As a result, IBM became a company with a global outlook that nevertheless stood to gain 
little by a dismantling of trade barriers.676 
 
F.H. Fentener van Vlissingen was another such builder of multinational empires. Born into a 
prominent family of Dutch industrialists, he had started his business career as director of a steel 
syndicate, allowing him to observe first-hand the interconnectedness of the Western-European steel 
and coal market, particularly along the Rhine River. In 1920, he capitalized on this knowledge by 
helping engineer a deal between newly formed Dutch Koninklijke Hoogovens and the predecessor of 
German steel magnate Vereinigte Stahlwerke. Around the same time Fentener van Vlissingen entered 
the booming market for artificial silk by co-founding ENKA, which became a major Dutch exporter. 
But in the mid-1920s, as trade barriers rose and many countries considered artificial silk a strategic 
raw material worth protecting, ENKA switched strategies and started acquiring stakes in foreign 
companies in i.a. England, Italy and the United States, where it formed the American Enka 
Corporation in 1928.677 In 1925, it acquired a stake in German competitor Vereinigte Glanzstoffe 
Fabriken (VGF) and four years later ENKA practically merged with the much larger German 
company, forming Algemene Kunstzijde Unie (AKU). Just as the Great Depression started, Fentener 
van Vlissingen and AKU had thus become closely tied to both the German and the American market, 
where its stake in American ENKA represented the second largest Dutch investment in the United 
States after Royal Dutch Shell.678 
 
As befitting entrepreneurs with such geographically dispersed investments, both Watson and Fentener 
van Vlissingen took an active interest in international affairs. Watson joined the CEIP Board of 
Trustees in 1934 and both men would serve as presidents of the main voice of business 
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internationalism, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)—Fentener van Vlissingen from 
1933 to 1937 and Watson from 1937 to 1939. Founded in 1919 by businessmen from Allied countries 
concerned about post-war economic reconstruction, the ICC had quickly established itself as the 
premier interest group for international business and banking.679 Yet, throughout the 1920s and early 
1930s the ICC took a cautious approach to lobbying for free trade policies. This was partly a function 
of the organization’s hybrid structure, which combined an international secretariat with headquarters 
in Paris with a decentralized base of national sections that exercised actual control over policy via 
their representation in the ICC’s Council. This arrangement gave the ICC a quasi-intergovernmental 
aspect as the national sections were usually closely aligned with and largely financed by the main 
business groups in their respective countries, which in turn tended to consult closely with 
governments in matters of foreign economic policy.680 Broader political considerations of its members 
also played a role in the ICC’s hesitancy. Even enterprises with significant international investments, 
such as IBM and AKU, still relied on the home market for the majority of their business, which meant 
that on important domestic issues such as taxation and regulation their interests converged with their 
more nationally oriented colleagues. Consequently, business internationalists were unlikely to risk a 
major rift with their countries’ major interest groups on whose political support they depended.681 
 
This close association of the ICC with national business communities was particularly problematic 
as by the late 1920s trade associations of industrialized countries had become wellsprings of 
protectionist sentiment. Peak business associations—i.e. the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States (USCOC), the Confédération générale de la production française (CGPF), the Reichsverband 
der Deutschen Industrie (RDI) and the British Federation of Industries (FBI)—were dominated by 
companies from the manufacturing sector which had some interest in boosting exports but were 
unwilling to do so at the expense of admitting foreign competition into their markets.682 To ensure 
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protection for their members, these business groups usually worked hand in hand with national 
governments, for instance by advocating for the American Hawley-Smoot Tariff in 1929 or by 
participating in setting French import quotas in the early 1930s.683 “It is certainly unfortunate,” 
complained American diplomat and free-trader Robert W. Bingham to Watson, “that there should be 
a group in control of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce so blind to their own interests and to the welfare 
of the country.”684 Meanwhile, the separate pro-free-trade interest groups of internationally oriented 
enterprises such as the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) or the Deutscher Bund für freie 
Wirtschaftspolitik (DBfW), were usually small and exercised comparatively little political clout. “We 
have essentially remained [a nation of] petty bourgeoisie,” complained a German economist at the 
inaugural meeting of the DBfW, expressing the frustration of free traders everywhere, “the middle 
classes […] command a traditional influence that is not always proportionate to their economic import 
or insight.”685 
 
By the early 1930s, economic internationalism appeared, to many, as a quaint ideology that survived 
mostly in the boardrooms of investment banks, in the offices of trading firms and at the conferences 
of interest groups and cultural enterprises they had spawned. Its diminishing appeal as a guiding 
philosophy was poignantly symbolized by the fate of Dunford House, Richard Cobden’s birthplace. 
When in 1927 Cobden’s widow could no longer afford the upkeep, the shrinking ranks of the British 
free trade movement sprang into action with a plan to convert the estate into a museum and training 
center dedicated to the memory of the great free trader. But the coffers of Britain’s business 
community remained closed, forcing Cobden’s old associates to turn to his American followers for 
funds. Starting in 1928, the Carnegie Endowment largely assumed financial responsibility for 
Dunford House, effectively making one of the few remaining bastions of the free trade philosophy in 
Britain an outpost of America’s internationalist East Coast Establishment.686 
 
What then changed to bring about renewed activism for a liberal economic world order? Much of the 
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initial impetus for the new transnational coalition stemmed from the failure of the World Economic 
Conference in London in the summer of 1933. Many internationalists, including Butler and Thomas 
Watson, had initially supported even controversial New Deal policies as emergency measures that 
were justified by the severity of the crisis, soon to be replaced by the inevitable restoration of world 
markets. High hopes were attached to the London conference at which both the CEIP and the ICC 
applied to have delegations admitted. The ICC’s Biennial Congress at Vienna, held only weeks earlier, 
passed by quietly as delegates held their breaths and waited for the diplomats to act. Yet, the summit 
failed in such comprehensive fashion that it was clearly not merely a temporary setback but, at least 
for the time being, the end of efforts to negotiate an internationally coordinated response to the 
crisis.687 Moritz J. Bonn, who had participated in the preparatory meetings to the Conference, later 
reported with dismay to the Comité d’Administration on the disappearance of the former collegiality 
between delegates that had always allowed for frank and confidential exchanges of views on the 
sidelines of such meetings: “you could barely talk with them, and yet it was our old friends, it was 
not like those were people we did not know.”688 
 
Coming in the wake of the the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, the Ottawa Agreement of 1932, in which 
Great Britain had turned towards its imperial market, and the consolidation of National Socialist 
power in Germany, the London fiasco seemed like the final nail in the coffin of commercial and 
financial liberalism.689 The world appeared now headed toward a balkanized system of largely self-
contained national or regional blocs, which changed the calculations even for businesses that had 
hitherto profited from economic nationalism. Jumping over the tariff barrier was only a sound 
business strategy if the long-term security of the investment was guaranteed and if profits could be 
extracted. Viewed from this angle, interests in Germany such as those of F.H. Fentener van Vlissingen 
and Thomas J. Watson started to look more and more tenuous as the regime pursued a path toward 
isolation. Although Fentener van Vlissingen’s AKU profited greatly from Germany’s autarchic 
ambitions, in which artificial silk played a key role as a substitute for cotton, the flip side of this 
critical position were repeated calls by National Socialist leaders for nationalization.690 Watson 
experienced similar difficulties with DEHOMAG. Stringent currency controls prevented IBM from 
extracting profits, thus making the company dependent on securing the subsidiary’s long-term 
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viability so as not to be forced to write off the entire DEHOMAG investment.691 Such personal 
interests were powerful motivations for economic internationalists and Watson made no effort to 
conceal his mixed agendas when he informed President Roosevelt before one of his sweeping trips 
through Europe that he was undertaking the journey “in the interests of my Company, the International 
Chamber of Commerce and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.”692 
 
The prospect of a permanent turn toward national economies also had significant implications for 
domestic political and economic relations. Whether the New Deal’s National Economic Planning, the 
“Swedish Model” or the extreme cases of Soviet collectivism and National Socialism’s permanent 
war economy—as countries resorted to a combination of currency devaluation, tariff hikes, import 
quotas and exchange controls to combat the economic downturn governments directly intervened in 
the economy.693  As businessmen the world over discovered, the price of protection from global 
competition was unprecedented government intrusion into the private sector, leading delegates at the 
first ICC Congress after the London failure to urge governments to take a step back. René Duchemin, 
president of the CGPF, asserted that there could be no revival of economic activity among 
entrepreneurs “as long as they encounter governmental interference at every step” and Eliot 
Wadsworth, a CEIP Trustee, reminded the Congress that once “the hand of government enters into 
any field it is slow to withdraw".694 Suddenly, the pre-1914 era of British trade liberalism appeared 
as the Golden Age of private enterprise and tranquility. In a letter that encapsulates the state of mind 
of economic liberals at a time of shrinking world markets and growing security concerns in Europe 
and Asia American banker-statesman Thomas Lamont idealized the supposedly “greatest single 
period of comparative world peace” during the century from 1815 to 1914 and wished for a return to 
the “relaxed conditions of world trade which marked that fortunate era.”695  
 
Finally, and moving squarely into the realm of culture, economic nationalism threatened the political 
power, social status and cultural cache of cosmopolitan elites in a way that is not easily quantifiable 
but became part of the everyday lived experience of anyone connected with such institutions as the 
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CEIP and the ICC. Harold James has succinctly summarized the cultural frame that characterized the 
Depression-era backlash against all things international: “Everything that was moving across national 
boundaries—whether capital, goods, or people—really had no business to be doing that and should 
be stopped.”696 In the United States, international businessmen and bankers were taken aback by 
President Roosevelt’s attack on the “unscrupulous money changers” in his inaugural address.697 Wall 
Street’s traditional international spirit had become a “a term of reproach almost synonymous with that 
of a trafficker with the enemy,“ noted The Economist, an experience that was also made by CEIP 
trustee John W. Davis when he served as the lead attorney for J.P. Morgan & Co. during a 
Congressional investigation into charges that Wall Street banks had wittingly caused the stock market 
crash.698 The public mood was not much different in Europe, where the charge that the Bank of France 
was controlled by the infamous deux cent familles became a rallying cry of the left, while in Britain 
a “banker’s ramp” was said to have forced Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald out of office 
in 1931.699  
 
It was a discursive shift that soon implicated cultural institutions such as the Carnegie Endowment, 
which encountered crude, conspiratorial attacks on the foundation’s alleged desire to deliver the 
United States into the hands of Communists, the “Rothschild banking interests” or returning it “to the 
status of a colony of the British Empire.”700 But more respected academics and journalists also began 
to focus on the strands of interests that tied Butler and the Carnegie Endowment to Wall Street and 
industry. “All these men are involved in big business, all share the same ideas,“ concluded Horace 
Coon after surveying the CEIP Trustees. “They are members of the group […] which rules America 
through their interlocking directorates.”701 The CEIP’s elevation to the status of political bogey for 
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American economic nationalists, on par with J.P. Morgan and U.S. Steel, culminated in a caustic 
speech by Congressman George H. Tinkham of Massachusetts in February 1933 before the House of 
Representatives, in which he called for an investigation into the foundation’s activities. Calling 
Nicholas Murray Butler “disloyal and seditious” and James T. Shotwell “an expatriated British 
subject,” Tinkham accused the CEIP of effectively forming an “invisible government” and invoked 
America’s national heritage to end in a soaring call to arms against internationalists:702  
We descendants of those who established civilization upon this continent, fought the battle of 
Bunker Hill, died at Valley Forge, saw the rising of the sun at Yorktown […] are ready here 
and now to fight again the battle of the Republic without quarter and without cease, by all the 
means that lie within our power, to expose the plotters against American independence, 
American sovereignty, American neutrality and American safety. […] Nicholas Murray Butler 
states he is for peace. There will be no peace on the American continent unless he retires to 
England or fights the second battle of Bunker Hill. 703 
 
The result of this shift in atmosphere on the foundation itself was somewhat paradoxical. At the very 
time that internationalism was falling out of favor with the public the CEIP’s trustees became more 
energized with board members starting to question the leadership’s strategy and actively debated 
budgeting decisions.704 It may seem odd that men who had sat silently through countless meetings 
during the heyday of cultural internationalism in the mid 1920s suddenly discovered an interest in the 
foundation’s work. But with governments having failed to provide international peace and prosperity 
and the cultural tide turning against them, Eastern Establishment internationalists such as Thomas 
Watson turned to transnational and cultural venues to promote their interests and ideas. This change 
in attitude was not an unalloyed boon for the foundation’s directors as ignoring the “advice” of such 
influential figures could have unpleasant repercussions. Banker and Carnegie Corporation trustee 
Russel Leffingwell once lobbied to have the CEIP’s flow of money stopped after he had come to 
doubt that “in these days of stupendous and agonizing human problems Mr. Carnegie’s money is 
being effectively used by the Endowment.”705 The CEIP’s turn toward economic internationalism in 
the second half of the 1930s was thus partly a continuation of its established program while also 
reflecting a new sensitivity toward the priorities of businessmen and bankers.  
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London Revisited: The Chatham House Conference and Cooperation with the ICC 
When the Carnegie Endowment started its major study program in the field of international 
economics it joined a growing chorus of international organizations and non-governmental actors. 
Against the background of the Great Depression and especially in the wake of the World Economic 
Conference numerous initiatives were launched with the ultimate goal of presenting governments 
with blueprints for returning to a liberal economic world order. In March 1933, The ICC called an 
expert committee to study monetary policies with the goal of preparing the ground for a return to an 
international gold standard. Advocates for stable currencies also found staunch support in the study 
section of the Bank for International Settlements.706 In the fall of 1933, the Social Science Research 
Council and the Rockefeller Foundation launched a study of international economic relations and 
Rockefeller also cooperated with think tanks and universities such as the Brookings Institution and 
the London School of Economics to found institutes for the study of commercial policy and 
international economics.707 Around the same time, the League of Nation’s Economic and Financial 
Section (EFO) reinvented itself as a think tank that strove to promote a liberal economic order and 
became a consistent advocate for reciprocal trade treaties modeled on the American RTAA.708 
Objective, scientific study of international commerce and finance was to guide the way back to 
stability and prosperity and thus accomplish what diplomats had failed to achieve. 
 
The origins of the Carnegie Endowment’s own initiative dated back to July 1931 when Butler had 
suggested that an “international conference of economists and business leaders” should be called to 
work out specific steps for fighting the Depression, present these to the public and force the hand of 
politicians toward international solutions. The idea was approved by the CEIP’s Executive Committee 
that December but was put on hold after the World Economic Conference was announced for 1933. 
Revived after the London failure, the plan for a transnational expert conference was finally worked 
out during a series of meetings between Butler and Earle Babcock in late 1934 during the Centre 
Européen director’s annual visit to New York.709 Invitations would be sent out to economic experts, 
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politicians and businessmen to gather at Chatham House in London for a three-day conference to 
work out specific policy recommendations on tariff reduction, monetary stabilization and effective 
international organization. Each day would be dedicated to one of the three issue areas and on each 
day a chairman would initiate the discussion with specific suggestions that could serve as a basis for 
final resolutions. As these chairmen would be hand-picked by the CEIP, this arrangement gave the 
Endowment obvious sway over the final outcome. The resulting resolutions would then be used to 
campaign for a political consensus in the several countries to push governments toward action. 
“Public opinion can make governments do anything,“ Butler was convinced, “provided it knows its 
own mind and finds a way to express itself.” 710 
 
The setup was remarkably simple. It essentially claimed for the Carnegie Endowment the authority 
to arbitrate a transnational consensus on some of the most contentious issues in international politics. 
This at a time when the world economy was divided into three entrenched blocs—the American dollar 
economy, the British Empire’s Sterling area and the gold bloc with France as its unofficial leader—
with each side insisting on a different solution. France demanded an immediate and universal return 
to the gold exchange standard, Britain rejected this as long as France did not dismantle its import 
quota system. Germany, still nominally a member of the gold bloc, was wielding exchange controls 
as an economic weapon for political ends. Finally, the United States saw multilateral discussions 
primarily as veiled attempts to make demands for American concessions, especially on war debts, 
and preferred a bilateral approach to trade liberalization through a series of RTAA treaties while 
keeping the dollar off gold. “I would no more sit in on a world monetary conference […] than jump 
out of this window,“ Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau told a French diplomat in 1936.711 
Moreover, and contrary to what Butler imagined, economic experts were rarely the voice of altruistic 
reason but—at least when speaking at international forums—tended to voice their respective 
government’s viewpoint. Economics had become the battleground, not a neutral source for 
technocratic solutions. British journalist and free trade activist Francis W. Hirst, who worked closely 
with Babcock on the Chatham House project, tried to caution Butler on the “very chaotic and 
contradictory state of expert opinion” and confessed privately to Babcock: “How on earth we are 
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going to get the experts to agree to specific recommendations on trade and currency beats me!”712 
The composition of the conference was a careful balancing act as the CEIP was aware that any final 
result would be judged based on who had participated in the discussions. Nationality was of utmost 
importance to ensure that the three major monetary blocs would be sitting at the table, as well as the 
irredentist German and Italian regimes. Politically, the foundation’s officers were aware that, tempting 
as it was to stack the conference with economic liberals, such a move would later make it easy to 
dismiss any results as politically motivated (Butler: “That would ruin it entirely”).713 In the end, the 
conference had a strongly Anglo-Saxon tilt, with all but ten of the sixty-seven attendees coming from 
English-speaking countries, forty-seven from Britain alone. A critic later characterized it as a meeting 
of “a viscount or two, a few lords, and twelve sirs” and Hirst joked that the conference was so 
Anglican that the CEIP should consider inviting the Archbishop of Canterbury to lead the 
congregation in prayer.714  Despite this numerical lopsidedness there was considerable talent from 
other parts of Europe: with Jacques Rueff, René Seydoux and Paul van Zeeland three of the gold 
bloc’s more influential economic thinkers attended and the German representative, Ernst 
Trendelenburg, was a high functionary in industry and government who had been personally selected 
by Reich Minister of Economics Hjalmar Schacht. Notable was the complete absence of any 
participant from outside Western Europe and North America as well as political blind spots that had 
by now become characteristic of CEIP events. Despite having gone to great length to secure German 
and Italian representation, inviting a Russian economist was never seriously considered: “Russia is 
the embodiment of tyranny, torture and autarchy. I think it would put people (decent liberal + 
conservative) off, just as it would if you invited a leading English Communist like [G.D.H.] Cole or 
[Harold J.] Laski.”715 The American delegation was entirely composed of committed internationalists 
with four CEIP officers and trustees as its core—“a hand-picked lot of gold standard propagandists, 
economists, international bankers,” thundered Social Justice. 716 
 
Perhaps because of its association with the avowedly liberal Carnegie Endowment and the  generic 
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tenor of its final resolutions, which in rather general terms called for low tariff zones and on 
governments to “consult one another without delay“ on the question of monetary stabilization, the 
Chatham House Conference attracted little attention from contemporary observers, nor—for that 
matter—from historians.717 Predictably, bankers such as Thomas Lamont were delighted while even 
Shotwell admitted that the resolutions were hardly inspiring—“a suitable and commonplace 
pronouncement.“ Yet, he also stressed that this told only part of the story as “behind such statements 
lies a necessary good deal of quasi diplomatic adjustment of ideas between men of different 
nationalities.”718 The measure of success in this case was less what appeared on paper than what had 
been voiced behind closed doors. In a break with the foundation’s usual procedure, the CEIP had kept 
publicity for the event to a minimum, a strategy that clearly paid off as “inter muros, people did not 
mince words,” as one attendee noted.719 
 
The cloistered setting allowed participants to adopt strikingly different perspectives than they might 
have taken in a public forum. Instead of downplaying their own interestedness, many who attended 
went out of their way to emphasize their private sector bona fides. Percival Perry, the chairman of 
Ford Motor Company Ltd., based his suggestions on observations he had made on a recent European 
inspection tour and several attendees identified themselves as investors in shipping companies that 
were vitally interested in a restoration of international trade.720 In Chatham House’s unofficial 
atmosphere, the experts also felt free from some of the customary deference to official policy. Jacques 
Rueff, senior adviser to the Bank of France, chastised his own government’s quota system as 
“absolutely incompatible with maintenance of the capitalistic system.”721 Ernst Trendelenburg 
enabled a pro-League-of-Nations resolution to pass by abstaining from voting and privately even 
signaled his approval. Sir Henry Strakosch, an influential expert in British monetary policy-making, 
reiterated his government’s position that the restoration of internal markets took precedence to 
reviving world trade but conceded that, in the long run, it would be desirable for the world to return 
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to a common monetary standard, probably based on gold.722 The conference demonstrated that below 
the top level of government—in ministries, central banks and trade associations—there was a sizable 
and growing reservoir of economic experts who were disaffected with what they considered 
nationalist and statist policies and were willing to work across borders to affect change. 
What distinguished the Chatham House Conference from similar efforts in other venues around the 
same time was its focus on public opinion and political culture. A number of participants made it clear 
that they had not come to London to develop concrete policy solutions in the faint hopes of 
governmental action. Political decision-makers were not lacking in advice but in political incentives 
to act on the numerous suggestions they were receiving. Banker Sir Henry Bell put the challenge in 
a nutshell. The problem was that the “world had changed its ideal” of economic relations between 
states:    
We have really to choose between a return to a world economy such as existed before 1914, 
inside of the tariffs that existed then, based upon an almost universal gold standard, and a 
collection of national economies. The whole trend of political opinion is in the direction of 
national economies.723 
The main hope that the assembled experts attached to a gathering conducted under the auspices of the 
Carnegie Endowment was that the foundation could help change that dynamic. Pointing toward the 
achievements of Richard Cobden in broadening the mass appeal of economic liberalism in nineteenth 
century Britain, Jacques Rueff hoped that the upshot of the meeting would be “to start a Liberal 
movement in the world again.”724 But while Rueff was at times openly dismissive of policy consensus 
and wanted the foundation to simply advocate on the basis of first principles, the idea behind the 
conference was something rather more concrete: to create a transnationally negotiated body of 
knowledge that could serve as the intellectual foundation of such a campaign. It was in this spirit that 
on the second day of the proceedings CEIP Trustee Peter Molyneaux introduced a resolution that 
called on the Carnegie Endowment and the International Chamber of Commerce to cooperate in a 
comprehensive study that would make “available in accessible form all possible accurate information 
with respect to international economic relations” in an effort to promote international stability and 
progress.725  
 
The Molyenaux resolution had been cleared in advance with ICC President Fentener van Vlissingen, 
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who at the time was engaged in his own campaign to rally the ICC around a program against 
government intrusion in the economy and for reviving international markets. On 24 June 1935 the 
ICC’s biennial Congress opened in Paris and by placing the gathering under the motto “The Revival 
of World Trade” Fentener van Vlissingen prepared to tackle the controversial issues that had long 
divided the ICC head-on. And indeed, in a move that surprised many observers, the Congress’s 960 
delegates from thirty-nine countries, including Italy and Germany, unanimously approved the two 
main resolutions calling for monetary stabilization and the lowering of tariffs. But below the surface 
rifts along national and sectoral lines continued to divide the ICC, with the Wall Street Journal’s 
correspondent commenting that the congress’s unanimity “was like that with which diplomats are 
familiar”—disguising differences of opinion rather than resolving them.726 It was to expand on his 
organization’s incipient turn toward advocacy for economic internationalism that Fentener van 
Vlissingen gladly accepted the CEIP’s offer for cooperation, brought to the Paris Congress by Thomas 
J. Watson.727 The suggestion was unanimously adopted by the Congress and a few days later the ICC 
President dramatically took an airplane to London to personally discuss the broad outlines of the 
project with Butler, who was sure that it would be the “greatest undertaking upon which the 
Endowment has been engaged“.728  
 
Cooperation was advantageous to both organizations primarily due to the familiar need for 
transatlantic bridge-building. The ICC’s seat was in Paris and despite its sizable U.S. contingent 
Americans tended to regard it primarily as an “international,“ i.e. European, organization. The CEIP-
ICC cooperation also constituted a much-needed pooling of resources in a challenging funding 
environment. The CEIP’s finances were strained as a result of the unfavorable development of the 
stock market but its sizable endowment still placed it in a far better position than most voluntary 
societies that depended on regular membership contributions, including the ICC. In times of 
diminishing personal wealth, even on the part of those well-to-do financiers who usually funded 
philanthropic work, internationalists were competing for a limited and shrinking pool of resources. 
For instance, the number of businesses that were paying members of the American ICC section 
plummeted from 745 in 1927 to 226 in 1935. Similar conditions prevailed in other countries.729 Joint 
funding of projects was thus in the interest of both organizations. For the ICC, whose annual budget 
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was only ten to fifteen percent the size of the CEIP’s, access to  the foundation’s money promised an 
opportunity to undertake work on a scale that would have been impossible for the business 
organization to undertake on its own.730 Finally, while the ICC’s direct contacts to senior government 
circles in multiple countries could be advantageous for achieving real policy change they also 
constrained the organization’s ability to publicly advocate for policies that were regarded as anathema 
in certain capitals. Throughout the 1930s, ICC leaders were continually concerned about “keeping 
clear of political problems” and exceeding the organization’s “legitimate field of action“.731 
Cooperation with the explicitly internationalist Carnegie Endowment, which had experience with and 
a long record of public advocacy for such policies enabled the ICC to escape some of its political 
constraints. 
 
The Joint Committee initiated by the two organizations in the summer of 1935 to “study” international 
economic relations was less an academic inquiry than a site of transnational negotiation between 
business elites under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment. With René Duchemin, Harper Sibley 
and Ernst Trendelenburg the Committee’s nineteen member included i.a. the presidents of the CGPF, 
USCOC and the Reichsgruppe Industrie, the successor to the RDI under National Socialism. Britain 
was represented by Alan G. Anderson of the Bank of England and Arthur Balfour, a Vice President 
of the ICC. For the CEIP, James T. Shotwell and Malcolm Davis were joined by Trustees Thomas J. 
Watson and Peter Molyneaux. The CEIP-ICC group was assisted by a Committee of Experts, mostly 
comprised of liberal economists such as free trade theorist Bertil Ohlin, Jacob Viner and Ludwig van 
Mises that would submit studies on individual aspects of commercial and monetary policy. In any 
case, the organizational setup, which had the experts report to the Joint Committee rather than on its 
behalf, guaranteed that there would be minimal causal links between the economists’ reports and the 
Committee’s final recommendations.732   
 
This is not to suggest that the two sponsoring organizations agreed on the precise purpose of the 
undertaking. The ICC president, taking into account his membership’s primary interest in stable 
international exchange rates, attempted early on to restrict the scope of the inquiry to studying 
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mechanisms for restoring a global exchange standard. The European ICC leadership essentially 
wanted the experts to produce a technical blueprint for stabilization that could be presented to 
governments as the consensus of both business leaders and economists. To this effect, Fentener van 
Vlissingen stacked the expert committee with specialists on monetary issues and at a preliminary 
meeting on 8 October 1935 that took place in Paris with minimal American participation, he pushed 
through a draft outline that would have mentioned international trade only in the introduction.733 To 
the Americans this attitude reflected a narrow gold bloc mentality. In the United States the debate 
over economic internationalism had coalesced around Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s free trade 
agenda and rallying the business community and eventually the broader public around support for 
this policy was the top priority of Butler, Shotwell and Watson. When Leo Pasvolsky related his 
observations on the state of affairs in Paris at a preliminary meeting of the American group in New 
York at the end of October, his report elicited strong reactions against the ICC president’s agenda.734  
 
The conflict came to a head at the first joint meeting of the American and European delegations on 
16 November at the ICC’s headquarters in Paris when Shotwell bluntly informed the ICC delegates 
that the CEIP was “not technically interested in all of the details of stabilization, which are 
exceedingly difficult to explain to the general public.“ The interest of the Endowment was not to 
resolve certain procedural problems of international commerce but to change the public discourse on 
trade and internationalism. It was a public belief that international commercial relations were harmful, 
the “movement of self-sufficiency” that prevented the United States from becoming involved in 
Europe.  By cooperating with the business group the Endowment hoped to embed the idea in the 
public imagination that there was “peace in economy.”735 British delegate Alan Anderson, while 
pointing out that in his country there was more need to rally support for monetary stabilization, agreed 
that both policies needed to be linked:  
“I submit that what we ought to say to the world is ‘you want prosperity—you can get it in 
one way only, and that is by joining both policies.’ […] Then there is the other part of the idea 
to be put across—that peace can only be attained if the people have peace of mind, that trade 
is the best way to do it and that absence of trade and the presence of debt have quite obviously 
been the principal causes of an increased spirit of animosity.”736 
These two interlocking causal arguments, that international trade leads to prosperity and prosperity 
leads to peace—what Anderson called “the big idea”—were little else than a reiteration of the key 
tenets of classical liberal economics and Cobdenite internationalism—one critic derided the project 
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as “a new encyclopedia on the eighteenth century model.”737 Yet, the context had changed 
significantly: instead of representing the patriotic governing ideology of the British Empire, the idea 
was to be promoted as a norm by a transnational group of internationalist activists and businessmen. 
Instead of supporting an imperial government, it was intended to be subversive of government power 
by forcing states to relinquish authority back to international markets—to consumers and businesses.  
 
How fragile this emergent norm remained became apparent in the late summer of 1936 when the time 
arrived to issue a report. In early August, the Joint Committee gathered again in Paris to craft thirteen 
resolutions by which governments were encouraged to sign bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements, abolish import quotas and stabilize their currencies. For maximum impact, the finished 
study, including all expert reports, was set for a simultaneous international release in English, French 
and German on 14 September. But a delay in printing prevented the finished report from reaching 
New York in time for a meeting of the American group on 9 September. Instead of signing off on the 
recommendations, as intended, the Americans vetoed its release until the full report, not just the 
thirteen resolutions, was in the hands of every CEIP trustee and American ICC member and the boards 
of both organizations had had a chance to vote on it. In fact, American indignation over the printing 
delay was little more than a diversion to disguise a more embarrassing truth: political considerations 
were preventing the American side from endorsing the resolutions. With President Roosevelt standing 
for reelection in less than two months it was high political season in the United States and the 
American ICC section suddenly balked at a mention of the controversial issue of war debts in the 
report’s preamble. Furthermore, Harper Sibley most likely also wanted to delay attaching his 
signature to a public declaration that could have been interpreted as an endorsement of the Chamber 
of Commerce of the United States for the President’s foreign economic policy. It were these political 
considerations rather than the desire to examine two hundred pages of technical studies that prevented 
a vote.738 
 
The European section of the ICC was apoplectic about the Americans’ stalling since time was of the 
essence. Since the victory of the Popular Front in the French general elections that May and a general 
strike in June, pressure on France to devalue its currency had reached a tipping point, thus presenting 
the threat of another round of competitive devaluations.739 Furthermore, the demands struck at the 
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heart of the strategy behind the CEIP-ICC cooperation, which had been to decouple international 
economics from national political pressures. The Joint Committee’s resolutions had never been 
intended to be examined by anyone but the Committee members themselves before release and 
certainly not by the national ICC sections with their strong links to governments and protectionist 
interests. By postponing release and giving national sections time to weigh in the entire report was in 
peril. “[Y]our demand has upset many applecarts,” complained Arthur Balfour to an American 
colleague, “By submitting [the report] to your Committee over there you have jumped a claim and, 
unless we are very careful, all the other National Committees of the International Chamber will wish 
to examine the Conclusions and quite possibly to modify them.”740  
 
The unexpected dissension denied the two organizations the opportunity of taking credit when 
governments acted along the lines recommended by the Joint Committee. On 25 September 1936, 
less than two weeks after the planned release, France devalued the Franc after previous consultation 
with the American and British government. All three countries then declared to henceforth coordinate 
their monetary policies in order to keep exchange rates between the currencies stable. Butler 
immediately praised the Tripartite Agreement as “the most important step forward toward economic 
recovery and world peace since the Pact of Paris” and remarked on its close resemblance to the 
Chatham House recommendations. A note was hastily inserted into the freshly printed CEIP-ICC 
report taking notice of the new development, praising its “happy consonance with the needs and facts 
and tendencies exposed in the attached studies” and expressing the hope that further steps would be 
taken to restore world trade.741 There is no evidence that the Chatham House conference or the work 
of the Joint Committee helped initiate the Tripartite Agreement. The accord had originated on the 
French side, after pressure on Léon Blum’s Front Populaire to devalue the Franc led the government 
to search for ways to soften international repercussions. The Roosevelt administration was receptive 
to stabilization but unwilling to provide an opening to broach other issues by calling for an 
international conference. Simultaneously issuing a previously negotiated declaration proved 
acceptable to all parties.742  
 
The Chatham House and Joint Committee participants did, however, play a role in creating the 
necessary political backing for this policy by campaigning for international economic and monetary 
coordination in front of business and foreign policy elites. In May, Leon Fraser, now Vice-President 
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of the First National Bank of New York, had told the American Academy of Political Science that a 
period of “pronounced prosperity” would ensue once currencies of “the principal nations” had been 
stabilized.743 Meanwhile, Arthur Balfour urged the British business community to unite behind the 
CEIP-ICC program and to help “influence international and national policy” in favor of international 
cooperation. Would British businessmen be willing to stand up for an interdependent world even at 
the risk of incurring “temporary sacrifices which are inevitably bound up with a policy of international 
collaboration,” Balfour asked the Derby Chamber of Commerce and called on his colleagues to 
provide political cover: “These are tasks which we must call on Governments to perform, but they 
will not act until we show them that business public opinion is behind them.”744 
 
Furthermore, the Carnegie Endowment, the ICC and economic internationalists in general could 
claim some measure of success based not solely on the specific stipulations of the Tripartite 
Agreement but also on its general tenor. In language that could have been taken from a CEIP brochure 
the note declared that the stabilization of currencies was a necessary step to “safeguard peace” and 
“to promote prosperity in the world and to improve the standard of living of peoples.”745 The language 
of peace through economics had been inserted at the insistence of French Minister of Finance Vincent 
Auriol, who wished to embed the Agreement in a scheme of “world monetary peace which would 
lead to world economic peace.“  That the language of economic internationalism had thus made 
headway in the French Finance Ministry is less surprising in view of the fact that Chatham House 
attendee and Assistant Director of the General Administration of Funds Jacques Rueff had worked 
closely with Auriol in drafting the text of the agreement.746 
 
It was not any immediate impact on international economic diplomacy, however, that was the chief 
legacy of the Chatham House Conference and the CEIP-ICC Joint Committee but its mid-to-longterm 
perspective. The transnational space created by the two organizations had aimed at insulating 
economics from the contemporary pressures of national governments, voting publics and protectionist 
peak business associations. These discussions in 1935–37 coalesced around an alternative liberal 
policy consensus based on the Cobdenite tradition that associated commercial and financial 
                                                 
743 Leon Fraser, “Economic Recovery and Monetary Stabilization,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 17, 
no. 1 (May 1936): 105, emphasis in original; see also Frieden, “Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–
1940,” 86. 
744 Speech delivered by Arthur Balfour at the Derby Chamber of Commerce, 11 December 1935, cf. Arthur Balfour, 
“Great Britain and International Trade,” World Trade 8, no. 1 (January 1936): 8. 
745  Statement of September 25 by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Treaties and Other International 
Agreements of the United States of America, 1776–1949, vol. 3, Multilateral 1931–1945 (Washington: GPO, 1969), 
277. 
746  Telegrams from Hugh Wilson to Cordell Hull, 4 and 8 September 1936, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1936, 
Vol. I: General (Washington: GPO, 1953), 543. 
199 
 
entanglements with peace. The question was now how to implement the results at the national level. 
 
 
 “Putting the goods in the shop window”: How Free Trade became American 
As the year 1936 drew to a close, signs abounded that the acute economic crisis was passing. 
Industrial production in many countries had reached pre-1929 levels and the Tripartite Agreement 
raised hopes that the time of successive rounds of aggressive devaluations was fading. But as 
economic internationalists looked toward the future there was little reason for celebration. “Can We 
Maintain Prosperity?” asked the June 1937 cover of the ICC’s journal World Trade against the 
backdrop of a V-shaped graph illustrating the collapse and recovery of the global economy in recent 
years. Uncertainty was fueled by the instability of an international political situation that showed 
more and more indications of an approaching war. Furthermore, and to the great disappointment of 
internationalist businessmen, there were few signs that the recovery would make divisions between 
the world’s major economic blocs more permeable. Germany still coupled stringent currency controls 
with restrictive trade policies and import substitution while Britain continued to cling to imperial 
preference to protect its industry from the world market. Despite the Tripartite Agreement’s high-
minded language, chances for the return of an international monetary standard and a free movement 
of capital remained remote. Was the world headed for a recovery without restoration of international 
trading relations? A permanent international economic regime based on largely self-contained 
monetary and trading blocs?  
 
To the Carnegie Endowment and the International Chamber of Commerce the response to this 
challenge was the embedding of the liberal economic consensus expressed by the Chatham House 
Conference and affirmed by the Joint Committee in national political cultures. As officers of both 
organizations pondered the next step, the importance of exerting influence on voting publics moved 
to the fore. While enthusiastically endorsing a continuation of the cooperation, Alan Anderson told 
the ICC’s Council that the time for scholarly studies had passed. What was needed now was not 
dispassionate research but public advocacy and salesmanship. It was time “to put the goods in the 
shop window in attractive form“.747 In a similar vein, James T. Shotwell informed Butler that the way 
forward was one of “continued propaganda” for the ideas developed by the CEIP and the ICC.748 
Over the course of the next years the officers of both organizations strove—sometimes jointly, 
sometimes separately—to build political coalitions for internationalist economic policies. Success of 
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this strategy was uneven and closely correlated with the amount of political support received from 
governments. 
 
In the United States, Cordell Hull’s RTAA initiative had set the nation’s commercial policy on an 
internationalist course and throughout the 1930s the administration concluded a number of treaties, 
especially with Latin American and smaller European countries. But domestic support for free trade 
remained lukewarm at best, especially in Congress, and business internationalists such as John W. 
Davis were frustrated by the “rather tepid support” that Cordell Hull was receiving from his 
President.749 In the eyes of men like Davis, the problem was that Americans had yet to overcome the 
“mentality of a debtor nation,” as a number of attendees of the Chatham House Conference had put 
it.750 For the United States to become a steward of the international economic order Americans would 
need to no longer associate international economic ties with the threat of foreign domination and 
instead adopt the perspective of the creditor who was interested in the prosperity of those who owed 
her money. This was all the more urgent as Congress had provided for the RTAA to expire after three 
years, setting up periodic reauthorization votes that pitted the administration and economic 
internationalists against protectionist sentiment in Congress. On the positive side, these debates 
presented the CEIP with an issue around which to organize its activism. “[K]nowing […] that public 
opinion can only deal with one major question at a time,” James T. Shotwell suggested to focus all 
energy on a campaign in support for Hull’s trade policies within weeks of the Chatham House 
Conference.751 
 
The starting point for this push came on the evening of 13 April 1935 when President Butler, having 
just returned from London, received some of his regular circle of New York’s internationalist business 
leaders for an informal dinner at his house to discuss how to most effectively campaign for the 
Chatham House resolutions. Soon it became apparent that in light of the tense international and 
domestic situation Butler’s guests were prepared for a new level of involvement. Instead of issuing 
the usual pro-forma statements of support the group appointed a committee of three, consisting of 
leading internationalist Newton D. Baker, CEIP Trustee Roland S. Morris and Senator James P. Pope 
to draft a plan. The committeemen—all three of whom were Democrats—urged that a conference of 
all “leaders of great bodies of opinion,“ from peace societies to business groups to labor unions, be 
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called to decide on a “course of common action.” The suggestion was taken up by Butler and in a 
striking departure from the CEIP’s long record of eschewing cooperation with anyone it suspected of 
being a “radical” pacifist, a socialist or female, a conference that November at Columbia University 
brought together such disparate organizations as the Council on Foreign Relations, the League of 
Women Voters and the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.752  
 
The roster of organizations invited to Columbia bore a striking resemblance to the membership of the 
National Peace Conference (NPC). This umbrella organization had originally been formed in 1933 
under the theory that internationalist and peace groups should temporarily lay aside their differences 
and form an emergency coalition to weather their own budgetary crises and counter the wave of 
nationalist sentiment. The Carnegie Endowment had been approached but, true to its elitist creed, had 
refused to join and without access to the CEIP’s resources the underfunded NPC had struggled to 
remain afloat. Two years later, the Columbia conference finally ended in a rapprochement between 
the CEIP and the broader peace movement, albeit on quite unequal footing. The chairman of the 
League of Nations Association submissively hailed the Chatham House resolutions as “the Magna 
Charta of our efforts” and the delegates unanimously endorsed them as a basis for unifying the peace 
movement behind a common goal.753 On this basis, the CEIP not only agreed to join the NPC but 
oversaw a sweeping reorganization of the Conference into an operational advocacy group with a 
professional staff, financed almost exclusively with Carnegie funds. The sudden influx of money 
caused frustration among many long-time peace activists at what some regarded as a hostile takeover 
by the conservative Endowment with the goal of remaking the NPC into an effective lobbying arm 
for the Chatham House consensus.754 When talking to journalists off the record, they expressed “a 
certain irritation” at the CEIP’s policies and questioned whether its officers were “really fulfilling the 
demands of its founder.”755 
 
Over the course of the next two years, the NPC played a major role in taking the cause of peace 
through economics out of the corporate boardroom and adapting it to the sensibilities of American 
labor union halls and farm workers’ meetings. In the first place, this meant minimizing any 
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associations that could have marked economic internationalism as a foreign discourse. NPC Director 
Walter W. van Kirk was instructed by Baker to downplay the origin of the organization’s new program 
as “to most Americans Chatham House means little beyond the fact that it is British, and I think the 
American peace movement ought not to claim to be following a British declaration of policy.”756 In 
addition, to broaden the social acceptance of its message and to further Americanize it the NPC called 
an expert Committee on Economics and Peace that mirrored the CEIP-ICC effort on a national level 
but whose members represented a much broader set of approaches—such as those of Keynesian 
economists Alvin H. Hansen and Harry D. Gideonse.757 Their report generally affirmed the CEIP-
ICC credo that "[p]rosperity of nations works toward peace, […] and economic distress helps breed 
war" and even stressed the special responsibility of businessmen in fostering harmonious relations 
between nations. Yet, in a nod to labor and small business interests, it stopped short of endorsing a 
vision of boundless free trade and noted that U.S. policy should navigate between “the extremes of 
complete interdependence and complete self-sufficiency.” It also noted that “capitalism as we have 
known it has helped cause some wars” but assured readers that Fascism and Communism were not 
viable alternatives.758 
 
The strength of the NPC, and the reason for its initial attractiveness to the CEIP, was its widely 
distributed network of grassroots member organizations which allowed it to bring its message directly 
to every part of the country. Starting in the summer of 1937 and led by Clark Eichelberger of the 
League of Nations Association, the NPC launched a “Campaign for World Economic Cooperation.“ 
The highly professional operation started with impersonal approaches such as radio broadcasts and 
publications, leading up to a three day conference in Washington, DC, in March 1938 at which 
volunteers from the NPC’s member organization assembled in the nation’s capital for the two-fold 
purpose of lobbying their Congressmen and for being trained in delivering the message effectively to 
their communities. Taking cues from contemporary advertising techniques, attendees were reminded 
“to put showmanship into this vast job of trying to stimulate men, women and youth.”759  
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Fig. 5a: Handbill used during the National Peace Conference’s CEIP-financed Campaign for World 
Economic Cooperation. (Box 253, Folder 4, CEIP US) 
 
 
The Campaign tailored its message to specific audiences (fig. 5a), producing pamphlets targeted at 
workers (“High tariffs DO NOT mean high wages”), farmers (“Return American products to the trade 
routes of the Seven Seas”), and small businesses (“More goods move across the counter which means 
surer profits”).760 The CEIP continued to finance these efforts until 1939, when the NPC’s pacifist 
stance on the neutrality question became unacceptable to the Endowment. But the CEIP continued its 
grassroots campaign for economic internationalism through its own International Relations Clubs, by 
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organizing speaking tours, sponsoring radio content and by funding outside groups.761 
 
The Roosevelt administration was involved in this campaign from the very beginning, eager to 
capitalize on the opportunity to boost support for the RTAA. Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. 
Sayre took the lead in coordinating with the peace activists. He had been the keynote speaker at the 
initial reorganizing meeting of the NPC in 1935 and subsequently remained in touch with NPC 
Director Van Kirk, particularly ahead of the 1937 RTAA reauthorization vote.762 At times the 
objectives of the NPC’s economic campaign overlapped with the administration’s political needs to 
such an extent that it was difficult to tell the two apart. For instance, the main target audiences of the 
Campaign for World Economic Cooperation – farmers, organized labor and small to mid-sized 
manufacturers – happened to coincide with those constituencies where opposition to Cordell Hull’s 
trade policies ran highest. 763 And it was not only the State Department that participated. A 
representative of the U.S. Office of Education attended the Washington Conference, where he offered 
his bureau’s expertise in tailoring messages to specific audiences to help create radio scripts that met 
“the needs of various elements and mental levels” of American society. 764 
 
The RTAA reauthorization votes of 1937, 1940 and 1945 and their attendant Congressional hearings 
demonstrated the strength of the new economic internationalist coalition and showcased a discourse 
linking free trade not only to peace and prosperity, but holding that the consumption of foreign goods 
was essential to both and hence ultimately patriotic. Secretary of State Cordell Hull even went so far 
as to rather implausibly inform Congress that in his experience with RTAA negotiations foreign 
governments were “riveted on peace and promoting peace, rather than dwelling solely on nickels and 
dimes.“ Such altruistic high-mindedness left Hull’s protectionist critics with few arguments other than 
to protest that fostering peace had not been one of the original justifications for the program.765 The 
RTAA was easily reauthorized in all three years, but the long-term significance of those debates lay 
in revealing how quickly the internationalist discourse had become embedded in American politics. 
In the early 1930s protectionists had found a receptive audience when charging internationalists with 
putting economic interests above country; only a few years later economic nationalists found 
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themselves on the defensive, accused of stymieing prosperity and endangering peace with economic 
particularism. 
 
It was via this indirect route rather than through direct lobbying of decision-makers that the Carnegie 
Endowment and its allies in the International Chamber of Commerce made an impact. Harper Sibley, 
having originally blocked the CEIP-ICC Joint Report, did present the findings of the two 
organizations at the RTAA hearings in 1937 but struggled to make the case that the Committee should 
pay attention. Congress did not appreciate “advice being offered by some Europeans as to how we 
should legislate,” Representative Allen T. Treadway informed Sibley, noting that judging by the 
names of the ICC’s officers they were “practically all foreigners.”766 The Congressman most likely 
did not realize that Sibley and the pacifists campaigning throughout the country at the time were 
essentially reading from the same “foreign” script. There was also an important symbolism in Sibley’s 
testimony that went beyond its immediate content. It was a striking gesture for the sitting president 
of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, an organization that only three years earlier had 
tempered its muted support for the “principle” of the RTAA by stressing the need of continued 
protection of American industry from “destructive competition,“ to personally present the CEIP-ICC 
findings.767 
 
If nothing else, the joint CEIP-ICC efforts to rally American business leaders behind the cause of 
economic peace had helped silence what had once been a powerful voice for economic nationalism 
in the United States. But the foundation’s close cooperation with the Roosevelt administration was 
also ultimately pragmatic. For Hull’s State Department the appeal of the RTAA treaties was that they 
allowed for a gradual restoration of commercial ties without committing the administration to any 
formal multilateral projects such as global monetary policies or an international trade organization. 
For the CEIP and the ICC, however, the campaign for reciprocal trade treaties was merely a first step, 
part of a broader educational program that would prepare the ground for a stable economic regime 
that would secure peace, prosperity and the future of private enterprise. From the beginning, it was 
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Großraumwirtschaft: Between economic peace and economic appeasement 
One of the key movers behind the CEIP-ICC campaign in Europe was a rare example for an almost 
immediate return on a philanthropic investment. Inviting the vice-governor of the Belgian central 
bank Paul Van Zeeland to the Chatham House had originally been intended to boost Gold Bloc 
representation at the conference768 but the economist had hardly returned from London when on 19 
March 1935 the Belgian government fell and Van Zeeland was asked to form a new cabinet.769 A 
delighted Butler sent a congratulatory note praising this “happiest of omens” and expressing the hope 
that the new prime minister would show “how a broken economic world [could] be reconstructed and 
rebuilt on the foundations of confidence and peace.”770 Yet, any initial exhilaration of having a CEIP 
grantee ascend to a position of tangible political power was quickly tempered by political realities. 
Heading an unstably national unity government, beleaguered by the growing strength of Fascist 
parties and an economy in crisis Van Zeeland committed a mortal sin in the eyes of many 
internationalists and devalued the Belgian franc within days of assuming office.771 That the Belgian 
nevertheless became one of the CEIP’s most valued European partners in the second half of the 1930s 
was due to the larger political project he represented. At a time when the governments of Europe’s 
major economic powers offered little support to the cause of free commerce beyond occasional lip 
service it were the smaller industrialized, export-dependent countries such as Belgium that pushed 
energetically for economic internationalism. Just as the RTAA provided the Endowment with an 
opportunity for advocacy in the United States, Van Zeeland’s attempts to free Belgium from the 
economic stranglehold of Europe’s closed-off markets offered the foundation an opportunity for 
alliance-building.772  
 
That Van Zeeland and the CEIP saw eye-to-eye on these issues had already been evident at Chatham 
House, where he had successfully lobbied the Conference for an endorsement of the Ouchy 
Convention—a 1932 commercial agreement between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg that 
had been blocked by Great Britain and the United States. The tendency of governments to resort to 
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purely national solutions in response to the Depression troubled Van Zeeland, who regarded small 
national markets as a relic of the past and insisted that in the future coordination would have to be 
undertaken “on a higher and larger scale.”773 As with many of the CEIP’s European partners, for the 
Premier cooperation with the foundation was also part of a broader transatlantic vision. Partially 
educated at Princeton in the early 1920s, Van Zeeland viewed the Continent’s post-war instability as 
indicative of Europe’s decline and the rise of America’s responsibility to protect Christianity and 
Western Civilization.774  
 
The practical project that united the Belgian politician and the CEIP was a shared aspiration to bring 
the message of economic peace to the Continent and, most pressingly, to use it to soften the defenses 
of the citadel of economic nationalism: Germany. The foundation’s leadership believed that 
advocating for economic liberalism in Europe would be futile as long as the German threat persisted 
and few other statesmen were so identified with efforts to reach a detente with Germany as Van 
Zeeland. In the summer of 1936, the League’s EFO had turned to the Belgian for help in promoting 
its plan for an economic entente between the world’s major powers. The following April, at the behest 
of the French and British governments, the prime minister took on an ambitious assignment of 
“clearing diplomacy” (Dumoulin) in an effort to bring the major European powers and the United 
States to an entente that could stop the slide towards war. Armed with the concept of “economic 
peace” as developed by the CEIP/ICC inquiry and the League of Nations, Van Zeeland toured 
European capitals, including Berlin, and the United States and released a report in January 1938 that 
offered few new proposals but has since become infamous for its sympathetic view of German 
territorial demands.775 
 
A range of explanations have been cited for the unsuccessful attempts at economic appeasement in 
the 1930s, from a politically naïve faith in the rationality of actors to policy constraints to economic 
and financial stakes in the German market.776 Personal financial investments and larger economic 
considerations were certainly never far from the minds of those engaged in outreach to the regime, as 
the cases of Fentener van Vlissingen and Thomas J. Watson indicate. As the Italian foreign ministry 
observed, Van Zeeland’s policies proved especially popular with Wall Street circles eager to “meet 
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German wishes as far as possible” in the hopes of “reintegrating Germany into the sphere of 
international economic cooperation.”777 Even those not personally invested had their eyes firmly on 
the economic consequences of Europe’s largest economies possibly turning towards autarchy. “It is 
possible we are losing forever some of our fundamental markets,“ Shotwell warned the CEIP trustees 
and Belgian member of the Comité d’Adminsitration Alfred Nerincx urged a restoration of foreign 
trade “so that small countries with industries might have the power to live.”778 But in addition to such 
long-term strategic consideration there was also a short-term, pragmatic argument. At a time when 
the German regime appeared inaccessible to other forms of political bargaining, many liberal 
internationalists believed that appeals to economic self-interest presented the most promising form of 
engagement. As both Van Zeeland and the CEIP repeatedly stressed in the second half of the 1930s, 
the German Group of the ICC was one of the few remaining channels through which the Western 
democracies could still possibly exert an influence on German attitudes.779 
 
This claim was not completely unfounded as German businessmen whose interests did not coincide 
with the regime’s promotion of autarchy embraced the chance to cooperate across borders. The 
freedom of action of Germany’s corporate leaders under National Socialism remains the subject of 
debate but most studies agree that the regime’s control applied unevenly across different sectors of 
the economy and only gradually intensified over time.780 Along this spectrum, the German ICC group 
offers an interesting, and thus-far neglected, example of a business coalition that retained a degree of 
not only economic but also political autonomy before the war. Already in 1933, the Reichskanzlei 
planned to bring the group in line with the new regime by “promptly hand[ing] over Germany’s 
representation to a gentleman from the party.”781 This never happened—for reasons that will become 
clearer below—and throughout the 1930s the group under chairman Abraham Frowein gave full 
public support to National Socialist policies while simultaneously working to modify them through 
cooperation with the CEIP and the ICC office in Paris. Far from being a resistance group, however, 
the German ICC section used these links to pursue a National Socialism that was compatible with 
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their international business and banking interests. The goal was not to reconstruct a liberal world 
order but to reconcile the path of the “New Germany” with the “conviction that the expansion of 
world economic relations enriches our own country and that the progressive shrinking of world 
economic relations necessarily entails a further pauperization of the individual peoples.”782 
 
The burden of this intellectual balancing act between National Socialism’s illiberal, militarist 
expansionism and the CEIP-ICC’s vision of a laissez-faire global economy rested mainly on the 
adaptability of the discourse of Großraumwirtschaft—literally the “economy of large spaces”—that 
permeated German economic, spatial and racial planning. Most commonly, the concept referred to 
the economic dimension of the National Socialist vision for Europe—a European economic union 
dominated by Berlin that would be immune to economic blockade. Left deliberately vague as an 
integrating economic discourse, however, Großraumwirtschaft could easily be portrayed as sharing 
some of the same concerns that occupied liberal economists: an equitable distribution of resources, 
the return to commercial exchanges beyond the borders of existing nation states.783 One of the key 
promoters of the latter interpretation was the Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) at the University of 
Kiel, whose director Andreas Predöhl—a member of the CEIP-ICC expert committee and also a 
Rockefeller Foundation grantee—became the intellectual leader of the German ICC section. Joining 
the NSDAP in 1937, he espoused the virtues of autarchy and the dawn of a “new economic order,” 
based on rule by force, but was nevertheless eager to jump start world trade and to keep channels to 
the Western democracies open.784 In May 1936, he hosted Fentener van Vlissingen at the IfW, whose 
presentation focused on the impossibility of achieving autarchy on a national level but also supported 
a “different distribution of colonial territories” and, in a not entirely unselfish gesture given his 
investment in AKU, greeted the synthetic substitution of raw materials as a sensible step towards 
making nations more secure.785  
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The notion that the CEIP-ICC project could be uncoupled from political liberalism to find common 
ground with the German authorities was most infamously on display at the ICC’s Berlin Congress in 
June 1937, where Watson, Fentener van Vlissingen and James T. Shotwell served as props for the 
German regime, with the two ICC officials receiving the Order of the German Eagle out of the hands 
of President of the Reichsbank Hjalmar Schacht and Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels 
in a crowded ballroom amid swastika banners and Nazi salutes. What to most observers constituted 
a tasteless display of obsequiousness, appeared to the three men as a unique opportunity to bring their 
message to the very heart of autarchy and economic nationalism. The regime did indeed show 
surprising flexibility in allowing the ICC to present an alternative model to Schachtian economics. In 
his opening address the outgoing Dutch ICC president was allowed to claim that the international 
division of labor was “more than an ideal” but instead “an undeniable necessity.”786 “Fenter [sic] van 
Vlissingen […] peddles age-old mistakes and global economic nonsense,” Goebbels fumed in his 
diary that evening, and yet he made no attempt to confine these unwelcome messages to the 
conference hall.787 To the contrary, the German press covered the Congress sympathetically and even 
reprinted in full Shotwell’s and Georges Theunis’s attack on economic nationalism on the 
conference’s fourth day, in which the latter used the CEIP/ICC findings to critique the feasibility of 
autarchy. Even the Völkischer Beobachter reported on the Congress without its usual agitation against 
internationalists and pacifists.788 
 
Apparently encouraged by the progress made at Berlin, Shotwell and Watson next travelled to 
Brussels, where Paul Van Zeeland was currently working on his economic diplomacy report. The 
immediate subject of discussion, however, was a public call for the creation of an “organism of 
economic studies” made a few weeks earlier by King Leopold III. A move—almost certainly inspired 
by his prime minister—that immediately caught the attention of the Carnegie Endowment.789 
Underscoring the power of elite consensus formation, Shotwell, Watson and Van Zeeland readily 
agreed that the theoretical framework of rational international economic relations was by now well-
established and that the “great problem was one of education.“ As they looked beyond Van Zeeland’s 
current mission they concurred that what was needed next was not more studies but a revival of the 
original Chatham House idea of a coordinated publicity campaign that would “prepare the public 
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mind for the necessary institutional adjustments,“ as Shotwell later put it.790 Apparently, it was 
tentatively agreed that after the conclusion of his diplomatic mission Van Zeeland would take a 
leading part in a contemplated new organization under the auspices of the CEIP and the ICC. Funds 
were scarce, however, and thus for the next two years Shotwell and Watson ran a persistent campaign, 
loosely coordinated with the U.S. Government, to lobby the Carnegie Corporation for funds for a 
transatlantic publicity campaign that has left a remarkable record of the worldview that animated 
economic liberals in the final years before the war.791 
 
The principles of sensible economic policy were known “since the days of Adam Smith,“ Shotwell 
and Watson maintained in a memorandum submitted in February 1938, but the totalitarian states had 
been more effective in pressing their case through the means of modern propaganda. The situation 
was now akin to the “warfare of ideas” that had marked the era of the Reformation in which it had 
proved impossible for either side to vanquish the other. Straining their historical analogy, the two men 
argued that the outcome of that conflict—the idea of toleration—had reduced the “sphere of action 
of governments” and enlarged the “sphere of liberty,“ thus subtly implying that an accommodation 
with Germany would be good for liberalism as well as for business.792 A few months later, Van 
Zeeland followed up with a concrete outline for the new organization that is striking for the sheer 
scale of activities it envisioned in Europe, which surpassed anything that was being undertaken in the 
United States. The plan called for the creation of a “Center of International Action,“ whose task would 
be to conduct “international propaganda in the highest sense of that word.“ Based at the ICC’s 
headquarters in Paris and presumably headed by Van Zeeland, the Center’s board would be staffed 
mainly by CEIP and ICC representatives, filling remaining vacancies by cooptation to insulate the 
organization from political pressures. The substantial annual budget was set at 135,000 dollars—or 
more than the ICC’s entire annual expenditures—of which two-thirds were to go directly into 
information campaigns through the media. Mirroring the approach taken by the NPC in America, this 
outreach was to target a much larger audience than previously reached. Working mainly through the 
radio and cinema, economic internationalism was to directly approach the European mass 
consumer.793 
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The CEIP’s application placed the Carnegie Corporation in a delicate position. Alienating men as 
powerful as Butler and Watson was not a decision to be taken lightly but on the other hand the 
Corporation could hardly close its eyes to the reality that it was being asked to undertake a vast 
propaganda campaign to serve what were obviously specific political and economic interests. The 
project was essentially a “promotional proposition,“ judged referee Robert T. Crane of the Social 
Science Research Council in evaluating the proposal. The notion that the underlying economic 
principles were settled science and widely accepted was “sheer nonsense,“ an attempt to justify that 
the money was requested “for promotion of a cause and not for research.”794 But even if one took the 
CEIP’s claims at face value, another reader remarked, it was still highly doubtful that the proposed 
campaign could be effective in light of the barriers that totalitarian states had erected “against the 
diffusion of information.”795 It ultimately fell to Frederick T. Keppel to convey the uncomfortable 
truth that the Corporation would not approve the application, an experience which, to the IBM 
director’s great embarrassment, demonstrated that while America’s corporate leaders were a major 
force behind American economic philanthropy, they were not necessarily in charge: “I felt […] as if 
I had been passing a tin cup on the corner, and I am not in that line.”796 
 
The Carnegie Corporation’s words of caution were well-founded as, in fact, the flow of information 
through the CEIP-ICC channel had always been much more one-sided than the Endowment claimed. 
The National Socialist authorities were adept at utilizing transnational links for propaganda purposes 
and a main reason for the continued nominal independence of the German ICC section was that it 
afforded the regime with a means to present its far-reaching territorial demands in terms of sound 
economic policy. An especially active conduit for such propagandistic outreach was Andreas 
Predöhl’s IfW. In the early stages of his work for the CEIP-ICC expert committee, Predöhl had 
attempted to cut the project loose from its liberal moorings. In a personal letter to T.E. Gregory 
Predöhl complained about the “suggestive character of the enquiry” and, calling the Endowment’s 
bluff of seeking an “objective” study, he warned of the “risk of introducing liberal tendencies” into 
the survey. “I […] emphasize this not because I desire to confront your political ideal with a different 
one, but because I believe that political ideals should be entirely foreign to our enquiry.”797 This plea 
did not yield any immediate results, but neither was there a process for ensuring the conformity of 
                                                 
794  Robert T. Crane to Frederick P. Keppel, 16 February 1938, Series III. A, Box 73, Folder 2, Carnegie Corporation 
Records, RBML Columbia. 
795  “Memorandum of Corporation Reader ([Vabian D.] Sewney),” 25 November 1938, Series III. A, Box 73, Folder 2, 
Carnegie Corporation Records, RBML Columbia. 
796  CEIP Board of Trustees meeting of 11 December 1939, p. 44–45, Box 15, Folder 3, CEIP US. 
797  Andreas Predöhl to T.E. Gregory, Box 128, Folder 2, CEIP CE. 
213 
 
individual studies with the two sponsoring organizations’ political preferences. Thus, Predöhl’s 
contribution to the final report was essentially a piece of German propaganda, translated into French 
and English and distributed to opinion-makers around the world at the expense of the Carnegie 
Endowment and the International Chamber of Commerce. That such propaganda did not fall on deaf 
ears is shown by how much credence CEIP trustees gave to German claims that what truly threatened 
world peace was the unfair distribution of raw materials, which, according to Alanson B. Houghton 
made “impossible a peaceful Germany.” His colleague David P. Barrows even went so far as to 
consider a German takeover of much of Europe’s natural resources a fortunate prospect from an 
economic perspective as they would allegedly be “more ably handled than they would be by any other 
nations.”798  
 
That information flowed much less freely in the other direction is illustrated by the fate of another 
contribution to the CEIP-ICC Committee. In his 150-page report economist Bertil Ohlin had 
investigated claims that Germany, Italy and Japan were held back in their natural development by a 
lack of colonies as sources for raw materials and destinations for exports and emigration. His verdict 
was that such claims were unconvincing. Economic advantages of a redistribution of colonies for the 
countries in question would be “minute” and he cast serious doubt on the notion that “over-
population” was a problem and, in any case, the possession of colonies was “not an important, still 
less an indispensable factor” in addressing it.799 Ohlin’s report had attentive readers in the German 
government and in late October 1936, within days of the public release of the Committee’s report, the 
German section of the ICC, informed Fentener van Vlissingen that it had judged Ohlin’s study to 
contain such a “one-sided” and “tactless” treatment of the subject that any further distribution of this 
specific volume of the CEIP/ICC report in Germany was out of the question. Worried about the 
success of the planned Berlin Congress, the ICC President complied promptly. The CEIP’s Centre 
Européen also expressed its deepest regrets at Prof. Ohlin’s inconsiderateness and even assisted in 
the complete suppression of the offending study by passing on a list of all German addresses to which 
the volume had already been shipped.800 
 
Despite ample evidence of the difficulty of cooperating with National Socialist Germany the dream 
of transnational economic cooperation would not die. In 1939, with war more an imminent reality 
than a possibility, the old CEIP-ICC alliance jolted back into action. The ICC Council shed its political 
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hesitancy to set up a “Committee on Economic Peace” while the CEIP Board voted to subsidize the 
undertaking with 50,000 dollars—an amount that in Butler’s words just avoided “smashing” the 
CEIP’s existing programs—with another 100,000 dollars to be requested from the Carnegie 
Corporation.801 As a sign of the urgency felt by international businessmen Thomas Watson, Alan 
Anderson, Arthur Balfour and F.H. Fentener van Vlissingen also pledged to contribute significant 
private funds. The seriousness of the undertaking was also reflected at the Committee’s inaugural 
meeting on 26 January 1940 in Brussels, which included not only Fentener van Vlissingen and 
Malcolm Davis for the sponsoring organizations but with Royall Tyler (LoN) and Per Jacobsson (BIS) 
representatives of much of the remaining infrastructure of international organization.802 The renewed 
exercise in transnationalism was nevertheless short-lived as wartime conditions soon rendered 
cooperation impossible, even on an informal level. The Committee’s second and final meeting at The 
Hague on 29 March 1940— less than two weeks before the German invasion of the Netherlands—
took place under a cloud of secrecy. Questioned by local journalists at his hotel, Paul van Zeeland did 
not give up any information on the Committee’s plans.803 The situation was even more difficult for 
the French and British members. After consultation with its government, the French ICC section 
announced that it had decided not to send any delegates to a meeting that would be attended by 
citizens of an enemy nation, and in Britain the issue even reached the floor of the House of Commons 
with a parliamentary question on whether any British subjects had gone to The Hague. 804 
 
A far cry from the CEIP’s ambitious vision of a transnational propaganda agency, the short-lived 
Committee for Economic Peace clearly saw its task as continuing to light a way towards a synthesis 
between economic liberalism, social economic planning and Großraumwirtschaft. At their first 
meeting the group tasked Bertil Ohlin, Andreas Predöhl and John H. Williams with jointly drafting a 
report on an “economic framework for a durable peace,“ thus leaving it to a Swedish, a German and 
an American economist to reconcile these different approaches.805 While no record appears to have 
survived of the second meeting, a presentation Paul Van Zeeland gave in front American post-war 
planners around the same time offers some indications on the thinking among this circle of experts. 
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Van Zeeland envisioned a post-war “economic union” between the British Commonwealth, France 
and its colonial empire and most Western European nations, including Scandinavia, a divided and 
thus weakened Germany and possibly Poland. While goods and capital would circulate freely within 
this union there would be no return to the gold standard and no “importation of capital from the United 
States,” an arrangement that, Van Zeeland freely admitted, was “based in part upon certain phases of 
Germany’s experience under the Nazi regime.”806 Much was vague in Van Zeeland’s proposal, 
including the relationship between the “economic union” and the outside world but the plan 
demonstrated how by the start of the war the search for common ground had resulted in an 
amalgamation of economic concepts. Classical liberal ideas of a free movement of goods and capital 
were blended with the idea of a closed, possibly autarchic, Europe that deliberately evoked notions 




The final meeting of the Committee for Economic Peace in 1940 marked the end, for the time being, 
of a five-year CEIP campaign to counter what Harold James has called the “End of Globalization.“ 
In bringing its message of “economic peace” to the European Continent, the foundation participated 
in activities that placed it firmly on the side of those advocating for economic appeasement, however, 
this highlights the still slippery definition of that term. Thomas J. Watson’s involvement with the 
National Socialist regime is often interpreted as a metaphorical fall from liberalism: due to naivite 
paired with conceitedness or, worse, in the amoral pursuit of profits on the German market the IBM 
director strayed across the line separating the democratic from the authoritarian camp and found 
himself on the wrong side of the ideological struggle of the twentieth century.807 Yet, such an 
interpretation does not sufficiently take into account the larger discursive context that framed 
Watson’s actions, which hardly lends itself to a dichotomy of “liberalism vs. totalitarianism.” The 
concept of “economic peace” as developed by the CEIP and the ICC only becomes legible when read 
against the backdrop of a mental map of a world temporarily, possibly permanently, divided into 
national and regional blocs with a variety of political systems: democracy, republicanism, imperial 
monarchy, Fascism, National Socialism, Communism. The CEIP-ICC project of an “economic peace” 
that encompassed both America’s RTAA policy and German Großraumwirtschaft sought to take 
account of this diversity by separating economic liberalism, which was to be promoted, from liberal 
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political values, which were optional. In practice, the resulting “liberalism” would have provided for 
a global regime marked by a relatively free movement of goods and capital, but not of people or ideas. 
 
The case of the CEIP-ICC Joint Committee exemplifies how complex combinations of interests can 
shape the transnational production of knowledge, yielding no readymade answer to the question of 
whether transnational networks bolster or undermine state power. Shaping the expert discourse on 
international economics through transnational networks was an attractive option for private sector 
interests such as the managers of IBM and AKU trying to scale back government intervention in the 
economy. It afforded agency to smaller states with little clout in international negotiations such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands. It was, however, also open to authoritarian regimes such as those of 
Italy and particularly Germany, which utilized those same channels to disseminate propaganda. 
Indeed, one area that would warrant further research is to what extent transnational economic 
governance structures that developed during the Great Depression were later absorbed and redirected 
by Germany to help govern the Großwirtschaftsraum Europa. 
 
The later careers of some of the members of the Committee for Economic Peace give some indications 
in this direction: among those attending the final meeting in 1940 was CEIP-ICC veteran Andreas 
Predöhl as well as the President of the Reichswirtschaftskammer Karl Lindemann, who would over 
the course of the following years take a leading role in the expropriation of Dutch industry under 
German occupation.808 The Bank of International Settlements at Basle, the rare international 
organization that still cooperated on friendly terms with the German regime, sent its economic advisor 
Per Jacobsson.809 Fentener van Vlissingen, who also attended, would soon complete the transition 
from international cooperation to collaboration. As head of the Nationaal Comité voor Economische 
Samenwerking during the German occupation of the Netherlands, Fentener van Vlissingen served as 
an intermediary between the German authorities and Dutch industry, helping to bring the demands of 
the Reich’s war economy into alignment with those of private businesses. He did not lose his faith 
that the international distribution of labor was the most efficient international economic regime but 
publicly made it clear that it was only a vision for a distant future. The immediate role for the 
Netherlands would be as part of an economic bloc under German leadership, which could, for 
instance, consist of a customs union with the occupier.810 His company AKU, meanwhile, continued 
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to expand vigorously as demand for artificial fibers soared during the war.811 
 
Less fraught with moral ambiguities, the CEIP’s campaign for economic peace in the United States 
nevertheless shows the complex relationship between the private sector and the “national interest.“ 
The foundation worked closely with the American government to support the Roosevelt 
Administration’s commercial policy both at home and abroad. The CEIP-ICC cooperation could 
consequently be viewed as pre-figuring America’s post-war projection of economic power by 
working to reconfigure the European economy in accordance with American policies, practices and 
values.812 The perspective from Chatham House complicates this picture by showing that “American” 
interests and values were constructed entities. In a country with diverse political traditions, including 
a long-standing discourse that associated international capital flows with foreign—especially 
British—domination, making economic internationalism “American” was a political project, pursued 
through and in interaction with transnational networks.  
 
In fact, one of the private sector organizations most closely associated with creating political support 
for the post-1945 establishment of American economic and political hegemony in Western Europe 
was a direct descendant of the CEIP-ICC cooperation (fig. 6b). In the second half of the 1940s the 
Committee on International Economic Policy provided key business sector backing for 
internationalist policies such as a closer integration with European markets through the Marshall 
Plan.813  
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Fig. 5b: The CEIP-ICC campaign for international economic cooperation—institutional and personal 
continuities, 1935–1948.  
 
 
Few readers who saw the newspaper article announcing the Committee’s formation in July 1944—
on Independence Day, no less—will have suspected anything but a spontaneous initiative on the part 
of patriotic business leaders eager to support the administration’s post-war policies.814 In reality, the 
new organization was a rebranding of the CEIP-ICC partnership, an Americanized version of the 
Committee on Economic Peace featuring some of the same actors. James T. Shotwell and Thomas J. 
                                                 
814  Cf. “New Group Offers World Trade Plan,” New York Times, 5 July 1944. 
219 
 
Watson still occupied leading positions, key funding continued to be provided by the Carnegie 
Endowment and, fittingly, the Committee’s first publication, Merchants of Peace, was a chronicle of 
the ICC’s interwar international initiatives that was described by a contemporary reviewer as “a 
panegyric, not a history.”815 Not all was the same, however, as the new organization expanded its 
membership to represent a wide range of the American business community, a move that had been 
closely coordinated with the State Department, which appreciated the new “emphasis on the interests 
of American business.”816  
 
If the Committee on International Economic Policy’s campaign for the Marshall Plan demonstrated 
the turn of the American business community toward economic internationalism its European pendant 
was widespread business support for a project of European integration that was supportive of 
employers’ interests. Paul Van Zeeland continued to play a leading role in this movement toward an 
Europe du patronat. In 1948, he cooperated with Józef Retinger to found the Ligue Européenne de 
coopération économique, a pressure group with sections in most Western European countries and 
closely tied to business interests. Concerned that rising pro-European sentiment could go hand-in-
hand with anti-Americanism, Van Zeeland and Retinger were also the initiators of the Bilderberg 
meetings, which brought together business leaders and politicians from both sides of the Atlantic for 
off-the-record discussions that would help foster trust and understanding.817 In contrast to the interwar 
years, transatlanticism and European integration now enjoyed widespread support among peak 
industrial organizations. In a show of business solidarity, a “Europe Day” hosted by the 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie in Trier in 1952 featured Georges Villiers, President of the 
Conseil national du patronat français, as a speaker, thus symbolizing an alliance of the successors to 
the RDI and the CGPF for economic internationalism.818 
 
By the late 1940s the language of “economic peace” had, however, been largely consigned to 
historical retrospectives. Its simultaneous associations with the appeasement policies of the 1930s 
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and with a pacifist cause now more and more identified with Communist rhetoric made it a poor 
vehicle of self-identification for Western businessmen. Business advocates continued to make a 
normative case for free market economics but in light of the new political environment the cause of 
“freedom” figured far more prominently than “peace.”819 It thus fell to James T. Shotwell, now 
President of the CEIP, to remind readers of a new edition of Merchants of Peace, published in 1959, 
of the contributions of interwar economic internationalists to international order: based on the 
mundane everyday experience of global economic transactions they had formed “the foundations of 
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When war swept over the European Continent again in 1939 it destroyed or disrupted much of the 
internationalist infrastructure that had been built up in the previous decades, yet the concepts and 
ideas did not vanish. While the political contours of the postwar order were negotiated at a series of 
inter-Allied conferences a normative reconceptualization of nations as parts of larger, interdependent 
structures was taking place that would have a profound impact on the institutionalization of the global 
order. In January 1943, readers of the American Mercury were given a familiar message by Carlo 
Sforza, the long-time Italian partner of the Carnegie Endowment, now in exile in the United States. 
The notion of complete national sovereignty was over, he argued, to be replaced by a “superior 
international law.” “No American should forget that in the coming world even the Ocean will be no 
more than a big river,” the Count declared. “The era of isolation is gone forever.” If the content was 
familiar, the medium was less typical. Sforza’s statement was part of an advertisement campaign for 
Pan American Airways and below Sforza’s reproduced signature the airline, which had been the first 
to introduce regular transatlantic flights in 1939, announced optimistically: “Pan American looks 
forward to playing its part in the world of the future, through […] providing widespread distribution 
of the world’s culture, science and goods.”821 Anticipating the coming end of the war, America’s 
major corporations were prepared to go global and were helping create a political culture that would 
sustain the desired expansion of markets. On the other hand, European exile politicians were seeking 
partners in establishing their own claims to power—the ad identified Sforza as the “Leader of Free 
Italy”—as well as in securing their countries’ place in a future world order.  
 
The start of the war threw the CEIP into turmoil. Soon after the German attack on Poland the Centre 
Européen was moved to humble emergency quarters at the seaside town of La Baule in Southern 
Brittany. Much of the staff returned to Paris during the Phoney War of the following months but with 
the invasion of France in May 1940 Malcolm Davis left his post to join the International Red Cross 
and most operations were halted. The ties were definitely severed when the United States entered the 
war as continued communications with or transfers of funds to an institution in Occupied Europe 
could have constituted a violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act.822 At the same time, nerves 
were frayed in New York, where for the first first time in its history a dissident faction on the Board 
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of Trustees led by William M. Bullitt openly sought to oust President Butler, charging that the 
Endowment had “spent a great deal of money” and had “little to show for it.”823 The Endowment’s 
officers reacted with a concerted lobbying campaign that brought the majority of trustees into the 
President’s corner and swiftly contained the revolt. In addition to personal loyalty, it was the evidently 
political motivation of the charges, a populist attack against the Republican East Coast foreign policy 
establishment, which enraged the CEIP’s staff. James T. Shotwell polemically denounced the 
insurgents as an alliance between “bolshevist” and “conservative and reactionary” elements, the 
“same combination as in Germany.”824 Even worse, Bullitt and his allies had advocated for a kind of 
patriotic self-censorship in which the CEIP would suspend all operations for the duration of the war 
and invest its entire annual income in government-issued war bonds.825  
 
Such a vision of the proper role of an NGO in wartime could hardly have been further removed from 
the conception of the CEIP’s directors, for whom the ongoing tectonic shifts in the international 
system provided an incentive for the foundation to “utilize all its tools and procedures—basic 
planning, research, publication, education of all types” to influence the contours of the post-war 
settlement.826 Around the world, the violent upheaval of the Second World War raised expectations 
of deep structural changes, yet the shape of the future world order appeared hazy at best. To many 
Europeans the role of the stock market crash in destabilizing the fragile peace appeared to demonstrate 
the inadequacy of the existing global economic order to the challenges of modern life. Centralized 
national planning seemed to be the way of the future. In Britain, the Labour Party affirmed the need 
for an effective system of collective security but made it clear that the maintenance of international 
peace was “inseparable from […] the common ownership of the main instruments of production.”827 
At the treasury, John Maynard Keynes publicly denounced National Socialist designs for Europe but 
privately commended the Schachtian model of exchange controls and restricted trade, suggesting a 
similar system for Britain.828 Exile governments largely shared the British faith in the promise of 
planning as the road to national prosperity and thinking on a future international regime tended to 
stress the importance of international planning agencies as coordinating bodies that would prevent 
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interests from clashing. In July 1943, less than three years before becoming the first Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Norway’s foreign minister Trygve Lie saw the “national planned 
economy under the direction of the State” as the enduring legacy of the war, which would then need 
to be complemented by “international planning” in other fields.829 By the end of 1942 promoting 
social welfare by fortifying the nation state through managed currencies and centralized economic 
planning appeared as a credible basis for a future postwar international regime.  
 
The historiography of the emergence of eventual post-war institutional arrangements—the creation 
of the United Nations, American-led globalization, Western European integration under an American 
security umbrella—has traditionally explained them as results of national political deliberations. In 
the United States, historians have highlighted the central role of the State Department’s Advisory 
Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy in conjunction with private policy groups such as the Council 
on Foreign Relation’s War and Peace Studies.830 Similar constellations existed in Britain, where 
interdepartmental planning boards communicated with private groups such as the Political and 
Economic Planning group and Chatham House.831 Some exile governments had their own planning 
staffs, such as the Belgian Commission pour l’Etude des Problèmes d’Après-Guerre.832 National 
positions formulated in these venues were then brought into alignment at a series of inter-Allied 
conferences, thus laying the groundwork for the future international order. Reconstructing decision-
making processes between or within largely self-contained national units has tended to emphasize the 
national over the international and change over continuity, often resulting in narratives that 
disassociate post-war institutions from their interwar predecessors, thus constructing the year 1945 
as a “clean break” that allowed people and nations to start anew.833 
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This literature—what Cecilia Lynch has called “creationist” accounts of the post-1945 order834—is 
increasingly challenged by contributions that contextualize new arrangements within long-term 
developments and stress the resiliency of international institutions, both in social practices and as 
manifested in organizations. Many aspects of the new international system looked surprisingly like 
the old as institutions either persevered—the ILO, the BIS—or continued to function under a new 
name—the PCIJ, many of the League’s technical sections.835 Methodologically, this change in 
perspective has shifted attention from the reconstruction of bureaucratic decision-making processes, 
the traditional terrain of diplomatic history, to the role of ideals and ideas in shaping state action and 
international institutions. Whether the United Nations, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Non-Alligned 
Movement or Western European economic integration—the multilateralization of the international 
system in the second half of the twentieth century was predicated on a normative commitment to 
supranational formations beyond the nation state.836 Even to the extent that states sought out 
supranational cooperation to preserve rather than relinquish power837 such actions were only possible 
within the framework of revised notions of national sovereignty and the relation of the state to the 
international community. Investigating the processes of construction that shaped these allegiances 
draws attention to a new set of actors and underlying political interests.838 
 
In the years prior to Bretton Woods and the United Nations Conference at San Francisco the Carnegie 
Endowment consciously set out to shape the framework within which political decisions would be 
made. Its most active directors during this time, Philip Jessup and James Shotwell, agreed: “It is the 
ideas and not the actions which in the long run move the course of history.”839 Viewing the wartime 
and post-war debates on the future global order through the perspective of an organization dedicated 
to the transnational dissemination of knowledge is apt to destabilize the national framework in at least 
three ways:  
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Firstly, many of the experts who staffed the various national planning bodies were part of the same 
transnational knowledge networks that had developed during the interwar years. Participants of the 
Carnegie Endowment’s interwar projects were now widely dispersed throughout official or unofficial 
planning bodies—CEPAG, Chatham House, the State Department, the CFR. For instance, of the 
economists who had participated in the CEIP-ICC expert committee Leo Pasvolsky was now the 
central figure of American post-war planning as director of research in the State Department’s 
Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy,840 Lionel Robbins headed the Economic Section 
of Britain’s War Cabinet Offices,841 Bertil Ohlin and Dag Hammarskjold were ministers in Sweden’s 
war cabinet and Theodore Gregory was the economic adviser to the Indian government. Finally, Paul 
Van Zeeland headed the Belgian CEPAG.842 This is not to suggest that everyone advocated for the 
same policies but it does point toward the shared discursive frameworks in which post-war planning 
on the expert level took place on all sides. Additionally, personal acquaintances facilitated the work 
of postwar planners as governments were keenly interested in learning the position that other states 
were taking on the same issues.843 
 
Secondly, despite the apparent diversity of private American post-war planning there was a significant 
amount of continuity with earlier internationalist activism as most of the major initiatives—the CFR’s 
War and Peace Studies, the IIS, the Foreign Policy Association—traced their funding at least partially 
to America’s major grant-giving foundations and often served to transmit established internationalist 
discourses into government channels.844 An example of this mechanism was the Commission to Study 
the Organization of Peace (CSOP), a highly visible group that reliably represented Eastern 
Establishment consensus positions in public debates throughout the war. The Commission also 
enjoyed access to and support from the top levels of the U.S. government with members meeting 
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regularly with President Roosevelt.845 Arguably, its more important impact on American policy, 
however, did not come from the over one hundred eminent citizens who signed CSOP’s public 
statements but from a small, executive offshoot, the so-called “Design Group.” This fifteen-member 
team headed by Harvard professor and PCIJ judge Manley O. Hudson was formed in late 1943 with 
CEIP-funding to facilitate conversations between government officials and leading American experts 
on the transnational collective security debates of the past two decades.846 The internationalist 
networks of America’s major foundations were repositories of expertise on global governance that 
was now brought to bear on the policy process. 
 
Thirdly and finally, American foundations became key institutional links connecting émigré 
experts—often former grantees—and U.S. planning groups. The impact of exiled European scholars 
on American academia in the 1930s and 1940s, particularly in the social sciences, has long been 
recognized.847 When it comes to formulating America’s future policy vis-à-vis their home Continent, 
however, their influence is usually considered small as their wartime service tended to be restricted 
to branches of the U.S. government that were remote from the levers of power, such as the Research 
and Analysis branch of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).848 Nationality did indeed play a key 
role in determining access to the policy process and the citadel of American planning, Leo 
Pasvolsky’s Advisory Committee, remained largely closed to émigrés.849 Yet, exile scholars were not 
only experienced but inexpensive and American philanthropies and private research institutions 
sought to make this untapped reservoir of expertise available to the American planning process by 
organizing conferences and research projects. Facilitated through personal connections, wartime 
cooperation between government and philanthropy became very close and proceeded according to an 
almost standardized process: 1. government planners encountered an issue that warranted further 
research or where competing factions favored different approaches 2. The CEIP or the Rockefeller 
Foundation learned of the debate and initiated a research group, usually staffed with émigré scholars 
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3. The results were transmitted to the government through publications and, more effectively, through 
interactive public-private partnerships such as the Design Group, often raising further questions and 
leading to new research activity.850 
 
The central message of those who had participated in the CEIP’s internationalist debates of the past 
decades was that recovering stability for a war-torn world required nothing less than reforming the 
very foundations of the modern international system—the supremacy of the nation state. In his 
programmatic statement “The World We Want,” published in1941, CEIP officer Malcolm Davis 
called for the “modification and pooling of sovereignty among States.”851 To Paul Van Zeeland, 
national sovereignty as it had developed over the course of the last hundred years was “false and 
artificial because it was wholly exaggerated.”852 Thomas Mann, writing for the newspaper of a 
prisoner-of-war internment camp in the United States wondered how citizens could reconcile their 
obedience to “world civilization” (Welt-Zivilisation) with individual liberty and national culture.853 
On the other hand, Mann also saw the danger of a “leveling of the world through the dictatorship of 
a uniform rational moralism.”854 While they recognized the need to reconfigure the nation state, the 
conservative and liberal internationalists associated with the CEIP were loath to topple it, lest such a 
move open the door to a technocratic or socialist world commonwealth. A possible intermediary level 
between the national and the global toward which peoples’ allegiances could be directed were regional 
groupings, for instance a European confederation. 
 
This concluding chapter analyzes the often subtle and circuitous long-term effects of transnational 
networking through the lens of the CEIP’s contribution to the expert discourse on international 
organization, particularly European integration, both through its own advocacy and research activity 
and by association with the future Italian foreign minister Carlo Sforza.855 While many accounts of 
the process that led to an integration of European markets and the development of regional political 
institutions take the years after 1945 as their starting point856 the interwar period has increasingly 
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emerged as a key site for this process, particularly on the level of ideas and identity.857 Like Jean 
Monnet, Carlo Sforza’s career spanned the war years, yet, seventy-five years of age by the time he 
returned to the Italian foreign ministry in 1947 and charged with guiding the diplomatic activities of 
a defeated country, historiography has often regarded him as only a secondary figure in the political 
history of post-war Europe. An “unreformed Mazzinian federalist,” “baffled” by the challenges of his 
time, Sforza’s tenure appeared to point back to the nineteenth century rather than toward the future.858 
His most significant original contribution to the process of European economic integration—a 
Franco-Italian customs union—failed to materialize and is thus not viewed as integral to the 
development of the European Common Market.859  
 
While Sforza and many of the older internationalists certainly were inspired by notions of Europe’s 
place in the world that differed from those of a new generation of leaders for whom the pre-1914 
international system was at best a distant memory, tracing these ideas highlights the complex origins 
of international institutions as different strands of thought competed or were amalgamated. For this, 
the CEIP’s wartime activities are a case in point. While the Italian worked on the foundation’s 
advocacy campaign, its research divisions created some of the foundational studies of post-1945 
international relations, including a project by Jacob Viner, the renowned economist who had 
participated in the CEIP-ICC expert group, Percy E. Corbett, professor of international law at McGill 
University in Montreal, and Austrian émigré scholar Leopold Kohr. The result of their work would 
soon be cited by virtually every economic study on the process of European integration. It is unlikely 
that Sforza, Viner, Corbett and Kohr ever met in person. Yet, taken together their separate efforts 
show how multiple perspectives and interests inform the production and dissemination of knowledge 
through transnational networks.  
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“A community of views”: The CEIP’s customs union project 
As it had done in 1917, the CEIP offered its unreserved assistance to the U.S. government within days 
of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The war produced unprecedented requirements for expertise, resulting 
in an expansion of the administrative state that brought many foundation officers into government 
posts and most CEIP officers started donning several official and unofficial hats.860 Malcolm Davis 
was recruited by the OSS in June 1942 and over the course of the war advanced from an unpaid, part-
time consultant to chief of the covert operations arm of the Foreign Nationalities Branch (FNB) in 
New York while maintaining his connection to the Carnegie Endowment as cover.861 James T. 
Shotwell became a member of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign 
Policy and of the General Advisory Committee on Cultural Relations tasked with advising the 
government in setting up its cultural diplomacy program.862 Philip Jessup’s familiarity with 
international administrative procedures led him to join the Department’s Office for Foreign Relief 
and Rehabilitation in 1943, which soon became the core of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration.863  
 
The CEIP also underwent institutional changes under wartime conditions. With much of the world 
inaccessible to its programs, resources flooded back into the United States and funded an expansion 
of the foundation’s domestic educational campaigns as well as a new focus on research both in support 
of the government’s war effort and with a view toward influencing the post-war order. An internal 
CEIP report from June 1943 listed forty government agencies and committees that had submitted 
requests for information or research within the past year, many of which came in the form of “informal 
inquiries made either by personal visits or by telephone.”864 With most of the foundation’s junior staff 
called away for wartime service the CEIP’s Washington office became a veritable international 
intellectual hub where a growing ensemble of émigré scholars was employed on short- to mid-term 
research projects.  
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The Endowment’s aid programs for European refugees were administered unevenly and attracted 
much criticism at the time. Unlike the Rockefeller Foundation, the CEIP never instituted a 
comprehensive program to identify and support highly talented scholars in order to save Europe’s 
intelligentsia.865 Aid was granted on an individual basis under circumstances that clearly favored 
those with established ties to the foundation or who were otherwise well-connected. In addition to 
Sforza, those who benefited from these arrangements included his former Comité colleague Rafael 
Altamira y Crevea, Ernst Jäckh of the DHP and men and women whose social status was high but 
academic credentials tenuous at best, such as German Center Party politician Prince Hubertus zu 
Löwenstein and Millicent Leveson-Gower, the Duchess of Sutherland. Most applicants for help, 
however, were told to submit their requests to the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign 
Scholars, an agency of American academic institutions that co-sponsored temporary positions at 
universities.866 
 
Larger political considerations sometimes played a key role in these decisions, as is evidenced by the 
CEIP’s reluctant aid to one of its closest partners. When Hajo Holborn lost his position as Carnegie 
Professor in Berlin in 1934 the CEIP initially refused to become involved at a time when it was still 
holding out hope that relations with the new German regime could eventually be repaired. The 
foundation even lent credence to the crude justification provided by the National Socialists that 
Holborn was fired for disseminating “Marxist” beliefs. Only after remonstrations from other 
European correspondents and after stern reminders from the Emergency Committee as to its moral 
obligations to Holborn did the foundation agree to a one-time stipend of one thousand dollars for its 
former employee.867 As in Holborn’s case, who was eventually able to relocate to Yale University, 
many former grantees found the doors at Morningside Heights shut but still managed to translate the 
social and cultural capital they had gained through association with the CEIP into opportunities in the 
United States.868 
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The most active research arm of the foundation during the war was the Division of International Law, 
headed since 1940 by Philip Jessup. Under his guidance, the Division set up two large umbrella 
projects aimed at making interwar discourses on international law and international organization 
accessible for an eventual post-war settlement. The first was an undertaking dubbed “International 
Law of the Future” and chaired by PCIJ judge Manley O. Hudson, which at its core was a series of 
conferences between mainly American and Canadian jurists designed to foster a “community of 
views” on the outlines of a future world order.869 The second major project documented and analyzed 
the mechanics of the League of Nations, a task that was largely undertaken by exiled veterans of the 
League Secretariat. At the same that the Rockefeller Foundation funded the installation of the 
Economic and Financial Section at Princeton’s Institute of Advanced Studies870 the CEIP was taking 
in experts from many of the Secretariat’s other sections who had made their way to America. At times 
the foundation’s office at Jackson Place must have resembled a Little Geneva with researchers 
including Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer (formerly Information Section), Pablo de Azcárate y Flórez 
(Minorities Section), Leon Steinig (Social Questions), Vladimir Pastuhov (Mandates Section) and 
Bertil Renborg (Opium Trafficking Section).871 The main motivation behind all these activities was 
that, as Manley Hudson put it, there would eventually be a new Versailles when power would be 
“concentrated in the hands of a few men” who would lay the foundations of the future world order 
and experts in international organization needed to be ready to make an impact. “I would esteem it 
an everlasting disgrace if the historian should have to [say] that we made no effort to contribute what 
we could.”872  
 
One CEIP research project with an unexpectedly long afterlife was a study into the efficacy of customs 
unions as tools for regional economic integration. The question of how Europe could be organized 
into larger units after a presumptive German defeat was widely debated, especially during the early 
years of the war. Acting on a suggestion by Jean Monnet, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
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had proposed what amounted to a full Franco-British Union in June 1940.873 Ideas for regional 
federations were also developed by the exile governments of Eastern and Southeastern European 
countries, particularly Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia. Belgian post-war planners 
such as Paul Van Zeeland also revisited the Ouchy Convention’s abortive attempt to construct an 
economic Benelux union.874 The ease with which Germany—and to some extent the Soviet Union—
had been able to capitalize on the Continent’s fragmentation in pursuit of its expansionist aims 
encouraged both exile politicians and the leaders of the major Allied countries to think seriously about 
stabilizing Europe through larger political and economic constellations. 
 
The State Department started to formulate its approach to such initiatives in late spring 1942. Initial 
discussions of Pasvolsky’s Advisory Committee centered on an Eastern European union and members 
initially looked to America’s domestic institutions for ideas on how to organize such a construct. 
Economic arrangements of the prospective union were to be based “on the experience of the United 
States with a large internal market” and an electric power corporation along the lines of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority was to stimulate infrastructure development. But when toward the end of 1942 
discussions moved to the possibility of Western European integration doubts began to surface that the 
United States would be able to supervise such ambitious social engineering without significant 
investment of treasure and manpower and without incurring the animosity of many Europeans. As 
one critic noted, there were real risks associated with “carelessly assum[ing] that our social 
organization would be sufficient and properly adapted in conditions like those of Western Europe.”875 
Furthermore, the Advisory Committee’s deliberations became part of a larger debate between 
proponents of regionalism around Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and advocates of 
universalism such as Cordell Hull and Leo Pasvolsky.876 European economic integration, universalist 
critics argued, would merely transpose conflicts onto a higher plane as an antagonistic Europe would 
seek to assert its interests against America. “Regionalism means bigger and better wars, and forever,” 
departmental adviser Eugene V. Rostow warned ominously.877 As 1942 drew to a close the debate on 
Europe’s future political, monetary and commercial arrangements was wide open. 
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The impetus for the CEIP’s involvement with this question came around the same time. In December 
1942, the Endowment’s point man for its League of Nations initiatives, Percy Corbett, moved to the 
Yale Institute for International Studies (IIS) for a Rockefeller-funded, interdisciplinary research 
project with economist Jacob Viner, on leave from the University of Chicago. The duo was 
immediately impressed by the academic talent assembled at Yale, which created a fertile intellectual 
atmosphere with “close contact and pooling of ideas.”878 The IIS group, referred to by outsiders as 
the “State Department” for its geostrategic flair and close contacts to Washington included Arnold 
Wolfers, formerly of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, Nicholas John Spykman and Frederick S. 
Dunn.879 Before moving to Yale, however, Corbett had reached an understanding that cooperation 
with the CEIP’s Division of International Law would continue in order to bring “economics, 
international law and political science jointly to bear on the post-war problems which are selected for 
attack.”880 Within weeks of starting their project, Corbett and Viner identified European commercial 
integration as an area warranting further research and started sending out feelers to gauge the 
Endowment’s interest in cooperating in a study on the history of customs unions. On 24 February the 
two men submitted their official proposal, noting that “present interest in the idea of customs unions 
and the possibility that they will be an important feature of post-war arrangements” made the 
investigation of the historical experience with such institutions “a timely one.”881  
 
The customs union project was an unlikely alliance that sought to provide facts in order to mediate 
between different ideological, disciplinary and national points of views on European integration. 
Joseph Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation liked to refer to Viner and Corbett as “Corvinbetter” to 
“recognize the fact that intellectually two minds have become one” but at least when it came to the 
question of regionalism the perspectives of all participants were far apart.882 Percy Corbett’s views 
had been shaped by his participation in a study group initiated by the Institute of Pacific Relations 
(IPR) in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 that sought to ascertain causes of the conflict and 
future prospects for international organization.883 When Corbett released his findings in 1942 they 
amounted to a strong endorsement of regional groupings as laboratories for reconfiguring the 
relationship between the citizen and the nation state. Nationalism was not a natural state of human 
existence, he wrote, but an “artificial product of propaganda.” The challenge was to induce “the 
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obedience of the official and private individual” to be “transferred from the national government to 
the supranational authority.”884 A unified world federation was a utopian project for the time being 
and internationalists needed to set their sights on lower, more achievable projects. Uniting Europe in 
one federalist project would be ambitious enough and sub-federations in Scandinavia or the Danubian 
Basin would probably be a more practicable starting point but, along with a Pan-American Union, 
these projects offered the best prospect for beginning the process of a “shifting of loyalties” from the 
national to the supranational level.885 
 
As an economist and free trader, Jacob Viner had a far less positive take on European commercial 
integration. In September 1942, he and Alvin Hansen had co-written a paper on the “American 
Interests in the Economic Unification of Europe with Respect to Trade Barriers” as part of the CFR’s 
War and Peace Studies that warned of the effects of the “creation of an autarkic continental economy.” 
America was interested in a free circulation of goods on a global scale and thus should “aim at the 
interpenetration of Europe’s economy with that of the rest of the world,” not at arrangements that 
could lead to the closing-off of the European market.886 Viner’s apprehensiveness tracked closely 
with attitudes of America’s internationalist business community. While international, particularly 
European, stability was certainly good business even progressive managers in the United States 
represented in such lobbying groups as the Committee on International Economic Policy under CEIP-
ICC auspices focused most of their attention on claiming new markets for American exports and 
investments while avoiding a continuation of wartime state controls over the economy. Robust new 
global or regional institutions were viewed skeptically as either starting points for new protectionism, 
supranational statism or insubstantial mirages—Thomas J. Watson stunned his fellow CEIP trustees 
by declaring that there was “no such thing as international law.”887  
 
The Carnegie Endowment, represented by its officer George Finch, approached the customs union 
issue from the perspective of its long-standing support for both Pan-American and Pan-European 
movements. Indeed, the CEIP was the American organization with perhaps the best institutional 
memory of the interwar period’s various initiatives for greater political and economic integration of 
the European continent. It had, after all, been Nicholas Murray Butler who had written the foreword 
for the American edition of Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe. Throughout the 1920s 
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and 1930s the Centre Européen kept in close touch with organizations such as the Union douanière 
européenne and the foundation had at various points attempted to broker a Danubian and later a 
Balkan federation. When in September 1929 Aristide Briand launched his call for a European Union 
it came as a disappointment to the CEIP only in so far as Earle Babcock had lobbied for weeks for 
the French Prime Minister to deliver his speech at the Centre Européen, thus forever associating the 
Carnegie Endowment with the cause of European integration.888 Neither were these associations all 
in the past, as the CEIP continued to work for the European idea in the United States. The frequently 
quoted popularity of Clarence Streit’s proposal for an Atlantic union in the early years of the war was 
helped by the fact that the CEIP gave Union Now wide distribution through a special grant.889 Through 
Butler’s intervention and a modest subsidy Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi was able to relocate his 
Pan-European project to the Graduate school of New York University,890 The hope that the CEIP 
attached to a research project on commercial integration was that its results would prove a “useful 
tool to those who advocate customs unions for the post-war world.”891 
 
Finally, in addition to these diverse American actors, there were the perspectives of the European 
émigrés they cooperated with. Having agreed to participate in the customs union project, in June 1943 
the Division of International Law hired Austrian exile Leopold Kohr and tasked him with assembling 
comprehensive documentation on historical instances of customs unions that would prepare the 
ground for later analysis. Kohr’s employment was testament to the longevity of transatlantic networks 
as the sequence of connections leading to his hiring reached back to Shotwell’s war history project. 
Kohr was part of a circle of friends that included Alfred Vagts and his fellow Austrian exile 
Ranshofen-Wertheimer that had all been connected to the IAP in Hamburg, the secretariat of the 
German war history section.892 Ranshofen-Wertheimer had already joined the Endowment in the 
summer of 1942 to work with Corbett on the League of Nations project and advocated for European 
union through an, admittedly, “painfully slow process of mutual adaptation and progressive 
diminution of customs barriers.”893  
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Kohr’s officemate at 700 Jackson Place was Raphael Lemkin, then in the process of writing what 
would become his seminal work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe which would soon propel the concept 
of “genocide” into public consciousness. Born and raised in the multiethnic Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, Kohr disagreed emphatically with his colleague’s project, holding the introduction of racial 
concepts—even to protect ethnic minorities—a setback for the notion of a liberal international law.894 
In 1941, Kohr had published an impassioned defense of localism—or Kleinstaaterei—in an article 
whose title, “Disunion Now,” was a clear reference to Clarence Streit’s book. The idea that a country 
as homogeneous as the United States could be a model for European Union seemed fanciful to him. 
In the long run, democracy in Europe would only be able to survive in small units and, while he did 
not explicitly call for it, Kohr suggested that existing nations should first be broken up into smaller 
states to then unite them in a loose European federation.895 
 
The complicated setup of the CEIP’s customs union study with its institutional entanglements and 
competing agendas was by no means unusual. While focusing on the official institutions of U.S. post-
war planning suggests a rather orderly, methodical policy process, the reality looked more like a 
network of public and private institutions in which organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment, 
the Rockefeller Foundation or the Brookings Institution created links between transnational expert 
communities and the state. Meanwhile, the CEIP’s Division of Intercourse and Education focused on 
building public support. As one participant in the foundation’s League of Nation’s project noted, it 
was one thing for experts to agree on the legal and economic framework of a future world order. 
Implementing their recommendations, however, depended on the political will of “statesmen, 
diplomatists, parliaments and the peoples themselves” and on their willingness to “give up certain 
prerogatives of sovereignty.”896 After twenty years of disappointment at the hands of the U.S. Senate, 
the CEIP was acutely aware that it was not enough for elites or even the majority of the population to 
support internationalist policies, but support needed to be country-wide and extend deep into the low-
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“A receptive mood”: Carlo Sforza as Visiting Carnegie Professor  
Applying the lessons learned while promoting the World Court and the Chatham House resolutions 
the core of the Division of Intercourse and Education’s wartime work was a decentralized campaign 
for internationalist post-war policies that favored local educational activity.897 The organizational 
framework for this campaign was established within weeks of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Concerned 
about the possibility that the United States would again renounce participation in a future international 
organization, the leaders of the East Coast’s preeminent foreign policy groups spent the winter of 
1941/42 discussing means of spreading their internationalist message “beyond cloistered groups of 
‘intellectuals’.”898 The debate over how to anchor internationalist principles was closely tied to an 
attempt to conceal the source of the funding behind the campaign. While the desirability of activism 
at the local level was widely shared, it was equally clear that if such activity came under the auspices 
of any of the established East Coast foreign policy groups, it would create a “stigma in the minds of 
many.”899  
 
In March 1942, Clyde Eagleton of CSOP urged the Carnegie Endowment to take the lead in 
coordinating a country-wide campaign on behalf of all internationalist organizations. The American 
people were “in a receptive mood,” Eagleton argued, and with an expenditure of about fifty thousand 
dollars the CEIP could sponsor “eight or ten regional service centers” whose facilities would be 
available to all interested parties.900 The CEIP acted on this suggestion and over the course of the next 
year, so-called “International Relations Centers” were established in eight cities, covering the country 
from Dallas to Minneapolis and San Francisco to Chapel Hill. In keeping with the low profile 
approach, the CEIP worked through existing institutions, such as the World Study Council in Detroit 
and some of the payments were channeled through CSOP, further obscuring the provenance of the 
money.901 The strategy was so successful that it attracted remarkable little attention from the CEIP’s 
usual critics. An investigation by the Chicago Daily Tribune into the “new propaganda network” 
darkly hinted at an “eastern-financed drive to submerge the American Union and Constitution in a 
world government” but was heavy on conspiratorial-sounding conjecture and low on specifics.902 
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As with the more centralized research work conducted in Washington, European émigrés were an 
integral part of this educational campaign, particularly as part of the CEIP’s Visiting Carnegie 
Professor of International Relations program (VCP). Throughout the war the foundation sent exile 
scholars and politicians such as Austrian jurist Hersh Lauterpacht, the former director of economic 
studies at the Bank of France Robert Lacour-Gayet and Carlo Sforza to mostly mid-sized American 
colleges for two- to four-week lecture programs on international affairs (fig. 7a).903 Often branching 
out into surrounding areas for additional talks at local Rotary Clubs, townhall meetings, or related 
CEIP-organized conferences, the Visiting Carnegie Professors directly reached tens of thousands of 
Americans. As Sforza’s case illustrates, motivations and expectations behind such sponsorship were 
rarely straight-forward but usually consisted of a combination of personal and political calculations. 
 
 
Fig 6a – Carlo Sforza leads a discussion group during his term as Visiting Carnegie Professor of 
International Relations at Union College, Schenectady, NY, October/November 1940. (CEIP Year 
Book 1941, 44 post) 
 
 
On a basic level, Sforza’s wartime employment reflected the strong personal bonds that had grown 
over decades of familiarity. A founding member of the Comité d’Administration, Sforza had long 
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been the most recognizable face of the CEIP’s European operations and, along with Nicolas Politis, 
its most influential collaborator. Butler heaped praise on the Italian—“a most effective coadjutor of 
ours in various parts of our fields of work”; “speak[s] with full authority”; “exceedingly judicious”—
and Earle Babcock appreciated the Count’s “trenchant, sometimes ironical and usually witty 
comments” at the Comité’s meetings.904 In exile in Paris and then Brussels, Sforza was in close touch 
with Europe’s foreign policy elites and Italian opposition figures. Subsequently to joining the Comité 
in 1925, he also established an increasing presence in the United States. With multiple appointments 
as Visiting Carnegie Professor at U.S. universities and several appearances at the Williamstown 
Institute of Politics, the transatlantic steamer passage became an almost annual ritual for Sforza, 
building up contacts among the East Coast’s foreign policy establishment in the process.905 When in 
June 1940 Sforza had to flee the Continent, the CEIP was quick to lend assistance by passing an 
“emergency expenditure” to pay for the relocation of the Count and his family to the United States.906 
 
For Sforza, his choice to come to the United States was above all a political calculation.  His 
association with the CEIP gave him a base of operations, a steady income and political connections 
that could further his ambitions to become Italy’s post-war leader-in-waiting. Sforza’s CEIP salary, 
which amounted to about five thousand dollars per year—roughly equivalent to the pay of a senior 
clerk—became his main source of income throughout his American exile, making him in practice, if 
not in name, an employee of the Carnegie Endowment. From the beginning, President Butler 
instructed the CEIP’s staff to consider the Italian “as on our pay-roll.”907 This financial security 
afforded the Italian free time for his political activities, which mainly consisted of building a base of 
political support in the United States through the Italian-American Mazzini Society, and—
significantly—insulated him from political pressure, be it from Washington or from Rome. Especially 
the latter was a valid concern in light of constant surveillance by Italian authorities, who for years 
had attempted to drive a wedge between the prominent émigré and the CEIP. In the past, Italian agents 
had even attempted to prevent Sforza’s VCP appointments by urging college officials to close their 
doors to the Count. A Tulane University official rebuffed such a request by pointing out that, given 
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the Endowment’s reputation and the power of its president, it was “hardly possible to deny the 
offer.”908 
 
Sforza’s ambitions were not at all contrary to the foundation’s interests. Just as the Division of 
International Law’s effort to preserve and make available the expertise of European academia and of 
the League Secretariat offered shelter for international bureaucrats, the VCP program aimed not only 
at disseminating knowledge but at positioning European candidates for future positions of leadership 
in a post-war world. Throughout the interwar years the CEIP had been well aware of Sforza’s 
ambitions to one day play a significant political role in a post-Mussolini Italy. Now, it was Nicholas 
Murray Butler who within days of Sforza’s arrival in the United States introduced the Italian politician 
to President Roosevelt.909 When after Pearl Harbor the search for a credible Italian exile leader who 
could rally the Italian-American community and inspire opposition within Italy itself became a 
pressing issue for the U.S. government, Sforza, a household name in the American foreign policy 
establishment after fifteen years of association with the CEIP, ran initially practically unopposed. His 
was “the first name that comes to the lips of practically everyone consulted” noted a State Department 
analysis in January 1942.910 To Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle it was “perfectly plain that 
the only leader available is Carlo Sforza.”911 On 24 February, Sumner Welles, in a remarkably strong 
endorsement, urged President Roosevelt to throw the weight of the U.S. government behind Sforza, 
adding that “practically everyone” who had been consulted agreed with the choice: “no other leader 
is in sight.”912  
 
But Sforza’s elevation to Italy’s leader-in-waiting was frustrated when the enthusiasm of the 
bureaucracy collided with broader policy considerations. President Roosevelt was skeptical of 
publicly or even covertly backing a candidate at such an early stage. Furthermore, the British 
government had concluded that Sforza’s plans for a republican Italy would be far less amenable to 
British interests in the Mediterranean than a weakened monarchist state and lobbied in Washington 
to withhold official recognition from a man who, they argued, was “completely unrepresentative of 
modern Italy.”913 The monarchist card was also favored by some American strategists, notably 
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Coordinator of Information William J. Donovan, who hoped that a Vatican-supported royalist coup 
against Mussolini could remove Italy from the battlefield.914 The lack of official backing was 
disappointing to Sforza but what was more serious in the eyes of many inside the administration was 
that the U.S. government also stopped its covert subsidy to the Mazzini Society, which had helped 
keep the leaders of the democratic Italian-American community afloat. Among those incensed was 
OSS officer Allen Dulles, who worried that the decision would create a vacuum that could “leave the 
Italian field more open to subversive Fascist and Communist elements,” adding: “I can quite 
understand that this disturbs our friend Count Sforza.”915  
 
This was where the new connections between NGOs and the government proved efficacious. Support 
for Sforza ran particularly high in the OSS’s Foreign Nationalities Branch but multiple appeals by the 
FNB—by now employing Malcolm Davis—to Donovan to rethink his decision against the Mazzini 
Society were unsuccessful. Yet, while Malcolm Davis and his colleagues were bound by high-level 
policy decisions as OSS officers, no such constraints existed for Malcolm Davis the CEIP director. 
“His high position in the Carnegie Endowment enables him to do numerous things which contribute 
to the success of our work,” Davis’s supervisor D.C. Poole noted around this time.916 And indeed, 
once cut loose by the U.S. government the Mazzini Society increasingly relied on informal CEIP 
support for its financial survival. Besides Sforza, the Society’s secretary Alberto Tarchiani, whom 
Sforza had once introduced to Butler as his prospective “Permanente [sic] Under-Secretary of State” 
if he were ever to return to the Italian Foreign Ministry, also received a modest stipend as a special 
correspondent for Italy that was only tenuously justified by the actual services he rendered to the 
Endowment.917 While Sforza had clearly lost his fight for official recognition by the Roosevelt 
administration, his deep contacts among East Coast foreign policy elites ensured that his political 
project remained unharmed. 
 
Sforza’s actual work as VCP was carefully integrated into the CEIP’s overall strategy of exerting 
pressure through America’s political system by changing the discourse at the local level. Eschewing 
the East Coast’s Ivy League institutions with their busy academic and social life, the CEIP considered 
mid-sized universities where a man of Sforza’s stature would command the full attention of the 
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community “worth ten Universities of Chicago or Columbia Universities.”918 It was also no accident 
that many of the locations selected to receive special attention from Sforza—Western Reserve 
University and Kenyon College (Ohio), the University of Madison (Wisconsin) and Emory University 
(Georgia)—mapped onto the electoral fault lines of the U.S. Senate’s debate on foreign relations. 
Michigan and Ohio were home to two of the most prominent representatives of the chamber’s anti-
internationalist wing, Senators Robert M. La Follette, Jr., and Robert A. Taft, while Georgia’s 
powerful Democratic Senator Walter F. George was at the time of the appointment chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee and a crucial swing vote on international issues.919 The CEIP’s 
eagerness to send their lecturers out into the American heartland was a constant source of friction as 
it conflicted with Sforza’s more pressing concerns with émigré politics. Conveniently, the Count had 
detected spots around Washington, DC, and New York “where isolationism and provincialism are just 
as thick as in Alabama” that were within easy traveling distance to Mazzini Society rallies and 
meetings at the State Department.920 Thus, the itineraries of European VCPs were usually split 
between easily accessible locations on the East Coast and politically more salient destinations, 
especially Ohio, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Georgia.921 
 
By sending the liberal aristocrat Sforza to regions of the United States that received much of their 
information on international affairs from the Hearst press and the Chicago Tribune, the Endowment 
hoped to counter the cliché of European diplomats as “men of sinister purpose and abnormal capacity” 
and thus remove a potential obstacle to future transatlantic cooperation.922 In the dozens of lectures, 
seminars, round table discussions and newspaper interviews Sforza conducted in- and off-campus his 
engaging personality proved a perfect fit for the CEIP’s strategy of subtle activism. Faced with the 
inevitable question about his links to the famous rulers of Renaissance Milan Sforza was fond of 
gently turning the tables on the questioner by chuckling at Americans’ obsession with European 
royalty.923 Since he was well aware that his students and listeners were “afraid of ‘propaganda’” the 
former diplomat was careful to avoid any appearance of internationalist proselytizing, of a foreigner 
meddling in American political discussions. His curriculum relied heavily on personal anecdotes to 
bring to life European diplomatic history of the past decades and it was usually only in his final lecture 
on “America, her interests and her duties in relation with [the] world of today and tomorrow,” that he 
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impressed upon his listeners that there was “no more place of isolation in a world, all the parts of 
which become more and more interdependent.”924 A grudgingly admiring journalist who had 
witnessed Sforza lecture in Oklahoma in the 1930s once characterized the politician, schooled in the 
arts of persuasion, as “as tricky as a pet mule in a circus, and as slippery as a Mississippi eel. You aim 
your forensic howitzer at him and find it was loaded with boomerangs.”925 
 
The combination of a changed geopolitical constellation and a Carnegie-financed public relations 
campaign did not fail to make an impression. Future U.S. President Harry S. Truman got a first-hand 
view of the changed intellectual landscape in the United States when in August 1943 he traversed the 
Midwest on behalf of the Western Policy Committee (WPC), a local cut-out for the CEIP that traced 
its roots back to the campaign for the Chatham House Resolutions of 1935. Over the course of three 
weeks, Truman and his Republican colleague Walter H. Judd visited nineteen cities in four states, 
reaching over 10,000 Midwesterners with their message of global interdependence.926 “When the 
Japanese moved into Manchuria in 1931 it was as if Hirohito’s soldiers marched right down the main 
street of Hastings,” Judd proclaimed in Nebraska. “When Hitler’s armies marched into the 
Sudetenland […] it was as if they walked in hob-nailed boots over the threshold of every home in 
America.”927 The response was rather different than expected. An accompanying journalist observed 
that the politicians were not “quite prepared for the universal friendliness shown here to the thesis 
they are presenting.” Already a year earlier the WPC’s director had reported to the CEIP’s 
headquarters that “the old Borah isolationism” was practically extinct in Idaho.928 The changed 
atmosphere was clearly evident in the Congressional elections of 1944. In Ohio, Robert Taft narrowly 
avoided defeat to a relatively unknown Democratic challenger. In New York, long-time 
internationalist target Hamilton Fish III was voted out of the House of Representatives and in the 
most conspicuous demonstration that times had changed, Senator Gerald Nye lost his Senate race in 
North Dakota. The Carnegie Endowment and its network of affiliated national and local organizations 
had been of active assistance in pushing some of these politicians out of Congress.929  
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From research to policy: The Design Group 
In the summer of 1943, as the CEIP’s educational drive was showing signs of success, the 
foundation’s research activities in support of post-war planning were taking on a greater sense of 
urgency. The war was going well for the Allies. The German advance in the East had been stopped, 
in North Africa and Sicily British and American forces were making inroads and over the course of 
the following years a series of inter-Allied conferences—from Hot Springs to Bretton Woods to San 
Francisco—would create the institutional framework of the post-war world.930 Conducted mostly at 
the technical level, these conversations became the natural focal point for lobbying efforts by those 
who wanted to leave an imprint on the peace settlement. What counted in these discussions were not 
so much the opinions of individual policy makers—the American lead negotiator at Bretton Woods, 
Harry Dexter White, privately favored the Soviet economic model931—but the body of knowledge 
brought to bear on the negotiations as delegations formulated the national interest. As the American 
government prepared its negotiating positions, one of the issues that approached resolution early on 
was the question of the place of regional arrangements in a post-war world. In July 1943, the State 
Department initiated a Special Subcommittee on Problems of European Organization to investigate 
the implications of a European economic union for the interests of the United States. One of the 
participants was Jacob Viner and this, in connection with the fact that both the chief and the assistant 
chief of the Department’s Division of Economic Studies were former students of his, greatly increased 
the potential significance of the CEIP’s customs union study.932 
 
One may have expected an American foundation that intended to promote the cause of European 
economic integration to draw the attention of policy-makers to the example of the United States to 
suggest that unencumbered trade between states could lead to a prosperous, stable and peaceful 
commonwealth.  Instead, the CEIP’s lead researcher Leopold Kohr approached the project from a 
rather different perspective. Perhaps in keeping with his “small is beautiful” credo or to make 
maximum use of his language skills, more than half of the two hundred and fifty treaties and plans 
he collected as historical examples of customs unions documented the experience of the nineteenth 
century Zollverein between the collection of small German states or Austro-Hungarian 
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arrangements.933 This Germanic slant was by no means contrary to the wishes of his financiers, who 
believed that a Central European union could form the nucleus of a broader European federation. As 
may be recalled, many of the foundation’s officers and partners had long believed that the break-up 
of Austria-Hungary had been a mistake. In the course of working on his war history project, James T. 
Shotwell had become intrigued with the concept of Mitteleuropa, plans for a Central European union 
generated in German and Austrian debates over war aims, and now touted this to Viner as “the most 
important effort ever made to create a Central European customs union.”934  
 
The approach of stabilizing the perennial trouble spots of Eastern and Southeastern Europe through 
the enlargement of markets held a certain appeal to representatives of an organization that had long 
sought to encourage regional cooperation among Danubian and Balkan states and that had been 
sympathetic to the proposed Austro-German customs union of 1931. Ideas such as Friedrich 
Naumann’s dictum that the “spirit of large-scale business and of supranational organization has 
reached politics” certainly resonated with the premises on which the CEIP-ICC cooperation had been 
built.935 Mitteleuropa’s abundant illiberal facets received far less attention: deliberately designed as 
an alternative to Western democratic traditions it conceptualized a supposedly organic economic 
integration as a means to establishing German political and cultural hegemony over large parts of 
continental Europe.936 One émigré who strictly opposed such a Central European route to integration 
was Carlo Sforza, who saw Mitteleuropa “in no way” as a path toward European union but as a 
product of scholarly warfare, “inspired by war ideas.”937 Neither did the nostalgia for the grandeur of 
the Habsburg Empire endorsed by some of his fellow exiles appeal to the Italian liberal, for whom 
the future could not be built on the “rotten failures of the past.”938  
 
In the short run, the CEIP’s customs union project was anything but a success. Kohr only finished his 
preliminary work in the summer of 1944 and with Jacob Viner still occupied by multiple consulting 
commitments the anticipated study never materialized in time to make an impact on American 
planning. Furthermore, the renowned economist made no secret that he had little sympathy for the 
course pursued by the foundation and its Austrian researcher, expressing some puzzlement at their 
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apparent fixation with the Zollverein.939 Rather than viewing such historical examples as possible 
blueprints for future arrangements, Viner interpreted them as more sinister enterprises that were 
mainly vehicles for political domination. During the deliberations of the State Department’s Special 
Subcommittee he voiced the concern that, just as the Zollverein example had demonstrated with 
Germany, a future European union would “increase the bargaining power of the area” and thus hurt 
American commercial interests.940 These fears were shared by the full committee, which weighed the 
advantages of a large, prosperous market for American exporters against the potentially disastrous 
consequences should a united Europe pursue a protectionist or even autarkic external commercial 
policy.  “Like the little girl in the nursery rhyme,” the Subcommittee concluded, a European customs 
union could either be “very, very good or horrid” and thus counseled “an attitude of caution and 
reserve” toward such plans.941 
 
While the CEIP’s research evidently failed to sway the needle of American post-war planning on the 
issue of European economic regionalism there were other areas where American experts proved more 
understanding of the views of their European colleagues. This was particularly the case when it came 
to the future of Europe’s colonial possessions. The official position of the U.S. government very much 
followed the anti-imperialist tradition of American foreign policy. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 had 
promised sovereign rights to “all peoples,” a commitment that was affirmed by U.S. Vice President 
Wendell Wilkie in October 1942 when in a widely publicized speech he called for an end to Europe’s 
colonial rule over wide areas of the globe.942 Colonialism had also always posed a thorny problem to 
Europe’s interwar federalists. Framing European integration as incompatible with colonialism would 
have been politically toxic but including overseas possessions in an economic union was equally 
unfeasible. The State Department’s Subcommittee noted that the future of the colonies could well be 
“the chief stumbling-block” to any movement toward European integration.943 
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What European exiles brought to this question was a liberal imperial reform discourse that separated 
colonialism from its formerly economic or nationalist justification into a project of transnational 
identity formation, as the joint development of dependent areas would bring meaning and purpose to 
international institutions.944 Carlo Sforza, while harboring no illusions about the often-touted 
economic rationale for colonies, held continuing European control over these areas important for 
reasons of political culture. Seeking to turn overseas possessions from a liability into an asset, he 
proposed to build on the work of the League’s Mandates Section by expanding it into a joint-venture 
for international development: “In the new frame each of our colonies will cost us much less, our 
economic gains will be much greater, and the discontent of the natives will be eliminated almost 
completely.”945 Sharing in an internationalized colonial project in the face of rising anti-colonial 
sentiment in Africa and Asia could reconstitute European morale, preserve national pride and form a 
bond between European nations as between “two white men meeting in the desert.” For Sforza, 
international colonial administration thus became an integral part of constructing a common European 
identity as well as uniting the continent and America, which lacked “colonial experience” in a 
common purpose.946 Coudenhove-Kalergi, similarly promoted the idea of an “Atlantic Civilization” 
that was distinct from the ”Asiatic branches of mankind”947 and Moritz Julius Bonn envisaged a 
system that would incorporate “politically backwards” peoples “as free members in a co-operative 
empire” with standards for colonial administration set by an international body.948 
 
One American on whom such arguments made a distinct impression was Jacob Viner. In January 
1943 he was handed a letter in which Bonn appealed for help in moving American public opinion 
toward a more sympathetic attitude vis-à-vis the colonial powers. The U.S. armed forces were now 
coming into contact with “articulate semi-educated natives” in Asia and Africa who would persuade 
the American people to support their aspirations for independence by dismantling Europe’s colonial 
empires, Bonn worried. This would be a mistake based on profound misconceptions as to the nature 
                                                 
944 See for example the interwar Eurafrika discourse that posited an indelible link between African development and 
European prosperity, cf. Dirk van Laak, Imperiale Infrastruktur: deutsche Planungen für eine Erschliessung Afrikas 
1880 bis 1960 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004); Thomas Moser, Europäische Integration, Dekolonisation, Eurafrika: 
eine historische Analyse über die Entstehungsbedingungen der eurafrikanischen Gemeinschaft von der 
Weltwirtschaftskrise bis zum Jaunde-Vertrag, 1929–1963 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000). 
945 Carlo Sforza, The Totalitarian War and after: Personal Recollections and Political Considerations (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1942), 69. 
946 Sforza, Europe and Europeans, 236; Sforza, The Totalitarian War and After, 71. 
947 Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe: Autobiography of a Man and a Movement (New York: G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1943), 306–307. 
948 Moritz Julius Bonn, “The New World Order,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 216 
(July 1, 1941): 174; Moritz Julius Bonn, “The Future of Imperialism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 228 (July 1, 1943): 72; according to Patricia Clavin, it is highly likely that Bonn disseminated such 




of the colonial conflict. Hinting at the close link between anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism he 
warned of seeking to export the “American Brand of Democracy.” The solution lay not in immediate 
independence but in the gradual transformation of coercive colonial regimes into benign development 
projects.949 An impressed Viner suggested that Bonn publish the letter in the New York Times, where 
it would “do a lot of good.” As the Council on Foreign Relation’s rapporteur on colonial policy Viner 
also gave these sentiments wider circulation in official circles with a 1944 report on “The American 
interest in the ‘colonial problem.’“ “We must avoid a holier-than-thou or ‘moral leadership’ attitude,” 
the economist argued. The administration should avoid hastily giving in to public sympathies for 
colonized peoples and instead channel these sentiments into “minimum standards of colonial 
administration” and improvements in infrastructure, education and public health. Such an approach 
would not only serve the economic goals of U.S. industry but also “satisfy American humanitarian 
interests.”950  
 
Interpersonal networks were not the only avenue through which established internationalist 
discourses reached decision-makers. A more formal venue grew out of the CEIP’s “International Law 
of the Future” project. Manley Hudson’s group completed its work in December 1943 and the 
resulting two hundred page document was ceremoniously presented to Secretary Hull, Vice President 
Henry A. Wallace and Attorney-General Francis B. Biddle.951 Despite its legalistic name, the 
document was much more than a law treatise. Ranging from abstract principles to concrete proposals 
for a future political, legal and economic global infrastructure, the booklet represented the fruits of 
the CEIP’s entire wartime research and was—in effect—a condensation of over three decades of 
transnational consensus-building. It reiterated many of the core premises of the foundation’s 
economic and legal internationalism (“A complete autarchy is impossible for any country”; “the 
sovereignty of a State is subject to the limitations of international law”) and endorsed a successor 
organization to the League of Nations as well as a continuation of the League’s technical sections.952 
Among the latter was the work of the Mandates Section. While the document noted that the precise 
involvement of the new international organization in colonial affairs would have to be determined in 
light of political circumstances, it endorsed the idea that the international community should embrace 
its responsibility for “protecting dependent peoples against serfdom and exploitation, and of assuring 
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to them an opportunity of developing their indigenous cultures and their self-respect.”  
 
Meanwhile, Hudson, CEIP officers Shotwell, Malcolm Davis and Philip Jessup as well as League 
veterans Arthur Sweetser, Huntington Gilchrist and Raymond Fosdick started to meet informally with 
over a dozen State Department officials, including Leo Pasvolsky, Benjamin V. Cohen and Green H. 
Hackworth, to translate the International Law of the Future results into a concrete proposal for an 
international organization.953 This so-called “Design Group” finished its proposed charter for a 
“General International Organization” in May 1944, about two months before the State Department 
finalized its own draft for the postwar political order.954 The final documents bore striking similarities 
to each other as well as to the eventual outcome of the United Nations Conference at San Francisco 
the following year. The Design Group’s charter already envisioned a division between a Security 
Council and a General Assembly, including the distinction between permanent, veto-powers and 
additional, elected members without a veto.955 Yet, this was less evidence of any direct influence in 
one direction or the other than of the generally blurry lines between official and unofficial planning 
at the expert level. Conferences, publications, personal communication and temporary contracts 
ensured a permanent circulation of ideas between the State Department and institutions such as the 
CEIP, the CFR, the IIS or the Brookings Institution. 
 
In another remarkable instance of converging discourses, CEIP-sponsored ideas that had been 
branded as internationalist propaganda only years earlier now became widely accepted across class 
divides. It may have been unsurprising that the United States Chamber of Commerce’s Committee on 
International Post-War Problems, headed by former CEIP-ICC Joint Committee participant Harper 
Sibley, faithfully reproduced many of the transnational compromises negotiated during the second 
half of the 1930s. More astonishingly, when the American Federation of Labor unveiled its own 
official post-war program during a mass rally at the Hotel Commodore in New York City in May 
1944 the document had largely been ghost-written by James Shotwell.956 The two organizations still 
advocated for different policies but by relying on the same source of expertise their frame of reference 
was virtually identical: a future liberal world order with a return of international markets that would, 
however, be policed by international institutions to prevent exploitative working conditions and the 
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emergence of international cartels. 
 
On the other hand, as the example of the customs union study shows, the ability of non-governmental 
groups to suggest concrete policy solutions was limited—even for an organization as well-connected 
as the CEIP. By the summer of 1943 the type of regional organization favored by many in the 
foundation had practically been ruled out by the administration and consequently the idea played an 
ever smaller role in CEIP-connected publications. The booklet on the future of international law still 
contained a perfunctory mention that the new international organization should not preclude the 
creation of “groups of States on the basis of regional propinquity” but half a year later the Design 
Group’s draft charter made no mention of this.957 Rather than completely abandoning the customs 
union study, however, the project languished in a state of inertia until a changed political situation 
refocused attention. On 17 May 1948, almost four years after Leopold Kohr’s document collection 
had been sent to Chicago, the Carnegie Endowment’s new president Alger Hiss picked up the phone 
to call Jacob Viner in order to impress upon the professor the urgency of finally completing his 
analytical work. Viner agreed wholeheartedly that the book was “timely right now” and that “any 
further delay would be undesirable.”958 The sudden interest in an economics project now in its sixth 
year had much to do with the political activities of another former CEIP collaborator at the time. 
 
 
The union that wasn’t: The Franco-Italian customs negotiations of 1948 
In late spring of 1943 the CEIP prepared another full slate of teaching assignments for their VCP 
Carlo Sforza, alas, when the next academic year started, Skidmore and Williams College did not get 
the opportunity to host the Italian. As soon as Allied forces had gained a foothold in Northern Africa, 
the Count had attempted to travel to Libya to create a “public focus of Italian resistance in an Italian 
territory” but with Churchill still favoring a monarchist solution for Italy the British blocked the return 
of the major representative of Italian republicanism.959 The deadlock was finally broken by 
Roosevelt’s personal intervention and in early September 1943 the State Department informed the 
British government in no uncertain terms that Sforza would be permitted to travel. Sforza’s rocky 
relationship with the British authorities continued to undermine his political standing, leading him to 
decline a number of government positions over the course of the next years. It was not until Prime 
Minister Alcide de Gasperi shook up his cabinet to remove all Socialist ministers that the Count 
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became part of the post-war government. On 2 February 1947, Carlo Sforza became Foreign Minister 
of Italy once again—a quarter century after he had last held the post. 
 
Sforza entered the foreign ministry at a time when questions of European commercial union had 
moved to the forefront of newspaper columns and international conference agendas. Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg had revived the idea behind the Ouchy Convention and formed a tariff 
union. The Marshall Plan and American pressure had furthered the cause of European integration and 
since September 1947 a European Customs Union Study Group was meeting periodically in Geneva 
to discuss the creation of a common market.960 Sforza’s own contribution to this movement and his 
signature foreign policy initiative of the first year of his tenure, a push for a customs union between 
Italy and France, has, however, often been regarded as less a contribution toward the eventual creation 
of a European common market than as a naïve, idealist project based on questionable economics 
whose main objective was to placate American calls for market integration in the course of the 
European Recovery Program.961 On the other hand, Sforza himself traced the idea back to a pivotal 
meeting between himself and Charles de Gaulle in Algiers in 1943 at which the two men hashed out 
the outlines of an economic union between the two countries.962 In fact, neither of these two narratives 
accurately reflects the genesis of the foreign minister’s initiative, which had originally taken shape in 
a rather different context.   
 
While Sforza had campaigned to change the minds of American voters during the war, America had 
also left an imprint on his own views on the policies needed to restore European stability. The most 
tangible impact of the Carnegie Endowment’s work on Sforza was his growing conviction that any 
movement toward a federated Europe would have to start with economic integration and then proceed 
toward political union. Sforza usually traced the need for closer economic cooperation to his readings 
of Italian national hero Giuseppe Mazzini, who believed that growing economic interdependence 
would become a pacifying force in international relations. Yet, it was only during the 1930s and in 
the course of Sforza’s close cooperation with the CEIP that he began to stress the necessity of 
European economic integration.963 In his lectures and wartime publications, Sforza chastised the 
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Fascist illusion of “autarchy” and asserted that “a more-or-less federated Europe” would soon prove 
its superior ability to address the economic interests of Italians.964 To Sforza, the logical starting point 
for such a union were the “two Latin sisters,” France and Italy. When these two countries stood 
together they could be a positive force in international affairs, he told the Cleveland Plain Dealer in 
November 1941.”965 By 1943, his ideas had taken on a more specific form. Italy and France should 
act as “pioneers of humanity” by demonstrating the feasibility of the integration of two nation states 
in an “economic alliance or agreement.” This, Sforza thought, would not only command worldwide 
respect but blaze a trail for other nations to follow.966 By the end of his lecture activities for the CEIP, 
the suggestion for a Franco-Italian customs union had become a fixed part of his program. 
 
Once in office, the seventy-five-year-old set out to put these ideas into practice. A few months after 
he took the oath of office, Sforza used the first meeting of the Committee for European Economic 
Co-operation (CEEC) in Paris to sound out the French delegation on Franco-Italian economic 
cooperation. He followed up on this initiative with a memorandum to the CEEC in August, urging 
the development of a customs union that encompassed the Marshall Plan area as a prelude to European 
unification.967 While the political advantages of Italy appearing to take the lead as America’s most 
eager European advocate in support of the Marshall Plan were not lost on the Italian government,968 
to the foreign minister these policy choices were as much about finally bringing Italy’s foreign policy 
into alignment with the requirements of new international norms as about short-term political 
advantage. At a meeting of the Italian cabinet on 16 December 1947, a number of ministers, who no 
doubt had one eye on the upcoming election in 1948, expressed serious reservations about a policy 
that was insufficiently assertive of Italy’s sovereignty and could open the government to public 
criticism. Sforza was nothing if not dismissive of such concerns. Nations had become so 
interdependent that it was counterproductive for the country to base its diplomacy on “the old cliché 
of independence,” he lectured his colleagues.969 
 
In fact, as Sforza’s fellow ministers knew and American foreign-policy makers soon discovered, 
resistance to both European integration and the transatlantic alliance was widespread in Italy as liberal 
internationalist policies collided with local political constellations and cultural preferences.970 A main 
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source of opposition was the political left—Communists, socialists and labor unions. The Italian 
Communist party (PCI) participated in a Europe-wide campaign to brand the “Marshallization” of 
Europe as a threat to world peace, claiming that it would lead to a pauperization of the Continent. Yet, 
to a considerable extent criticism across the political spectrum was voiced in cultural and explicitly 
nationalist terms, with the PCI condemning Italian participation in the Marshall Plan as giving in to 
an American capitalist plot to undermine Italy’s national sovereignty and to replace its authentic 
European culture with shallow Hollywood fare.971 Even Italian business leaders were less than 
sanguine about new free trade initiatives. Under Fascism, the blow of government intervention in 
private enterprise had been softened by protectionist policies that afforded ample opportunities for 
rent-seeking. In the resulting low-export Italian economy attitudes toward globalization remained 
conflicted. Angelo Costa, president of the country’s premier employers’ association Confindustria, 
did his best to unify the contradictory views of his constituents when he declared autarchic policies 
“errors” that were “perhaps deadly, perhaps necessary, perhaps inevitable” in times of economic 
hardship.972 In any case, he affirmed, Italians would never shed their culture of home-made food and 
small-scale artisanal manufacturing for a globalized economy based on mass-production.973  
 
That Sforza was aware of these sentiments is evidenced by the unprecedented emphasis the foreign 
minister placed on building public support for his policies. Drawing on his decades of experience in 
campaigning for an “international mind” in Europe and in the United States, Carlo Sforza made public 
outreach a cornerstone of his tenure. In countless interviews, conferences, speeches and publications 
he made the case for sacrificing national sovereignty in return for economic and security benefits. 
Under his management, the foreign ministry’s once staid press office was reorganized into an effective 
public relations bureau, releasing a steady stream of Sforza’s speeches and statements to the press, 
which disseminated his ideas to foreign and domestic audiences.974 The policy prescriptions and their 
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normative justification bore unmistakable hallmarks of the interwar liberal internationalist discourse, 
as was evident in Sforza’s famous programmatic address on European union at Perugia on 18 July 
1948. Sforza deplored the notion of the “absolute sovereignty” of nation states that was the “sole 
cause of all modern wars”; he asserted that European states had become “small in the face of modern 
technology”; and he called for an end to the “foolish customs barriers that only serve to keep down 
the standard of living.”975 
 
To the Italian public, however, the foreign policy debate hardly presented itself as a referendum on 
interwar internationalist schemes but instead at times took the form of an exegesis of the thought of 
Italy’s nineteenth century founding fathers. Sforza’s Perugia address was replete with allusions to the 
leaders and the battles of the Risorgimento. He pointed to Giuseppe Mazzini’s support for a United 
States of Europe and traced it forward to the antifascist philosopher Eugenio Colorni to argue that 
Italian nationalism had always been singularly compatible with internationalist principles: “only in 
Italy did we have a Risorgimento that was both national and universal.”976 On another occasion he 
claimed that the “deeper meaning” of the Risorgimento was for the country “not to isolate itself from 
the great problems of Europe and of the world.”977 This brazen appropriation of the symbols of Italian 
nationalism was countered by Socialist opposition leader Pietro Nenni. Exaggerated fears of isolation 
were precisely the type of “old attitude of timid moderates against whom Mazzini spoke out in his 
time,” the Socialist leader argued. He chastised Sforza for repeatedly daring to invoke Mazzini, 
“heaven knows why […], as the moral authority for his policy.”978 Sforza’s rhetoric demonstrated an 
awareness of the importance of the politics of memory in adapting globalist principles to local 
discourses.  
 
A combination of economic anxiety and fragile national pride in the wake of territorial losses posed 
a serious challenge to the reigning Christian Democrats in the election campaign of 1948, and this 
brought Sforza’s customs union idea back into the picture. The PCI seized on patriotic indignation 
and directly accused Sforza’s foreign policy of failing “to protect Italy’s independence from the 
American imperialists.”979 On the far right, Sforza’s pro-Allied statements during the war were now 
being used against him to support allegations that he had co-conspired to throw the Free Territory of 
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Trieste “into the Balkan hell,” where the monuments “left everywhere by the Italian genius” were 
now being overtaken by Slavs.980 In February 1948 the Soviet government fanned these nationalist 
flames in support of the PCI’s campaign by announcing its support for an Italian trusteeship of 
Somalia.981 The dramatic Soviet offer sprung the Italian government into action, as it sought to 
convince the Western powers that a similarly generous counteroffer was needed to diffuse the issue. 
“Do not give me away,” Sforza pleaded with his British counterpart Ernest Bevin, “personally I would 
sooner prefer a gigantic reconstruction in our South and in Sicily than to spend a penny in Africa. But 
you know too well that certain traditions are a force one cannot ignore.”982 To provide Sforza with a 
foreign policy success French foreign minister Georges Bidault quickly agreed to bring the Franco-
Italian customs union project to a signature, however, Ambassador Pietro Quaroni reminded him that 
Italians did not “live by bread alone.“ The two men concluded that in addition to the economic 
agreement there needed to be a further appeal to Italian national sentiment. While concessions on the 
colonial issue would be difficult in light of Anglo-American opposition, there was a possibility of 
accommodating Italy on Trieste.983  
 
The final, finely honed message was delivered to the Italian people during a carefully orchestrated 
meeting between Sforza and Bidault on 20 March 1948 on occasion of the signing ceremony for a 
governmental agreement on the Franco-Italian customs union. In what was the first visit by an Allied 
foreign minister to Italy since the end of the war, the two men were greeted by cheering crowds as 
they made their way through the heart of Turin. A center of Italian industry, the city had been selected 
by the Italian foreign ministry out of fears that the Piedmont could become a wellspring of opposition 
to European economic integration. A staged public demonstration of support was intended to deny 
this potential advantage to the PCI.984 Again symbolically attaching the idea of economic integration 
to the protagonists of the Risorgimento, the signing ceremony took place in the former study of 
nineteenth century liberal free trader Camillo Benso di Cavour.985 In their statements, both ministers 
stressed the need to move beyond the nationalist economic policies of the past and toward an 
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integrated European economic space. Finally, to the surprise of the attending Communist mayor of 
Turin Celeste Negraville, but agreed upon five days earlier between Sforza and Bidault, the French 
foreign minister unveiled a joint statement by the Western Allies calling for the complete return of 
Trieste to Italian control. Speaking only for his own country Bidault went even further, vowing to 
seek “the greatest possible degree of satisfaction” for Italy’s colonial demands.986  Over the course of 
the following days the Trieste announcement dominated Italian press coverage, serving, as intended, 
to blunt any criticism of the government’s internationalist foreign policy. 
 
In addition to the continuities of ideas, Sforza’s connections built during his American exile may have 
played an additional role in the 1948 election and beyond. The involvement of the recently founded 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Italian campaign was a seminal moment in the development 
of American conceptions of political warfare that would become a key feature of the Cultural Cold 
War. Suitcases of cash started arriving in Italy and the country was inundated with propaganda films 
supporting the Marshal Plan.987 The historical record concerning this time period is still slim, 
however, we do know that many of the CIA-sponsored institutions set up around this time to fight the 
cultural Cold War were closely connected to the main U.S. philanthropies and foundation officers 
often operated in both fields. This was definitely the case with Malcolm Davis. When in 1950, one 
such political warfare group—the National Committee for Free Europe (NCFE)—opened a Free 
Europe University in Exile in Strasbourg to help train leaders for a future liberated Eastern Europe 
they turned to the former Centre Européen director and now evidently CIA officer to help run it.988 
To what extent Carlo Sforza may have continued to cooperate with his old partners in the CEIP and 
OSS in these activities is still unclear, however, it appears noteworthy that an internal NCFE report 
regarding Davis’s “university” referred to Sforza as “our good friend in Italy.”989 
 
The Franco-Italian customs union never materialized. The French government’s participation in the 
negotiations had always been halfhearted as it considered an economic union with the Benelux 
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countries much more desirable.990 Even if it had come to pass, it is unlikely that the union, as 
contemplated, would have been warmly welcomed in Washington. The two governments had 
delegated much of the detailed bargaining to a commission representing both countries’ business 
communities and when this body reported back the result was a document full of protectionist 
safeguards that was far removed from the aspirations of free traders and economic internationalists. 
Even when accepting the premise of market integration, the Italian vision of a globalized economy 
hardly resembled the American one.991 Tangible results in the realm of territorial restitutions were 
similarly meager. Once the 1948 election was decided in favor of the Christian Democrats the issue 
quickly receded into the background of international politics and the United States and Great Britain 
never followed up on their commitment regarding Trieste, which was eventually divided between 
Italy and Yugoslavia. In 1949, the United Nations rejected most of the Italian government’s claims 
regarding its former colonies. The former Italian Somaliland, however, was given as a trust territory 
and held by Italy over the next ten years until Somali independence in 1960. Having secured this 
symbolic gesture, Sforza quickly shifted gears and stressed Italy’s desire to establish mutually 
beneficial trade relations with its former colonial possessions.992 Economic interdependence, not 




Spurned by the renewed interest in European economic integration in the late 1940s the CEIP’s 
customs union study was finally published in April 1950. The launch of The Customs Union Issue 
came a year after Leopold Kohr, frustrated by the repeated delays, had released his own reading of 
the material as Customs Unions: A Tool for Peace. Read side-by-side the two works offer a striking 
example of two academics working on the same data and reaching distinctly different conclusions. 
Kohr had little doubt about the efficacy of his subject matter and expressed dismay at the lack of 
public interest in the promise of commercial alliances for international pacification, speculating that 
due to the idea’s modern genesis in the Zollverein it had been “tainted in the public mind with 
Germanic associations.”993 Viner, meanwhile, offered a nuanced reading of the potential of various 
characteristics of commercial unions for increasing trade and prosperity but, on balance, struck a 
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decidedly negative tone. From a free trade perspective, Viner argued, customs unions would likely do 
more harm than good as they tended to preserve or even raise external tariff barriers while only 
removing internal obstacles. Furthermore, he suggested that in light of the issues of the day the 
instrument of a customs union appeared rather anachronistic. Since the 1930s novel protectionist 
measures such as quotas and export controls had in many instances supplanted traditional tariffs as 
the main obstacles to free trade, making customs unions neither “a practicable nor suitable remedy 
for today’s economic ills.”994 
 
Viner’s emphatic non-endorsement would have likely come as a disappointment to the CEIP officers 
of 1943 and most certainly to Leopold Kohr. By 1950, however, the political conversation had already 
moved well beyond the possibility of a simple European customs union. Within weeks of the 
publication of The Customs Union Issue, Robert Schuman would unveil his plan for a supra-national 
European architecture of which tariff reductions were only one of many aspects. Remarkably, neither 
the repeated delays nor the somewhat restricted scope of the study nor Viner’s pessimistic conclusions 
would do much to undermine the CEIP’s original purpose of offering policy-makers sound scientific 
evidence in support of policies that would help stabilize Europe through regional economic 
cooperation. The foundation succeeded in this goal less by virtue of the specific results of Viner’s 
study than by helping initiate a new field of academic inquiry of which The Customs Union Issue 
became one, if not the, foundational text: economic integration theory.995 As John Oslington points 
out, it was almost inevitable that as the book approached classic status over the course of the following 
decades its historical context and ultimately even its specific conclusions gradually disappeared from 
view. Instead of being remembered as Jacob Viner’s warning to resist the siren calls of advocates of 
customs unions as leading away from the true path of global free trade it today serves as a symbol 
signifying the respectable lineage and legitimacy of economic integration research as a sub-discipline 
of economics.996  
 
The complex genealogy of The Customs Union Issue illustrates how recovering the non-governmental 
and transnational connections of expert networks can highlight continuities to earlier events and 
contexts and thus destabilize established interpretive frameworks. What has usually been viewed as 
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an artifact of the early Cold War, a reaction to the Marshall Plan and America’s larger designs for an 
integrated Europe997 had started as something else entirely: a wartime attempt by an American 
foundation to broaden the perspective of American post-war planners by making available to them 
information on the economic arrangements of the Habsburg Empire and of the German Zollverein; 
an effort to hold up pre-democratic multiethnic or multilateral institutions as a possible point of 
reference for post-war arrangements. Following these connections reveals that far from “applying the 
American principle of federalism” (Hogan)998  to create a European market and imposing a new social 
model America’s post-war planners were studying a variety of historical arrangements, past plans and 
existing institutions, always aware that change is more likely to be resisted when it comes in the form 
of foreign prescriptions.  
 
For the Carnegie Endowment as an institution the post-war years would bring about a perfect storm 
of interrelated crises in mission, leadership and public relations that almost destroyed its reputation. 
The downward spiral began when at the end of 1945 the Board of Trustees finally convinced a 
reluctant, nearly deaf and blind Nicholas Murray Butler to resign the presidency. With the active 
intercession of trustee John Foster Dulles the Board hired the promising, young diplomat Alger Hiss, 
executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference, as Butler’s successor.999 The choice was 
entirely in line with the contemporary trend of America’s major foundations recruiting their officers 
from the state bureaucracy and vice-versa, participating in a revolving door between American 
business, academia and government.1000 As there was no expectation of conflicts between the interests 
of these sectors men like Hiss saw the relationship as mutually beneficial and he expected that his 
work would continue to be “very closely related” to the State Department’s.1001 The new president 
immediately initiated overdue structural and programmatic reforms, abandoning the CEIP’s 
antiquated divisional organization and reorienting its mission toward the United Nations. This 
auspicious start was short-lived, however, as allegations began to circulate that Hiss had been a Soviet 
spy during his time at the State Department. 
 
The Hiss case, which finally led to a perjury conviction in 1950, became one of the most widely-
covered public trials of the post-war years. After initially backing their President, the trustees granted 
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Hiss a leave-of-absence in December 1948. But more damaging than the isolated case was the larger 
political framework of the allegation. On 20 December 1948, Lawrence Duggan, who had succeeded 
his father Stephen as the president of the Institute of International Education, died of an apparent 
suicide after his questionable interactions with Soviet intelligence had come to light.1002 The Institute 
of Pacific Relations, the main point of contact for America’s East Coast internationalists in the West, 
made headlines as an alleged hotbed for Communists during the 1930s.1003 Taken together, these cases 
created a public impression of the major institutions of American interwar internationalism as deeply 
entangled with Communism, ensuring that the issue would haunt the Endowment for years. In the 
1952 presidential election, Democrats played up links between John Foster Dulles, the presumed 
choice for Secretary of State in an Eisenhower administration, and Hiss in an effort to discredit 
Republican foreign policy.1004 In a peculiar coda to the controversy, in 1954 the CEIP, long 
accustomed to defending itself against the charge of being a front for capitalists, was investigated by 
Congress, along with other NGOs, for Communist influences. During his testimony CEIP President 
Joseph E. Johnson could not entirely suppress his sense of bewilderment at the suggestion: “I cannot 
believe that men like Thomas J. Watson […] would have had anything to do with the endowment if 
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The New York Times published Nicholas Murray Butler’s obituary on 8 December 1947. The paper’s 
appraisal of the man who had hovered over American foreign policy debates for almost four decades 
indicated the changing culture of memory regarding early twentieth century internationalism and 
internationalists. While not completely devoid of the usual honorific celebrations of the former CEIP 
president’s achievements, the article conveyed a certain sense of detachment from a man who had 
been born during the American Civil War and lived to see the Nuclear Age: “He passes now on the 
ebbing tide of a former epoch.”1006 Indeed, few had been so representative of the now unfashionable 
ideas that had animated the early Carnegie Endowment and its European sister organization, the 
Conciliation Internationale: visions of a world governend from smoke-filled club houses in which 
benevolent, liberal gentlemen worked to ward off the dangers threatening social tranquility and 
international peace. Such overt paternalism was strikingly at odds with recent global trends toward 
democratic participation—from New Deal America to Europe’s Social and Christian Democratic 
movements. Nor was the unabashed Eurocentrism of men like Butler or the late d’Estournelles de 
Constant helpful in dealing with the challenges of an era of decolonization. In the wake of the Second 
World War, Butler’s CEIP consequently joined many other interwar institutions in becoming 
increasingly associated with a naïve, dated and ineffectual brand of internationalism. 
 
Yet, while the international mindedness of an aspiring transatlantic upper class, celebrated during 
lavish banquets at the Waldorf Astoria and the Plaza Athénée, had contributed little toward the 
maintenance of world peace, a more enduring legacy of the CEIP’s philanthropy lay elsewhere. 
Starting in the mid-1920s, the foundation had invested most of its resources into a field of 
transnational foreign policy expertise in the hopes that informal agreement and technocratic 
consensus could provide international stability at a time of national antagonism and social upheaval. 
Money from private sources—especially from the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations but also 
from some European benefactors—were indispensable to sustaining the web of connections between 
the League of Nations, national governments, universities, think tanks, lobby groups and others 
working for international cooperation that has recently become the focus of much scholarly research. 
Within this larger network the CEIP connected academics and politicians for the purpose of branding 
a “patriotic” variety of internationalism. It fostered a field of international legal expertise as a site for 
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the official and unofficial settlement of competing national claims. In the wake of the breakdown of 
the global market during the Great Depression, it sought to bring economists, businessmen and select 
representatives of organized labor into agreement on the outlines of a new economic regime. 
 
By the end of the 1930s, the Carnegie Endowment’s sprawling network of contacts—built through 
countless exchange programs, conferences, study groups and publication projects—encompassed 
many of those who would go on to shape international politics, academic disciplines and public 
administration until well into the post-war years. They included politicians Carlo Sforza, Paul Van 
Zeeland and Bo Östen Undén; economists Luigi Einaudi, Charles Rist, John Maynard Keynes and 
Per Jacobsson; jurists Hans Kelsen, Hersch Lauterpacht and Manley Hudson. In some cases, former 
grantees were clearly able to harness the social and cultural capital they had gained by working with 
an American foundation to thrive in a post-war climate of transatlantic cooperation. Former Carnegie 
Professor Hajo Holborn went on to train a generation of American Europeanists and eventually 
became the first foreign-born President of the American Historical Association.1007 Meanwhile, Pierre 
Renouvin, who had edited the Centre Européen’s journal L’Esprit International, became one of the 
founding figures of post-war French historiography of international relations with a particular 
emphasis on American diplomatic history.1008 By the late 1940s, the Washington, DC, ambassadors 
of France, Italy and the Netherlands were all former Carnegie Endowment partners.1009  
 
Attempts to locate the CEIP’s legacy in the propagation of an easily identifiable program of liberal 
internationalism and transatlanticism—a specific “Carnegie vision” of international cooperation—
would, however, be problematic. There was no logical trajectory from membership in the liberal 
internationalist expert milieu of the interwar years to support for democracy, transatlantic cooperation 
and economic liberalism. For instance, by the time of the Comite d’Administration’s dissolution in 
1938, three of its members clearly displayed sympathy or even preference for authoritarian solutions: 
Nicolas Politis publicly expressed his admiration for the Salazar regime. Hungarian Pal Teleki was 
giving lectures in front German National Socialists about the need to transcend the “incompetent” 
League of Nations and to reorient societies away from the cult of “individualistic lifestyles.”1010 Erich 
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von Prittwitz und Gaffron, having lost his job as a lobbyist for the Silesian chambers of commerce, 
initially appealed to the CEIP for permanent employment. When that did not materialize, he found a 
new position as assistant to the General Manager of Prussian State Theaters Heinz Tietjen.1011 After 
years of having worked for cultural internationalism, Prittwitz reinvented himself as a guardian of an 
unadulterated German national culture in a position that reported through Tietjen to Herman Goering. 
The technocratic, often paternalist, aspect of liberal internationalism could manifest itself in a variety 
of political projects—not all of them democratic. 
 
Given how large a tent the concept of the international mind propagated by the CEIP was, it is 
especially noteworthy who was excluded from the foundation’s experiment in informal transnational 
governance: the strident republicans of the DLM/BNV and the women’s rights activists of WILPF 
shared the experiences of many other pacifists, socialists and campaigners for the interests of ethnic 
minorities in finding access to Carnegie funding blocked, making it much more difficult for them to 
thrive and be heard by governments and a global public. That those who argued for addressing matters 
of economic, gender and racial inequality often found themselves pushed to the margins of the larger 
internationalist field was not merely a result of the League’s institutional setup or of governmental 
obstruction. It was also the result of funding decisions by private institutions. When in 1936, W.E.B. 
Du Bois appealed to the Carnegie Endowment for assistance with his research on the experiences of 
black soldiers during the First World War, the reply was both polite and resolutely negative. While 
the study certainly had merit from multiple perspectives, he was told, these did not come “directly 
within the purview of this Endowment.”1012 Even against the backdrop of the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia the CEIP did not see much of a connection between the Global Color Line and matters of 
war and peace. 
 
Conversely, as the CEIP’s support for economic liberals throughout the Depression years indicates, 
the political independence of philanthropic foundations could also provide a sanctuary for ideas 
during times of popular or governmental headwinds. The immediate post-war reconstruction of world 
order—an “embedded liberalism” representing a qualified revival of global markets with added 
protections under national social security schemes, all under an American security umbrella1013—did 
not immediately resemble the liberal visions propagated by the Carnegie Endowment and its allies. 
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As Wolfram Kaiser and Martin Conway conclude in their study of postwar planning within exile 
governments, Europe’s political compromises were not produced by experts in London, Washington 
or New York.1014 Yet, at the technical level, many solutions that shaped post-1945 global governance 
mechanisms were based on blueprints developed during the 1920s and 1930s in venues such as the 
League of Nation’s technical sections, the International Studies Conference or, indeed, the CEIP’s 
transnational programs. 
 
Viewed from a longue durée perspective, the Carnegie Endowment’s interwar activism stands out as 
an early attempt to combine financial, cultural and social capital in an effort to set the parameters of 
global debates. Private money was invested in structures intended to better represent the interests of 
transnational coalitions favoring a global order that facilitated international connection, expansion 
and (colonial) development, rather than security, stability and social protection at a national level. It 
was a transnationalization of politics which often aimed specifically at blocking, overturning or 
superceding strategies pursued and decisions made by national governments and democratically 
elected legislatures: American non-membership in the League and in the World Court; Franco-
German antagonism over questions of security and debts; governments’ turn toward national 
economies during the Great Depression. While most of the concrete goals associated with these 
projects failed, the CEIP helped institutionalize a transnational space for coordination and cooperation 
in a world marked by national divisions. 
 
Conspiratorial tales are frequently spun around networking institutions such as those described in this 
thesis, particularly the Bilderberg Group. Yet, as indicated by Paul Van Zeeland’s role in setting up 
these meetings gainst the background of his earlier experience with CEIP initiatives, the core concept 
behind Bilderberg was neither new nor particularly obscure: from the CEIP’s Hague Academy of 
International Law and the Chatham House Conference of the 1920s and 1930s to today’s World 
Economic Forum at Davos and the Munich Security Conference—the idea that informal, frank, 
transnational discussions between experts and policy-makers can help stabilize an interconnected 
world is ultimately grounded in a liberal skepticism of the destabilizing effects of mass psychology 
that first became virulent in the early twentieth century. Even less policy-driven and more diverse 
initiatives such as the Aspen Ideas Festival or the TED conferences ultimately fall back on a similar 
liberal ideal that cultural interchange between functional elites—be they journalists, managers, 
academics or politicians—can improve knowledge and ultimately improve social conditions. Yet, as 
the motto of TED events—“Ideas Worth Spreading” —implies, there is always a process of inclusion 
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and exclusion involved in determining the merit of specific forms of knowledge. 
 
In 1947, seven years after it had been closed at the start of the Second World War, the Centre Européen 
was gradually reopened. Yet, despite the best efforts to adjust the program of the center to the changed 
international situation1015 the Paris office never recovered the same status as a mediating institution 
between Europe and America it had enjoyed during the interwar period. The focus of international 
organization had moved from the Old World to the New and there was no longer a need for the type 
of unofficial American representation on the Continent which the CEIP had provided in earlier years. 
In 1954, the foundation closed its location on Boulevard Saint-Germain and relocated to Geneva, 
which remained a center of UN activity. Abandoned in 1970, the European center was resurrected 
almost forty years later when a branch was opened in Brussels in 2007. From Paris, the capital of a 
major nation state, to the UN to the European Union, the locations of the Endowment’s representation 
in Europe tracked the changing interpretations as to the locus of power and influence in a globalizing 
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